total estimated cost there was first deducted $3,903.14 computed as the cost of street and alley intersections, to be paid by the village at large. The balance was first apportioned to the lots abutting the line of improvement according to the foot-front rule of assessment, making the tax about $4 per foot. But, whenever the sum so apportioned to any lot was found to exceed 25 per cent. of the value of such lot, according to the last preceding assessment roll, the excess was charged against the village at large, to be paid, together with the cost of street and alley intersections, out of the general fund of the village. As a result of this, about one-half of the taxable frontage was assessed at the maximum amount of approximately $4 per front foot and the other one-half at varying rates ranging from 83 cents to $3.96 per foot front. A certain lot used for church purposes, No. 27, is conceded to be erroneously assessed, because the amount charged to it exceeds 25 per cent. of its value, according to the last assessment roll on which it appeared, and defendant's counsel stated such lot should and would be reassessed. Following the prescribed steps leading up to a final assessment, a hearing on the assessment roll so prepared was set for September 1, 1911. On that date complainants secured a temporary injunction from the Wayne county circuit court, which was served before any hearing was had, and all further proceedings were thereupon suspended pending this litigation.

The objections launched by complainants against the proposed assessment are, briefly stated: That it is invalid

(1) Because not made according to foot frontage pro rata, as required by statute; (2) because it is not according to benefits, is inequitable, and imposes unequal burdens; (3) because certain lots are assessed for street purposes in excess of 25 per cent. of their value as fixed by the last preceding tax roll; (4) because Act No. 707, Local Acts of 1907, under which the assessment in question purports to be made, is invalid, in that it embraces

objects not expressed in its title, embraces more than one object, and was irregularly passed.

The serious and important questions presented by the record and argued by counsel are: Were the statutory provisions governing special assessments in Highland Park complied with? If so, is an assessment by such method legal when, purporting to be levied according to frontage, it puts a greater proportionate burden on improved property than on adjoining unimproved property, the former having a greater assessed value on account of buildings thereon and the estimated foot-front tax on the latter being reduced because it exceeds 25 per cent. of the assessed valuation? Is Act No. 707 of the Local Acts of 1907 valid?

Authority for making special assessments to meet the costs of paving and other improvements on highways in villages incorporated under the general law is found in chapter of said act, which deals with powers of the council. So far as material here, the provisions are as follows: Section 2786, 1 Comp. Laws (3 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 5903):

"The expense of grading, paving, graveling and planking any street may be defrayed by a special assessment upon the lots and premises abutting upon such improvement in proportion to their number of feet front upon the street; or a part of such expense may be so paid and the remainder may be paid from the general highway fund, or from the street district fund, as the council may decide. The lots and premises to be assessed according to their frontage upon a street improvement as aforesaid, shall constitute a special assessment district.

*

Section 2787, 1 Comp. Laws (3 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 5904), authorizes payment from the general highway fund of any portion of such cost which, in the judgment of the council or board of assessors is justly apportionable to street intersections, public grounds, and buildings

"And the balance of such expense shall be assessed upon the taxable lots and premises included in the special assessment district, in proportion to their number of feet front

age upon such improvement. When such assessment is to be made upon lots in proportion to their frontage upon the improvement, if from the shape or size of any lot an assessment thereon in proportion to its frontage would be unjust and disproportionate to the assessment upon other lots, the council or board of assessors making the assessment may assess such lot for such number of feet frontage as in their opinion will be just."

Chapter 8 of said act prescribes the method of initiating such improvements and making special assessments therefor. Section 2837, 1 Comp. Laws (3 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 6058), provides:

If the assessment is required to be according to the frontage, they (the council or board of assessors) shall assess to each lot or parcel of land such relative portion of the whole amount to be levied as the length and front of such premises abutting upon the improvement bears to the whole frontage of all the lots to be assessed, unless on account of the shape or size of any lot an assessment for a different number of feet would be more equitable."

By Act No. 39, Pub. Acts 1899 (3 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] 6073), a section was added to said chapter 8, being No. 22, authorizing a division of special assessments into installments and issuing bonds to defray the cost of the improvement until the deferred taxes were paid, making it, however, optional with the owner of the property to pay the first installment, and have the remainder extended over a series of years, and providing that, if the first installment is not properly paid, the whole amount shall thereupon become due and no extension granted. In Corliss v. Village of Highland Park, 132 Mich. 157 (93 N. W. 254, 610, 95 N. W. 416), it was held that prior to the enactment of said section 22 the law authorized but a single assessment, limited to 5 per cent. of the value of the property. In Corliss v. Village of Highland Park, 146 Mich. 597 (110 N. W. 45), it was held that an assessment made under added section 22, Act No. 39, Pub. Acts 1899, though payable in installments at the option of the owner, was, nevertheless, a single assessment, limited to

5 per cent. of the total value by the general village act. Following these decisions, Act No. 707, Local Acts of 1907, was passed, and the assessment in question was sought to be levied in conformity with said act and the general village law, construed together. This act is entitled:

"An act to regulate the making of special assessments within the limits of the villages of Highland Park, St. Clair Heights, Hamtramck and River Rouge, in the county of Wayne."

Under said title, it was not only provided that assessments might be made payable in installments, being framed to authorize such a course under Boehme v. City of Monroe, 106 Mich. 401 (64 N. W. 204), and the views expressed in Corliss v. Village of Highland Park, 146 Mich. 597 (110 N. W. 45), but the act also increased the limit of the tax which might be assessed against property under such proceedings by the following language:

"SEC. 4. Any special assessment, when made in one part and when divided into installments, the aggregate of such installments, exclusive of interest, levied against any one lot or premises, may equal but shall not exceed 25 per cent. of the value of such lot or premises as valued and assessed in the last preceding general village tax roll.

"SEC. 5. Special assessment, when made in one part, and when divided into installments, no installment thereof, exclusive of interest, shall exceed five per cent. of the value of the district as valued and assessed in the last preceding general village tax roll."

It is apparent that in levying this assessment said Local Act No. 707 was followed and the requirements of the general act were observed, in so far as the amount to be levied and the condition of the property to be assessed permitted. Attention was also paid to, and an attempt made to comply with, the various requirements of all statutory provisions, the combined result of which is an assessment purporting to be according to the foot-front rule and proportionate to the benefits, but in truth violating the letter and spirit of such rule, and imposing an excessive assess

ment on improved lots in proportion to benefits received.

It is now well settled in most jurisdictions that adjacent property may be specially assessed to defray, in whole or in part, the cost of local improvements by which such property is especially benefited. That doctrine is based for its final reason on enhancement of values.

We have no special constitutional provisions restraining the exercise of legislative power in enacting laws which make provision for ascertaining what property is distinctively and specially benefited by local improvements and directing how the benefits shall be apportioned, so long as they are within the limit of the principle on which the doctrine is founded. By that limit such assessments must be laid and apportioned by the rules of enhanced values and reasonable equality. Provisions of law which make it legally impossible for the assessing officers to apportion the burden of such improvements according to benefits and with proximate equality are said to be "arbitrary exactions and not a legitimate exercise of legislative authority." Dillon on Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.), § 1443; Thomas v. Gain, 35 Mich. 155 (24. Am. Rep. 535); White v. City of Saginaw, 67 Mich. 33 (34 N. W. 255). It was long since held that a special assessment according to street frontage was constitutional and valid.

"It has been decided in this State that an assessment of paving and similar taxes may constitutionally be made in proportion to frontage of lots along the improvement. Williams v. Mayor of Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Motz v. City of Detroit, 18 Mich. 495; Hoyt v. City of East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39 [2 Am. Rep. 76]. The idea that underlies statutes for this purpose is, that the benefit to the abutting lots is generally in proportion to the length of their respective fronts, and that, as a rule, this principle of apportionment is more just than any other. There is a basis of truth to this idea, and it is so generally accepted that assessments for street improvements are perhaps now more generally apportioned by the frontage than by any other standard." Thomas v. Gain, supra.

See, also, Sheley v. City of Detroit, 45 Mich. 431 (8)