will only suspend their operation for a moment, or except from it pre-existing cases. The object would scarcely seem to be of sufficient importance to have found a place in that instrument. This construction would change the character of the provision, and convert an inhibition to pass retrospective laws. Had this been the intention of the convention, is it not reasonable to believe that it would have been so expressed? Had the intention been to confine the restriction to laws which were retrospective in their operation, language could have been found, and would have been used, to convey this idea. The very word would have occurred to the framers of the instrument, and we should have probably found it in the clause. Instead of the general prohibition to pass any "law impairing the obligation of contracts," the prohibition would have been to the passage of any retrospective law. Or, if the intention had been, not to embrace all retrospective laws, but those only which related to contracts, still the word would have been introduced, and the state legislatures would have been forbidden "to pass any retrospective law impairing the obligation of contracts," or "to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts previously made." Words which directly and plainly express the cardinal intent always present themselves to those who are preparing an important instrument, and will always be used by them. Undoubtedly there is an imperfection in human language which often exposes the same sentence to different constructions. But it is rare, indeed, for a person of clear and distinct perceptions, intending to convey one principal idea, so to express himself as to leave any doubt respecting that idea. It may be uncertain whether his words comprehend other things not immediately in his mind; but it can seldom be uncertain whether he intends the particular thing to which his mind is specially directed. If the mind of the convention, in framing this prohibition, had been directed, not generally to the operation of laws upon the obligation of contracts, but particularly to their retrospective operation, it is scarcely conceivable that some word would not have been used indicating this idea. In instruments prepared on great consideration, general terms, comprehending a whole subject, are seldom employed to designate a particular-we might say a minute-portion of that subject. The general language of the clause is such as might be suggested by a general intent to prohibit state legislation on the subject to which that language is applied, the obligation of contracts; not such as would be suggested by a particular intent to prohibit retrospective legislation.

It is also worthy of consideration that those laws which had effected all that mischief the constitution intended to prevent were prospective, as well as retrospective, in their operation. They embraced future contracts, as well as those previously formed. There is the less reason for imputing to the convention an intention, not manifested by their language, to confine a restriction intended to guard against the recurrence of those mischiefs to retrospective legislation. For these reasons, we are of opinion that on this point the district court of Louisiana has decided rightly.

LORD BROUGHAM.

[Henry Peter Brougham, Baron Brougham and Vaux, was born in Edinburgh, 1778. He was educated at the University of Edinburgh, where he distinguished himself as a student of science and as a debater. He was graduated in 1795. In 1800 he was admitted as an advocate. He was one of the founders of the Edinburgh Review, in 1802, and had then attained a high position in Edinburgh literary circles. In 1803 he was admitted a member of Lincoln's Inn, and two years later settled in London, where he supported himself for a time by writing for the Review. Under the patronage of Lord Holland he became an active Whig politician, but on the defeat of the Whigs he returned to the study of the law as a pupil of Tindal, afterwards chief justice. In 1808 he was called to the English bar, and joined the northern circuit, then led by Scarlett. In 1810 he entered parliament. Thereafter he became a conspicuous figure in public and in professional life. In 1811 his professional reputation was materially increased by his successful defense of the Hunts, indicted for libel for publishing an article in the Examiner on military flogging. He became an adviser of the Princess of Wales, and, when she became queen, Brougham was appointed her attorney general. His elaborate speech in defense of the queen in 1820 was one of his greatest efforts. In the following year he made a learned argument before the privy council on the queen's right to coronation. In 1825 he was elected lord rector of Glasgow University. Meantime, from 1816, he had been vigorously engaged in the cause of law reform. In 1830 he received the great seal, and was elevated to the peerage. After the resignation of Lord Melbourne he continued for a long time his extraordinary activities in politics and in the law. He took a large share in the hearing of appeals, and carried on an immense amount of literary work. He was one of the founders and the first president of the Social Science Association. In 1859 he was elected chancellor of the University of Edinburgh. He was an honorary D. C. L. of Oxford, and a fellow of the Royal Society. He died at Cannes in 1868. His life and times, from his own correspondence, and his collected works, have been published in England.]

Few men have been endowed with more versatile natural powers than Lord Brougham. Whatever he did-and few men have done more things-was well done. A great orator, he attained a considerable position as a man of letters. A clever, rather than a profound, lawyer, he won the highest official honor of his profes

sion. As a scientific investigator, though rash and empirical, he nevertheless accomplished some valuable results. He had brilliant talents in abundance; but he wanted the stability of character, the moderation and patience, which characterize the highest genius. "His mind ranged over so wide an area that he never acquired a thorough knowledge of any particular division of learning."

His contemporary reputation has become dim. He supported himself while studying law mainly by writing for the Edinburgh Review. His versatility and power of dispatch were extraordinary. In the first twenty numbers he had eighty articles. But his reviews were slashing and often superficial, and are now seldom read. What Sir Leslie Stephen says of his contributions to the Edinburgh Review may be said to characterize much of his work: "It was a forcible exposition of the arguments common at the time, but it has nowhere the stamp of originality in thought or brilliance in expression which could confer upon it a permanent vitality." His style is generally careless, inelegant, and involved. His facts are often huddled and heaped together without any regard to method. Indeed, his Sketches of Statesmen, which required little research, is generally considered his best performance.

As a law reformer Brougham was energetic and comprehensive, but his proposals for reform were marked by crudeness and imperfections. His efforts towards reform began as early as 1816, with his proposed amendment to the libel law. In 1828 he brought forward a comprehensive scheme of law reform, which he supported in one of his greatest speeches. His extraordinary energy in this laudable cause bore ample fruit. It caused a vast improvement in common-law procedure, and overthrew the cumbrous and antiquated machinery of fines and recoveries. As chancellor he effected considerable improvements in the court of chancery, secured the substitution of the judicial committee of the privy council for the court of delegates, and the institution of the central criminal court; the bankruptcy statute was founded on his bill. It was in the spirit and tendency of his efforts, rather than in actual results, that Brougham rendered his greatest service. He entered upon the cause of reform when no political capital was to be found in it; when the path was rugged and unpopular; when colleagues and opponents alike passed by topics which seemed only to impede professional advancement; when Eldon and Ellenborough held up their hands in horror at the suggestion of changes in the supposed perfection of the governmental system.

Brougham viewed the institutions of his country with an open mind, and he entered upon the task of reform with entire singleness of purpose. The broad map of modern English legislation is everywhere dotted by measures which received their first impetus from his vigorous mind.

As a judge he rendered substantial service. It was remarked by a sarcastic critic that, if Brougham had known a little law, he would have known a little of everything. Yet his work in the judicial committee of the privy council was of considerable importance, both in upholding liberal principles in ecclesiastical law, and in creating a body of precedents which have served as a sort of foundation of Indian law. As chancellor he worked with extraordinary energy, and expedited the work of his court beyond all his predecessors,

It is, however, as a parliamentary and forensic orator that he is best remembered. Any detailed account of his parliamentary efforts would require a sketch of the political history of his time. His speech of October 7, 1832, in the house of lords on the reform bill is one of his ablest efforts. He ended his speech with a prayer; fell upon his knees, and remained kneeling. He had kept up his energy with draughts of mulled port, and his friends, who thought that he was unable to rise, picked him up and set him on the woolsack. His speech of February 2, 1824, in opposition to the dictation of the Holy Alliance, also attracted much attention.

As an advocate he had no considerable success until after he had succeeded in politics; and throughout his practice he was most successful in political causes. He was lacking in the tact necessary to success in nisi prius practice, and his own intellectual power and irritable temper made him impatient with juries. He seemed to aim more at displaying his own powers than to secure verdicts for his clients. The result is well shown in the anecdote, quoted in the introduction, in connection with his astute rival Scarlett. He attained considerable reputation in 1811 by his successful defense of the Hunts, who were indicted for libel in publishing an article in the Examiner on military flogging. His most prominent appearances as an advocate were in connection with his ardent championship of Queen Caroline. He defended the queen in an able and elaborate argument, which brought him immense popularity. In 1821 he made a learned but unsuccessful argument before the privy council on behalf of the queen's right to be crowned. His speech in defense of Wil