reached on the evening of October 19th. One hundred dollars earnest money was paid thereon, and complainant went into possession on the morning of the 20th. On the 22d they went to a lawyer and had their agreement reduced to writing, and the balance of the purchase price was then paid. It is now insisted by defendant that the testimony shows that no reference was made to an agreement not to re-engage in business before the oral agreement was reached on the evening of the 19th, and that therefore that part of the written agreement is without consideration and void.

The consideration paid for the goods and business was a sufficient consideration to support this promise of the defendant; and no further nor additional consideration was necessary. Hubbard v. Miller, 27 Mich. 15 (15 Am. Rep. 153).

As to the point made that the written promise of October 22d, not to re-engage in business, was not a part of the oral agreement made on the 19th, it is only necessary to refer to a general rule laid down in Street v. Dow, Har. Ch. 427, where it is said:

"It is a general rule that a contract cannot rest partly in writing and partly in parol: but, where a contract is reduced to writing, all previous parol contracts relating to the same matter are merged in the written contract."

We must therefore conclude that the oral agreement of October 19th became merged in the written agreement of October 22d, and that the sole evidence of the agreement of the parties is the written agreement.

2. To the claim that this contract is an unreasonable restraint of trade, unconscionable, and void," it can be said that similar contracts to the one under consideration have been sustained by this court where they have been reasonably certain and restricted as to time and space. Hubbard v. Miller, supra; Beal v. Chase, 31 Mich. 490; Timmerman v. Dever, 52 Mich. 34 (17 N. W. 230, 50 Am. Rep. 240); Thompson v. Andrus, 73 Mich. 551 (41 N. W. 683); Up River Ice Co. v. Denler, 114 Mich.

296 (72 N. W. 157, 68 Am. St. Rep. 480); Reber v. Pearson, 155 Mich. 593 (119 N. W. 897); C. H. Barrett Co. v. Ainsworth, 156 Mich. 351 (120 N. W. 797); Buckhout v. Witwer, 157 Mich. 406 (122 N. W. 184).

The thing complainant shall refrain from doing is definite. As to space, it is reasonably restricted; and, as to time, it is during the period that complainant is engaged in the business in the city of Battle Creek. Contracts similar as to time have been upheld. 9 Cyc. p. 529. Hubbard v. Miller, supra. We do not think the contract is open to the objections made. It comes clearly within the exception of section 6 of Act No. 329, Pub. Acts 1905. (2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 2942 et seq.)

3. For a time before and after the sale was made, the defendant Charles W. was troubled with a nervous disorder; and it is claimed that he was affected to such an extent that he was incapable of making a valid contract. We do think this claim is borne out by the record; but, whatever may be the truth as to his mental condition at the time the contract was made, the record shows that complainant paid all the stock was worth, and no attempt was shown to overreach him in any way. His own testimony since recovery shows that he was and is now satisfied with the sale, and that he has never made any complaint of its unfairness, except that he wanted to go into business again.

4, 5, 6. We think the testimony shows that substantially all the money and credit used to launch the new business belonged to Charles W., and that he is managing and controlling the business as fully as he did before the sale to complainant, and that he is making use of his wife's name and the trade-name of "Eccles Furniture Company" to evade and sail around the stipulation in his contract. The defendant Lulu was not a party to the contract; but we are persuaded that she had knowledge of its existence, and she has assisted her husband in his attempt to evade its terms, with a due appreciation of its force and effect. Under these circumstances, we approve of the con

clusions reached by the chancellor that the permanent injunction should issue as to her as well as to her husband. The decree is affirmed. Complainant will recover his costs in both courts.

STEERE, C. J., and MOORE, MCALVAY, BROOKE, STONE, and OSTRANDER, JJ., concurred.

INDEX.

ABANDONMENT-See CRIMINAL LAW (4, 5).

ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL-See APPEAL AND ERROR (12); PLEADING (2).

ACCEPTANCE-See ESTATES OF DECEDENTS (12); SALES (2).

ACCOMMODATION INDORSER-See BILLS AND NOTES (7).

ACCOUNTING

See CORPORATIONS (1); ESTATES OF DECEDENTS (8-10); LIENS (1).

ACCOUNT STATED.

An action on an account stated will not lie upon defendant's promise to pay a stipulated sum in settlement of damages caused by his breaking a plate glass window belonging to plaintiff. Pudas v. Mattola, 189.

ACTION-See ACCOUNT STATED; PARENT and CHILD (1).

ACTIONS, LIMITATION OF-See LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.

ADJOURNMENT-See LOGS AND LOGGING (2).

ADMISSIONS See ESTATES OF DECEDENTS (6); PARENt and CHILD (3).

ADVERSE POSSESSION.

1. Plaintiff, in an action of ejectment, was entitled to have her case submitted to the jury on the question of adverse possession of her house and lot, which she had owned less than 15 years, but which had without dispute been included by a fence within the boundaries of her yard, during more than 30 years and which her predecessors in title had held in possession. Gildea v. Warren, 28.

2. Upwards of 15 years' recognition of and acquiescence in boundaries of real property amply support a claim for the premises included thereby, which ought not to be upset by new surveys based on alleged original monuments. Id. ADVERSE USER-See WATERS AND WATERCOURSES (7). AFFIDAVITS-See ARREST (1); ATTACHMENT (1, 2); DIVORCE (6); LOGS AND LOGGING (1).