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“But you will reply, why not re-enforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position ? To do this, you said, at our interview, that you required thirty thousand additional troops. I told you that it was impossible to give you so many. You finally thought that you would have ‘some chance’ of success with twenty thousand. But you afterwards telegraphed me that you would require thirty-five thousand, as the enemy was being largely re-enforced. “If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly reasonable; but it was utterly impossible to fill it until new troo could be enlisted and organized, which would require several weeks. “To keep your army in its present position until it could it be so re-enforced would almost destroy it in that climate. “The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of James river; and even after you received the re-enforcements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries before you could advance on Richmond. “It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time—perhaps as much as those at Yorktown. “This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the mean time General Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy without the slightest hope of assistance from you. “In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the Peninsula to the Rappahannock, I must remark that a large number of your highest officers, indeed a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me, are decidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the Peninsula now advise its abandonment. “I have not inquired, and do not wish to know, by whose advice or for what reasons the army of the Potomac was separated into two parts with the enemy between them. I must take things as I find them. “I find the forces divided, and I wish to unite them. Only one feasible plan has been presented for doing this. If you, or any one else, had presented a better plan, I certainly should have adopted it. But all of your plans require re-enforcements which it is impossible to give you. It is very easy to ask for re-enforcements, but it is not so easy to give them when you have no disposable troops at your command. “I have written very plainly as I understand the case, and I hope you will give me credit for having fully considered the matter, although I may have arrived at very different conclusions from your own. “Very respectfully, your obedient servant, “H. W. HALLECK, - - “General-in-Chief. “Major General G. B. McCLELLAN, ." Commanding, &c., Berkeley, Virginia.”

On the 7th I received the following telegram:

“WASHINGTON, August 7, 1862–10 a. m.

“You will immediately report the number of sick sent off since you received my order, the number still to be shipped, and the amount of transportation at your disposal—that is, the number of persons that can be carried on all the vessels which by my order you were authorized to control. “H. W. HALLECK, “Major General. “Major General G. B. McCLELLAN.” * *

To which I made this reply:

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY of THE PotoMAC, - “August 7, 1862–10.40 p.m.

“In reply to your despatch of 10 a.m. to-day, I report the number of sick sent off since I received your order as follows: Three thousand seven hundred and forty, including some that are embarked to-night and will leave in the morning. The number still to be shipped is, as nearly as can be ascertained, five thousand seven hundred.

“The embarcation of five batteries of artillery, with their horses, wagons, &c., required most of our available boats except the ferry-boats. All the transports that can ascend to this place have been ordered up; they will be here to: morrow evening. Colonel Ingalls reports to me that there are no transports now available for cavalry, and will not be for two or three days. As soon as they can be obtained I shall send off the first New York cavalry.

“After the transports with sick and wounded have returned, including some heavy-draught steamers at Fort Monroe that cannot come to this point, we can transport twenty-five thousand men at a time. We have some propellers here, but they are laden with commissary supplies and are not available.

“The transports now employed in transporting sick and wounded will carry 12,000 well infantry soldiers. Those at Fort Monroe, and of too heavy draft to come here, will carry 8,000 or 10,000 infantry. Several of the largest steamers have been used for transporting prisoners of war, and have only become available for the sick to-day.

“GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, “Major General. “Major General H. W. HALLEck, “Commanding United States Army.”

The report of my chief quartermaster upon the subject is as follows:

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY of THE POTOMAC, “Office of Chief Quartermaster, Harrison's Landing, August 7, 1862.

“GENERAL: I have the honor to return the papers herewith which you sent me, with the following remarks:

“We are embarking five batteries of artillery, with their horses, baggage, &c., which requires the detailing of most of our available boats, except the ferryboats. The medical department has ten or twelve of our largest transport vessels, which, if disposable, could carry 12,000 men. Besides, there are some heavy draft steamers at Fort Monroe that cannot come to this point, but which can carry 8,000 or 10,000 infantry.

“I have ordered all up here that can ascend to this depot. They will be here to-morrow evening. As it now is, after the details already made, we cannot transport from this place more than 5,000 infantry.

“There are no transports now available for cavalry. From and after to-mor. row, if the vessels arrive, I could transport 10,000 infantry. In two or three days a regiment of cavalry can be sent if required. If you wait, and ship from Yorktown or Fort Monroe after the sick and wounded transports are at my disposal, we can transport 25,000 at a time. The number that can be transported is contingent on circumstances referred to.

“Most of the propellers here are laden with commissary or other supplies, and most of the tugs are necessary to tow off sail craft also laden with supplies.

“I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, “RUFUS ING ALLS, “Chief Quartermaster. “General R. B. MARCY, “Chief of Staff.”

On the 9th I received this despatch:

“WAshingtoN, August 9, 1862–12.45 p.m.

“I am of the opinion that the enemy is massing his forces in front of Generals Pope and Burnside, and that he expects to crush them and move forward to the Potomac.

“You must send re-enforcements instantly to Aquia creek.

“Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory. You must move with all possible celerity.

“H. W. HALLECK, “Major General. “Major General G. B. McCLELLAN.”

To which I sent the following reply:

“Berkeley, August 10, 1862–8 a.m.

“Telegram of yesterday received. The batteries sent to Burnside took the last available transport yesterday morning. Enough have since arrived to ship one regiment of cavalry to-day. The sick are being embarked as rapidly as possible. There has been no unnecessary delay, as you assert—not an hour's— but everything has been and is being pushed as rapidly as possible to carry out your orders. n

“G. B. McCLELLAN, “Major General Commanding. “Major General H. W. HALLEck, “Commanding United States Army.”

The following report, made on the same day by the officer then in charge of the transports, exposes the injustice of the remark in the despatch of the gen, eral-in-chief, that, “considering the amount of transportation at your disposal your delay is not satisfactory.”

“Harrison's Landing, Virginia, August 10, 1862.

“Colonel Ingalls, being himself ill, has requested me to telegraph to you concerning the state and capacity of the transports now here. On the night of the 8th I despatched eleven steamers, principally small ones, and six schooners, with five batteries of heavy horse artillery, none of which have yet returned.

“Requisition is made this morning for transportation of one thousand cavalry to Aquia creek. All the schooners that had been chartered for carrying horses have been long since discharged, or changed into freight vessels.

“A large proportion of the steamers now here are still loaded with stores, or are in the floating hospital service engaged in removing the sick. To transport the one thousand cavalry to-day will take all the available steamers now here not engaged in the service of the harbor. These steamers could take a large number of infantry, but are not well adapted to the carrying of horses, and much space is thus lost. Several steamers are expected here to-day, and we are unloading schooners rapidly; most of these are not chartered, but are being taken for the service required, at same rates of pay as other chartered schooners. If you could cause a more speedy return of the steamers sent away from here, it would facilitate matters.

“C. G. SAWTELLE, “Captain and Assistant Quartermaster, commanding Depot. “General M. C. MEIGS, “Quartermaster General United States Army, Washington.”

Our wharf facilities at Harrison's landing were very limited, admitting but few vessels at one time. These were continually in use as long as there were disposable vessels, and the officers of the medical and quartermaster’s departments, with all their available forces, were incessantly occupied day and night in embarking and sending off the sick men, troops, and material.

Notwithstanding the repeated representations I made to the general-in-chief that such were the facts, on the 10th I received the following:

“WASHINGTON, August 10, 1862–12 p.m.

“The enemy is crossing the Rapidan in large force. They are fighting General Pope to-day; there must be no further delay in your movements; that which has already occurred was entirely unexpected, and must be satisfactorily explained. Let not a moment's time be lost, and telegraph me daily what progress you have made in executing the order to transfer your troops. “H. W. HALLECK, “Major General. “Major General G. B. McCLELLAN.”

To which I sent this reply:

“Berkeley, August 10, 1862–11.30 p.m.

“Your despatch of to-day is received. I assure you again that there has not been any unnecessary delay in carrying out your orders. “You are probably laboring under some great mistake as to the amount of transportation available here. “I have pushed matters to the utmost in getting off our sick, and the troops you ordered to Burnside. “Colonel Ingalls has more than once informed the Quartermaster General of the condition of our water transportation. From the fact that you directed me to keep the order secret, I took it for granted that you would take the steps necessary to provide the requisite transportation. “A large number of transports for all arms of service, and for wagons, should at once be sent to Yorktown and Fort Monroe. “I shall be ready to move the whole army by land the moment the sick are disposed of. You may be sure that not an hour's delay will occur that can be avoided. I fear you do not realize the difficulty of the operation proposed. “The regiment of cavalry for Burnside has been in course of embarcation today and to-night; (10) ten steamers were required for the purpose; (1,258) twelve hundred and fifty-eight sick loaded to-day and to-night. “Our means exhausted, except one vessel returning to Fort Monroe in the morning, which will take some (500) five hundred cases of slight sickness. “The present moment is probably not the proper one for me to refer to the unnecessary, harsh, and unjust tone of your telegrams of late. It will, however, make no difference to my official action. “G. B. McCLELLAN, “Major General Commanding. “Major General H. W. HALLEck, “Commanding United States Army.”

On the eleventh this report was made:

“HEADQUARTERs ARMY of The PoToMAC, “Berkeley, August 11, 1862–11.30 p.m. “The embarcation of (850) eight hundred and frty cavalry, and (1) one brigade of infantry will be completed by (2) two o'clock in the morning; (500) five hundred sick were embarked to-day. Another vessel arrived to-night, and

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(600) six hundred more sick are now being embarked. I still have some (4,000) four thousand sick to dispose of You have been greatly misled as to the amount of transportation at my disposal.

“Vessels loaded to their utmost capacity with stores, and others indispensable for service here, have been reported to you as available for carrying sick and well. I am sending off all that can be unloaded at Fort Monroe, to have them return here. I repeat that I have lost no time in carrying out your orders.

“G. B. McCLELLAN, . “Major General, Commanding. “Major General H. W. HALLEck, “Commanding United States Army.”

On the same day I received the following from the quartermaster in charge of the depot:

“AssistANT QUARTERMASTER’s Office, ARMY of the PotoMAC “Harrison's Landing, August 11, 1862.

“ColoneL: In reply to the communication from General Marcy, which was referred to me by you, I have to state that there are now in this harbor no disposable transports not already detailed, either for the use of the hospital department, for the transportation of the 1st N. Y. cavalry, or for the necessary service of the harbor. I think the steamers loading and to be loaded with cavalry could take in addition three thousand infantry. These boats are, however, directed to leave as fast as they are loaded; some have already started. The embarcation of this cavalry regiment is going on very slowly, and it is not in my power to hurry the matter, although I have had several agents of the department and one commissioned officer at the wharf, to render all the assistance possible. The entire army is this morning turning in, to be stored on vessels, knapsacks, officers' baggage, and other surplus property, and with our limited wharf facilities it is impossible, unless the regular issues of forage, &c., are suspended, to avoid great confusion and delay with what is already ordered to be done. Of coursé, if any infantry is ordered to embark on these cavalry transports, the confusion and difficulties will be increased.

“I know of no boats that may be expected here to-day, except the South America and Fanny Cadwallader, a propeller which was ordered to be sent back from Fort Monroe.

“The transports with the artillery left for Aquia creek on the night of the 8th and the morning of the 9th. They were ordered to return immediately.

“I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, “C. G. SAWTELLE, “Captain and A. Q. M., Commanding Depot. “Lieut. Colonel RUFUs INGALLs, “A. D. C. and Chief Quartermaster, Army of the Potomac.”

On the 12th I received the following:

“WASHINGTON, August 12, 1862–12 m.

“The Quartermaster General informs me that nearly every available steam vessel in the country is now under your control. To send more from Philadelphia, Baltimore and New York, would interfere with the transportation of army supplies and break up the channels of travel by which we are to bring forward the new troops. Burnside moved nearly thirteen thousand (13,000) troops to Aquia creek in less than two (2) days, and his transports were immediately sent back to you. All vessels in the James river and the Chesapeake bay

H. Ex. Doc. 15 11

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