It is a remarkable fact, that the scriptures alone should have been long denied the right of being interpreted by the same principles which are unhesitatingly applied to the language of common ife, and to other books in which the same kind of usage prevails. At no period of its existence has the christian church enjoyed an immunity from the influence of false systems of philosophy upon sacred interpretation. Even the reformation did not escape. The divines of that period had not shaken themselves loose from the authority of names and systems. Though they aimed to make the bible the religion of protestants, it was the bible as modified by the philosophy of Augustine and Aristotle. We need not dwell on the instances of being "wise above what is written," which abound in the theoretical expositions, we do not say the fundamental doctrines, of the reformers. The great outlines of divine truth, they saw clearly. These are drawn so plain in the bible, that even a perverse philosophy could not obscure them from their view. But when they came to explain these doctrines, we perceive at once that they were educated in the school of Aristotle. It was the great fault, as is well known, of that school to reason a priori, concerning the nature of things in the material and the moral world, instead of proceeding from facts back to general principles. The method was, first to form the system, and then to find or explain facts to agree with it. In a similar manner, the divines of the re formation, following the habits of reasoning in which they had been trained, first made out their philosophy, and that too, a closetphilosophy, not one found among the realities of the moral world, as they are exhibited to common sense and consciousness; and then interpreted the scriptures to accord with the views thus erro neously formed. That the philosophy of theology at the period to which we refer, originated in the manner now described, is sus ceptible of overwhelming proof.

From the prevalence of a different philosophy, and a different mode of interpretation, many theoretical views which the reformers generally held, have, for a considerable time, been going into disuse, and are ready to vanish away. It was not strange that those great and good men should clearly discern the distinguishing doctrines, or facts, of the gospel, and at the same time, not discover the true reason of those facts, but in this respect, be misled by previous opinions and habits of thinking. But it is no longer reputable to the understanding of any man, to maintain for example, as Calvin did, that one moral being can, by any possibility, be, or be justly considered as being, guilty of the sin of another. It is too late in the day, the light of truth has risen too far above the horizon, for so dark an absurdity to be imposed, as sound sense and correct philosophy, upon men at all informed on moral subjects. Ancient systems of philosophy, the Platonic, the Gnostic, and the Aristotelian together, have been given to the wide winds;

worthy, in the main, of no better fate. The world will not go back to that darkness again. No power can avail to bring the human mind anew under that bondage of mental and moral death. Once disenthralled, it is free forever.

But while erroneous systems are thus yielding to the progress of truth, we by no means anticipate an entire abandonment of all philosophy, in matters of religion. Such an abandonment, we do not hesitate to say, is impossible. Neither the interpreter of scripture, nor the theologian, can proceed a step, without presupposing some fundamental principles respecting the nature of things. For proof of this, we need only refer to the numberless instances in which the literal meaning of a passage is set aside by common consent, simply because that meaning is inconsistent with something which every one knows and admits to be true; and to the undisputed and indisputable fact, that the bible meets and recognizes men as already possessing a mass of correct knowledge, respecting the first principles of things in the moral world. The latter fact shows that the theologian must, the former that he does, make use of something which may properly be called philosophy. We are not, indeed, by any means tenacious of the term in question. We never cling to names, except as the vehicle of ideas. For ourselves we prefer to call those first principles of things, the dictates of common sense; for the latter phraseology justly and accurately describes their character and parentage. Still, we insist that there is no impropriety in calling them the decisions of philosophy. It will be admitted that there may be, and is, a nat ural philosophy which is correct; and that it is not the less so, because it has taken the place of systems, which consisted throughout of egregious error. The Copernican system is true, and not the less true because that of Ptolemy was false; and yet the former system is philosophy, a philosophy of the celestial phenomena. It can be called by no other name so appropriate, and so well sanctioned by general usage. But why is it called philosophy? What do we learn of its character and subject-matter, by that appellation? Or rather, what are the realities themselves, about which it is conversant? Surely, those general facts, or laws of the material. universe, which explain the more obvious and sensible phenomena. Or, we may say, that natural philosophy, in general, is conversant with the reasons of things,-the more obvious class of things, in the natural world. Now will any man show us that there is not, and cannot be, a philosophy conversant with the reasons of things in the moral world, or, if you please, with its general laws, or facts, which shall also be as correct, and as easily proved so, as the Copernican system of astronomical philosophy? Certainly there are first principles, or reasons of things in the moral world, as there are in the natural; if so, there may as well be a science, and a true science, of the former, as of the latter. And

since both are alike conversant with the reasons of things, or ultimate facts, both may with equal propriety, be called philosophy. Were we to give a name, however, to the science of first principles in the moral world, which should convey the most meaning in the shortest compass, we should call it the philosophy of common sense.

But call these first principles by what name we may, or call them by no name at all, the things themselves remain, and will remain, forever the same. No power of man can avail to change their nature, or annihilate them; and least of all can that be done by any alterations in nomenclature. Men may do their best to bring into discredit the knowledge of these things; they may pour_odium on the word philosophy; they may banish it from the English language; they may visit with anathemas those who venture to designate by it the eternal truths of which we speak: but these truths will still be rooted fast in the convictions of mankind. Marshal argument after argument, against the word in question; scatter the seeds of suspicion, the fire-brands of contention, throughout a whole community, because some persons say there is a true philosophy of things; this will not move the things, the elementary ideas of moral truth, one hair's breadth from their safe abiding-place in the human breast.

In maintaining that there is a true philosophy which is to be applied in the interpretation of the bible, we are not without the support of all interpreters and theologians of note. The former, when they appeal to the nature of things, acknowledge our doctrine. They not only acknowledge it practically, by actually applying their knowledge of fundamental truths, to ascertain the meaning of the word of God; but they explicitly own it as one of the principles of interpretation, that the literal meaning of a word is to be rejected, for some other, when the former would make a passage assert known falsehood, and the latter would not. In the phrase, "nature of things," moreover, they mean to include things in the moral as well as in the natural world. For on what other principle does Prof. Stuart maintain, that anger, or wrath, as predicated of God, does not mean sinful passion, which is seen in men, except this, that the moral nature of the two things, viz. perfect holiness, and sinful passion, is such that they cannot, by any possibility co-exist in the same being; or that a being cannot be perfectly benevolent, and at the same time, retaliate an injury on another, merely for personal gratification? On what ground does he most strenuously maintain that God did not exert a physical agency in hardening Pharaoh's heart, than, that such is the nature of perfect benevolence, and such the nature and tendencies of sin, that God, an infinitely benevolent being, cannot be directly and efficiently engaged in producing the latter? Why does he hold that all sin must be voluntary, except from the nature of the case? In like manner, those theologians admit our doctrine, who, on the VOL. IV.

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ground that the moral character of one being cannot be transferred to another, deny the literal imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, and of Christ's righteousness to believers; as well as those who hold that Christ did not suffer as much as all mankind, or as the elect, would have done, or that regeneration is not a literal creation of new faculties. We would by no means intimate that the known nature of things alone, leads the theologians and interpreters in question to the above specified conclusions; but that this is a principal source of evidence in these cases, cannot be denied. There may, in each and every instance, be other reasons of an exegetical nature, which co-operate with the former, and which seem, to many minds, to constitute the only evidence in the case. But an accurate discrimination often detects, under what wears the appearance of mere exigency, an application of the pri mary dictates of common sense.

Should any one alledge that to adopt the principle in question, is after all, making a bible for ourselves, we would ask him to try the experiment of divesting his mind of all the ideas he possesses, which can have the least influence on his views of the meaning of scripture. Let him cast into perfect oblivion all his conceptions of God, of right, wrong, happiness, misery, obligation, accounta bility, authority, moral government, law, punishment, reward, holiness, sin, justice, mercy, repentance, pardon, etc. Let him bring his mind, if he can, into a state of utter destitution of ideas on these subjects, that he may be prepared to come to the law and to the testimony," as he would think, without pre-judgment. His endeavors to dispossess himself of these elementary ideas will be as much in vain, as the attempt would be, to return to original nothing. But suppose for once, he should be able utterly to forget, for instance, what faith is, so as to affix to that word no more meaning than the mere English reader would to the letters Rara, would the bible be a revelation to him, respecting the na ture of faith? Would the word faith, or any other expressing the same or a kindred idea, be any thing more to him, if written, than marks upon paper, or if uttered in his ear, than mere sound? To come to the pages of the written word, then, and with the docility of a learner, to ask simply what it teaches, and no more, does not imply that we are not to carry with us that primary knowledge of things which constitutes one of the essential elements of a moral being. We might as well cease to be moral beings, and yet continue to exist, as to divest ourselves of every notion that has respect to the fundamental truths, or subjects, in moral science. Not till man has uncreated himself, will he be able to obliterate from his mind all impressions of those truths. We are happy to find Prof. Stuart coinciding with us on this point. So strong are his impressions respecting the nature and essential requisites of accountable agency, that he affirms it to be necessary for him to be made

over again, and to have new faculties, before he can believe it to be consistent with perfect justice to punish men for sin which is their's only by imputation, or putatively.

We do indeed occasionally find Prof. Stuart endeavoring to avoid the appearance of what he calls theologizing. If by theologizing, he means extorting from the bible, nolens volens, what will support one's peculiar theological views, he is unquestionably right in avoiding all appearance of it. But if, secondly, by the term in question, he means an application of the first principles of moral and religious truth to the interpretation of the scriptures, this he cannot possibly avoid, and still interpret correctly. And if thirdly, he means by theologizing, tracing out the bearings of his interpretations on particular theological points, he was under an unavoidable necessity either of doing this to some extent, or of making an extremely meager commentary. The Epistle to the Romans, above all other parts of the bible, is theological ground; and the results of the interpreter must, in the main, be of a theological nature. Of almost every verse in the doctrinal part of the epistle, it is the same to ask what it means, as it is to ask what the bible teaches on a vital point of theology. The interpreter of course, is not bound to carry out his results in the field of theological investigation, to their utmost extent; but he must show precisely what they are, and whither they tend. This he cannot do, without taking his position as a theologian. He must either do nothing, or commit himself on points which are theological. If any thing in the compass of human conception is theological, surely the doctrines of Paul are of this kind, when he undertakes to prove that a man cannot be justified by the deeds of the law, and that the law is not made void by pardon through Christ. So when he asserts that sin is a transgression of the law, he teaches a theological doctrine; and no interpreter can go beyond a literal translation of it, i. e. enter into an explanation of the thing meant by that declaration, without having to do with the very core of theology. Of what use, indeed, is it, to attempt to interpret a great part of the scriptures at all, if the results which we obtain are not to be considered as theological truth? Until the bible has ceased to be the fountain head of theology, it will remain true, that the interpreter of Paul's epistles, at least, must theologize. It will be out of his power to remain neutral. He may stand alone, or come under other colors; but a flag he must have, if he is an intelligible writer.

That change in the method of interpreting the scriptures which commenced with the reformation, as we have intimated, was retarded by the long lingering attachment of learned men to old scholastic modes of philosophizing. From the first, indeed, interpreters studied critically the original language, and investigated the history, antiquities, manners and customs, etc..of the Jews; but they were too prone to expect that the meaning when discovered, would be in accordance