employees, that the union itself is going to have to do a better job of designing their own pension plans.

In other words, by having a free condition in the market, if you will, that we will have somewhat of a self-correcting, or as Mr. Reilly has put it, a kind of a safety valve.

Now a second approach is to try and do all these things through a great mass of legislation and regulations. We certainly, at least in bearing on the issue we have before us today, prefer the former approach.

Mr. SICKLES. Well, if I may just stay with that one point for a moment, before I go away from it, would you-you are in favor of a vesting, I am going to understand from your answer, as far as the employee contribution is concerned.

Would you-and this is a different point, though-be in favor of vesting as far as the employer contribution is concerned?

Mr. PRINE. I would say generally yes. I do believe that conditions of service are highly reasonable.

Mr. SICKLES. Certainly, that there is some regulation involved. Mr. PRINE. Yes. I should make clear here that as far as I know, our association has no particular position on this, and I am reflecting purely a personal point of view.

Mr. SICKLES. With respect to the States which do have right-towork laws, would I understand from your testimony that you would feel that this union pension fund does not exist, its application does not exist in the right-to-work States, and that by passing 14(b), we would then impose this particular union pension fund in these right-to-work States?

Mr. PRINE. Well, the point is that when he becomes a member, of course, he is subject to this kind of an approach which I have described. Now in a right-to-work State today, we are sure that he has, normally, at least, the opportunity to join. Clearly, if 14(b) is repealed, we will have a situation in which unions and employers are free to negotiate these kinds of contracts which would force that worker into the union in all States where such arrangements were negotiated, and then he would be subject to this kind of harsh provision.

Mr. SICKLES. As a matter of fact, though, without dwelling too long on it, it seemed to me that there is room for argument, that with the existence of an industrywide, or, I suppose, area wide pension plan, that the employee would have more protection because if he were to stop employment with one plant, and then go to work in another plant, then his pension plan would accumulate, whereas, if he were to go from one plant to another, and he didn't have this combined arrangement, we would say, one plan for an entire area, that he would continually lose, as he would go from one plant to another, because he wouldn't build up any credit.

Mr. PRINE. You, of course, I believe, are stating a case for the kind of vestings that I have understood that we both believe is appropriate. If we do have these vesting provisions, he is entitled to those benefits, subsequently.

Mr. SICKLES. It would seem to me that the man's greatest concern would be his entitlement to a pension when he acquires the age, and that any passing back of funds over the years as he goes from one employer to another which would lead to the impulse not to save, but

to spend up to our income, would not be desirable as to insure that the fund would stay in an industrywide plan, so when he does acquire the age of 60 or 65, he would receive the pension benefit to which he would be entitled, and I would say that there might be some room for argument in favor of this kind of plan, because then you don't have the problem of going from one employer to another.

Would you agree with that, that there is some room for argument? Mr. PRINE. I would certainly have this type of an objection. I would hope they would not be trying to create a situation in which his only basis for accumulating benefits as he goes along is if he chooses to go to work for a union shop, and in having to move, finds he has to move into precisely that kind of an operation to stay within a plan, and also stay within the industry.

I think it far better that he is protected through vesting provisions, so that even though he might move from a union shop to an open shop, or from a printing industry to some other industry, that he is accumulating these benefits in respect to his income as he goes along.

Mr. SICKLES. I think this is the thrust of this national report that I was telling you about. I wanted to ask Mr. Reilly just one last question, and that was for just further clarification with respect to your statement at the bottom of page 6 and the top of page 7, in which you were talking about classifying dues as assessments or vice versa, and what this recent ruling of the Department of Justice is in its real application, because I am not sure that I understand.

Would this be a case where what would be normally not really part of dues can't be classified as a special assessment, and thereby get around the law? Or is this a question of clarification of use of the term "assessment" and the use of the term "dues"?

Now I know some organizations that call their dues, they do it on what they call the assessment system, whereby a man only pays so much in the nature of dues, based upon the number of days on which he works. This they call an assessment, and they change their constitutions to call it a dues structure, just to make sure that they were calling it the proper name as specified by Congress.

Is that the situation, or are they getting around the law?

Mr. REILLY. Pretty much so, Congressman Sickles, in that the section 302 uses the term "periodic dues," and as I recall it, that same term is used in the provisions in the National Labor Relations Act title, title I, which permits checkoff.

Now shortly after the act had been passed, a number of international unions levied special assessments for strike funds. Sometimes they were levied by the conventions; other times, as in the ITU, they had a popuular referendum among the union members on it.

Now the question then arose as to whether or not they were dues that had to be paid in order to keep a job, and the matter was referred to the Department of Justice, because section 302 has criminal sanctions as well as equity sanctions, as you know from your own practice, Mr. Sickles, and the Assistant Attorney General to whom it was referred, came over with questions to the Solicitor of Labor, Mr. Tyson, at this period, and Assistant Attorney General Quinn, concurred in by then Assistant Solicitor George Washington, issued an opinion to the effect that if the union in its constitution called the special assessments dues, then a man had to pay those, presumably, under the TaftHartley Act.

48-225-65-pt. 2- -8

And so the result of that opinion, then, the opinion came out as a result of an amendment to the UAW constitution. As a result of it, though, scores of unions then amended their constitutions so as to call special assessments "dues." They say, "The term 'dues' includes," and then they mention initiation fees, and special assessments.

Mr. SICKLES. Would it be a proper statement, though, that what they are really concerned with is what do we mean by dues, and what is within the purview of dues? There might be some area of debate here, but they have not really come to the point where they can take a fine or something which we would normally not feel is dues, and by just calling it an assessment, thereby get around the law.

Mr. REILLY. I am not meaning to imply that the Department of Justice ever gave its blessing to union fines being called dues. That has never been done by the Department or by the Board, but I think the time the act was drawn, and being counsel to the Senate committee and knowing their thinking, what they had in mind were the periodic dues which are normally charged, not special assessments which could be levied by a local or for some particular cause, or levied by the international convention.

Mr. SICKLES. Thank you very much.

Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing here.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask a question. Mr. SICKLES. Mr. Griffin.

Mr. GRIFFIN. If I may go back to the union welfare pension situation in the instances to which you alluded, do the dues that are collected from union members, so-called periodic dues, include a contribution to the welfare and pension plan, if you know?

Mr. PRINE. They are a regular contribution, and we are under the impression that they do come under the heading of "dues." It is either dues or so-called regular assessments, but it is month by month. We think it is dues.

Mr. REILLY. The fine is dues, in the laws.

Mr. GRIFFIN. It is my impression that it is part of the dues that is required.

Now we hear, over and over again at these hearings, that the employee does not have to become a union member. All he has to do is pay

dues.

Now I take it that in this situation he would have the privilege of paying dues which would include a contribution to the welfare and pension plan, to which he would never be entitled as a beneficiary, if he did not choose to become a member.

Mr. PRINE. Correct.

Mr. GRIFFIN. That is a great privilege, then.

Thank you.

Mr. SICKLES. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. REILLY. Thank you very much. We appreciate your courtesy, gentlemen.

Mr. SICKLES. The next witness is Mary Crabtree, of Indianapolis, Ind. Do we have any prepared statement from you, Mrs. Crabtree? Mrs. CRABTREE. I have a hearing problem; I cannot hear. I can see better.

Mr. SICKLES. You may proceed in any way you like. Do you wish to read your statement?

Mrs. CRABTREE. Yes.

STATEMENT OF MRS. MARY CRABTREE, INDIANAPOLIS, IND. Mrs. CRABTREE. Mr. Chairman, my name is Mary L. Crabtree. I am from Indianapolis, Ind. I am a union member, and I have been for 18 years. I oppose the repeal of section 14 (b) of the Taft-Hartley law because it contains the spirit of the American idea of personal liberty. As a worker who benefits from membership in Local 1048, IBEW, I would not advocate anything harmful to good unionism.

The privilege to force membership is a source of power not given to or sought by any other organization outside of government. This fact alone would cause me to question compulsory unionism. Where today I have responsible union leaders using wisdom and restraint, tomorrow there may be new leaders with far less judgment. There are already signs of change in leadership in the labor movement nationally and in my own local. Section 14(b) allows each State to declare its own public policy on the matter of sovereign rights and personal choice.

There is no way to eliminate rivalry for union leadership or between unions. Right-to-work laws do not insure labor peace, nor do they cause a lack of it. I can remember two unsuccessful raids against local 1048 long before a right-to-work law was passed in Indiana, and I believe an attempt is still underway which was started before the law was repealed early this year.

There is no way for a right-to-work law to harm a union's legitimate business, which is bargaining with an employer. Because unionism has a legitimate purpose and does much good for its members, it does not require police force to attract members. I feel very strongly that it is degrading to unionism for its leader to publicly declare that they must force membership.

There are persons whose religious conviction prevent them from joining any organization. That they are a tiny minority does not alter the question: "Is it right to deny even one a job?"

I have been very disturbed by the violence that occurred during contract negotiations last year at the RCA plant at Marion, Ind. The IBEW represents this plant, and though my own local was not involved in the violence, it has brought the question of morality in union conduct very close to my consicence.

I could not willingly support a union whose leaders were dominated by Communists. I could not willingly support a union whose leaders provoked or condoned violence against management or its own members.

Any union member is likely at some time during his working life to be faced with one or both of these situations. Since the leadership of the AFL-CIO has not dealt effectively with either of these moral problems, what other way is left for dealing with a local whose activities violate your conscience except by withdrawing from membership? Where there is no right-to-work law, there is no way to keep from supporting criminals except to lose your job. Where compulsory unionism is enforced the law rewards the criminal and punishes the law-abiding citizen. It is needlessly cruel and unjust to ask a man to give up a job to do what law should do for him.

I believe forced riding creates more hardship and unfairness to the worker than free riding creates for the union. The labor movement

is a minority group. It should be and is protected by law, but who is the tiniest minority of all? When the guarantees of liberty are traced from the Bill of Rights, who finally holds them? No group holds rights—just the individual citizen. Personal liberty is still highly prized, even by union members.

Mr. SICKLES. Thank you very much, Mrs. Crabtree.

Mr. Griffin.

Mr. GRIFFIN. No questions.
Mr. SICKLES. Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWs. No, thank you.

Mr. SICKLES. Thank you very much for coming and contributing your testimony.

Mrs. Bernice R. Cox.

STATEMENT OF MRS. BERNICE R. COX, ANDERSON, IND.

Mrs. Cox. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Bernice R. Cox. I live at 5311 Inza Court, Anderson, Ind. I am a production worker on final assembly at the Delco-Remy Division of the General Motors Corp., where I have been employed for 21 years. I am a member of local No. 662 of the United Automobile Workers Union by coercion, and that is why I am here today.

I want to thank the members and staff of this subcommittee for permitting me to make this appearance, for I feel that what I have to say should be of some consideration in any fair deliberation of the legislation before you-H.R. 77, which would deny to the individual States their present right to outlaw forced union membership. Because of my experience with this subject, I am opposed to such legislation and urgently request that you gentlemen vote to retain section 14 (b) of the Taft-Hartley Act.

When I first went to work for Delco-Remy, there was no agency or union shop agreement in force, and those of us who disapproved of the manner in which labor bosses dictated to their membership, or for other reasons disliked unions, neither had to join or pay tribute in the form of dues.

In 1954 or 1955, I cannot remember the exact year, local No. 662 negotiated a union shop contract with management and all of us who worked at the plant were forced, whether we liked it or not, to become members of the union. In 1957, as you all know, Indiana outlawed compulsion in union membership. During the campaign which preceded this, I and many of my fellow employees worked for the enactment of such a law. Those of us who did, refused, as a matter of principle, to pay dues to the UAW when the law became effective.

A short time later, however, an Indiana court ruled that the right-towork law, while banning the so-called "union shop," did not outlaw the "agency shop." The reasoning of the court was, in effect, that it was illegal to force anyone to join a union, but not illegal to force everyone in a given shop to pay dues to that same union.

Almost immediately, local No. 662, which had a union shop agreement with management prior to enactment of the right-to-work law