agree with the deductions, which he had learnt as articles of faith, he will rejoice at the coincidence, and be thankful, that his labours are thus rewarded. But he will feel no enmity to those, whose deductions are different; he is too well acquainted with the numerous requisites of a good interpreter, to expect that they should be often united; and knowing, that interpreters, differently qualified, and interpreting on different principles, can never agree in their results, he will have charity for those, whose opinions are different from his own. He will believe indeed, like other men, that his own opinions are right, and consequently, that what opposes them is wrong. But the principle, on which he argues, that his opinions are right, is very different from the principle, on which either a general council, or an individual enthusiast, would rest as a basis of the truth. He will not pretend, that he cannot err; he will not pretend, even that the Church, of which he is a member, cannot err. And, though in point of fact, he believes that it does not err, yet, as he admits the possibility, he feels no enmity to those, who contend, that it does err. Though he believes, that he himself has rightly interpreted the Bible, and thereon founds his conviction, that his own Articles of Faith are legitimate deductions from the Bible, he is no less desirous of granting to others, than of obtaining for himself, the privilege of acting from private conviction. The freedom, with which he maintains, that the doctrines of his own Church are in unison with Scripture, the same freedom he allows to those, who claim that unison for themselves. He believes indeed, and he asserts, that his own is the true re. ligion. Yet he thinks it right, that other men should also have the liberty of believing and asserting that theirs is the true religion. And he submits with humility to that Almighty Being, who alone cannot err, to determine, whether he, or they, be really in possession of what each possesses in his own belief.

Such is the interpreter, who explains the Bible by the aid of reason and learning. Let us now consider the interpreter, who aspires to the possession of higher means. When a general Council, assembled by the Church of Rome, deliberates on points of faith, the Holy Spirit is supposed to guide them in their inquiries, and to exempt their decisions from even the possibility of a mistake. Here then lies the grand distinction between the interpretative principle of the Church of Rome, and the interpretative principle of the Church of England. The Church of England, like all other Christian communities without exception, asserts, that its doctrines are in strict conformity with Scripture. But in so doing, it merely asserts the fact, that it does not err from the truth; whereas the Church of Rome, beside the fact of not erring from the truth, claims also the opinion, that it cannot err from the truth. Now this claim of opinion, in addition to the claim of fact, makes a difference of infinitely

greater moment, than men in general suppose. It has been frequently said, and very lately repeated, that, as the two Churches act alike in maintaining, each for itself, that it does not err, 'tis mere metaphysical subtlety to distinguish between the petty terms of does not,' and 'can not. But these terms, insignificant as they may appear, denote nothing less, than two distinct principles of action, and principles so distinct, that the one leads to charity and toleration, the other to intolerance and persecution. On the former principle, which is maintained by the church of England, though we believe that we are right, we admit, that we are possibly wrong; though we believe that others are wrong, we admit that they are possibly right; and hence we are disposed to tolerate their opinions. But on the latter principle, which is maintained by the Church of Rome, the very possibility of being right is denied to those, who dissent from its doctrines. Now, as soon as men have persuaded themselves, that in points of doctrine they cannot err, they will think it an imperious duty to prevent the growth of all other opinions on a subject so important as religion. Should argument therefore fail, the importance of the end will be supposed to justify the worst of means. But the intolerance, thus produced by an imaginary exemption from error, is far from being confined to the Church of Rome. The same intolerance is produced in every man, who imagines, that he interprets the Scriptures under the especial

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guidance of the Holy Spirit. It makes no difference, in this respect, whether such especial guid ance is supposed to be vouchsafed to a general council, or to an individual in his private apart. ments. The result in either case is the same. either case, the persons who believe themselves so gifted, will conclude, that they cannot err. In either case, they will deem it impious to tolerate what the Spirit, as they imagine, has condemned. And hence we may justly infer, that the same inquisito rial power, which has been exercised by the Church of Rome, would be exercised by others, who set up similar pretensions, if the means of employing that power were once at their command.

Have we not then sufficient ground for resisting pretensions, no less dangerous to the community, than fallacious in themselves? Can we want further arguments for the interpretation of Scripture by reason and learning? Perhaps indeed I ought not in this place to use arguments at all in their faIt may appear superfluous to plead for reason and learning in an University like this, where mathematical acumen and classical literature go hand in hand. But it is the misfortune of many well-intentioned young men, to have been seduced into a belief, that the acuteness of reasoning, which is wanted in mathematics, and the learning, which they employ in the study of the classics, may be laid aside as useless, nay, even as an incumbrance, when they transfer their inquiries to religion. The

words of man's wisdom are then exchanged for a supposed demonstration of the Spirit. But let us not deceive ourselves on so momentous a subject. Because an inspired Apostle has declared, that his wisdom was derived from the suggestions of the Holy Spirit, let us not imagine, that our wisdom will be dignified by the same supernatural aid. Because an inspired Apostle has declared, that his wisdom was not the wisdom of man, but the power of God, let us not imagine, that the same divine il. lumination, the same intellectual light, in which St. Paul composed his Epistles, will be infused into a modern expounder of them. Nor, because St. Paul has declared, that the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God, let us conclude, that the duty of a Christian requires him to discard from the study of the Bible the assistance of human learning. The wisdom of this world, which St. Paul advised the Corinthians to reject, is very different from that, which is meant by human learning: indeed so different, that they, who are least acquainted with the latter, are often best acquainted with the former. Let us remember also, that they who depreciate human learning, as the means of interpreting the Scriptures, depreciate what was the pillar of the Reformation: that they act contrary, both to the princi. ples, and to the practice of our Reformers: that they would involve us in mental darkness, and thus bring us back to Popery again.

Lastly, let us inquire, whether the rules of in