puted evidence. Nowhere is it claimed that this is an unjust claim against the estate of the deceased. It was a part of the record of the proceedings before the court. The allowance was unappealed from. We see no injustice or impropriety in allowing it to stand as a part of the verdict and judgment in the case. It carried no interest according to the direction of the circuit judge. Under the circumstances, we think there was no error with reference to this item.

The next item discussed is that of clearing the land. This, it will be remembered, was the first item in the claim which had been disallowed by the commissioners. The evidence upon the subject of what this labor was worth, when it was performed, and whether before or after the making of the $1,000 note, was quite conflicting, and there was evidence pro and con upon the subject. The ruling of the court limited this recovery to clearing done after the date of the last note. Of the merits of that claim the jury were the judges, and, as counsel for appellant has simply discussed the merits of the question, we must say that it was a question properly submitted to the jury.

The next item in dispute was with reference to the socalled $700 note, and the interest thereon. This subject presents a question of fact, nothing more nor less. The question was fairly submitted by the court to the jury, and we think properly so, and we find no error in the admission of evidence upon the subject. The notes were introduced in evidence in connection with the claim of the claimant, that the father intended to compensate him for the labor performed, and upon the theory that the notes were some evidence of what the father considered the services of the claimant worth. There being evidence of a promise to compensate on the part of the father, we think this subject has been covered by this court in the following cases: In re Williams' Estate, 106 Mich. 490 (64 N. W. 490); Sammon v. Wood, 107 Mich. 506, 511 (65 N. W. 529).

In the first above-cited case this court held that where a promise is made to compensate for services by will, and the promisor dies without so providing, the value of the services may be recovered as a claim against the estate, and a verbal contract to convey land may be resorted to in an action to recover for such services, for the purpose of negativing the presumption that they were gratuitously rendered.

In the last cited case it was held that an agreement to pay for services at death is valid and enforceable against the estate of the promisor. It is not essential to a recovery by a child for services rendered to a parent that a formal contract be established in relation thereto; but if the facts and circumstances attending the performance of the work and in its acceptance are sufficient to rebut the presumption that the services were gratuitous, and to authorize the inference that both parties acted under the understanding that they were to be paid for, the parent is liable.

Counsel for appellant next discuss the question as to whether the $700 note was a valid gift, claiming that it was void for want of delivery and for want of a sufficient consideration. No time need be spent upon this question, because it appears that it was the claimant's position that his claim was not based upon the two notes, but was one for personal work and labor performed during the eleven years that he worked for the father after he became of age, being for six years before his marriage, and about five years after he married, while living upon the farm; the only object of introducing the notes being to show the language used by the deceased, and to support the testimony in addition to the notes themselves, that the father intended his son to have at least $1,700, the amount of the two notes which he had left with the justice of the peace. It is sufficient to say that there was some evidence in support of this claim, and the question was properly submitted to the jury.

Under the head of "Admissions," counsel for appellant

next discusses the eleventh assignment of error, based upon the refusal of the court to allow claimant's erased claim to be read to the jury. The files in the case showing the claims being in evidence, the following occurred:

"Mr. Corwin: For the purpose of the jury, then, I will read the part which was put in here, and which was afterwards stricken out, as testified to by this witness.

"Mr. Smedley: I object to him reading to the jury a claim that is not filed.

66 'Mr. Corwin: It shows the claim which he started to file, and which he changed.

The Court: Are you simply reading what is on that paper?

"" Mr. Corwin: What was put in and stricken out. We have a right to consider it as bearing on the bona fide claim of this man as to what his claims were and what he understood, and whether he understood it one way one minute and another way another minute; one thing one day and another thing the next day. The jury have a right to consider whether or not he is acting squarely in filing this claim.

The Court: It already appears that he did change his claim.

"Mr. Corwin: Here is a claim where he goes to work and files a claim for a certain number of years' work, at a certain price per year, and then he strikes it out and makes up his mind he wants something else.

"The Court: Just a minute, gentlemen. It is perfectly competent, Mr. Corwin, to show that this plaintiff had filed a claim different from the claim that is here now. That would be perfectly competent, or if he made statements at any other time differing from his claim here; but since because there is something in there erased, that is not the claim. It is erased as much as it could be. It is supposed to have been wiped out entirely. It is simply a method of erasure, that is all. I don't believe that is a paper to exhibit to the jury. They have no right to consider it at all.

"Mr. Corwin: It shows, if your honor please, the value he placed, himself, on his own wages.

The Court: It is simply a blank. You wouldn't have any right to consider it, any more than you would turn over here and consider it on that blank sheet there. "Mr. Corwin: Note an exception."

Appellant's counsel claims that the question is governed by Ludlow v. Pearl's Estate, 55 Mich. 312, 317 (21 N. W. 315), where it was held that it was proper for the defense to show that the claim was originally smaller; that, while such showing would not have been conclusive, the original claim would be in the nature of an admission as to value. We have examined the printed record in the above case, and find that there the change and erasure were made during the examination of witnesses before the commissioners, "near when the evidence was all in." In the instant case, in the language of appellant's counsel: "It shows the claim which he started to file, and which he changed." We think the cases are not similar. It also appears that the claim was never verified except for the amount of $193.85, and it is fair to infer that the claim for $1,266 was never presented to, or filed with the commissioners. It may be doubted therefore whether it was a proper paper to be presented to the jury. In view of the offer of the court to permit counsel to show any statements made by claimant at other times, we are of opinion that the ruling was not reversible error.

The only remaining subject discussed by appellant's counsel is that of a suggested verdict. The question arose in this way: In the course of its charge the court said:

"Was there a contract under the rules which I have already given you? If there wasn't a contract, return a verdict of $1,070.68. If there was such a contract, then what were the services worth? Were they worth more than the claims allowed? If they were, add that amount to the $1,070.68 and figure interest on the $1,700 and add it up and announce your verdict.

"Mr. Smedley: Your honor, you said, 'Find out how much it was worth, and then add interest on $1,700.' "Mr. Corwin: I noticed that myself.

"Mr. Smedley: You should have said: 'Figure interest on that amount.'

"The Court: Did I say $1,700 ?

"Mr. Smedley: Yes.

"Mr. Corwin: In other words, suggesting a verdict to the jury.

"The Court (to the jury): In the first place determine what amount this plaintiff is entitled to, and then add interest on that at 5 per cent., leaving out the small item of $29.83, and whatever you find, if anything, in regard to the ditch and the clearing of land. I will read a request handed up on that subject: 'If you find that the labor was to be paid for after the death of the father, and you find that the labor is $1,700, due at the death of the father, then he is entitled to interest at 5 per cent. on the $1,700, or such other sum as you find is right, from the death of the father, namely, one year and one month. No interest can be allowed on the other small items, the $29.83, the $40.85, and the other item, if you find them in favor of the claimant."

Counsel for appellant strenuously urges that here was an intimation of what the court believed the evidence established, and that it was reversible error, and he cites many cases on the subject. In other parts of the charge the court had fully left to the jury the amount to be found for labor and services, if anything. We are of opinion that the court here made an inadvertent remark, which it promptly corrected, when its attention was called to it, and that no error, sufficient to reverse the case, was thereby committed. This court has held that, in determining whether remarks made by the court in the course of a trial were improper and prejudicial, the context, and the circumstances under which they were uttered, must be considered. Lamb v. Lippincott, 115 Mich. 611 (73 N. W. 887). It would be unfortunate to litigants, if an inadvertent remark of the trial judge, corrected at once, like the one we are considering, should be held to be reversible error.

We think that the case was fairly tried, and, finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed, with costs against the estate.

MOORE, C. J., and STEERE, MCALVAY, BROOKE, KUHN, OSTRANDER, and BIRD, JJ., concurred.