AGENCY-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. ALIMONY-See CRIMINAL LAW (5); DIVORCE (1, 9). AMENDMENTS-See APPEAL AND ERROR (7); MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (7). ANSWER-See MANDAMUS. ANSWER TO INTERROGATORIES-See CREDITOR'S SUIT. 1. To review improper remarks of defendant's attorney on the 2. An exception to the ruling of the trial court in passing on the admissibility of evidence is necessary on error. Houser v. Carmody, 122. 3. Upon an objection to a question as leading, counsel are not permitted to review its competency. Garfield v. Lapham, 217. 4. Findings of fact made by the court without a jury can only be overturned if there is a total want of evidence to support them or if they are contrary to the undisputed evidence. Holcomb v. Sayers, 238. 5. Briefs of appellant and appellee in this court should contain a statement of the facts, distinct from argument, and should inform the court as to the issues of law and of fact as they arose upon the trial. Supreme Court Rule 40. Freeman v. Shaw, 262. 6. Findings of fact made by the trial judge without the aid of a jury are regarded on error as special verdicts which, if supported by any evidence, are conclusive; but appellant may review the case on the contention that there is no testimony to sustain them. Wood v. Rooks, 270. 7. On appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer to a bill of complaint it is discretionary with the court, in affirming the case, to permit an amendment to complainant's bill or to dismiss it without leave to amend. Act No. 299, Pub. Acts 1909, 1 Comp. Laws, § 549, 4 How. Stat. (2d Ed.) § 12071. Macomber v. Cottrell, 352. 8. A writ of error does not lie in any case before judgment, and will not issue to review bastardy proceedings after conviction and before judgment or sentence. People v. Brannen, 411. 9. No judgment known to the common law is rendered in such cases; the proceedings are purely statutory, the judgment being final and reviewable only by writ of certiorari. Id. 10. A writ of error brought to review the order of a circuit court granting leave to appeal from the admission to probate of a will, after the time limited by statute, will be dismissed by APPEAL AND ERROR-Continued. the court on its own motion; since the order in question is merely interlocutory. In re Apsey's Estate, 426. 11. Mandamus will not issue to require a circuit judge to settle and sign as the record for use on appeal, in a divorce case and a suit consolidated with it, the minutes of the stenographer not condensed or reduced to narrative form (Chancery Rule 37). The application for mandamus may, however, be treated as an application to extend the time for appeal and further time be granted to condense the minutes of the testimony in compliance with the rule and to settle a case for review. Southwick v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 472. 12. Error does not lie to review an order sustaining plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's plea in abatement, with leave to defendant to plead to the declaration, because the order entered is not a final determination; defendant's remedy is by writ of certiorari under Act No. 310, Pub. Acts 1905. Wanner v. Martin, 503. 13. The objection that a bill is multifarious is not a ground of general demurrer and an order overruling it is not appealable. Snover v. Boynton, 539. 14. Where relator's bill came on to be heard on an answer of one defendant containing a plea in abatement, and a demurrer of another, and was dismissed because complainant's testimony showed that she was not entitled to any relief in equity, and for other legal objections based on the averments of the bill, she could not dismiss the suit as to the demurring defendant, more than ninety days after the order was entered, without his consent; nor was she entitled to have a record of the testimony settled as to the other defendant where no extension of time was secured, although notice of settlement was served before the expiration of the statutory period, the return of the circuit court showing that the record was not presented to him for settlement because complainant's counsel conceded that he would have to procure an extension of the time. McNamara v. Kent Circuit Judge, 602. 15. Under Chancery Rule 37e the circuit judge will not be compelled by writ of mandamus to certify to a record which does not contain a true or complete transcript of the proceedings so as to fairly present the questions involved in the appeal, although the appellee does not propose amendments to the proposed case. Alderson v. Newaygo Circuit Judge, 608. 16. After two and a half years from the date of entry of decree, no appeal under Act No. 299, Pub. Acts 1909, will lie, although the delays were for mutual benefit and both parties consented. Perkins v. Perkins, 690. 17. On motion such appeal must be dismissed, since neither parties nor trial court can confer jurisdiction beyond the statutory provisions, and the payment of the statutory fee to the register in chancery within the prescribed period is jurisdictional. Id. 173 MICH.-45. APPEAL AND ERROR-Continued. See CRIMINAL LAW (27); ESTATES OF DECEDENTS (7); VENUE (1). ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL-See BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE (5); TRIAL (2). ARGUMENT OF PROSECUTOR-See CRIMINAL LAW (9). ARREST. Relator's arrest on a capias should have been quashed, the writ being improperly issued on the affidavit of the plaintiff in the action that the defendant therein at a certain time and place, in presence of a person named, uttered certain slanderous words, and also at other times and places unknown to plaintiff, and in other discourses defendant published other slanderous statements, since no allegation that plaintiff had personal knowledge of the facts appeared in the affidavit, and its averments tended to negative any such knowledge. Martin v. Saginaw Circuit Judge, 22. ASSAULT-See HOMICIDE (2, 3). ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES-See ATTACHMENT (3). ASSIGNMENT AS SECURITY-See MORTGAGES (1). ASSIGNMENTS-See BANKS AND BANKING (1); INSURANCE (2); PLEADING (3); PUBLIO OFFICERS (1). ATTACHMENT. 1. Unless the affidavit in attachment proceedings is attached to the writ the judgment is invalid. 3 Comp. Laws, § 10556, 5 How. Stat. (2d Ed.) § 13357. Yale State Bank v. Fletcher, 585. 2. Evidence considered and found to establish the fact that the affidavit was annexed to the writ before service. Id. 3. The deputy county clerk may act in the place of the clerk to whom a case has been referred for assessment of damages after a default judgment: he may perform any duty that his principal could perform. Id. 4. The fact that the sheriff filed a certificate with the copy of the writ of attachment, certifying that the annexed inventory was a true copy, etc., did not tend to prove that no inventory was made. Id. See HOMESTEADS; LOGS AND Logging (1). ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-See CONTEMPT (1); CRIMINAL LAW (6); DIVORCE (4, 5); EVIDENCE (10, 11); NEW TRIAL (5); PUBLIC OFFICERS (1). AUDITOR GENERAL. See TAXATION (5, 6). AUTHORITY TO PURCHASE-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. See STREET RAILWAYS (3). BANKRUPTCY. Trustees in bankruptcy under 30 U. S. Stat. 557, as amended by Act June 25, 1910, chap. 412, § 8; 36 U. S. Stat. 840, have the same rights, remedies, and powers as judgment creditors holding execution duly returned unsatisfied. Crawford v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 109. See CREDITOR'S SUIT. BANKS AND BANKING. 1. Upon learning of the sale of a private bank, a depositor could refuse to accept the purchasers as his bankers, in place of the vendors, or he could affirm the arrangement made between them and look to the purchasers to pay his deposit. v. Ivory, 444. Gillett 2. Having knowledge that there was a sale and that as between themselves the vendors and purchasers had arranged for a substitution of debtors, plaintiff, a depositor, by permitting his money to remain on deposit, with the new banking firm, and making no demand on the vendors, and also by filing a claim for the amount of his deposit with the receiver of the purchasers, after their failure, accepting from the receiver two dividend payments thereon, thereby became, by novation, a creditor of the insolvent purchasers, and lost his remedy against the vendors; plaintiff was estopped to claim that he did not assent to the substitution. Id. 3. While the facts do not constitute an election of remedies, they establish a substitution of debtors with plaintiff's consent. Id. 4. Plaintiff could not, after participating in the proceeds of the receivership, raise the objection that the court of chancery had no jurisdiction in that suit. ld. See BILLS AND NOTES (8). BASTARDY PROCEEDINGS-See APPEAL AND ERROR (8). BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS—See CORPORATIONS (1). BILL IN AID OF EXECUTION-See ATTACHMENT (1); HOME- BILLS AND NOTES. 1. Testimony tending to show that plaintiff purchased the note sued on from his grandmother, in consideration of services rendered, that the latter received it from the administrator of the payee's estate, supported by the indorsements on the instrument, raised a question of fact as to ownership. Molby v. Murray, 143. 2. Whether an indorsement of payment for the use of a team of defendants was authorized by him, so as to extend liability under the statute of limitations, presented a proper question for the jury. Id. 3. Where plaintiff took for collection defendants' check given to the vendor of a horse purchased by defendants, and being & BILLS AND NOTES-Continued. creditor of the vendor and holding his mortgage on the animal and on other property to secure it, gave him $50 in cash, and credit for the remainder of the check, but retained the mortgage lien on the horse, etc., plaintiff was not entitled to recover on the check as a holder in due course; and defendants were entitled to defend against an action on the check upon the theory that they had been defrauded and had rescinded the sale by returning the animal. Holcomb v. Sayers, 238. 4. Negotiable notes import consideration, and plaintiff, whose declaration sets out copies of the notes sued upon and offered in evidence, is, in the absence of any defense, entitled to judgment. Cawthorpe v. Clark, 267. 5. In an action between the original parties to notes that were never negotiated, it was competent for the defendant to show want of consideration: the burden of proving consideration remaining on plaintiff upon the whole case. Id. 6. Notes of defendant given in payment of accrued interest on a debt owed by defendant's deceased husband, the amount of the notes being indorsed on the instrument evidencing the indebtedness, were supported by consideration: the discharge of decedent's indebtedness pro tanto was a sufficient consideration; the fact that the debtor was not living did not change the relations of the parties. Id. 7. While parol evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict a valid written contract, as a promissory note, it is not incompetent to show in defense of an action against an accommodation indorser that the payee agreed to look after the insurance, and keep it in force upon the maker's stock of goods and fixtures, but failed to see that it was kept in force: the agreement did not contradict or vary the terms of the note; it was a distinct collateral undertaking although a part of the same transaction. Clare County Sav. Bank ▼. Featherly, 292. 8. The rule admitting evidence of a collateral agreement is especially applicable where such agreement operates as an inducement for entering into the contract, and defendant is entitled to recoup his damages for breach of the collateral undertaking in an action by the payee, a bank, against him on the note. Id. 9. It became a question of fact whether such arrangement was made, upon plaintiff's testimony, disputed by defendant, that he signed the note on the express condition that the payee should look after the insurance and hold the policy as security for the debt. Id. 10. The indorser did not waive the alleged condition where he knew of the fact that the insured property had been moved, but had no knowledge that consent had not been secured from the insurer. Id. 11. The court rightly declined to instruct the jury as requested by defendant, that if the indorser desired to be protected by the insurance it was his duty to see that it was kept in force, |