網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

KEATING, J.-I concur in opinion that the ruling of the learned Judge was correct.

MELLOR, J.-I am of the same opinion. The effect of the arrangement between the two Companies was to make the line of the Great Western Company one line from Paddington to Milford. I do not say how it would be if the Great Western Company had run over the line of the South Wales Company on payment of tolls. I do not dissent from what my brother Byles has said on that point; but I express no opinion upon it, as it is not necessary for the decision of this case.

Judgment affirmed.

1862.

GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY CO.

v.

BLAKE.

MEMORANDUM.

In this Vacation the following gentlemen were appointed her Majesty's counsel:- William Matthewson Hindmarch, of Gray's Inn, Esquire; George Boden, of the Inner Temple, Esquire; and Thomas Weatherley Phipson, of Lincoln's Inn, Esquire.

AN

INDEX

TO THE

PRINCIPAL MATTERS.

ACTION.

See BILL OF EXCHANGE.

AGENT.

See ATTORNEY.

AUCTION.

BILL OF EXCHANGE.

it appeared at the trial that the
legal estate was in two trustees, the
devisee having an equitable interest
only. The Judge amended the writ
by adding the names of the two
trustees, they being present in Court
and consenting to be parties.-Held,
that the Judge had power to make
the amendment under the 222nd

MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED, (2). section of the Common Law Pro-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

AGREEMENT.

See CONTRACT.

GUARANTEE.

cedure Act, 1852. Blake and Others
v. Robert Done,

465

(2.) Of Plea of Justification in
Action for False Imprisonment.

To an action for false imprison-

LANDLORD AND TENANT, (1). ment, the defendant pleaded a justi-

AMENDMENT.

(1.) Of Writ in Ejectment by add-
ing Names of Two Trustees as
Plaintiffs.

In ejectment by mortgagee of
devisee against heir-at-law, in which
the question was as to the compe-
tency of the testator to make a will,

fication, alleging several facts which
constituted reasonable and probable
cause for the defendant suspecting
that the plaintiff had stolen his
goods. At the trial the defendant
failed to prove all the allegations in
the plea, and the learned Judge
amended it by altering one and
striking out others.-Held, that the
amendment was properly made, the
facts stated in the plea as amended

affording sufficient reasonable and (2). Action for Board and Lodging probable cause for the suspicion. Hailes v. Marks,

ANCIENT WINDOWS.

See EASEMENT.

APPOINTMENT.

56

See SUCCESSION DUTY ACT, 1853.

APPRENTICE.

(1). Contract to serve Executrix on

Death of her Husband.

By indenture, an infant, with the consent of his father, bound himself apprentice to a tradesman, "his executors and administrators, such executors or administrators carrying

during time of Trial.

The defendant being desirous of apprenticing his son to the plaintiffs, it was verbally agreed between them, that the son should go on trial for a month, and if the parties were satisfied, he should be bound apprentice for four years, the defendant to pay a premium of 1007. by instalments. The son went on trial and remained about sixteen months, when the defendant removed him. No deed of apprenticeship was executed, or any part of the premium paid.-Held, for the son's board and lodging that the plaintiffs could not recover during any part of the time he remained with them. Harrison and Another v. James,

ARBITRATION.

804

on the same trade or business and See COMMON LAW PROCEDUre Act, in the town of W.," and with him

and them to serve for the term of seven years. And the master, in consideration of the service of the apprentice, covenanted to teach and instruct him, or cause him to be taught and instructed during the term.-Held: First, that upon the death of the master, the apprentice was bound to serve his widow, who was his executrix, whilst she carried on the same business in the town of W.; and that she was bound to teach the apprentice.

Secondly, that it was no answer to an information against the apprentice for absenting himself from the service of the executrix, that he had consulted an attorney, who advised him that the apprenticeship was determined by the death of the master, and that he had acted on the bonâ fide belief that the advice was correct. Cooper, appellant, v. Hannah Simmons, respondent,

(1).

1854, (3). Award "that there should be a Verdict for the Plaintiff."

After issue joined, a cause was referred by a Judge's order to an arbitrator, who had no power to direct a verdict to be entered. The arbitrator awarded "that there should be a verdict for the plaintiff for the sum of 77 98. 11d.”—Held, that the award might be construed as a finding by the arbitrator that the plaintiff was entitled to recover 77. 98. 11d., and consequently the award was good. Everest v. Ritchie,

698

(2). Letter by Arbitrator to one of the Parties disclosing Ground of

Award.

An arbitrator, on the day on which he made his award, with a view to prevent further litigation, 707 wrote to one of the parties a letter

agent, and the plaintiff paid the defendant 501.: that the defendant

which disclosed the ground of his award.-Held, that the letter could not be used for the purpose of shew-again requested the plaintiff, on his ing that the arbitrator was mistaken in point of law. Holgate and Others v. Killick, 418

(3). Plea of Nul Tiel Agard. Held, in the Exchequer Chamber (reversing the judgment of the Court of Exchequer), that where an award is made upon all the matters in difference, and is in the required form, and intended by the arbitrators to express their decision, an objection that they adopted the opinion of a third person by which they agreed to be bound, cannot be raised under a plea of nul tiel agard to an action on the award. Whitmore v. Smith, 509

[blocks in formation]

A declaration stated that B. and the defendant, joint owners of a horse and mare, agreed that the defendant should sell them, and pay one moiety of the proceeds to the plaintiff as the agent of B., who was abroad: that the defendant sold the horse to C. for 6007., and the mare for 3007., and did not receive the price of the horse, but took from the purchaser of the mare a promissory note for 3007., which the defendant indorsed and delivered to the plaintiff as the agent of B., and the amount of which was received by the plaintiff as such agent: that the defendant afterwards requested the plaintiff, upon his own responsibility, to pay the defendant one moiety of the 3007. in the plaintiff's hands as such

own responsibility, to pay the defendant 100l., the residue of the moiety of the 3007., which the plaintiff was willing to do provided the defendant, in consideration of the said sum of 50%. so paid, and the further sum of 1007, when paid, would undertake either to deliver to the plaintiff a bill of exchange for 2337.38. of the sale of the horse, less the for(being B.'s moiety of the proceeds feits in respect of the same), drawn by the defendant upon and accepted by C. at two months date, or pay the plaintiff 2337. 38. in cash within two weeks; and thereupon the defendant wrote and delivered to the plaintiff the following undertaking:-" In consideration of your having paid me the sum of 1501. on account of my share of the mare, I hereby undertake to deliver to you a bill for 2331. 3s. drawn by me upon and to be accepted by C. at two months, or the above sum in cash within two weeks from this date."-On demurrer: Held, that the declaration disclosed a sufficient consideration for the defendant's promise. Surtees v. Lister,

ATHEIST. See WITNESS.

ATTACHMENT.

See ATTORNEY.

ATTORNEY.

1

Order to deliver to Client his Papers

-Claim of Lien by Agent.

Where an order has been made that an attorney deliver to a client his papers, it is no answer to an attachment for disobedience of the

« 上一頁繼續 »