increase of intrinsic power and skill in the artist, would enable him to transcend that limit. He has done the best possible. Gabriel could do no more. God himself, were he to create a metallic clock outright, could do no more.

We will now, in concluding this article, offer a few remarks. 1. On this view of the subject, we may see the harmony of the preceptive will and purpose of God. His law expresses what he would have his creatures do. His purpose, respects all that he will do himself to obtain obedience from his creatures. His law is one of the means which he uses to accomplish his purpose. His purpose is not only to use the law, but so to carry on his works of creation and providence with a universe as to secure the highest possible amount of obedience. What inconsistency is there in expressing the choice of his heart as to what his creatures should do, and his using at the same time the best means in his power to promote the very same object?

2. We may see that God's choosing, all things considered, that his creatures should obey, is consistent with his purposing, all things considered, to do just what he does, to obtain their obedience. For all considerations relating to his glory and the welfare of his creatures, lead him to prefer that his creatures should obey. And all considerations relating to the very same objects, lead him to resolve on doing just what he does to obtain their obedience. And the consistency lies here. Those great ends would be promoted in the highest conceivable degree if all his creatures would obey and they will be promoted by him in the highest possible degree, by his doing just what he does to obtain their obedience. What he does to obtain their obedience, is a thing totally distinct from their obedience itself: and his purpose about his own conduct is as distinct from his preference as to their conduct; and his purpose to do just as he does rather than otherwise taking all things into consideration, is just as distinct from his preference that his creatures should obey rather than otherwise, taking all things into consideration-all things, which pertain, respectively, to the two things. In other words, there is no consideration which induces him to purpose to do differently from what he does, and there is no consideration which induces him to prefer that any creature would sin rather than obey. Preferring obedience in others is distinct from securing it; and if he prefers obedience in others to their sin, he will do all that is possible to secure obedience in his creatures; and if it is not possible to secure from them all that he prefers, he will secure all that is possible. And here is not only a consistency, but one, we venture to affirm, so very intelligible and obvious, that a mere child can understand it and and feel its force. Tell him, that his father prefers that all his children should voluntarily perform their duties rather than neglect them; and that though some will disobey, he still resolves to

do the best he can on his part to induce them to obey; and there is nothing in the least mystical or inconsistent, to his apprehension. Tell him just so about God; and he sees at once, that his Heavenly Father is sincere in calling upon him to obey; that obedience, instead of thwarting any wish of God, would gratify his heart; that God has purposed to do nothing, in order to hinder him from obedience; and that, if he refuses, it will be purely his own fault,and God will be very angry with him on that very account. The difficulties which have been felt on this subject have arisen, we are persuaded, from a positive unwillingness to admit the distinction, between the conduct of God and the conduct of his creatures. If any one will only admit the idea to come clearly before his understanding, (whether he embraces it as true, or not,) that moral beings exist as really as God, and are as immediate causes of their own actions as God is of his, and that all which God does to secure obedience, applies to them as such beings; he cannot fail to see, that there is full ground for the distinction between the preference of God, as to what they do, and his choice as to what he shall do himself in order to secure their obedience. We say the distinction can be easily enough understood, if any one will have patience enough to look at the subject: and the distinction will also be admitted by every mind, that suffers not the unauthorised idea of immediate divine efficiency to crush it to the dust.

3. We remark that God does all that he wisely can to secure the salvation of men, in perfect consistency with his electing a part unto salvation.

In using the means of redemption in this world, God is doing all that he can, in this particular work, to contribute to the good of his entire kingdom. For when you sum up all the good results which will be gained in the present universe to eternity, you describe the objective motive of all the works of God-the very end chosen by his infinite wisdom and benevolence. He cannot possibly transcend infinite wisdom and benevolence by effecting more, and it would not be infinite wisdom and benerolence to effect less. Consequently he will take all the steps and measures to redeem men that he can, consistently with gain to his entire kingdom. And if the measures taken are such as will secure the salvation of a given number, then are they elected and separated from others, by the very choice and purpose of God to attain the highest good possible. And what is this but affirming that election is founded on good and wise reasons? Dr. Tyler here asks, what election is there in such a purpose?' What election in performing his works of grace, so as to effect the highest good possible! What other election can there be, we would ask, worthy of God?

But, speaking with reference to salvation and perdition, that writer inquires: Who made Peter and Judas to differ? We suppose that question in the mouth of Paul, was applied to a totally different subject from salvation. Tig de axpive? Who distinguisheth thee with gifts? But were we to apply it to the subject of salvation, the question, as used by Paul, would mean who saved Peter? Not, who kept Judas in his impenitence? Who saved Peter! God, who interposed and induced him to repent! But did he not interpose for Judas without success? We know not how far he may have gone in that particular instance; but we know that he goes far in favoring salvation in the case of many who perish, and charges on them the very guilt of refusing his grace, and hardening their hearts?

But, says that writer, if God "did as much to effect the salvation of the one as the other; how can it be said that Peter was elected, in distinction from Judas?" Did as much for Judas, as he did for Peter in the whole work of his salvation? Is that the meaning? But we have never said that, or any thing which implies it. Did as much for Judas, as he did for Peter at the time he repented? Is that the meaning? We have not asserted even that. We have said, that what God did for the repentance of Peter was effectual and converting grace, and what he did for Judas was ineffectual and resisted grace; and that what he did for both, was all that he in wisdom could do toward the object of securing their repentance and interest in salvation. In purposing to do this, we say, in intelligible language, that he elected Peter; and that the election was founded not in mere will and volition, but in a wise regard to the highest good he could effect in his kingdom. Every body can see that this is an election. Whether he did as much for both or not, he resolved to do the best he could; and, as a consequence, elected Peter.

But "how was Peter elected in distinction from Judas?" How, in distinction? Why, Peter was elected and Judas was not: what other distinction would you have? Perhaps however Dr. Tyler refers to the will of God. The question would then read thus: Can God will to save Peter, in any sense in which he does not will to save Judas, if he prefers that both should repent rather than perish, and does all that he can for the object? Very well if that is the meaning, we are glad to come up to the question. For the question carries us to that very point from which we diverge in opinion,-to the very angle where we separate in our subsequent courses of thought: and we like to go back to the guide-board in this case, and point out in intelligible language, so clear that a child can understand it, the path of truth. Well: the guide-board of the scripture is before us: what saith it? how readest thou?

"NOT WILLING THAT ANY SHOULD PERISH, BUT THAT ALL SHOULD COME TO REPENTANCE." Again. " HE HATH MERCY, ON WHOM HE WILL HAVE MERCY, AND WHOM HE WILL,

HE HARDENETH." They are both there, are they not? One is just as true as the other, is it not? How then do we diverge? Let us see. You say the direction runs thus: He hath mercy on Peter, merely because he will, and leaves Judas to hardness, merely because he will: and with this thought you run off, as we insist, into a course of perplexity and error. The distinction made between Peter and Judas, you ground on bare volition, on simple will and wont in God. Precisely that. Nothing else in the universe. We tell you here, Look at the top of the guide-board: do you follow that direction? When you resolve the failure of salvation in the case of Judas into a pure will-not in God as the reason, into sheer unwillingness-a simple resolve to the contrary-are you admitting that God was willing in any sense, that Judas should not perish but should come to repentance? or that he was willing to do any thing in favor of the object? Tell a child, Pure unwillingness in God and nothing else, is the reason why he did not save Judas,' and we defy you to make him understand how there could be any willingness in God, that Judas should come to repentance and not perish. Your very account of election makes the whole heart of God for Peter, and his whole heart against Judas, in every step of his conduct; and you leave no room, any where, for God to show the least willingness that Judas should come to repentance.

We will now undertake to tell how we read the guide. God was not willing that Judas should perish, but that he should come to repentance. We understand, that there was a period in the life of Judas before he perished, when the long-suffering of God waited upon him, and he was urged to repentance. And what we understand the declaration to mean is, that God really preferred that Judas should, at that period, repent, rather than neglect repentance and perish. He preferred, with his whole heart, that Judas should do the one rather than the other. You can understand it a full preference as to what Judas should do in the case. Does it state what Judas would do? Not at all. Does it tell what God himself could consistently do in the case, or how far he could go to favor the object? Not a word of that. Nor can we infer at all from this choice of his heart as to the conduct of Judas in the case, that God could go any farther on his part than he did to favor the repentance of Judas, with any gain to the cause of redemption on the whole, or, at least, with any gain to obedience in his whole kingdom. If he places his creatures in those conditions and under that influence which, while they favor the salvation of all in different degrees, will, on the whole, secure the greatest number possible for him to secure to

holiness and salvation, then it is certain, that the very object on which his heart is set in his own works, will lead him to prefer that all his creatures themselves on their part, should co-operate with him even in the least he does for their repentance, rather than that they should perish.

But, we read on, "He will have mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth." He resolves on his own works himself, without being turned aside or changed, or counseled at all by his creatures. He will go forward with the measures of his own choice among his creatures, rescuing with his mercy and leaving to hardness whom he will; not turning aside, one moment, for the issue those measures are to have upon individuals. Is not this very plain and intelligible? He will take this course, because he cannot possibly take a better? He resolves as a sovreign, on whom devolves the care and government of the universe, on the best possible course, and, because it is the best possible, he will pursue it. This is not acting upon mere will and choice; it is acting upon will and choice that are founded on reason. The child understands the top and bottom of the guide. He sees they both point the same way,-to the heart of God, and that, an undivided heart of unbounded glory!

Once more: 4th. We see the perfect consistency between the purpose of God to do all that is possible for the good of his kingdom, and his ability to answer our prayers. The question has been asked, "If God does all that can to save men, how can we, with any propriety, ask him to do more."* To this we re

ers.

ply that we never can, with any propriety, ask God to do more in reference to the past than he has done already, nor ask him to change his purposes in regard to what he will do in the future. It is no object of prayer, to seek a change in the purposes of God. We place confidence in him, that he purposes to do the best that is possible, and that we can never give him any counsel in our prayWe always pray, when we perform the act with propriety, in reference to a case on which God has not yet acted. We do not ask him to do more than he has done, for he has, as yet, done nothing in the case. Whatever is to be done in answer to our prayers, is yet to be done. Neither do we ask him to do more than he has purposed to do in the case, either directly or indirectly. Not directly; for that would be impious. Not indirectly; for as we are yet ignorant as to what he has purposed to do, we know not but it is his purpose to do all that we ask and even more. We appeal to his intrinsic power to perform such things as we ask, and rely on those promises by which he has assured us, that it is a rule of conduct with him to answer prayer. And the