cases of breach of contract or other injury' the injured party may claim "a writ of injunction against the repetition or continuance of such breach of contract or other injury, or the committal of any breach of contract or injury of a like kind, arising out of the same contract, or relating to the same property or right; and he may also in the same action include a claim for damages or other redress;" whilst the latter provides that the plaintiff may "at any time after the commencement of the action, and whether before or after judgment, apply ex parte to the court or a judge for a writ of injunction to restrain the defendant from the repetition or continuance, &c.," as above, and "such writ may be granted or denied by the court or judge upon such terms as to the, duration of the writ, keeping an account, giving security, or otherwise, as to such court or judge shall seem reasonable and just, and in case of disobedience such writ may be enforced by attachment by the court, or, when such court shall not be sitting, by a judge: provided always, that any order for a writ of injunction made by a judge, or any writ issued by virtue thereof, may be discharged or varied or set aside by the court," on application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order.

That Act "does not give courts of law power to grant an injunction against a threatened injury, but only in cases where the wrongful act has been actually commenced. The powers, moreover, given by the Act can be used only against the defendant or defendants in the particular action, and can only affect them as to acts which they themselves do or authorise to be done. It must therefore in many cases fail entirely to provide the remedy sought by the injured party." Kerrs Inj., p. 233.

It will be observed at a glance that this section of the Code applies to cases greatly dissimilar from the cases to which Sec. 492 applies. That section was framed in order to enable the courts to restrain parties from committing fraud or wrong in respect of property being the subject of dispute: this section was framed in order to enable the courts to restrain parties from committing or continuing breaches of contract or other injuries. The notes given above will apply for the most part to this section also.

In any suit for restraining.-See Chapter X of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, Sec. 54 of which enables the courts to " grant a perpetual injunction to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in favour of the applicant, whether expressly or by implication.”

The 3rd section of the same Act makes obligation' include "every duty enforceable by law."

Breach of contract.-When the obligation "arises from contract," the Court" shall be guided by the rules and provisions contained in Chapter II" of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. See Sec. 54 thereof.

Injury. See the last note but one above. When the defendant invades or "threatens to invade" the plaintiffs right to, or enjoyment, of property, the Court may grant a perpetual injunction in certain cases specified in the section last referred to, and for the purposes of which a trademark is 'property.'

After the commencement. This seems to imply that the application may not be included in the plaint, by the presentation of which the suit is instituted.'

After judgment.-Cases may arise in which the plaintiff may deem it necessary to protect his interests during the longer or shorter interval of time that must elapse between the pronouncing of the judgment and the signing of the decree.

Temporary injunction.-See the notes to Sec. 492. Under the Specific Relief Act, 1877, "mandatory injunctions" are only perpetual.

Or refuse the same.-See the notes to Sec. 492. Instead of granting the injunction the court will, in a proper case, award damages to the party injured.

In case of disobedience. This must be made out most clearly and satisfactorily, at the hearing of an application duly supported by affidavits or other evidence, after notice to the opposite party.

If defendants are enjoined from doing certain acts, attended with specified effects, though these happen, it must be shown that the acts of the defendants caused them. A verdict that they did, where new trial is granted, is not conclusive as to the breach of the injunction. Dawson v. Paver, 5 Ha. 424, 425.

Before granting injunction, Court may direct notice to be given to opposite party.

This is new.

494. The Court shall in all cases, except where it appear that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party.

Under the Common Law Procedure Act the rule for an injunction is nisi only. Gittins v. Symes, 1 C. B., 362; 24 L. J., C. P., 48. In equity the affidavits in support of an ex parte injunction should always state the precise time at which the plaintiff, or those acting for him, became aware of the threatened injury. Calvert v. Gray, 2 Coo. C. C. 171, n. They must show either that notice to the defendant would be mischievous, or that the mischief is so urgent, that it would be done, if notice were served on the defendant, before the injunction could be obtained. If the affidavits fall short of this point, the motion will be ordered to stand over, and notice of it must be served on the defendant. Anon, 1 L. J. Ch 4.

A special injunction will be granted ex parte, in cases of waste or other immediate urgency, on affidavit of the facts and certificate of bill filed, but if defendant has entered an appearance, or plaintiff has delayed applying instanter notice of motion must be given. Setons Decrees, p. 450.

Injunction to corporation binding on its members and officers. sonal action it seeks to

495. An injunction directed to a corporation or public company is binding not only on the corporation or company itself, but also on all members and officers of the corporation or company whose perrestrain.

Binding on. And therefore enforceable against. The Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, Sec. 33 provides for the enforcing an injunction against the officers of a corporation by attachment and sequestration.

Order for injunction may be discharged, varied or set aside.

496. Any order for an injunction may be discharged, or varied, or set aside by the Court, on application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with

such order.

Any order for an injunction.-It is remarked in Kerrs Inj., p. 631, that: In cases where the order for an injunction is irregular, a motion should be made to discharge the order, not to dissolve the injunction. By moving to dissolve the injunction the irregularity is waived. Vipan v. Mortlock, 2 Mer., 476; Angier v. May, 3 W. R., 330.

Discharged.-A rule nisi is discharged' when the court decides that it shall not be made absolute, i. e. that the party who obtained the rule nisi shall take nothing, and the suit remain in statu quo. Wharton.

Varied. If the injunction goes beyond the terms in which other injunctions have been granted, or the reach of the principle, the party should apply to the court to alter the terms of it. See Downshire v. Sandys, 6 Ves., 109.

Set aside. This term probably is used with reference to cases in which an injunction has been granted after notice, but in default of appearance by the defendant.

It will be observed that the section does not speak of dissolving' the injunction, which is a common phrase in the equity courts. The books speak of dissolving' an injunction granted ex parte, of an injunction being 'dissolved on application for ambiguity, for misrepresentation of facts, and the like, and of the decree operating to' dissolve' a provisional injunction, and so forth.

Kerrs Inj., Chap. XXIX, Sec. 2, shows that an interlocutory injunction may be dissolved at any time before the hearing of the cause, for various reasons. And Kerr, 928, that: "If on the motion to dissolve an ex parte injunction, it appear that the plaintiff has misstated his case, either by misrepresentation, or by the suppression of material facts, so that an injunction has been obtained which would not have been obtained if a more accurate statement of the case had been made, the injunction will be dissolved on that ground alone. Brown v. Newall, 2 M. & C., 558, 570; Semple v. London and Birmingham Railway Co., 1 Ra. Ca., 493; Bell v. Hull and Selby Railway Co., ib. 616; Greenhalgh v. Manchester and Birmingham Railway Co., 3 M. & C., 799; Stedman v. Webb, 4 M. & C., 346, 351; Castelli v. Cook, 7 Ha. 89, 94; Dalglish v. Jarvie, 2 Mac. & G., 238; Philipps v. Prichard, 1 Jur. N. S., 750; Fitch v. Rochfort, 18 L. J. Ch., 458. The plaintiff will not be allowed to maintain it on the merits then disclosed. Att.-Gen. v. Corporation of Liverpool, 1 M. & C., 211; Hilton v. Lord Granville, 4 Beav., 131 ; DeFencheres v. Dawes, 11 Beav., 46; Castelli v. Cook, 7 Ha. 89, 94; Dalglish v. Jarvie, 2 Mac. & G., 238; Fitch v. Rochfort, 18 L. J. Ch. 458. Nor can he be heard to say that he was not aware of the im

portance of the facts so misstated or concealed, Att.-Gen. v. Corporation of Liverpool, 1 M. & C., 210, 211; Dalglish v. Jarvie, 2 Mac. & G., 241, or that he had forgotten them. Clifton v. Robinson, 16 Beav., 355; Sheard v. Webb, 2 W. R., 343."

But: "A man who has obtained an ex parte injunction which was afterwards dissolved on the ground of concealment of material facts, is not precluded from making an application for another injunction on the merits. Fitch v. Rochfort, 18 L. J. Ch. 458. See Philipps v. Prichard, 1 Jur. N. S. 750." Kerrs Inj., p. 629.

And: "Although an injunction may have issued irregularly, the irregularity may be waived by any act of the defendant, affirming the subsistence of a regular injunction. Travers v. Lord Stafford, 2 Ves. 20; Vipan v. Mortlock, 2 Mer. 476. The question whether there has been a misrepresentation or concealment of material facts upon the application for an ex parte injunction cannot be taken into consideration on appeal from an order made by the Court in which the injunction was granted, or by which it was continued. Bell v. Hull and Selby Railway Co., 1 Ra. Ca. 616. After long acquiescence under an order for an injunction, an application for dissolving it will not be readily entertained. Glascott v. Lang, 3 M. & C. 451; Bickford v. Skewes, 4 M. & C. 500; Feistel v. King's College, Cambridge, 10 Beav. 491; Great Western Railway Co. v. Oxford, Worcester, &c., Railway Co., 3 D. M. & G. 341." Ib., p. 632.

Compensation to defendant for issue of injunction on insufficient grounds.

497. If it appears to the Court that the injunction was applied for on insufficient grounds, or

if, after the issue of the injunction, the suit is dismissed or judgment is given against the plaintiff by default or otherwise, and it appears to the Court that there was no probable ground for instituting the suit,

the Court may, on the application of the defendant, award against the plaintiff in its decree such sum, not exceeding one thousand rupees, as it deems a reasonable compensation to the defendant for the expense or injury caused to him by the issue of the injunction:

Proviso.

Provided that the Court shall not award under this section a larger amount than it might decree in a suit for compensation.

An award under this section shall bar any suit for compensation im respect of the issue of the injunction.

Compare with Sec. 491.

The injunction-Which it has granted.