the 9th corps beyond the Manassas railroad, between Piedmont and Salem, with a brigade at Manassas gap. The cavalry under Averill had a skirmish at Manassas gap, and the brigade of Pleasonton gained a handsome victory over superior numbers at Barber's Cross Roads. Bayard's cavalry had some sharp skirmishing in front of Salem.

On the 6th the 1st corps advanced to Warrenton; the 2d corps to Rectortown; the 5th corps commenced its movement from Snicker's gap to White Plains; the 9th corps to Waterloo and vicinity on the Rappahannock; the 11th corps was at New Baltimore, Thoroughfare and Hopewell's gaps; Sickles's division guarding the Orange and Alexandria railroad from Manassas Junction towards Warrenton Junction; the cavalry near Flint hill; Bayard to cut off what there might be in Warrenton, and to proceed to the Rappahannock

station.

November 7th: General Pleasonton was ordered to move towards Little Washington and Sperryville, and thence towards Culpeper Court House. November 8th: the 2d corps moved half way to Warrenton; the 5th corps to New Baltimore.

November 9: the 2d and 5th corps reached Warrenton; the 6th Baltimore.

corps, New

Late on the night of the 7th I received an order relieving me from the command of the army of the Potomac, and directing me to turn it over to General Burnside, which I at once did.

I had already given the orders for the movements of the 8th and 9th; these orders were carried into effect without change.

The position in which I left the army, as the result of the orders I had given, was as follows:

The 1st, 2d, and 5th corps, reserve artillery, and general headquarters, at Warrenton; the 9th corps on the line of the Rappahannock, in the vicinity of Waterloo; the 6th corps at New Baltimore; the 11th corps at New Baltimore, Gainesville, and Thoroughfare gap; Sickles's division of the 3d corps, on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, from Manassas Junction to Warrenton Junction; Pleasonton across the Rappahannock at Amissville, Jefferson, &c., with his pickets at Hazel river, facing Longstreet, six miles from Culpeper Court House; Bayard near Rappahannock station.

The army was thus massed near Warrenton, ready to act in any required direction, perfectly in hand, and in admirable condition and spirits. I doubt whether, during the whole period that I had the honor to command the army of the Potomac, it was in such excellent condition to fight a great battle. When I gave up the command to General Burnside, the best information in our possession indicated that Longstreet was immediately in our front near Culpeper; Jackson, with one, perhaps both, of the Hills, near Chester and Thornton's gaps, with the mass of their force west of the Blue Ridge.

The reports from General Pleasonton on the advance indicated the possibility of separating the two wings of the enemy's forces, and either beating Longstreet separately, or forcing him to fall back at least upon Gordonsville, to effect his junction with the rest of the army.

The following is from the report of General Pleasonton:

"At this time, and from the 7th instant, my advance pickets were at Hazel river, within six miles of Culpeper, besides having my flank pickets towards Chester and Thornton's gaps extended to Gaines's Cross Roads and Newby's Cross Roads, with numerous patrols in the direction of Woodville, Little Washington, and Sperryville.

"The information gained from these parties, and also from deserters, prisoners, contrabands, as well as citizens, established the fact of Longstreet, with his command, being at Culpeper, while Jackson, with D. H. Hill, with their respective commands, were in the Shenandoah valley, on the western side of the

Blue Ridge, covering Chester and Thornton's gaps, and expecting us to pass through and attack them.

"As late as the 17th of November, a contraband just from Strasburg came in my camp and reported that D. H. Hill's corps was two miles beyond that place, on the railroad to Mount Jackson. Hill was tearing up the road and destroying the bridges, under the impression that we intended to follow into that valley, and was en route for Staunton.

"Jackson's corps was between Strasburg and Winchester. Ewell and A. P. Hill were with Jackson. Provisions were scarce, and the rebels were obliged to keep moving to obtain them.”

Had I remained in command, I should have made the attempt to divide the enemy as before suggested, and could he have been brought to a battle within reach of my supplies, I cannot doubt that the result would have been a brilliant victory for our army.

On the 10th of November General Pleasonton was attacked by Longstreet, with one division of infantry and Stuart's cavalry, but repulsed the attack.

This indicates the relative position of our army and that of the enemy at the time I was relieved from command.

It would be impossible to participate in operations, such as those described in the foregoing pages, without forming fixed opinions upon subjects connected with the organization of our armies, and the general conduct of military opera tions.

This report would be incomplete without a brief allusion to some general considerations which have been firmly impressed upon me by the events which have occurred.

the

To my mind the most glaring defect in our armies is the absence of system in the appointment and promotion of general and other officers, and the want of means for the theoretical instruction of the mass of officers. The expansion of army was so great and so rapid at the commencement of the existing war that it was perhaps impossible, in the great scarcity of instructed officers, to have adopted any other course than that which was pursued; but the time has arrived when measures may be initiated to remedy existing defects, and provide against their recurrence.

I think that the army should be regarded as a permanent one; that is to say, its affairs should be administered precisely as if all who belonged to it had made it their profession for life; and those rules for promotion, &c., which have been found necessary in the best foreign armies to excite honorable emulation, produce an esprit du corps and procure efficiency, should be followed by us.

All officers and soldiers should be made to feel that merit-that is to say, courage, good conduct, the knowledge and performance of the duties of their grade, and fitness to exercise those of a superior grade-will insure to them advancement in their profession, and can alone secure it for them.

Measures should be adopted to secure the theoretical instruction of staff officers at least, who should, as far as possible, be selected from officers having a military education, or who have seen actual service in the field.

The number of cadets at the Military Academy should be at once increased to the greatest extent permitted by the capacity of the institution. The regular army should be increased and maintained complete in numbers and efficiency.

A well-organized system of recruiting and of depots for instruction should be adopted, in order to keep the ranks of the regiments full, and supply promptly the losses arising from battle or disease. This is especially necessary for the artillery and cavalry arms of the service, which, from the beginning of the war, have rendered great services, and which have never been fully appreciated by any but their comrades. We need also large bodies of well-instructed engineer troops.

In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns the direction should be left to

professional soldiers. A statesman may, perhaps, be more competent than a soldier to determine the political objects and direction of a campaign; but those once decided upon, everything should be left to the responsible military head, without interference from civilians. In no other manner is success probable. The meddling of individual members of committees of Congress with subjects which, from lack of experience, they are of course incapable of comprehending, and which they are too apt to view through the distorted medium of partisan or personal prejudice, can do no good, and is certain to produce incalculable mischief.

I cannot omit the expression of my thanks to the President for the constant evidence given me of his sincere personal regard, and his desire to sustain the military plans which my judgment led me to urge for adoption and execution. I cannot attribute his failure to adopt some of those plans, and to give that support to others which was necessary to their success, to any want of confidence in me; and it only remains for me to regret that other counsels came between the constitutional commander-in-chief and the general whom he had placed at the head of his armies-counsels which resulted in the failure of great campaigns. If the nation possesses no generals in service competent to direct its military affairs without the aid or supervision of politicians, the sooner it finds them and places them in position the better will it be for its fortunes.

I may be pardoned for calling attention to the memorandum submitted by me to the President on the 4th of August, 1861; my letter to him of July 7, 1862; and other similar communications to him and to the Secretary of War. I have seen no reason to change in any material regard the views there expressed.

After a calm, impartial, and patient consideration of the subject—a subject which demands the closest thought on the part of every true lover of his country-I am convinced that by the proper employment of our resources it is entirely possible to bring this war to a successful military issue. I believe that a necessary preliminary to the re-establishment of the Union is the entire defeat or virtual destruction of the organized military power of the confederates ; and that such a result should be accompanied and followed by conciliatory measures; and that by pursuing the political course I have always advised, it is possible to bring about a permanent restoration of the Union—a re-union by which the rights of both sections shall be preserved, and by which both parties shall preserve their self-respect, while they respect each other.

In this report I have confined myself to a plain narrative of such facts as are necessary for the purposes of history.

Where it was possible, I have preferred to give these facts in the language of despatches, written at the time of their occurrence, rather than to attempt a new relation.

The reports of the subordinate commanders, hereto annexed, recite what time and space would fail me to mention here: those individual instances of conspicuous bravery and skill by which every battle was marked. To them I must especially refer, for without them this narrative would be incomplete, and justice fail to be done. But I cannot omit to tender to my corps commanders, and to other general officers under them, such ample recognition of their cordial co-operation and their devoted services as those reports abundantly avouch.

I have not sought to defend the army which I had the honor to command, nor myself, against the hostile criticisms once so rife.

It has seemed to me that nothing more was required than such a plain and truthful narrative to enable those whose right it is to form a correct judgment on the important matters involved.

This report is, in fact, the history of the army of the Potomac.

During the period occupied in the organization of that army, it served as a barrier against the advance of a lately victorious enemy, while the fortifications

of the capital were in progress; and under the discipline which it then received it acquired strength, education, and some of that experience which is necessary to success in active operations, and which enabled it afterwards to sustain itself under circumstances trying to the most heroic men. Frequent skirmishes occurred along the lines, conducted with great gallantry, which inured our troops to the realities of war.

The army grew into shape but slowly; and the delays which attended on the obtaining of arms, continuing late into the winter of 1861-'62, were no less trying to the soldiers than to the people of the country. Even at the time of the organization of the Peninsula campaign, some of the finest regiments were without rifles; nor were the utmost exertions on the part of the military authori ties adequate to overcome the obstacles to active service.

When, at length, the army was in condition to take the field, the Peninsula campaign was planned, and entered upon with enthusiasm by officers and men. Had this campaign been followed up as it was designed, I cannot doubt that it would have resulted in a glorious triumph to our arms, and the permanent restoration of the power of the government in Virginia and North Carolina, if not throughout the revolting States. It was, however, otherwise ordered, and instead of reporting a victorious campaign, it has been my duty to relate the heroism of a reduced army, sent upon an expedition into an enemy's country, there to abandon one and originate another and new plan of campaign, which might and would have been successful if supported with appreciation of its necessities, but which failed because of the repeated failure of promised support, at the most critical, and, as it proved, the most fatal moments. That heroism surpasses ordinary description. Its illustration must be left for the pen of the historian in times of calm reflection, when the nation shall be looking back to the past from the midst of peaceful days.

For me, now, it is sufficient to say that my comrades were victors on every field save one, and there the endurance of but little more than a single corps accomplished the object of the fighting, and, by securing to the army its transit to the James, left to the enemy a ruinous and barren victory.

The army of the Potomac was first reduced by the withdrawal from my command of the division of General Blenker, which was ordered to the Mountain

department, under General Frémont. We had scarcely landed on the Peninsula when it was further reduced by a despatch revoking a previous order giving mə command at Fortress Monroe, and under which I had expected to take ten thousand men from that point to aid in our operations. Then, when under fire before the defences of Yorktown, we received the news of the withdrawal of General McDowell's corps of about 35,000 men. This completed the overthrow of the original plan of the campaign. About one-third of my entire army (five divisions out of fourteen, one of the nine remaining being but little larger than a brigade) was thus taken from me. Instead of a rapid advance which I had planned, aided by a flank movement up the York river, it was only left to besiege Yorktown. That siege was successfully conducted by the army, and when these strong works at length yielded to our approaches, the troops rushed forward to the sanguinary but successful battle of Williamsburg, and thus opened an almost unresisted advance to the banks of the Chickahominy. Richmond lay before them, surrounded with fortifications, and guarded by an army larger than our own; but the prospect did not shake the courage of the brave men who composed my command. Relying still on the support which the vastness of our undertaking and the grand results depending on our success seemed to insure us, we pressed forward. The weather was stormy beyond precedent: the deep soil of the Peninsula was at times one vast morass; the Chickahominy rose to a higher stage than had been known for years before. Pursuing the advance, the crossings were seized, and the right wing extended to effect a junction with reenforcements now promised and earnestly desired, and upon the arrival of which

the complete success of the campaign seemed clear. The brilliant battle of Hanover Court House was fought, which opened the way for the first corps, with the aid of which, had it come, we should then have gone into the enemy's captial. It never came. The bravest army could not do more, under such overwhelming disappointment, than the army of the Potomac then did. Fair Oaks attests their courage and endurance when they hurled back, again and again, the vastly superior masses of the enemy. But mortal men could not accomplish the miracle that seemed to have been expected of them. But one course was left-a flank march in the face of a powerful enemy to another and better base— one of the most hazardous movements in war. The army of the Potomac, holding its own safety and almost the safety of our cause, in its hands, was equal to the occasion. The seven days are classical in American history; those days in which the noble soldiers of the Union and Constitution fought an outnumbering enemy by day, and retreated from successive victories by night, through a week of battle, closing the terrible series of conflicts with the ever-memorable victory of Malvern, where they drove back, beaten and shattered, the entire eastern army of the confederacy, and thus secured for themselves a place of rest and a point for a new advance upon the capital from the banks of the James. Richmond was still within our grasp, had the army of the Potomac been re-enforced and permitted to advance. But counsels, which I cannot but think subsequent events proved unwise, prevailed in Washington, and we were ordered to abandon the campaign. Never did soldiers better deserve the thanks of a nation than the army of the Potomac for the deeds of the Peninsula campaign, and although that meed was withheld from them by the authorities, I am persuaded they have received the applause of the American people.

The army of the Potomac was recalled from within sight of Richmond, and incorporated with the army of Virginia. The disappointments of the campaign on the Peninsula had not damped their ardor nor diminished their patriotism. They fought well, faithfully, gallantly, under General Pope; yet were compelled to fall back on Washington, defeated and almost demoralized.

The enemy, no longer occupied in guarding his own capital, poured his troops northward, entered Maryland, threatened Pennsylvania, and even Washington itself. Elated by his recent victories, and assured that our troops were disorganized and dispirited, he was confident that the seat of war was now permanently transferred to the loyal States, and that his own exhausted soil was to be relieved from the burden of supporting two hostile armies. But he did not understand the spirit which animated the soldiers of the Union. I shall not, nor can I living, forget that when I was ordered to the command of the troops for the defence of the capital, the soldiers, with whom I had shared so much of the anxiety, and pain, and suffering of the war, had not lost their confidence in me as their commander. They sprang to my call with all their ancient vigor, discipline, and courage. I led them into Maryland. Fifteen days after they had fallen back defeated before Washington, they vanquished the enemy on the rugged height of South Mountain, pursued him to the hard-fought field of Antietam, and drove him, broken and disappointed, across the Potomac into Virginia.

The army had need of rest. After the terrible experiences of battles and marches, with scarcely an interval of repose, which they had gone through from the time of leaving for the Peninsula; the return to Washington; the defeat in Virginia; the victory at South Mountain, and again at Antietam, it was not surprising that they were in a large degree destitute of the absolute necessaries to effective duty Shoes were worn out; blankets were lost; clothing was in rags: in short, the army was unfit for active service, and an interval for rest and equipment was necessary. When the slowly forwarded supplies came to us I led the army across the river, renovated, refreshed, in good order and discipline,

H. Ex. Doc. 15-16