INVESTIGATION BY INDUCTION.

355

SECTION NINTH.

RELIGION.

THERE are two inlets by which the belief of a Deity is received into the soul,-the philosophic and the moral; the principle which refers every event to a cause, and the form which conscience assumes of a law, thereby carrying the mind necessarily to the notion of a lawgiver.

The argument for the existence of a Deity has been divided, according to the scholastic jargon, into the arguments, à priori, and à posteriori. The term à priori, in this case, it has often been observed, is an absurd mistake, and a ridiculous misnomer. It has not, however, been remarked, that both these arguments are different forms of the same principle, -that every event must have a cause.

The popular proof for a Deity, consists in design; and this is so independent of metaphysics, that all which speculative philosophy can do, tends rather to

diminish than to increase conviction. This is the method which Paley has followed in his admirable work on Natural Theology. He enters into no disquisition concerning the way in which design may be inferred from its effects,-appeals to no law in the mind by which the belief in design is founded,—refutes few metaphysical sophisms of speculative atheists, but merely details the facts as he finds them, selecting and giving prominence to those which are most likely to affect a plain and unbiased understanding; and the result is most triumphant and satisfactory. The proof, in the cumulative augmentation of moral probability, approaches so indefinitely near to demonstration, that all objections may be safely and wisely disregarded, as belonging to a far lower order of argument; since possibilities have no weight, when balanced against probabilities, nor probabilities, when weighed against demonstration.

In a treatise on the mind, however, matters are different. There nicer doubts must be resolved, and slighter scruples weighed, than merit attention in theology or in morals, where the question is, not how our notions are formed, but what we ought to believe, or what we ought to practise.

Hume has denied, and Reid has affirmed, "that design and intelligence in the cause may be inferred with certainty, from marks or signs of it in the effect." As the existence of other minds, however, is inferred,

not from an immediate intuition of the existence of other minds, but from the marks and signs of intelligence in their conduct and actions, Hume's rashness, and unphilosophical presumption, incurred some ridicule, from composing, printing, and publishing, a work without having any reason, on his own philosophy, to infer the existence of any intelligent beings capable of benefiting by its perusal. It is sufficient to observe, without entering upon metaphysical sophistry, that no one acknowledged to be sane, doubts the existence of his fellow-creatures; and whoever will give himself the trouble of summing up his reasons for the belief of their existence, will find that the same arguments apply with still greater force to prove the being of the Supreme and Original Mind. We infer design from its effects,-the question how we do so, is speculative and not practical; whether a law of thought be original or acquired, impressed upon the mind from the first, or the result of its matured powers, does not affect its title to authority, nor lessen its claim to our obedience; we therefore do not question the justice of the axiom, or its importance, when we hesitate to pronounce, with Reid, that "the metaphysical principle" of design being deduced from its effects, is a peculiar and ultimate law of thought.

To constitute it so, we must carry with us, from the first, "marks or signs" by which to judge of design.

If this were the case, the child must be possessed of criteria, which the philosopher is unable to assign; but the readiest mode to shew that this is not an ultimate action, is to resolve it into simpler terms. Instead of stating the proposition, as Reid has done, "design and intelligence in the cause may be inferred with certainty from marks or signs of it in the effect,' and yet without specifying what these marks or signs are; this law of thought may be simply expressed thus: Fitnesses imply design. We use the plural number, for in popular apprehension one fitness does not exclude chance, a single arrow may hit the mark, and yet be accounted a random shot; but a flight of arrows, equally successful, imply not only an aim, but a steady one. Wherever, therefore, there is a concurrence of means towards an end, the mind no longer retains any hesitation in ascribing this concurrence to designing intelligence.

Now, that fitnesses should imply design, requires no new inlet of thought, and no additional power of thinking. Fitness implies an end for which it is fitted, and the perception and choice of an end, equally implies mind and design. The proof, indeed, for a supreme mind, is short and simple. There are but three hypotheses. Whatever happens, must happen by chance, by necessity, or by design. These three conditions exhaust all possibilities. Chance is the first refuge of ignorance, and necessity the se

cond. Every event has a cause; when the mind ascribes any event to chance, it merely pleads its ignorance of the cause. The plea of necessity is only a more learned ignorance. Necessity is not a cause, but an effect,-not power, but the want of it, -the not being able to offer resistance to superior force. The term necessary, has been applied, though not in strict propriety, to the Divine being, to designate absolute and unlimited existence. It has also been applied, with still greater impropriety, instead of the term certainty, to the determinations of the will. That which is necessary, is that which cannot be otherwise; it is true, the Divine being cannot be otherwise, because his essence is the fulness of being, to which nothing can be added, and from which nothing can be taken away; but this is a necessity solitary and incomparable, for which the term absolute were better substituted. Every other necessity of existence, except that which is connected with unlimited, indeterminable, and absolute being, is a necessity which is not original, but which is so constituted by the will of a superior. Blind necessity could perceive no ends,-admit no limits, and use no means; therefore, fitness is altogether incompatible with necessity. Power also implies choice and will, for that which does not will to act, if it acts at all, must be previously acted upon. Hence original power and choice are inseparable, and the supreme