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were inevitable accidents, and not events which might be avoided by care and prudence. The real cause of loss in the present case was the act of the crew in boring holes in the ship's side, and although the damage was done by water, the original cause is that which must be taken into account. In Ionides v. The Universal Marine Insurance Company (8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 705; 32 L. J. 170, Ex.; Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 353) it was held that if goods are reduced to such a state by perils of the seas as that there is no hope of recovery, but while they still exist in specie, they are nominally taken possession of by persons in the military service of a belligerent state, this is a loss by perils of the seas and not by capture; that is to say, that if damage naturally results from an act done, it must be considered as occasioned by that act and not by the consequences of that act. A shipowner is liable for the wrongful and barratrous acts of his crew, unless those acts are excepted in his bill of lading. The damage in the present case was occasioned by barratry, which is not excepted in the bill of lading, and the shipowner is therefore liable: (Kay v. Wheeler, 16 L. T. Rep. N. S. 66; L. Rep. 2 C. P. 302; 2 Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 466). A shipowner has all the liability of a common carrier, and is liable for any losses except such as are cccasioned by the act of God or the Queen's enemies, unless he limits his liability by special contract: (The Liver Alkali Company v. Johnson, ante, vol. 1, p. 380; vol. 2. p. 352; 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 805; 31 L. T. Rep. N. S. 95; L. Rep. 7 Ex. 267; L. Rep. 9 C. P. 338). Here the shipowner has only limited his liability in case of damage from perils of the sea and fire, whilst the damage was occasioned by the barratry of the crew; his liability therefore remains.

Milward, Q.C. (E. C. Clarkson with him) for the respondent (defendant).-The case of The Liver Alkali Works v. Johnson is distinguishable, because in that case there was no contract at all, except at common law, and moreover it was not a maritime contract. Further this is an American ship, and the English common law cannot be applied unless it has been shown to be applicable. It has never been really established that the owner of a seagoing ship is a common carrier: (The Duero, 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 37; 3 Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 351.) They are not bound to carry all goods that are brought to them. If that be so then, in order to show their liability as common carriers, it would be necessary to give evidence as to their liability as common carriers for the goods they do accept. It must be shown that there is a custom by which the liability of common carriers is imposed upon them, and such a custom would be a maritime custom. But then there is no such general maritime custom, and therefore no liability as common carriers. The question is then reduced entirely to the meaning of the contract in the bill of lading contained, and whether barratry is or is not a peril of the sea. In The Freedom (ante vol. 1, pp. 28, 136; 24 L. T. Rep. N. S. 452; L. Rep. 3 P. C. 594) it is said, "The words in the bills of lading, dangers of the seas,' must of course be taken in the sense in which they are used in a policy of insurance. It is a settled rule of the law of insurance not to go into distinct cases, but to look exclusively to the immediate and proximate cause of the loss." And in Dudgeon v. Pembroke (ante p. 323; 31 L. T. Rep. N. S. 31; L. Rep. 9 Q. B. 581) it is distinctly laid down that, in the case of loss by perils of

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the sea, the proximate and not the remote cause of loss must be regarded. Here the proximate cause was not the act of the crew, but damage by sea water, which is a peril of the seas. But even if the act of barratry be considered the proximate cause, it is an act for which the shipowner is not responsible. In Lloyd v. The General Iron Screw Collier Company (ubi sup.) the act of negligence was committed within the scope of the authority of the master and crew; it was a case of collision, and the charge was negligent navigation. Here the act is wholly out of the scope of the authority of the crew, and a principal cannot be liable for any wrongful act on the part of his agent committed beyond the scope of the agent's authority: Story on Agency, p. 295.

Cohen, Q.C., in reply.-The shipowner has entered into a specific contract to deliver safely, unless he is prevented by certain excepted perils named in the bill of lading. He has not been prevented by these perils, but by a wrongful act on the part of the crew. He is therefore respon

sible.

Sir R. PHILLIMORE.-This is an appeal from the judgment of the learned judge of the County Court of Durham, in a suit before him, which was a suit for damage done to a cargo of wheat.

The evidence established that the damage resulted from the barratrous act of the crew of the Chasca in boring holes in the bottom of the vessel, through which the water came and injured the wheat.

The question which the learned judge had to determine, and from which an appeal has been brought, was a question simply of law, namely, whether such a barratrous act as that was an excepted peril of the sea, because in this case there was a bill of lading in the following words: "Shipped in good order and condition by E. E. Morgan and Sons, on board the American barque Chasca, whereof Henry Pratt is master, now lying at the port of Portland, Oregon, and bound for Cork for orders, to say 16,050 sacks of wheat, containing1,994,256lbs.,being marked and numbered in the margin, and are to be delivered in like good order and condition at the port of dered at Cork, the dangers of the seas and fire only excepted;" and therefore, as this was not a danger by fire, the only question is, whether it falls within the category of excepted "dangers of the seas." The learned judge came to the conclusion that it did, after having an argument addressed to him by counsel, founding his opinion upon the presumed false analogy in cases of policies of insurance to cases depending on the contracts contained in bills of lading.

, as or

Now, the first question of law which the court has to decide is this; is the court entitled to look at the real cause, the causa remota, or must it confine its attention to the proximate cause, just as in a policy of insurance? The real cause the court is, in my judgment, entitled to look at.

The only case cited to the contrary is The Freedom (ubi sup.), where the learned judge who delivered the judgment of their Lordships says: "The words in the bill of lading, dangers of the seas.' must, of course, be taken in the sense in which they are used in a policy of insurance. It is a settled rule of the law of insurance not to go into distinct causes, but to look exclusively to the immediate or proximate cause of the loss." Now, that is a dictum in no way necessary for the judi cial conclusion at which their Lordships arrived;

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and I say without hesitation, that in my judgment it was an erroneous dictum, that must have fallen inadvertently from the judge who delivered the sentence. It must have been an erroneous dictum, because the facts of that case, and others of the same kind decided by the Privy Council at the same period, all proceeded upon the hypothesis that a loss occasioned by negligence was a loss which was not excepted by the exception of " perils of the sea " in a bill of lading. I say, then, that if losses occasioned by negligence are not within the exception of "perils of the seas" losses occasioned by barratry, are a fortiori not within it. Not only then, is there a variance with the cases and the decision itself, but a variance with other cases. First, the case of Lloyd v. The General Iron Screw Collier Company (Limited), in which it is said by Pollock, C.B.: "We are all agreed that the plaintiff is entitled to our judgment. The declaration distinctly discloses the cause of the accident. It sets out the bill of lading, from which certain common perils are excepted, including barratry of the masters and mariners, but not gross negligence or improper conduct short of barratry. Then to the defendant's plea, that they were prevented from carrying the goods by the perils excepted, the plaintiff, to prevent any mistake, replies that the supposed perils were incurred by and through the gross negligence, mismanagement, and improper conduct of the defendants' servants, and not otherwise. The opinions handed down to us by those who have discussed these matters, and the decided cases, clearly establish the proposition that in cases of this sort we are to look, not at the causa proxima, but at the real cause of the loss. Here, therefore, if the direct negligence of the master and mariners should turn out to be the cause of the loss, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, notwithstanding the exception in the bill of lading." In the case of Grill v. The General Iron Screw Collier Company, decided in 1864 by a judge whose opinions are always cited with the highest respect in every court of justice, the late Mr. Justice Willes says: "As, however, reference has been made to cases on policies of insurance, and the interpretation that has been given to them, I may say that a policy of insurance is an absolute contract of indemnity from loss by perils of the sea, and it is only necessary to see whether the loss comes within the terms of the contract, and is caused by perils of the sea. The fact that a loss is partly caused by things not distinctly perils of the sea does not prevent it coming within the contract. In the case of a bill of lading it is different, because there the contract is to carry with reasonable care, unless prevented by the excepted perils." I am, therefore, of opinion that the dictum cited from the case of The Freedom cannot be put forward with any force as an authority that the court should derive the law as to bills of lading from the law as policies of insurance.

The next question is one of fact, and I have anticipated the opinion of the court by saying that it seems to have been admitted that it was the boring of the holes in the bottom of the vessel by the barratrous act of the crew.

Now, the third question is one of law. Was this barratrous act a peril of the sea? I have no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion to which common sense, as well as all the interests of navigation, seem to render it desirable for the court to arrive, namely, that an act of this kind is

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not a peril of the sea, and, on the authority of the cases and on principle I am constrained to reverse the sentence of the court below, and to pronounce in favour of the respondent, with costs.

Solicitors for the appellants, Pritchard and Sons, agents for Bateson and Co., Liverpool. Solicitor for the defendants, Thomas Cooper, agent for R. Brown and Son, Sunderland.

Dec. 10, 1874, and June 7, 1875.

THE TURLIANI

Necessaries-Material men-Mortgagee-Maritime lien-Priority-Practice-Transfer from County Court-Reference to registrar and merchants— Ship under arrest of High Court-Subsequent arrest by County Court.

An advance of freight to enable a master to pay his ship's disbursements before sailing does not give the charterer a claim against the ship, which will take precedence of the claim of a mortgagee; nor does an advance for a similar purpose made by an insurance company.

Where it is necessary that a wooden ship bound upon a particular voyage should be coppered, the coppering is a "necessary for the voyage," which gives the material man doing the work to a foreign ship, upon the orders of the master, a maritime lien.

Where causes of necessaries and wages had been instituted against a ship in the High Court, and other causes of necessaries in a County Court against the same ship, and the latter had been transferred after decree made to the High Court for the purpose of enforcing the decrees, the ship being under the arrest of the High Court, the latter court ordered all the causes to be referred to the registrar and merchants to report the amount due thereon.

Semble, that where a ship is under the arrest of the High Court, and causes are also instituted in the County Court against the ship, she should not be arrested by the County Court, as it is not probable that the ship will be removed out of the jurisdiction of the County Court without satisfaction of the plaintiff's several claims, within the meaning of the County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 1868, sect. 22.

SEVERAL Suits were instituted in rem against the Greek brig Turliani, in the High Court and in the County Court of Northumberland, holden at Newcastle.

No. 6877 was a cause of necessaries instituted in the High Court on the 23rd may 1874, on behalf of Ernesto Rodinis, ship chandler and merchant. The claim made in this cause will be found set out in the first schedule to the registrar's report (post). The ship was arrested in this suit by the marshall, and remained under arrest till the claim was on the 30th June pronounced for, and the vessel was sold by an order of the court. An appearance was on the 10th Dec., subsequently entered in this cause by Demetrio Vafiadachi, a mortgagee of the ship as defendant.

No. 6893 was a cause of necessaries, instituted on behalf of George Varnakiottes, shipbroker, in the County Court of Northumberland, holden at Newcastle, but transferred before proceedings to the High Court, by order of the latter court. The claim made in this case will be found set out in the second schedule to the registrar's report(post),

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and was pronounced for on the 8th July 1874, without prejudice to other claims. An appearance was also entered in this suit by the mortgagee on the 10th Dec.

No. 6895 was a cause of necessaries instituted in the High Court on behalf of Thomas Grieve, hardwareman. This claim appears on schedule 3 to the registrar's report, and was on the 14th July 1874 pronounced for without prejudice to other claims. An appearance was also entered in this suit by the mortgagee on the 10th Dec.

No. 6911 was a cause of necessaries (so called) instituted on behalf of Felice Bruma and others. This case was originally instituted in the County Court of Northumberland, holden at Newcastle, against the ship in rem, to recover an advance of 1451., made at North Shields upon the security of an instrument in the following terms:

I, the undersigned, Zani Cambani, master of the Greek brig Turliani, acknowledge to have received as a loan from Messrs. Bruma, Villa, and Schiaffino, on account of the Casa Marittima of Genoa, the sum of 1457., for the last expenses necessary for the continuation of my present voyage from North Shields to Buenos Ayres, binding myself to pay the said sum to the order of the Casa Marittima fifteen days after my arrival; and for the said sum I bind the freight and the ship. In faith of which I have signed the present document in duplicate, one taking effect, the other to be void.

Done at North Shields, 14th April 1874. (Signed)

ZANI CAMBANI, Master.

The ship was arrested in this suit by the County Court on the usual affidavit that she was about to leave the jurisdiction; at the time of such arrest she was already under arrest by the High Court, in cause No. 6893. No appearance was entered in the County Court, and the plaintiffs obtained a decree for the amount claimed. After this decree the cause was, on the application of the plaintiffs, transferred, on the 1st July 1874, to the High Court, in order that they might be able to enforce their judgment against the ship, which was under the arrest of the High Court. An appearance was, after such transfer, entered in this suit, also in the High Court, by the mortgagee.

No. 6913 was a cause instituted on behalf of William Boyd, under the 2nd section of the County Court Admiralty Jurisdiction Act Amendment Act 1869 (32 & 33 Viet. c. 51), to recover 2901. for breach of charter-party, dated the 17th March 1874, and made between the plaintiff and the master of the Turliani, the said sum of 2901. being an advance of freight made by the plaintiffs, as charterer, to the master of the Turliani, in relation to the carriage of goods under the said cbarter-party in the said vessel Turliani. This cause was originally instituted in the County Court at Newcastle, and no appearance having been entered in the County Court, the plaintiff obtained a decree for the amount claimed. The ship was arrested by the County Court in this suit, although already arrested in the High Court. After decree the cause was, on the application of the plaintiff, transferred on the 1st July to the High Court, to enable the plaintiff to enforce his judgment. An appearance was, after transfer, entered in the High Court in this suit also by the mortgagee.

No. 6918 was a cause of necessaries instituted on behalf of John Freeland Fergus Common, and Robert Brotherick Avery. The items of claim in this cause will be found set out in schedule 4 to the registrar's report (post). The metal and nails appearing thereby to have been supplied were fur

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nished by the plaintiffs for the purpose of coppering the ship. This coppering was done at North Shields by direction of Companis, the master, and a foreign surveyor. The vessel was at this time bound on a voyage to Sierra Leone; she was ironfastened, and it was admittedly an imprudent thing to copper an iron fastened ship, but the plaintiffs supplied the ship under the master's orders, and to obviate any evil consequences took care that the heads of the iron holds should be well covered with lead to prevent their coming in contact with the copper sheathing. The remaining facts material to this claim will be found set out among the "Reasons for the registrar's report: (See post.) This cause was instituted originally in the County Court at Newcastle, and the ship was arrested by that court, although already under arrest in the High Court. A decree was there obtained, in default of appearance, and the cause was afterwards,on the application of the plaintiff, transferred on the 7th July to the High Court, to enable him to enforce his 'judgment against the ship, then under the arrest of the High Court. An appearance was entered in the High Court in this suit also by the mortgagee.

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No. 6919 was a cause of necessaries instituted on behalf of the said John Freeland Fergus Common. The items of claim in this cause will be found set ont in schedule 4 to the registrar's report. The work therein claimed for was in respect of docking and undocking the ship, burning and blacking her bottom, caulking her beams and butts under the metal, finding and laying on felt, punching, laying on, nailing and dressing the yellow metal (claimed for in cause No. 6919), finding all labour and material (except yellow metal), including dock dues. The extras claimed included lead for covering the iron bolts and felt. The smith's work claimed was in respect of necessary repairs to the ship's gear. The work was done under the circumstances mentioned in cause No. 6911, and the cause was instituted and transferred after decree, precisely in the same manner as cause No. 6911. An appearance was entered in the High Court in this suit also by the mortgagee.

No. 6941 was a cause of bottomry instituted in the High Court on behalf of Demetrio Vafiadachi, the mortgagee before mentioned. The claim in this cause was based upon two instruments, binding the ship for the payment of certain sums of money advanced by Vafiadachi to enable the owners of the Turliani to build and fit her out for her first voyage. These instruments, not being bottomry bonds by English law, and the plaintiff having no claim of priority over persons having maritime liens upon the ship, this cause was abandoned, and Vafiadachi entered an appearance in the other cases, as mortgagee of the ship under the said instruments.

No. 6961 was a cause of wages instituted in the High Court on behalf of Companis (otherwise Cambani), the master, and the sum claimed was 101. 198. 9d. which was on the 10th Nov. 1874 pronounced for without prejudice to other claims. The ship had been built by one John Zancopulo, who sold part of her to Companis for 35,000 drachms. It was agreed that Zancopulo was to be captain, but that when he was ashore Companis was to act as captain, and have control of the ship and her affairs. Before the ship went to North Shields she had carried a cargo to Cuxhaven from the Levant. At Cuxhaven

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Zancopulo was taken ill, and directed the ship to go to Swansea to take up a charter to carry coal to Sierra Leone. Companis, however, took her to North Shields, owing to contrary winds. Whilst at North Shields a charter-party was entered into by Companis to go to Buenos Ayres with coals, and the ship, after being coppered, was duly laden under the charter-party. Companis, whilst at Newcastle, received various sums for the ship from the charterer and brokers, and had previously received considerable sums from Zancopulo at various times. Zancopulo alleged that the cop. pering of the ship was wholly without his knowledge and consent.

Dec. 10, 1874,-James P. Aspinall moved on behalf of the mortgagee that the several claims be referred to the registrar, assisted (if necessary) by merchants, to examine and report thereon, as usual.

E. C. Clarkson, for the plaintiffs in causes Nos. 6911, 6913, 6918, 6919, transferred from the County Court, objected upon the ground that the claims therein had already been investigated and pronounced for by the County Court, and that the defendant having neglected to enter an appearance in the County Court had no right to have the claims re-opened now. In cause No. 6913, the claim is for a sum advanced; a reference is unnecessary there.

Gainsford Bruce. for the other plaintiffs, contended that as the defendant had allowed such a length of time to elapse before asking a reference, he was now too late; and, further, that it would be useless to refer No. 6895, on account of the smallness of the claim.

Aspinall, in reply.

Sir R. PHILLIMORE.-I shall order all the claims, except that in causes Nos. 6895 and 6913, to be referred to the registrar. In taking this course I do not wish it to be understood that I decide that these claims in which judgments have already investigated are to be reopened. Whether it will be necesssary to reopen them or not is a question with which the registrar must deal when they come before him. There is, however, one matter in the case to which I wish to call attention. It is worthy of remark that this vessel, although under the arrest of this court, was arrested in several of the other suits by the same County Court, which is hardly consistent with the spirit of the County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, giving power to arrest only when there is a probability of the ship being taken out of the jurisdiction, the expense being very needlessly augmented thereby. I think it is desirable that the Bar and the Profession should consider this matter, which is one of importance.

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6918, for necessaries on behalf of Messrs. Common and Avery, also transferred from the abovenamed County Court.

6919, for necessaries on behalf of Mr. Common, also transferred from the above-named County Court.

,, 6941, for bottomry (afterwards acknowledged to be mortgage) on behalf of Basilio Papayanni, agent of Demetrio Vafiadachi.

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6961, for wages and disbursements on behalf of John Companis as master of the vessel. And whereas, on the 10th Dec. ult., you were pleased, at petition of the mortgagee, the plaintiff proceeding in cause No. 6941, to refer the claims in causes 6877, 6993, 6911, 6918, 6919, and 6961, to the registrar to report the amount due thereon, to waive reference in causes 6895 and 6913.

And whereas the proctors representing the parties in all the above-mentioned causes, have agreed that I should also report as to the right of several plaintiffs to the priority of payment out of the proceeds in court, as well as on the question of costs.

Now I do most humbly report that I have, with the assistance of Sydney Young, Esq., of London, merchant, carefully examined all of the claims filed in these causes, together with all accounts and vouchers, and the papers and proceedings produced and brought in, and having on the 29th Dec. ult. heard the evidence of Ernesto Antonio Rodinis, the plaintiff in cause No. 6877, of George Varnakiottes, the plaintiff in cause No. 6893, of John Zancopulo, the owner of 32-64ths of the vessel, a witness produced by the mortgagee, and on the 4th Jan. inst. heard parties through their proctors, on all sides, I find that the several claims ought to be paid out of the proceeds of the vessel, now remaining in court, in the following order:

(1.) The taxed costs of all parties, including those incurred as well in the County Court as in this court, save the costs of the plaintiff in cause 6961.

(2.) The claims of the material men for necessaries, to the extent following:-In cause 6877, 191l. 58. 3d.; in 6893, 901. 13s. 11d.; in 6895, 13l. 168 4d.; in 6918, 1291. 15s. 10d.; in 6919, 1067. 19s. ; as stated in the schedules 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, hereto annexed.

(3.) The claim of the mortgagees in cause 6941, to value of 1000 French gold twenty-five franc pieces, equal to the sum of 8001. sterling, on his filling an affidavit to the effect that no part of the said mortgage debt has been paid, or any interest thereon.

(4.) The balance (if any) to be applied to the satisfaction of the remaining claim or claims in such manner as I may hereinafter, if required, report. All which is humbly submitted by

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1. Paid for letters

2. Cash lent for ship's use 3. Goods supplied

4. Bonded stores..

No. 6893.

0 2.10 40 18 4 176 2 10

Claimed. £ s. d.

Allowed. £ s. d.

.179 2 10

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£326 6 5 H. C. ROTHERY, Registrar. Schedule 2. George Varnakiottes, shipbroker Claimed. £ s. d.

1. Reporting ship at Custom House

2. Notice to Board of Trade for measure brief.

3. Cash to master

4. Cash to North Sea pilot

5. Expenses incurred in trying to negotiate a loan, and obtain money for ship's use...

1 1 0

0 16 0 400

3 10 0

5 0 0

Allowed. £ s. d.

110

0 16 0

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THE TURLIANA.

Allowed. 3 6 11

10 10 0 75 0 0

90 13 11

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The circumstances of this case are very peculiar.

It was

"It seems that the Turliani or Turlina was a Greek vessel, built at Syra in the year 1872 by one Zancopulo. Whilst she was building, Zancopulo sold one half of the ship for the sum of 35,000 drachms to a person named Companis, and the vessel was registered in their joint names. arranged that for the first year, at all events, Zancopulo should be the master, and Companis mate; but that when Zancopulo was on shore, Companis was to be the master, and to have the management and control of the ship and of its affairs. It further appears that the owners, being unable to provide the necessary funds for the completion of the vessel borrowed from a Greek named Demetrio Vafiadachi, two sums of 700 and 300 Napoleons respectively, for which they gave two mortgages on the ship.

"The ship left Syra with Zancopulo on board as master, and Companis as mate, and proceeded thence to Cyprus, Odessa, and other places, and ultimately arrived with a cargo at Falmouth, whence she was ordered to proceed to Leery. On her way there she got on to a bank, and was obliged to put into Cuxhaven, where the cargo was discharged. At Cuxhaven she was placed on a bank, there being no dry docks there, and her bottom was caulked and tallowed, but no other repairs were done to her. She then sailed with Companis as master, Zancopulo remaining at Cuxhaven, partly because of his health, partly to settle the averages for Swansea, where a charter had been

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obtained for her to carry a cargo of coals to Sierra Leone.

"It is said that on the way the vessel met with contrary winds, and, accordingly, instead of continuing her voyage, she proceeded to the Tyne, where Companis obtained a charter for her to convey a cargo of coals to Buenos Ayres. A quantity of necessaries having there been supplied to her, and her bottom having been coppered, she was ready to sail on her intended voyage, when she was arrested at the suit of the necessaries men.

"In the meantime, Zancopulo, having heard of the change of the vessel's destination, came over from Cuxhaven, and seeing the condition of affairs, he endeavoured to raise money to satisfy the claims upon her, but in vain. Accordingly the several suits, some of which had originally been instituted in the County Court of Newcastle, but were afterwards transferred to this court, proceeded; and on the 30th June last the court ordered the vessel to be appraised and sold to answer the claims against her.

"The vessel was accordingly sold, and the proceeeds, amounting to 18107., were on the 14th Sept. last paid into court. But in the meantime other suits had been brought against the vessel, and amongst them one on the 8th Aug. by Demetrio Vafiadachi, the mortgagee, suing as a bottomry bondholder, and another on the 28th of the same month by Companis, the master, for his wages and disbursements. The claim, I should observe, of Demetrio Vafiadachi to sue as a bottomry bondholder was overruled by the court, but he was allowed to claim in respect of his two deeds for 700 and 300 Napoleons respectively as a mortgagee.

"There were then nine causes against this vessel, and it was agreed that they should all be referred to myself to report the amounts due thereon, and at the same time to decide the right of the respective parties to priority of payment out of the proceeds.

66

Accordingly, all the causes came before me on the 29th Dec., and on the 4th and 6th Jan. last, witnesses were examined, and the case was very fully discussed; and the conclusion to which I came was as follows:

"First, that this being a foreign ship, a claim for necessaries, strictly so called, would, on the authority of The Ella A. Clark (Brown. & Lush. 32), constitute a maritime lien under the 6th section of the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 65, and as such take precedence of the claims of a mortgagee, which is not a maritime lien.

"Secondly, that this being a foreign ship, a claim for necessaries would, on the authority of the case of The Jenny Lind (L. Rep. 3 Adm. & Ecc. 529), take precedence of that of the master of a ship for his wages and disbursements, where the master, as in this case, was part owner, and had mortgaged his interest in the ship.

"Thirdly, that an advance of freight was not a necessary within the meaning of the Act, and that, therefore, such a claim would not be entitled to precedence over that of the mortgagee.

"Fourthly, that a claim for moneys advanced by an insurance company was equally not a claim for necessaries, and would consequently not take precedence over that of the mortgagee.

Fifthly, that looking at the various sums which it was proved that Companis, the master, had received at different places, to his conduct at North Shields, and to the general facts of the case,

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