PRIV. Co.] MEIDBRODT v. FITZSIMON; THE ENERGIE. was offered, on the other 18001. was demanded and refused. Now the outside claim of Mr. Harper on that occasion was 1900l.-1220l. for the average and 7001. for freight. That being so, in my opinion he had no right to put on a stop order for 22001.; I think that was an illegal detention. I think if he acted under the sections of the Merchant Shipping Act and put the cargo into dock, he had a right to leave it in exactly the same position as on the 1st May, or before that in the stop order. There is no question that before that he would have taken, and been bound to take, 19007.-I mean up to the time he put on the stop order; he added 300l. to that he put on the stop for 22007., thereby placing and deliberately placing the cargo in such a position that it could not be released from that detention by the owner of the cargo without payment of money that was not due, and that could not be due. That was an abuse of the process of law. He was bound in law to leave the cargo in the same position as before, but what he did was in point of law the same as if this man came to him before the stop order was put on and offered him 1900l., and he said, 'No, you must give me 22001." The case cannot stand on that. In my opinion there was an illegal detention on the 3rd May. We must refer back the case to the Court of Admiralty with that declaration, and to have the damages ascertained. It Lord Justice Christian.-This is a case of some novelty and importance, and it would not be expected that this court should assume to carry the decision further than the decision may be actually necessary for disposing of this particular case. was strongly contended before us that the ordinary master's lien on the cargo for general average was superseded by the bare fact of the passing of this bottomry bond, that the lien was then in the nature of a thing recoverable by the special power of attaching the cargo of the ship, which the master, as the agent both of the shipowner and the merchant, by that contract of hypothecation conferred upon the bondholder; it was contended, following that up, that when the ship arrived at the port of discharge it was this bottomry transaction, and not the ordinary master's lien on the cargo for average, that regulated the liability of the cargo; and then it was further contended that in the absence of the bondholder, who had the special rights given to him by the bond, the master could not be considered as his agent for giving effect at the port of discharge to the liability imposed by the hypothecation transaction, or that, if he could have done so, his proper course was not the one he took, namely, of his own authority, retaining possession of the cargo, but he should have resorted to the Court of Admiralty for the purpose of attaching it. Now, as to that last proposition, that is to say, if the master was obliged to defend his proceedings upon the footing of the rights created by the bottomry bond, he could only do so by attachment, proceeding in the Court of Admiralty. I am of opinion that the argument of the counsel for the appellant was perfectly well founded; but as to all the other ques tions, and the most important of all, namely, whether or not the ordinary lien on cargo for general average is compatible with the existence of the right of attachment, such as this bottomry transaction conferred on the bondholder. On that I give no opinion whatever. It is unnecessary to do so, for the ground referred to by the Lords LPRIV. CO. Commissioners is amply sufficient for a decision of the case. I think, whatever may be thought of the legal relation in which the master stood to the cargo, he had no right to make the payment for the repairs-an excessive demand-the condition precedent to the delivery of the cargo to the merchant. In making that excessive demand he acted at his peril. It is clearly proved that he demanded a sum of at least 3001. beyond what, at the utmost, he should have demanded. What he seems to have done is this: he seems to have taken first the amount for which the cargo might be called to contribute for general average; be seems to have then taken his own estimate of what the freight ought to be, a matter not conceded between the parties. These two together came to 18007., or thereabouts. He then assumed that there were some other charges that might accrue in the future in the shape of demurrage, &c., and then he puts on a round sum of 4001. for the purpose of covering all these possible contingent demands, and makes it a condition precedent to the giving up of the cargo that the merchant shall pay 2200l. I hold that the master, in refusing to deliver the cargo unless that demand was satisfied, was guilty of an illegal detention, for which he must answer in damages; and, furthermore, I must say that I think, throughout the whole of this transaction the master, and those in whose interest he was acting, and those who no doubt were encouraging him, manifested a most reckless and reprehensible disregard of the interest of the owner of the ship. They manifested it, first, by the excess and stringency of the demand, as a condition precedent to the delivery of the cargo; next by following up that demand by the stop order for 22001. by 3001. more than was at first demanded; and lastly, by what, perhaps, more than anything else, shows the nature of the transaction, that after the merchant had been obliged to go to the Custom House and pay that sum of 22007. in order to get possession of his goods, and when some little time after that he sent to London the 11361., which I think was the amount ultimately ascertained to be the fair amount payable on foot of the claim for general average, and when he then asked these people to assist him to get back the 1136l., part of the 2200l., deposited with the Port and Docks Board, they said, "No, we will do nothing of the kind, the matter must now be allowed to take its course," the consequence of which was, that for nearly two months the merchant was kept out of that 11361., an unmitigated wrong, as from the very first it was an unmitigated wrong to have demanded an extra 3001. or 400l. from the merchant before he could obtain possession of his goods. 1 entirely agree in the decision, on the ground mentioned. The order of the court below must be reversed, and the case remitted to the court below for the purpose of ascertaining the damages, which I trust these gentlemen will have to pay for their high-handed proceedings. In accordance with such judgment a decree was drawn up, by which it was ordered that “the judgment for the defendant given in the Court of Admiralty be reversed and set aside, and judg ment given for the plaintiff, to be entered up for such sum as the Registrar of the said Court of Admiralty, with his mercantile assessors may ascertain to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff for damages arising from or consequential upon the detention of the cargo of timber PRIV. Co.] MEIDBRODT V. FITZSIMON; THE ENERGIE. from the lodging of the stop order, on the 3rd May 1873 until the 21st May, and that the plaintiff do have the cost of the proceeding on his petition in the said Court of Admiralty up to the time of the entering up of the judgment for damages; when ascertained, the said costs to be taxed and ascertained by the Registrar of the Court of Admiralty; and that each party do abide their own costs of this appeal matter, and that the deposit of 10l. lodged with the registrar of this court be handed back to the said appellant James Charles Fitzsimon, or to Messrs. Geeorge Drevar Fottrell and George Fottrell, jun., or either of them, his solicitors.' From this decree the master of the Energie appealed to the Judicial Committee of Her Majesty's Privy Council, giving the following grounds of appeal : 1. Because the said Court of Appeal erroneously held that the amount for which the appellant put a stop order on the said cargo, viz., 2200l., was improper and excessive. 2. Because the said Court of Appeal erroneously held that after such stop order had been put on nothing could take the cargo out of the hands of the dock board, except a payment of 22001. 3. Because the respondent at any time after such stop order was put on the cargo, could, by paying or legally tendering to the appellant, or giving notice to the dock board to pay to the appellant the amount of his lien on the said cargo, have entitled himself to a receipt for the amount claimed as due, and to delivery of the said cargo. and could have obtained delivery thereof. 4. Because the respondent did not at any time before the institution of this suit, tender to the appellant the amount due to him in respect of his claim and lien on the said cargo for freight, demurrage, and landing charges, and the appellant never dispensed with such tender. 5. Because at the time of the institution of this suit the appellant had not committed any breach of contract or duty with or to the respondent, within the meaning of the 37th section of the Court of Admiralty (Ireland) Act 1867. 6. Because the respondent, as soon as he paid or caused to be paid the amount due to the appellant for freight, received delivery of the said cargo. 7. Because the said decree of the High Court of Admiralty of Ireland was and is right, for the reasons stated in the judgment of the learned judge of that court and otherwise, and such decree ought to have been affirmed by the said Court of Appeal. 8. Because, even if the appellant had, before the institution of this suit, committed any breach of contract or breach of duty with or to the respondent, yet the respondent did not, by his evidence, prove that he had thereby suffered any loss or damage recoverable by law. March 24 and 25, 1875.-Cohen, Q.C. and E. C. Clarkson, for the appellant, contended that the appellant, being ready and willing to deliver on payment of freight and general average, was entitled to payment on giving up the goods: Paynter v. James, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 449; L. Rep. That, whatever sum the master may have asked [PRIV. Co. before the exact amount of freight was ascertained, that demand was no excuse for the respondents not having tendered the amount due (The Norway, 12 L. T. Rep. N. S. 57; 2 Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 254); that the lien upon the cargo for general average and freight justified the detention of the cargo on board the ship up to the 3rd May, and that the landing and warehousing the cargo on that date was justified in consequence of the respondents' refusal to pay the amount due; that the amount named in the stop order was not excessive, considering the amount then due for general average freight, demurrage, and other charges; that masters landing and warehousing cargoes are not bound to confine the stop order to the exact amount of money due upon the cargo, but may declare a lien upon the cargo for such reasonable amount as they deem necessary to discharge their lien; that the respondents might have had their cargo if they had tendered the proper amount due when ascertained, and had asked the appellant to give notice to the Ports and Docks Board that all that was due had been paid; that the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c, 63), sects. 67, 68, 69, 70, and 71, providing for the landing and warehousing of the goods and the preserving of a shipowner's lien thereon were merely a mode of giving the shipowner the right to procure bail for his freight and average, and that there could be no wrongful non-delivery short of a wilful detention by the master for an improper amount. Butt, Q.C. and J. C. Matthew.-First, the general average did not become payable until after the bottomry bond had been discharged, and, conse quently, at the time of the ship's arrival in Dublin, there was no lien for general average, and there was not improper detention of the cargo from the time of the first demand for delivery made by the shipowner. Until the shipowner had himself become out of pocket by paying off the bond, he could not claim for general average from the cargo owner. Secondly, the claim for freight was in the first instance excessive, no larger sum being ascertained than 6711. Before a master can claim payment of freight, it must be ascertained, and here it was not ascertained until after the 3rd May. The respondent was quite willing to pay the freight when ascertained, and there is no question of tender in the present case, as the master was never ready and willing to deliver. On the 1st May when the London agent for the ship saw the master, the plaintiff was not liable to pay anything-not in respect of freight, because none was dne, the cargo being then undischarged, and the freight was only payable on delivery; nor in respect of general average, because the bond in respect of which it was payable, was neither produced nor discharged. The discharge of the cargo by the master was in itself unlawful, and a detention under the circumstances, because there was no failure on the part of the respondent to take delivery, within the meaning of the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act 1862, sect. 27, and without such failure goods cannot be landed and warehoused. But even if such landing and warehousing was lawful in itself, there was a wrongful detention of the goods, by reason of the master putting a stop order upon them for more than was due. And, moreover, there was a further wrongful act when the master refused to inform the warehousemen of the payment of the amount due for general average, PRIV. Co.] MEIDBRODT v. FITZSIMON; THE ENERGIE. The refusal of a master to deliver dispenses with the necessity for a tender : Kerford v. Mandel, 28 L. J. 303, Ex. ; A master has no lien for demurrage occasioned by his own refusal to deliver, even when such refusal is for the purpose of preserving his lien for other charges. Cohen, Q.C., in reply, cited Cargo ex Galam, 9 L. T. Rep. N. S. 550; 1 Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 408. Cur. adv. vult. April 24, 1875.-The judgment of the court was delivered by Sir MONTAGUE E. SMITH.-The question on this appeal is, whether the respondent (the plaintiff in the cause and the owner of the cargo) has established a good cause of action against the appellant (the master of the ship Energie) for breach of duty or of contract in relation to the delivery of the cargo. The Judge of the High Court of Admiralty in Ireland held that he had failed to do so, and dismissed his suit. The Court of Appeal in Chancery in Ireland, to which, subject to a final appeal to Her Majesty in Council, an appeal from the Court of Admiralty lies, reversed that decision, maintained the action, and remitted the case to the court below for the purpose of ascertaining the damages. The present appeal is against that judgment. As to the principal facts in the cause, there is little or no dispute. [His Lordship then stated the facts as given above.] It is now to be considered upon what ground, if any, the present action is maintainable. The judgment of the Court of Admiralty has found, and that of the Appellate Court assumes, that up to the 3rd May the master was acting within his strict legal rights. Their Lordships do not dissent from that conclusion. The argument, however, that was addressed to them on behalf of the respondent makes it desirable to consider briefly what those rights were. That the master had, by Common Law, a lien for freight and general average contribution, and, by contract, a lien for demurrage upon the cargo, was not and could not have been successfully dis puted. The freight, however, was not payable before delivery, and could only be ascertained by measurement upon delivery. The case, therefore, was one of those in which the payment of the freight and the delivery of the goods are concurrent acts, in which, as is shown by the case of Paynter v. James (L. Rep. 2 C. P. 348; 3 Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 76), all that is required from the owner of the cargo is readiness and willingness to pay at the time of delivery, and in which a settlement can hardly be practically effected without some mutual trust and accommodation. In such circumstances the offer to pay so large a proportion of the freight as 6501., before breaking bulk, was not unreasonable. Again, before paying the sum demanded for average, the plaintiff had a right to be satisfied that it was the result of a proper adjustment. He did not himself see the average statement before the 1st May, though it had been in the hands of his London agents on the 18th April, when it was forwarded by them to the underwriters. There seems to have been a bonâ fide dispute as to the principle of the adjustment, which the subsequent conduct of the shipowners shows to have been at [PRIV. CO. least questionable. He had, moreover, fair grounds for declining to pay the average contribution, until he was satisfied that no claim would be made by the bottomry bondholder against the cargo. And of this he had no assurance before the 3rd, if before the 6th of May. He offered at least, as early as the 28th April, to sign an average bond, which, there being no doubt of his solvency, it would have been but reasonable in the shipowners to accept. It is true that their object was to get cash in order to pay the bondholder. But the owner of cargo is under no obligation to put the shipowners in funds to meet a debt for which they are primarily liable. Hence it appears to their Lordships that the detention of the cargo by the master up to the 3rd May, though not wrongful, was an act done in the rigid exercise of his rights; and that it is fairly open to argument whether, if he chose to detain the cargo under the circumstances above stated, he could impute the delay in its discharge thereby caused to the plaintiff, or make that a ground for a claim for demurrage. It does not, however, seem to them to be necessary for the determination of this case, to consider whether the lien for demurrage, which was once claimed, but finally waived, ever existed; and they abstain the more willingly from expressing an opinion upon this point, because the claim for demurrage is said to be now sub judice in another forum. The judgment under appeal has found that there was a wrongful detention of the cargo on and after the 3rd May, and that a right of action then accrued to the plaintiff by reason of the delivery to the Port and Docks Board, begun on that day, under a stop order for the excessive sum of 22007. In support of this judgment it has been argued that the delivery to the Port and Docks Board, of itself and irrespectively of the sum specified in the stop order was wrongful, inasmuch as the plaintiff had not "failed to land and take delivery" of his goods within the meaning of the 67th section of The Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act. Their Lordships, however, cannot assent to this proposition. They conceive that the word “failed " need not be taken to imply wilful default in the cargo owner; but that, upon the true construction of the section, the shipowner is at liberty to land the goods under it, whenever the delivery of them to the owner within the proper time has been prevented by the force of circumstances, whether the latter is or is not to blame. They think that this construction is fortified by some of the provisions of the section which, in certain cases, throw the risk and expense of the landing upon the ship owner. On the other hand it was argued against the judgment that it implies, if it does not express, that the master is liable to an action for damages whenever he lands under a stop order for a sum in excess, no matter how slightly in excess, of the amount due to him. Their Lordships do not so read the judgment. The proposition said to be involved in it is not necessary to support it, and seems to be inconsistent with the 72nd section of the statute, which sssumes that the master in some cases may bona fide have claimed a lien for more than was really due to him. The provisions of the statute which relate to this question are obviously designed both to give the master the means of discharging the cargo, retaining his lien, and to give the cargo owner the means of obtaining his goods by the deposit of a sum sufficient to cover the master's claim. But they do not extend the lien. The lien for the warehouse rent and charges occasioned by a landing, under the 67th section, is another and distinct lien created by the 76th section. The words of the 68th clause are: "If the shipowner gives to the warehouse owner notice in writing that the goods are to remain, subject to a lien for freight or other charges payable to the shipowner, to an amount to be mentioned in such notice, the goods so landed shall, in the hands of the warehouse owner, continue liable to the same lien, if any, for such charges as they were subject to before the landing thereof." If, then, the master wilfully inserts in his notice a sum which he knows to be in excess of that for which he had a lien before delivery, he not only injuriously affects the cargo owner by compelling him to deposit more than the statute requires in order to release his goods, but intends to produce that result by duress of the goods; and thus the delivery to the warehouse keeper is tantamount to a wrongful detention of the goods, and, as such, an actionable breach of duty. In the present case, the sum inserted in the notice was manifestly and grossly in excess of that for which the master could bonâ fide claim a lien. The outside sum claimed so late as the 6th May was 1991l. 28. 11d., being 12211. 28. 11d. for general average, and 7701. for freight, demurrage, and landing charges. On the 21st May the latter item had been swollen to 830l. 58. 7d., but the average claim had then been settled by the payment of 11361. 28. 4d.; and even if the sum of 8301. had been present to the mind of the master on the 3rd May as the amount claimable, in addition to the larger sum claimed for average, the aggregate of the two would have fallen short of 22001. by 1501. It was, however, argued that the mere insertion of an excessive sum in the notice is not actionable, because the statute gives to the cargo owner, by the 69th section, the means of releasing his goods otherwise than by a deposit of the sum specified in the notice; viz., by obtaining from the shipowner either a receipt for the amount claimed as due, or a release of freight. But upon the hypothesis that the goods are wrongfully detained by the shipowner for an excessive demand, it is not to be assumed in his favour that he would give such a receipt or release upon the offer of a less sum than that demanded; and a payment to the shipowner under protest would put the cargo owner in a worse position than he would be in by the deposit of the sum claimed by the shipowner; since, in the latter case, the shipowner would have to establish his claim ultra the amount admitted by proceedings under the 72nd section; whereas, in an action for money had and received, the burthen of proof would be on the plaintiff, the cargo owner. The evidence, moreover, in this case shows that the plaintiff did his best to obtain his timber under the 69th section. He actually paid the average; he was ready and willing to pay, though under protest the whole amount demanded for freight; but the master, under the instructions of Hoffmann and Co., refused to release the cargo upon any terms, or at all events upon any terms short of the payment of the 830l.; which, besides the amount claimed for demurrage, included items for which it is clear that the master when he landed the cargo [PRIV. CO. had no lien. The plaintiff, therefore, was driven to make the deposit of 22001. by the determination of the shipowners to use the stop order as the means of exacting the payment of charges for which they had no lien. Their Lordships are of opinion that, from the evidence in the cause, the Appellate Court might fairly infer that it was with this object and intention that the excessive amount was originally in serted in the stop order, and, consequently, that the landing and detention of the cargo under that stop order was a wrongful act, which gave the plaintiff a right of action as from the 3rd May. Had their Lordships been of a different opinion, the result would only have affected the date from which the wrongful detention is to be reckoned; for they entertain no doubt that the plaintiff had a good cause of action on the 15th May, the date of action brought. After the settlement of the claim for average by actual payment, it was clearly the duty of the master, and of the London agents for the ship, to reduce the stop order to the amount for which they then had, or could reasonably claim, a lien. This they refused to do; they refused either to release the goods or to reduce the stop order upon the receipt of the freight, which the plaintiff, on the 15th May, was ready and willing to pay. That this would have given to the plaintiff a right of action, if he had not one before, their Lordships have felt no doubt, but for the reason above stated they are of opinion that the judg. ment of the Appellate Court in Ireland was correct in finding that the right of action was complete on the 3rd May. Upon the point taken, to the effect that the plaintiff being entitled at most to nominal damages, the remand to the Admiralty Court is improper, it is sufficient to say that it is premature to say that the damages, though they may be small, will not be substantial. Their Lordships, will, therefore, humbly advise her Majesty to affirm; the judgment under appeal, and to dismiss this appeal with costs. Solicitors for the appellants, Hollams, Son, and Coward. Solicitors for the respondent, Waltons, Bubb, and Walton. April 29 and June 9, 1875. (Present: The Right Hons. Sir J. W. COLVILE, Sir BARNES PEACOCK, Sir M. E. SMITH, Sir R. P. COLLIER, and Sir H. S. KEATING.) THE FANNY M. CARVILL. Collision-Breach of regulations for preventing collision-Light-Screens Merchant Shipping Act 1873 (35 136 Vict. c. 85), s. 17-Construction. To render a ship liable to be deemed in fault under the Merchant Shipping Act 1873, sect. 17, for an infringement of the regulations for preventing collisions, the infringement must be one having some possible connection with the collision in question; a mere infringement, which by no possibility could have anything to do with the collision, will not render the ship liable. A ship carrying her side lights, with screens shorter than required by the regulations, is not to be deemed in fault if the shortness of the screens could not by any possibility have contributed to the collision. Semble, that the peculiar build of a ship requiring her side light screens to be shorter than provided in the regulations, is not a "circumstance of the case making a departure from the regulation necessary," within the meaning of the Merchant Shipping Act 1873, sect. 17. THIS is an appeal from a decree of the Right Hon. Sir R. J. Phillimore, Judge of the High Court of Admiralty of England, in a cause of damage lately pending in that court, brought by the respondents as the owners of a barque called the Peru, and the owners of the cargo lately laden on board her, against the barque Fanny M. Carvill, of which the appellants were owners, for the recovery of damages in respect of losses occasioned to the respondents by reason of a collision between the said vessels. The collision happened between 9 p.m. and 10 p.m. on the 18th Nov. 1874, in the English Channel, about fifteen miles off Beachy Head. The Peru, which is a Swedish barque of 589 tons register, was prosecuting a voyage from the Tyne to Monte Video with a cargo of coals. The Fanny M. Carvill, which is a British barque of 592 tons register, was on a voyage from London to Barcelona with a cargo of deals. The case on behalf of the Peru was that she was sailing close hauled by the wind on the starboard tack, heading about S.W., making about three knots an hour, with the wind about W.N.W., and the weather fine, clear, and moonlight, and that she had a red light on her port side and a green light on her starboard side, both burning brightly, and that whilst so proceeding the green light of the Fanny M. Carvill, which vessel was on the port tack, was seen at the distance of about one mile and a half from the Peru, bearing about two points on the port or lee bow, that the Peru was kept close hauled by the wind on the starboard tack, but that the Fanny M. Carvill approached, and though loudly hailed, ran into and struck the Peru on her port side. The respondents attributed blame to the Fanny M. Carvill, which was the port tacked vessel, for not keeping out of the way of the Peru, the close-hauled starboardtacked wessel. The case set up by the appellants was that the red light of the Peru was seen bearing four points on the starboard bow of the Fanny M. Carvill, distance about two miles, and that almost immediately afterwards the green light of the Peru came into view, and that the Peru continued to approach showing both lights broad on the starboard bow of the Fanny M. Carvill, that in about ten minutes the Fanny M. Carvill showed a flash light, and shortly afterwards the red light of the Peru was shut in and the two vessels would have passed clear, starboard side to starboard side, but that the Peru shut in her green light and again opened her red light, causing immediate danger of collision, that thereupon the helm of the Fanny M. Carvill was put hard aport and her mainyard squared, but that she was unable to clear the Peru, and with the bluff of her port bow struck the Peru on her port side amidships. The appellants charged the Peru first with having neglected to keep a good look-out; secondly, with having neglected to keep her course; thirdly, with having her lights improperly fixed and screened, and they attributed the collision to such alleged acts of neglect, and they further alleged that the Peru was in fault within the true intent and meaning [PRIV. CO. of the 17th section of the Merchant Shipping Act 1873, for infringing the regulations for preventing collisions at sea by neglecting to carry proper side lights. The cause was heard on oral evidence before the learned Judge of the court below, assisted by two of the Elder Brethren of the Trinity Corporation. It then appeared that the screens of the lights of the Peru fell short of the regulation length by nearly one foot, but no other complaint was made against the lights. The appellants alleged that, in consequence of the shortness of the screens, the green light of the Peru was seen across her port bow. The evidence as to the position of the lights and the other facts will be fonnd in the report of the case below (32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 129, 134; 2 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 478, 483). The learned judge of the court below, after hearing the evidence and consulting with the Elder Brethren, came to the conclusion that the story told by the witnesses from the Peru was true, and that that told by the witnesses from the Fanny M. Carvill was untrue, and that the deficiency in the length of the screens of the lights of the Peru did not, in fact, in any way contribute to the collision; but he reserved his judgment as to whether, owing to such deficiency, the Peru must also be held to blame under the said statute. The learned judge subsequently gave judgment upon this point in favour of the Peru, and made the usual decree, pronouncing for the damage proceeded for with costs. The judgments of the court below will be found: (32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 135; 2 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 485). From the decree so made the owners of the Fanny M. Carvill appealed for the following, amongst other, reasons: 1. That on the evidence taken in the court below, the collision was solely attributable to the negligence and improper navigation of those on board the Peru. 2. That the collision was in no way occasioned by any negligence or improper conduct of those on board the Fanny M. Carvill. 3. That on the evidence the side lights of the Peru were improperly screened, allowing the green light to show across her bow. 4. That on the evidence those on board the Fanny M. Carvill were misled by the improper exhibition of the lights on board the Peru. 5. That on the evidence it is clear that the collision was occasioned by the improper exhibition of the green light of the Peru. 6. That the finding of the learned judge that the green light of the Peru was not seen across the bow of the Peru by those on board the Fanny M. Carvill is not warranted by the evidence in the cause. 7. That the evidence established that the green light must have been and was seen across the bows of the Peru by those on board the Fanny M. Carvill. 8. That the learned judge should have found the Peru in fault within the meaning of 17th section of the 36 & 37 Vict. c. 85, on the ground of the improper condition of her side lights. 9. That upon the evidence given at the hearing of the cause, the circumstances of the case were not such as to make a departure from the regulation as to side lights necessary. April 29. Butt, QC. and R. Webster for the appellants. We submit, first, that the facts show that the Peru altered her course; secondly, |