lation of possession is embodied also in the Genitive case of the Greeks, Latins, Germans, and whatever other languages express relations in the same way; in the construct state of nouns in the Hebrew and the other cognate dialects; and in the preposition or, which is the substitute for the genitive termination in English, and the articles DE, du, DE'L, and DE LA in French.

The verbs TO BE in English, ESSE in Latin,ETRE in French, (and the same may undoubtly be said of the corresponding verb of existence in all languages,) are often employed to express the relation of possession or belonging to. To say that the rose is red or the orange yellow is as much as to say, that the qualities of yellowness and redness are the possession of, or belong to the rose and orange, But it will be observed, that the relation is not indicated by the name of the subject, nor by the epithet expressive of its quality, but by the verb, which connects the subject and predicate. And similar remarks will apply to many other verbs.

This class of relations is involved in many complex terms, which imply definite qualities and affections of mind, as friend, enemy, lover, hater, adorer, worshipper. These terms not only indicate certain individuals, to whom they are applied, but assert the existence of certain mental affections as their characteristics, and as belonging to them.

§. 287. (VIII.) Of relations of cause and effect.

There are relations also of Cause and Effect. We will not delay here to explain the origin of the notions of cause and effect any further than to say, that the notion of cause, as it first exists in the mind, includes nothing more than invariable antecedence. When the antecedence to the event, or the sequence of whatever kind, is our own voli tion, we have the new idea of power. The idea of invariable antecedence, therefore, which of course supposes some sequence, when it was combined with that of power, constitutes the full notion of cause. When the sequence is found invariably to follow, and its existence cannot be ascribed to any thing else, it is called the EFFECT.

Cause and effect, therefore, have certainly a relation to each other; it is thus that they exist in the view of the mind and in the nature of things, however true it may be, that men are unable to trace any physical connection between them. We cannot conceive of a cause, if we exclude from the list of our ideas the correlative notion of effect, nor, on the other hand, do we call any thing an effect without a reference to some antecedent. These two notions, therefore, involve or imply the existence of each other; that is, are relative.

If, in our notice of outward objects, we examine particular instances of cause and effect, we shall discover grounds of the correctness of this view. No one is ignorant that men usually give the name of events, of occurrences, or facts, to those things, which from time to time fall under their notice, when they are considered in themselves. They are the mere facts, the mere events, and nothing more. But when in the course of their further experience, such events are found to have certain invariable forerunners, they cease to apply these terms, and call them, in reference to their antecedents, EFFECTS. And in like manner the antecedents are called CAUSES, not in themselves considered, but in reference to what invariably comes after. In this explanation it is obviously unnecessary, independently of what has already been said on the subject, to take into consideration what we understand by Power, which we know and feel to be scattered through the universe; showing itself not only in the movements and efforts of men, but in every blooming flower, and twinkling star, and in all the works of nature, without which there can be neither cause nor effect, neither antecedence nor sequence, neither strength of harmony nor stability of action.

§. 283. Instances of complex terms involving the relation of cause and effect.

The simple relative feeling of cause and effect can of course only exist in such cases of cause and effect as come within the knowledge and cognizance of the mind.

This simple feeling, like most other simple states of mind, has but one name, (viz. that of cause and effect,) although arising on innumerable occasions. The relation, however, is embodied in a multitude of names which are expressive of complex objects, such as printer, sculptor, warrior, poet, manufacturer, painter, &c.

This may be thus illustrated. When we look at any interesting piece of statuary, the sight of it naturally suggests its author. But when our mind is thus directed from the statue to the sculptor, it is evident that we do not think of him as we do of a thousand others, but we combine with the conception of the individual a reference to what he has done. We unite with the mere complex notion of man that of cause, and this combination evidently alters its character, making it relative instead of absolute.

In like manner when we look at a fine portrait or historical painting, we are naturally reminded of the artist, whose ingenuity has been displayed in its proportions and colouring. But the word painter,which we apply to him, expresses not merely the man, but comprises the additional notion of the relation of cause, which he holds to the interesting picture before us.

§. 289. Connection of relative suggestion or judgment with

reasoning.

It may be profitable to notice here the connection, which relative suggestion has with reasoning in general. Feelings of relation, (or elementary judgments, as they may perhaps properly be called,) are, in some respects, to a train of reasoning, what parts are to the whole. But they evidently do not of themselves include all the parts in a train of reasoning, and are distinguished by this peculiarity, that their office, in a great measure, is to connect together other subordinate parts in the train. In the combinations of numbers, and in the various applications of demonstrative reasoning, the relations of PROPORTION and the relations of IDENTITY and DIVERSITY, (otherwise called of AGREEMENT and DISAGREEMENT,) find a conspicuous place. Moral

reasoning embraces all kinds of relations, those of degree, time, place, fitness and unfitness, possession, and cause and effect, as well of agreement and disagreement, and of proportion. Relative feelings, sometimes of one kind and sometimes of another, continually unfold themselves, as the mind advances in an argument.

Although in reasoning there are elements besides feelings of relation, it is evident that it cannot advance independently of their aid. Facts may be accumulated, having close and decisive relations to the points to be proved, but they can never be so bound together as to result in any conclusion, without a perception or feeling of those relations. So that in some respects, the senses, consciousness, original suggestion, memory, testimony, &c, may be regarded as the handmaids, of relative suggestion; the former furnishing the facts, and the latter rendering them available.

CHAPTER FIFTH.

MEMORY.

290. Internal knowledge not limited in its origin to one source or one power.

HOWEVER it may be regarded as a trite remark, that the memory has an intimate connection with the origin of knowledge, it probably is an indisputable one; although some may see reason for annexing the qualification, that it is less directly a source of ideas in itself, than in its various connections with other mental susceptibilities. We cannot form abstract notions, independently of the aid of the memory; we can neither exercise the power of reasoning nor of imagination without it; it may even be considered as implied in, or at least essential to the notion of personal identity. And how is it possible, therefore, not to regard it as, either directly or indirectly, one of the sources of internal knowledge?-The ways, in which knowledge is let into the mind, are more numerous, than would probably be supposed on a slight or cursory inspection; and it befits us, therefore, to be cautious of limiting its growth and expansion to one cause, to any fixed and exclusive mode of action, and to any single combination of circumstances. Such a limitation would seem to imply a disregard of the general experience on the subject, and a forgetfulness also, that the human soul is the result of divine workmanship, that its existence is beyond the direct cognizance of the senses, that it sustains a multitude of re