back from it.Again, place a person on the battlements of a high tower; his reason tells him he is in no danger; he knows he is in none. But after all he is unable to look down from the battlements without fear; his conceptions are so exceedingly vivid as to induce a momentary belief of danger in opposition to all his reasonings. (3) When we are in pain from having struck our foot against a stone, or when pain is suddenly caused in us by any other inanimate object, we are apt to vent a momentary rage upon it. That is to say, our belief is so affected for an instant, that we ascribe to it an accountable existence, and would punish it accordingly. It was an impulse of human nature, (though doubtless a singular exhibition of it,) when Xerxes, falling into a transport of rage with the Hellespont for having broken up and washed away his bridge, ordered i: to be beaten with three hundred stripes. It is on the principle of our vivid conceptions being attended with telief, that poets so often ascribe life, and agency, and intention to the rains and winds, to storms, and thunder, and Igatning. How natural are the expressions of King Lear, overwhelmed with the ingratitude of his daughters, and standing with his old head bared to the pelting tempest! "Nor rain, wind, thunder, ire are my daughters, I never gave you kingdoms, called you children." (4) There are persons, who are entirely convinced of the folly of the popular beliefof ghosts and other nightly apparitions, but who cannot be persuaded to sleep in a room alone, nor go alone into room in the dark. Whenever they happen out at night, they are constantly looking on every side; their quickened conceptions behold images, which never had any existence except in their own minds, and they are the subjects of continual disquiet and even terror. "It was my misfortune, (says Dr.Priestly,) to have the idea of darkness, and the ideas of invisible malignant spirits and apparitions very closely connected in my infancy; and to this day, notwithstanding I believe nothing of those invisible powers, and consequently of their connection with darkness, or any thing else, I cannot be perfectly easy in every kind of situation in the dark, though I am sensible I gain ground upon this prejudice continu ally." In all such cases we see the influence of the prejudices of the nursery. Persons, who are thus afflicted, were taught in early childhood to form conceptions of ghosts, hobgoblins, and unearthly spirits; and the habit still continues. It is true, when they listen to their reasonings and philosophy, they may well say that they do not believe in such things. But the effect of their philosophy is merely to check their belief; not in one case in a thousand is the belief entirely overcome. Every little while, in all solitary places, and especially in the dark, it returns and when banished returns again; otherwise we cannot give an explanation of the conduct of these persons. §. 202. Conceptions which are joined with perceptions. The belief in our mere conceptions is the more evident and striking, whenever they are at any time joined with our perceptions.-A person walking in a field, (to take a familiar instance and which every one will understand,) in a thick foggy morning, perceives something, no matter what it is; but he believes t to be a man, and does not doubt it. In other words, le truly perceives some object, and, in additon to that percestion, has a mental conception of a man, attended with beef. When he has advanced a a few feet further, all at once he perceives, that what he conceived to be a man is merely a stump with a few large stones piled on its top. He perceived at first, as plainly or but little short of it, tha: it was a stump, as in a moment afterwards; there were the whole time very nearly the same visible form and the same dimensions in his eye. But whatever he had in his eye, he certainly had in his mind the conception of a man, which overruled and annulled the natural effects of the visual perception; the concep tion being associated with a present visible object acquired peculiar strength and permanency, so much so that he truly and firmly believed, that a human being was before him. But the conception has departed; the present object of perception has taken its place, and it is now impossible for him to conjure up the phantom, the reality of which he but just now had no doubt of. In his Voyage of Discovery to the Arctic Regions, Capt. Ross mentions an incident, illustrative of the power and fruitfulness of our conceptions, when upheld by the actual presence of objects. It will be recollected, that the immense masses of ice, which are found floating in the polar seas, often display a variety of the most brilliant hues. Speaking of one of these ice-bergs as they are called, which he early fell in with, and which was about forty feet high and a thousand feet long, "imagination, he says, painted it in many grotesque figures; at one time it looked something like a white lion and horse rampant, which the quick fancy of sailors, in their harmless fondness for omens, naturally enough shaped into the lion and unicorn of the king's arms, and they were delighted accordingly with the good luck it seemed to augur." But it is unnecessary to resort to books for illustrations of this topic. Multitudes of persons have a conceptive facility of creations, which is often troublesome and perplexing; especially in uncommon situations, and in the night. And in all cases this tendency is greatly strengthened, whenever it can lay hold of objects, the outlines of which it can pervert to its own purposes. Many a person has waked up in the night and has firmly believed, that he saw a form clothed in white, standing in an erect position at some part of the room, but in a moment after the imaginary visitant has vanished, and there is nothing left but the reflection of the moonbeams on the wall. In all cases of this kind, where the conceptions are upheld, as it were, by present objects of perception, and receive a sort of permanency from thein, nothing is better known, than that we often exercise a strong and unhesitating belief. These instances, therefore, can properly be considered as illustrating and confirming the views in the preceding section. §. 203. Of our conceptions at tragical representations. · These observations suggest an explanation, at least in part, of the effects, which are produced on the mind by exhibitions of fictitious distress. In the representation of tragedies, it must be admitted, that there is a general conviction of the whole being but a fiction. But, although persons enter the theatre with this general conviction, it does not always remain with them the whole time. At certain passages in the poet peculiarly interesting, and at certain exhibitions of powerful and well-timed effort in the actor, this general impression, that all is a fiction, fails. The feelings of the spectator may be said to rush into the scenes; he mingles in the events; carried away and lost, he for a moment believes all to be real, and the tears gush at the catastrophe which he witnesses. The explanation, therefore, of the emotions felt at the exhibition of a trag edy, such as indignation, pity, and abhorrence, is, that at certain parts of the exhibition we have a momentary belief in the reality of the events, which are represented. And after the illustrations which have been given, such a belief cannot be cosidered impossible.The same explanation will apply to the emotions, which follow our reading of tragedies when alone, or any other natural and affecting descriptions. In the world of conceptions, which the genius of the writer conjures up, we are transported out of the world of real existence, and for a while fully believe in the reality of what is only an incantation. §. 204 Application of these principles to diversities in the mental character of individuals. It is a remark sometimes made, that the sanguine are apt to believe and assert what they hope; and the timorous what they fear. This remark implies, and is founded in part on what every one knows, that there are diversities in the mental character of different individuals. Some are constitutionally fearful; every obstacle assumes an undue importance, and every terror is magnified. Others are confident, fearless, ardent. Both of these classes of persons are known to commit frequent mistakes in judging of those things, which are future, and which have any connection with their respective mental characteristics. -As The remarks, which were made in the three last sections, will help us to an explanation in this thing.to what is called BELIEF, it is presumed no one can be ignorant of it, although it would be futile to attempt to explain it by words. It is, however, important to remark, that belief is regulated and controlled, not by direct volition, but by the nature of the circumstances, which are placed before the mind. But it has been already sufficiently shown, that belief is in a measure under the control of our conceptions, when they are very vivid. It is also undoubtedly true, that vividness of conceptions is always attended with a strong feeling of pleasure, or of desire, or of some other kind. But it is implied in the mental characters of the persons, on whom we are remarking, that their feelings are strong, though opposite; in the one case, confident and ardent; in the other, dejected and timid. Hence their conceptions will be strong. To the one, all difficulties and dangers will be magnified; to the other, the glory and the fruition of success. And as these distorted conceptions necessarily control more or less their belief, it will follow, that perfect reliance is not to be placed on their opinions, when they are directly connected either with their hopes or their fears. Nor will such distrust always imply an unfavorable opinion of the rectitude of their intentions. (See, in connection with this. subject, Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers, IV.; Stewart's Elements, CH. III.; Brown's Lectures, XLI; Priestley's Examination of Reid, SECT. VIII.; Kaime's Elements of Criticism, CHAP. II., &c.) |