In Rajendra Rau v. Sama Rau and another, I. H. C. R., 436, the defendants resided without the limits of the High Court, and the instrument sued on obliged to payment of money generally, but was signed without the limits of the High Court. Held, the High Court had no jurisdiction over the matter.

In Atmakari Bhavanna Setti v. Sri Ramulu and others, 3 H. C. R., 222, there had been a continuous series of mercantile transactions between the parties, of whom the plaintiffs lived at Berhampore, and the deceased person, whose sons were the defendants, at Madras. Goods, hoondies, and money, had passed between the two, the transactions between them being sometimes as principals, sometimes as agents, the one for the other. The plaintiff sued in the Court at Berhampore on an account furnished by the deceased, and headed "Account of the sale of goods and of the sums received and disbursed in the trade of A. Bhavanni carried on at Madras through M. Saniyasi Setti," at various dates. And at the time of suit brought, the defendants lived two at Madras, one at Bimlipatam, one at Vizagapatam, and one, a defendant improperly joined, at Berhampore. The Civil Court dismissed the suit as not having jurisdiction, and the High Court, on appeal, affirmed the decision, on the ground that "the whole cause of action did not arise within the jurisdiction of that court, and none of the defendants who were properly joined in the suit dwelled or worked within the Berhampore District" at the time of suit brought. It was also held, that the wrongful addition of the resident defendant could not bring the case under the operation of Sec. 4, Act XXIII of 1861.

The leading case in Madras is De Souza and another v. Coles, 3 H. C. R., 384. There the defendant was resident at Bimlipatam, and acted as agent for a Madras firm for the purpose of shipping goods from Bimlipatam. Amongst other things, it was agreed that the defendant should be entitled to a one-half share of the shipments made by him at Bimlipatam under instructions from the firm, upon his electing to take the risk. He elected so to do with respect to certain shipments, upon which there was a heavy loss, and the firm applied for leave to sue in the High Court to recover the sum found to be due by him. Collett, J., refused to give leave to sue, on the

ground that there were several causes of action, of which the principal did not arise within the limits of the High Courts jurisdiction, or if it did arise within them in part, it was a distinct and separate cause of action, in respect of which leave to sue ought not to be granted. From this order, the plaintiffs appealed, and Bittleston and Holloway, J. J., took time to consider their decision. Eventually they decided that the order was legally proper, and must be upheld, but on very different grounds: the former following English precedents, and the latter guiding himself mainly by rules laid down by the jurists.

Bittleston, J., thought the following propositions might be deduced from the decisions on the subject, namely:-(1). "That "the cause of action" means the whole cause of action; and as our charter expressly refers to a cause of action arising wholly or in part within the local limits, it seems to me safe to say, that the cause of action spoken of may consist of several parts, and which parts may arise in different places. (2). That the whole cause of action includes every fact essential to the maintenance of the action; and that each of these facts separately is but a part of the cause of action." And the learned judge went on to show, that in actions ex contractu "neither the making of the contract nor the breach of it constitutes the whole cause of it, but each is a part of the cause of action; and so also is the consideration for the defendant's promise. Further, the performance of a condition, or the happening of any event, upon which the plaintiff's right of suit depends, is also a part of the cause of action, and must occur within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court, when that jurisdiction depends upon the whole cause of action having arisen within those limits." In conclusion, the learned judge showed, that as the goods were purchased and shipped at Bimlipatam on the joint account, as the contract was there completed by the defendant electing to take half the risk, as the money was payable there as elsewhere, and as the defendant resided there, the court at Bimlipatam was the only court in which the suit would lie.

Holloway, J., after defining the words 'cause of action' and 'action,' proceeded to show that the ground of origin of the right

infringed logically can have no bearing upon the question; and after noticing various decisions and writings, declared that the case in 8 Moore, 291, Lutchmee Chund v. Zorawur Mull, involves implicitly the following propositions

First-The making of the contract is a matter perfectly indifferent, and is no part of the cause of action.

Secondly:-The place at which an obligation is to be performed is its seat, and the place of jurisdiction over it. That place of expected performance may be determined by the circumstances of the case; and in a contract of partnership its main seat is the place at which each of the partners is bound to pay what may be due.

This case, therefore, the learned judge thought, is wholly irreconcilable with Borthwick v. Walton, ubi supra, and with a string of cases hanging from that case, and being a case decided by the Privy Council, deserves greater weight in India than ordinary English cases. He then went on to indicate the principles upon which, with respect to obligations, the character of locality can be assigned; and gave and illustrated Savignys rules for the discovery of the special forum of the obligation. The result was that:-"A cause of action being the obligation and its breach, this cause of action for the main demand arose entirely out of the jurisdiction." The decision is replete with learning and admirably put together, and will well repay the closest study.

It was held in another important case, Bavah Meah Saib v. Khajeemeah Saib, 4 H. C. R., 218, that the High Court, under its Letters Patent, has jurisdiction to hear and determine a suit against nonresident foreigners when the cause of action arises within the local limits of its ordinary original jurisdiction.

In Subbaraya Mudali v. The Government, 1 H. C. R., 286, there were two questions of jurisdiction involving the construction of the twelfth clause of the Letters Patent, by which the jurisdiction of the High Court, in all cases other than suits for land and other immovable property, is made to depend upon the cause of action having arisen, or the defendant at the time of the commencement of the suit dwelling' or 'carrying on business' or 'personally work

ing for gain,' within the local limits of the courts ordinary original jurisdiction. Scotland, C. J., delivered the judgment of the court that "In suits brought against the Government, eo nomine, under the provisions of the Code, the local Government must be considered as the party sued; and having reference to Sec. 5, which does not contain the words "carrying on business," we may observe that the jurisdiction to entertain suits against the Government, as such, under that section alone would, it seems to us, exist only where the cause of action arose." But under the Letters Patent the court held that the local Government must be deemed to carry on business' as a deliberative and executive body within the local limits of jurisdiction of the High Court, in the same way as incorporated companies generally are to be deemed to carry on business at their head offices. It was further decided that the Collector of Madras did not 'carry on business' at Madras, within the courts local limits, inasmuch as he carried on business always at his office in Sydapet within the old district of Chingleput.

Resides or, &c.-See the notes above and to Sec. 16.

18. In suits for compensation for wrong done to person or moveable property, if the wrong was done within the local limits of the jurisdiction of one Court and the defendant resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain within the local limits of the jurisdiction of another Court, the plaintiff may at his option sue in either of the said Courts.

Suits for compensation for wrongs to person or moveables.

Illustrations.

(a.) A, residing in Dehli, beats B in Calcutta. B may sue A either in Calcutta or in Dehli.

(b.) A, residing in Dehli, publishes in Calcutta statements defamatory of B. B may sue A either in Calcutta or in Dehli.

(c.) A, travelling on the line of a Railway Company whose principal office is at Howrah, is upset and injured at Allahabad by negligence imputable to the company. He may sue the Company either at Howrah, or at Allahabad.

Suits for immove

19. If the suit be to obtain relief respecting, or compensation for wrong to, immoveable property situate within the limits of a single district, but within the jurisdiction of different Courts, the suit may be instituted in the Court within whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is situate; provided that, in respect of the value of the subject-matter of the suit, the entire claim be cognizable by such Court.

able property situate in single districts, but within jurisdictions of different Courts.

Suits for immoveable property situate in different districts.

If the immoveable property be situate within the limits of different districts, the suit may be instituted in any Court, otherwise competent to try it, within whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is situate.

Power to stay proceedings where all defendants do not reside within jurisdiction.

20. If a suit which may be instituted in more than one Court is insti tuted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant or all the defendants does not or do not actually and voluntarily reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, the defendant or any defendant may, after giving notice in writing to the other parties of his intention to apply to the Court to stay proceedings, apply to the Court accordingly;

and if the Court, after hearing such of the parties as desire to be heard, is satisfied that justice is more likely to be done by the suit being instituted in some other Court, it may stay proceedings either finally or till further order, and make such order as it thinks fit as to the costs already incurred by the parties or any of them.

In such case, if the plaintiff so requires, the Court shall return the plaint with an endorsement thereon of the order staying proceedings.

Every such application shall be made at the earliest possible opportunity, and in all cases before the issues are settled; and any Application when to defendant not so applying shall be deemed to have acquiesced in the institution of the suit.

be made.

21. Where the Court, under Sec. 20, stays proceedings, and the plaintiff reinstitutes his suit in another Court, the plaint shall not be chargeable with any court-fee; provided of the suit in the former Court, and that the plaint has that the proper fee has been levied on the institution been returned by such Court.

Remission of courtfee where suit instituted in another Court.

22. Where a suit Procedure where

Courts in which suit may be instituted are subordinate to the

may be instituted in more Courts than one, and such Courts are subordinate to the same appellate Court, any defendant, after giving notice in writing to the other parties of his intention to apply to such Court to transfer the suit to another Court, may apply acsame appellate Court. cordingly; and the appellate Court, after hearing the other parties, if they desire to be heard, shall determine in which of the Courts having jurisdiction the suit shall proceed. Courts are subordinate to different appellate Courts, but are subordinate to the same High Court, any defendant, after giving notice in writing to the other parties of his intention to apply to the High Court to transfer the suit to another Court having jurisdiction, may apply accordingly. If the suit is brought in any Court subordinate to a District Court, the application, together with the objections, if any, filed by the other parties, shall be submitted through the District Court to which such Court is subordinate. The High Court may, after considering the objections, if any, of the other parties, determine in which of the Courts having jurisdiction the suit shall proceed.

23. Where such Procedure where they are not so subordinate.

24. Where such Procedure where they are subordinate to different High Courts.

Courts are subordinate to different High Courts, any defendant may, after giving notice in writing to the other parties of his intention to apply to the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Court in which the suit is brought is situate, apply accordingly.

If the suit is brought in any Court subordinate to a District Court, the application, together with the objections, if any, filed by the other parties, shall be submitted through the District Court to which such Court is subordinate,

and such High Court shall, after considering the objections, if any, of the other parties, determine in which of the several Courts having jurisdiction the suit shall proceed.