of the term within which she had held the rank of a separate and independent nation, and exercised the powers belonging to it; that our interests were better understood on both sides at this time than they then were; that the treaty was known to contain things that neither liked; that I spoke with confidence on that point on our part; that in making a new treaty we might ingraft from that into it what suited us, omit what we disliked, and add what the experience of our respective interests might suggest to be proper; and being equally anxious to preclude the inference of any sanction to the maritime pretensions under that treaty, in respect to neutral commerce, I deemed it proper to advert again to the project, which I had presented some time since, for the regulation of those points, to notice its contents, and express an earnest wish that his lordship would find leisure, and be disposed to act on it. He excused himself again from entering into this subject, from the weight and urgency of other business, the difficulty of the subject, and other general remarks of the kind." By this correspondence it appears, that it was a part of Mr. Jefferson's policy, whenever Mr. Jay's treaty should expire, not to renew it. There were undoubtedly personal reasons for the adoption of this course. Mr. Jefferson, as has been seen, considered that treaty as an execrable measure, and regarded its ratification as opposed to the interests of revolutionary France, to which he was, in heart and soul, devoted. The advantages of the treaty had been so fully realized, that it was natural to expect that our government would have yielded at once to the offer of the British ministry to renew it. Their willingness to form a new treaty, upon the principles of Mr. Jay's, was repeatedly expressed, first by Lord Hawkesbury, in April, 1804, and afterwards by Lord Harrowby, in August of the same year. Lord Hawkesbury, in a conversation with Mr. Monroe, "went so far as to express a wish that the principles of the treaty of 1794 might be adopted in the convention, which it was then proposed to make; and Lord Harrowby informed him, "that his government might probably, for the present, adopt the treaty of 1794, as the rule in its own concerns, or in respect to importations from our country, and as he understood him, all other subjects to which it extended." He even went further, and said, if the treaty had expired (about which Lord Harrowby appeared to doubt) the ministry would take the responsibility on itself, as there would be no law to sanction the measure." But Mr. Monroe, acting under his instructions, was not willing to authorize even an inference, that the treaty of 1794 should ever form the basis of a future one, repeated to him the remarks he had previously made to Lord Hawkesbury, and observed, that in forming a new one, we must begin de novo-that we were then but little experienced in our relations with foreign countries; that our interests were better understood on both sides than when the treaty was made-and that in making a new one, we might introduce into it what suited us, omit what we disliked, and add what experience might suggest to be proper. The idea that the agents on the part of the United States, in this attempt at negotiation, understood the interests of their country more thoroughly than those connected with the negotiation of 1794, is but little short of ludicrous. The treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay, in its operation and effects, proved to be a most beneficial one to the country; and it is a little remarkable, that no subsequent arrangement with Great Britain has been equally advantageous. Under Mr. Jefferson's directions, an effort was constantly made to procure some provision against impressment-an object, certainly of great importance to our country. But, when it was found impracticable to induce the British government to enter into stipulations on that subject, it might well be doubted whether it was good policy, by insisting upon an impracticable measure, to sacrifice all the other advantages which must necessarily arise from a just and reasonable commercial treaty with that nation. To this day such a stipulation has not been obtained; but the disadvantages experienced by the trade of the United States, for the want of a treaty like that negotiated by Mr. Jay, have been numerous, and greatly detrimental. Those advantages were lost by not renewing that treaty; and the treaty was not renewed, it is believed the facts will warrant the declaration, because it comported with Mr. Jefferson's policy, at all times, to keep alive a controversy with Great Britain. In April, 1806, William Pinkney, of Maryland, was appointed joint commissioner with Mr. Monroe, for the purpose of settling all matters of difference between the United States and Great Britain, "relative to wrongs committed between the parties on the high seas, or other waters, and for establishing the principles of navigation and commerce between them." Their negotiations were held under the ministry of Mr. Fox, who was considered as a great friend to the United States. Owing to his sickness, the business on the part of the British government was placed in the hands of his nephew, Lord Holland, and Lord Auckland. On the 11th of September, 1806, the American commissioners wrote to the secretary of state, giving him an account of their first interview with the noblemen abovementioned, in which, when noticing the matter of impressment, they say "On the impressment subject it was soon apparent they (Lords Holland and Auckland) felt the strongest repugnance to a formal renunciation or abandonment of their claim to take from our vessels on the high seas such seamen as should appear to be their own subjects." And such was the answer, from first to last, to every attempt to come to a formal arrangement on this perplexing subject. Every ministry of Great Britain, however differently disposed on many other sub jects, on this thought and acted alike. With all the evidence that they possessed of the impracticability of negotiating successfully on this topic, Mr. Jefferson made it the turning point of all his efforts. In pursuance of this determination, on the 3d of February, 1807, Mr. Madison, secretary of state, wrote to Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, and after having alluded to the matter of impressments, said "In the mean time, the President has, with all those friendly and conciliatory dispositions which produced your mission, and pervade your instructions, weighed the arrangement held out in your last letter, which contemplates a formal adjustment of the other topics under discussion, and an informal understanding only on that of impressment. The result of his deliberations which I am now to state to you, is, that it does not comport with his views of the national sentiment, or the legislative policy, that any treaty should be entered into with the British government which, whilst on every other point it is limited to, or short of strict right, would include no article providing for a case which both in principle and practice, is so feelingly connected with the honour and sovereignty of the nation, as well as with its fair interests; and indeed with the peace of both nations. "The President thinks it more eligible, under all circumstances, that if no satisfactory or formal stipulation on the subject of impressment be attainable, the negotiation should be made to terminate without any formal compact whatever." On the 3d of January, 1807, Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney wrote to the Secretary of State, saying "We have the honour to transmit to you a treaty, which we concluded with the British commissioners on the 31st of December. Although we had entertained great confidence from the commencement of the negotiation, that such would be its result, it was not till the 27th, that we were able to make any satisfactory arrangement of several of the most important points that were involved in it. A large proportion of the provisions of this treaty,no less than eleven of its articles-was taken from that of 1794." After giving an account of the various articles, those gentlemen say "We are sorry to add that this treaty contains no provision against the impressment of our seamen. Our despatch of the 11th of November, communicated to you the result of our labours on that subject, and our opinion that, although this government did not feel itself at liberty to relinquish, formally by treaty, its claim to search our merchant vessels for British seamen, its practice would, nevertheless, be essentially, if not completely abandoned. That opinion has been since confirmed by frequent conferences on the subject with the British commissioners, who have repeatedly assured us, that, in their judgment, we were made as secure against the exercise of their pretension by the policy which their government had adopted in regard to that very delicate and important question, as we could have been made by treaty." This treaty was received at Washington the beginning of March, 1807, but was never even submitted to the Senate for their advice and consent to its ratification. On the 20th of May following, Mr. Madison wrote to Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney on the subject. The following is an extract from his letter : "The President has seen in your exertions to accomplish the great objects of your instructions, ample proofs of that zeal and patriotism in which he confided; and feels deep regret that your success has not corresponded with the reasonableness of your propositions, and the ability with which they were supported. He laments more especially that the British government has not yielded to the just and cogent considerations which forbid the practice of its cruisers in visiting and impressing the crews of our vessels, covered by an independent flag, and guarded by the |