ble of correct moral reasoning or of exhibiting any other indications of a well judging mind, is a fact well known. There have even been idiots, who certainly could present no claims to the character of judging well, that have, nevertheless, been remarkable for memory. Such are, indeed, instances of an extreme kind ;-but there are not wanting many other cases, where strong memories have been found united with feeble judgment. On this fact it may be remarked, as follows.

The connection between a strong memory and a weak judgment, it may be said without any hesitation, is not necessary, but merely accidental; that is, is not the constitution of nature, but in general the result of circumstances. As it is an accidental state of things, and not any thing essential and permanent in our mental structure, we must look for its appropriate cause in erroneous mental discipline.It may well be supposed, that those, who possess strong memories, are not insensible of their excellence in this respect; and the approbation, which they have received in consequence of it, encourages them to treasure up a dry collection of all facts, which will, in any way, bear repetition. Dates, genealogies, local incidents, traditional anecdotes, are all seized, and retained with peculiar avidity. But too much intent upon the mere dates and names of things, such persons fail to inquire into their true nature; they neglect other and more important forms of mental discipline; and thus justly sustain the reputation of possessing a showy rather than discriminating and sound knowledge. In instances of this description, the relations, by which the suggested trains of thought are associated, are the more slight and obvious ones, such as of time, place, &c. But there are some exceptions to this unwise course; individuals may be found, who, with an astonishing ability to recal the most unimportant incidents of daily occurrence, as well as the dry details of historical facts, combine the far more enviable ability of discriminating the true differences of things, of combining means for the attainment of ends, and of rightly estima

ting evidence in its various applications; which are among the characteristics of men of sound judgment.

§. 300. Intentional memory or recollection.

The definition of MEMORY, which has been given, is, that it is the power or susceptibility of the mind, from which arise those conceptions, which are modified by the relation of past time. This definition necessarily resolves memory in good part into association. It is, therefore, to be here observed, that our trains of associated thought are not voluntary; that is, are not directly under the control of the WILL. They come and depart, without it being possible for us to exercise any thing more, than an indirect government over them. (See §. 213.) It follows from these facts, that our remembrances also are not voluntary; or, in other words, it is impossible for us to remember in consequence of merely choosing to remember. To will or to choose to remember any thing implies, that the thing in question is already in the mind; and hence there is not only an impossibility resulting from the nature of the mind, but also an absurdity, in the idea of calling up thought by volition. Our chief power, therefore, in quickening and strengthening the memory, will be found to consist in our skill in applying and modifying the various principles or laws of association. And this brings us to a consideration of what is called INTENTIONAL MEMORY or RECOLLECTION; a subject, which was partly illustrated in the section above referred to.

Whenever we put forth an exercise of intentional memory, or make a formal attempt to remember some circumstance, it is evident, that the event in general, of which the circumstance when recalled will be found to be a part, must have previously been an object of attention. That is, we remember the great outlines of some story, but cannot, in the first instance, give a complete account of it, which we wish to do. We make an effort to recal the circumstances not remembered in two ways. We may, in the first place, form different suppositions, and see, which agrees best with the general outlines; the general features

or outlines of the subject being detained before us, with a considerable degree of permanency, by means of some feeling of, desire or interest. This method of restoring

thoughts is rather an inference of reasoning, than a genuine exercise of memory.

We may in the second place, merely delay upon those thoughts, which we already hold possession of; and revolve them in our minds; until, aided by some principle of association, we are able to lay hold of the particular ideas, for which we were searching. Thus when we endeavour to recite what we had previously committed to memory, but are at a loss for a particular passage; we repeat, a number of times, the concluding words of the preceding sentence. In this way, the sentence, which was forgotten, is very frequently recalled.

§. 301. Instance illustrative of the preceding.

We had occasion, in a former section, to mention the case of an individual, who, in consequence of an attack of apoplexy, forgot all the transactions of the four years immediately preceding. It is further to be observed here, that the same individual recovered by degrees all he had lost; so as after a while to have nearly or quite as full a remembrance of that period, as others. In this instance the power of the principles of association appears to have been at first completely prostrated by the disease, without any prospect of their being again brought into action, except by some assistance afforded them. This assistance, no doubt, was reading and conversation. By reading old newspapers and by conversation, he, from time to time, fell upon ideas, which he had not only been possessed of before, but which had been associated with other ideas, forming originally distinct and condensed trains of thought. And thus whole series were restored. Other series again were recovered by applying the methods of INTENTIONAL RECOLLECTION; that is, by forming suppositions and comparing them with the ideas already recovered, or by continually revolving in mind such trains as were restor

ed, and thus rousing up others. Such, we can hardly doubt to have been, in the main, the process, by which the person, of whom we are speaking, recovered the knowledge he had lost.

These views, in addition to what has now been said, may be illustrated also by what we sometimes observe in old men. Question them as to the events of early life; and at times they will be unable to give any answer whatever. But whenever you mention some prominent incident of their young days, or perhaps some friend, on whom many associations have gathered, it will often be found, that their memory revives, and that they are able to state many things, in respect to which they were previously

silent.

§. 302. Marks of a good memory.

The great purpose, to which the faculty of memory is subservient, is, to enable us to retain the knowledge, which we have from our experiences, for future use. The prominent marks of a good memory, therefore, are these two, viz, Tenacity in retaining ideas, and readiness in bringing them forward on necessary occasions.

FIRST; of tenacity or power of retaining ideas.-The impressions, which are made on some minds, are durable. They are like channels worn away in stone, and names engraven in monumental marble, which defy the operation of the ordinary causes of decay, and withstand even the defacing touch of time. But other memories, which at first seemed to grasp as much, are destitute of this power of retention. The inscriptions, made upon them, are like characters written on the sand, which the first breath of wind covers over, and like figures on a bank of snow, which the sun smiles upon, and melts. The inferiority of the latter description of memory to the former must be obvious; so much so as to solicit no comment. A memory, whose power of retaining is greatly diminished, of course loses a great part of its value.

SECOND; of readiness or facility in bringing forward

what is remembered.-Some persons, who cannot be supposed to be deficient in tenacity of remembrance, appear to fail, in a confident and prompt command of what they remember. Some mistake has been committed in the arrangement of their knowledge; there has been some defect. in the mental discipline; or for some other cause, whatever it may be, they often discover perplexity, and remember, as if they remembered not. Their knowledge, although they have it in possession, does not come promptly forth at their bidding, like the soldiers of the believing Centurion, who said to one, Go, and he goeth, and to another, Come, and he cometh. It is the opposite; calls without answers, requistions without obedience.

§. 303. Directions or rules for the improvement of the memory.

For the purpose of securing the most efficient action of this inestimable faculty, and particularly that tenacity and readiness, which have been spoken of, the following directions may be found worthy of attention.

(I)-Never be satisfied with a partial or half acquaintance with things.There is no less a tendency to intellectual, than to bodily inactivity; students, in order to avoid intellectual toil, are too much inclined to pass on in a hurried and careless manner. This is injurious to the memory. "Nothing (says Dugald Stewart,) has such a tendency to weaken, not only the powers of invention, but the intellectual powers in general, as a habit of extensive and various reading without reflection." Always make it a rule fully to understand what is gone over. Those, who are determined to grapple with the subject in hand, whatever may be its nature, and to become master of it, soon feel a great interest; truths, which were at first obscure become clear and familiar. The consequence of this increased clearness and interest is an increase of attention; and the natural result of this is, that the truths are very strongly fixed in the memory. A perpetual vacillation between the honours and toils of science is a species of "halting between two opinions," that is not less injurious in learning, than in religion.