way we become acquainted with the whole outward world, which, we are now prepared to assert explicitly, has an actual and independent existence.

But a new train of thoughts arises here. It may be said that the mere fact of our having ideas of externality, extension, colour, and the like, does not necessarily involve and imply the true and actual existence of those things, which they represent, or of which they are supposed and believed to be the effect. In other words we may possess certain internal affections, and attribute them. to something external and material as their cause; and we may truly and sincerely believe the reality of such a cause, while in point of fact it does not exist; and consequently, our conviction of a truly existing material world may be a self imposition and delusion. On this view of our exclusion from any satisfactory knowledge of a material world, which is not so singular as not to have had some acute advocates, a few remarks are to be offered.

§. 83. Correctness of their testimony in this respect.

The first remark, which we have to make, concerns the mere fact of belief. We have already made the declaration with confidence, that no man, who makes use of the senses at all, can doubt of the reality of external material things. It is no presumption to assert, that the belief of the reality of an external cause of our sensations is universal. This is the common feeling, the common language of all mankind.

Those, who deny the propriety of relying on the evidence of the senses for the existence of the material world, and who deny such existence, should explain this belief. That such a belief exists, cannot be denied; that it is a false belief, an unfounded conviction, ought not to be lightly asserted. It wars too much, as even a slight examination would suffice to show, with the sentiments of man's moral and religious constitution.

It is to be acknowledged with gratitude, that the great mass of mankind fully believe in the existence of

the Deity, a being of perfect truth as well as benevolence. But to create man so that he should be irresistibly led to believe in the existence of a material world, when it did not exist, to create him with high capacities of thought, feeling, and action, and then to surround him with mere illusive and imaginary appearances, does not agree with that notion of God, which we are wont to entertain. Mr. Stewart, in speaking of the metaphysical inquiries of Des Cartes, observes, that his reasonings led him to conclude, that God cannot possibly be supposed to deceive his creatures; and, therefore, that the intimations of our senses and the decisions of our reason are to be trusted to with entire confidence, wherever they afford us clear and distinct ideas of their respective objects.

In the second place, it will undoubtedly be admitted / that the sensations, which have been spoken of, have an existence. This existence is wholly internal; but still the simple fact remains that they exist; our consciousness most decisively teaches us so. But it has been laid down. as a primary truth, a first principle, that there is no beginning or change of existence without a cause. This is an elementary principle, placed as far above all objection and scepticism as any one can be, and eminently preliminary to the full exercise of reasoning.

And where then is the cause of these internal effects ? What man, who denies the existence of the material world, is able to indicate the origin of these results? If, yielding to the suggestions of our nature and the requisitions of our belief, we seek for a cause external to ourselves, we find a satisfactory explanation; otherwise we may expect to find none of any kind.

§. 84. The senses as much grounds of belief as other parts
of our constitution.

FURTHERMORE, it must be admitted, as has already been particularly stated and shown, that there are certain original sources or grounds of belief in our constitution. To say otherwise would be to loosen and destroy the foundation of all knowledge, whether that knowledge concern

(II) THE SENSES.

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ed matter or mind. But what evidence is there, that there are such original sources of belief, or that any one thing in particular is the foundation of such belief more than any other thing? The answer is our own internal consciousness and conviction, and this merely; we are conscious of belief, and are able to trace it to the occasions which give it rise.

Now if we carefully examine our minds, we shall find, that the intimations from the senses as effectually cause belief, as any other source of evidence whatever. Our consciousness, our internal conviction tells us that our belief is as decisively regulated by the perceptions, derived through the senses, as by our intuitive or inductive perceptions; and that they are as much a ground of knowledge. We assert this with confidence; therefore, if the senses are not a ground of belief and knowledge, the way is fairly open for unlimited scepticism on all subjects. It will in this case be impossible to fix upon any thing whatever, which is to be received as evidence,and men must give up all knowledge of intellect as well as matter, and will be at once released from all moral obligation.

§. 85. Opinions of Locke on the testimony of the senses.

As the satisfactory understanding of this subject is of much practical importance, we shall close what has been said upon it by some passages from Locke, whose clearness of apprehension never fails him, and who has the advantage of proposing his opinions in a diction, though somewhat antiquated, yet free, plain, and energetic,-"If af ter all this, (he says in the Fourth Book of his Essay,) any one will be so skeptical as to distrust his senses, and to affirm that all we see and hear, feel and taste, think and do, during our whole being, is but the series and deluding appearances of a long dream, whereof there is no reality; and therefore will question the existence of all things, or our knowledge of any thing; I must desire him to consider, that, if all be a dream, then he doth but dream that he makes the question; and so it is not much matter that a waking man should answer him.

But yet,

us.

if he pleases, he may dream that I make him this answer, that the certainty of things existing in rerum natura, when we have the testimony of our senses for it, is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs. For our faculties being suited not to the full extent of being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive knowledge of things, free from all doubt and scruple ; but to the preservation of us, in whom they are, and accommodated to the use of life; they serve to our purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those things which are convenient or inconvenient to For he that sees a candle burning, and hath experimented the force of its flame, by putting his finger in it, will little doubt that this is something existing without him, which does him harm, and puts him to great pain; which is assurance enough, when no man requires greater certainty to govern his actions by than what is as certain as his actions themselves. And if our dreamer pleases to try whether the glowing heat of a glass furnace be barely. a wandering imagination in a drowsy man's fancy; by putting his hand into it he may perhaps be wakened into a certainty greater than he could wish, that it is something more than bare imagination. So that this evidence is as great as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain, i. e. happiness or misery; beyond which we have no concernment, either of knowing or being. Such an assurance of the existence of things without us is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the good, and avoiding the evil, which is caused by them; which is the important concernment we have of being made acquainted with them."

CHAPTER SIXTH.

LAWS OF BELIEF. (III) TESTIMONY.

§. 6. Of testimony and the general fact of its influencing

belief.

WE shall next consider HUMAN TESTIMONY. By this is commonly meant the report of men concerning what has fallen under their personal observation. And this forms a third law or ground of Belief.

As to the fact, that men readily receive the testimony of their fellow beings, and that such testimony influences their belief and conduct, it cannot be denied. If a person should seriously deny the truth of a well attested statement in history, or question the well attested existence of a distant nation or city, merely because the evidence happened to be that of human testimony, it would be thought truly strange and unaccountable.

And surely if it were otherwise, if there were not this prompt and confiding reliance on testimony, a state of things would be presented very different from what actually exists. Without a general confidence in what men assert, every one's knowledge of events and facts would be limited to those only, of which he himself had been a personal witness. In this case no American, who had not been a traveller, could believe, that there is such a city as London; and no Englishman in a like situation could believe, that there is such a city as Rome; and no person whatever has any ground for be