that he had very little power, either for good or for evil. I will now say a few words in answer to an imposing, but, in my opinion, deceptive argument, urged by the gentleman from Delaware. He asks-If we are bound to obey the will of our constituents, how can we ever make an election, since that obligation would constrain the friends of each candidate to adhere to him throughout the contest? Now, there may be many difficulties connected with a doctrine or a duty, which neither destroys the truth of the one, nor absolves from the obligation of the other. If the mere existence of such difficulties would absolve us from any duty, there would be an end to the obligation of almost every duty. I see a very easy and obvious mode of surmounting the difficulty suggested by the gentleman; but, before I state it, I will take the liberty of asking him how he can get over the very same difficulty, upon his own principles? The principle of preference, whatever it is, that induces a member here to vote for a particular candidate, imposes upon him a moral obligation to vote for that candidate. 1 say we should vote in conformity with the will of our constituents. The gentleman says we should vote in conformity with the dictates of conscience. There is my principle, and here is his. They are of equal obligation. Is it not evident, therefore, that both would equally produce the difficulty under consideration? If we adhere, without departure, to the candidate selected upon either principle, there can be no election. But, sir, the difficulty is imaginary. The plain and practical rule, is, to endeavor, if possible, to carry into effect the will of our constituents. We must make this effort honestly, without any sculking behind pretexts, or forms. If it be found that their favorite cannot prevail; that the candidate who received their electoral vote unites but a small minority of the people of the United States in his favor, and that the two others are more prominent; we must then choose between them, still conforming to the will of our constituents, in making that choice, if their will be known to us. If we cannot succeed in electing their first choice, we should endeavor to elect the person next in their confidence. By this process, the final control will be found, where it ought to be, in the general voice of the people of the United States. [H. of R. Were upon us by the people, but by the constitution. The con Sir, I will now suppose a case, suggested by this argument of the gentleman from Delaware, which, from its peculiar application to myself, is better calculated than any thing I could select, to illustrate the sincerity of my attachment to the principles I have avowed. stitution, providing for another contingency, declares, that if this House fails to elect a President, the duties and powers of that office shall devolve upon the VicePresident. Now, if individual preference, without regard to the public will, were to decide this question, I need scarcely declare, in this place, that there is no man in this country whom I would prefer to the individual designated by the people for the office of Vice-President. But, sir, if, under the influence of this feeling, I were to give my vote in this House, for the indirect purpose of defeating the election, and throwing upon the VicePresident elect powers which the people never intended to confer; though my vote and my motive should be concealed from every human eye, I should never be able to make peace with my own conscience. I should regard myself as guilty of the most infamous dereliction of duty; and every honorable feeling of my nature would rise up to reproach me. In passing this sentence of deep reprobation upon my own supposed conduct, I trust T shall not be understood as speaking harshly of the possible conduct of others. The sentence I should pass upon myself, would result from my own peculiar notions of duty. Other gentlemen, entertaining different views of this subject, might pursue the course I should condemn in myself, without incurring the reproach of their own consciences, or deserving the reproach of others. I find myself called upon, to do what? Not to elect a President, but to complete an election which the people have left in an inchoate state, merely because they cannot meet together to complete it themselves. The framers of the constitution supposed that the popular branch of Congress would be the best means of con- I now invite the attention of the committee, for a few centrating the national will, and thereby consumma- moments, to a topic which has been drawn into this deing the work commenced by the people. The princi- bate, whether fortunately or unfortunately, it is not for ples in which it originated, are not changed by the acci- me to determine. We are told that we have a precedent, dental circumstances which have cast upon us the duty on this subject, set by the Congress of 1801; and we of adding the finishing stroke to it. All agree that it is are called upon to yield to that precedent the deference a misfortune that a majority of the people have not unit due to the acts of our predecessors. For my own part, ed in favor of one man; and that it was the very sir, I wish it to be distinctly understood, that I do end of the constitution, the "consummation most de- not consider that precedent entitled to the slightest voutly to be wished," that such majority should have possible respect, upon this question. With me it has been obtained in the first instance. Why, then, is it not not the weight of a feather. And why do I reject it? equally desirable now? What is it that has suddenly Not because it is a federal precedent, for mere words produced this magical change in the principles which have no weight with me; but because it was established regulate this great national operation, of choosing a Pre- by men who had deliberately resolved to violate their sident? Sir, these principles are eternal, and circum-duty to their constituents and to the constitution, by atstances do not affect them. If, as it must be admitted, it tempting an act of usurpation, which, for boldness and was the primary object of the constitution to elevate to desperation, would not have discredited a Cromwell or the Executive chair, the man who should be the choice a Bonaparte. They knew, perfectly well, that what of a majority of the people, that does not cease to be the they had in contemplation would excite the indignation object of the constitution when the election devolves of the people, and this rule was conseqently provided upon this House. The election of a President must be to veil their proceedings from the public eye. But, sir, regarded as a continued operation, carried on upon the I absolve the Federal party from the sin of that transacsame principies throughout. It would be a miserable tion. God forbid that the weight of that sin should rest and incongruous piece of patch-work, to commence with upon any party now in existence. It was the deed, one set of principles, and end with another. to be sure, of Federalists; but the Federal partyI mean the people of the United States, known by that denomination-never gave it their sanction. What, But, says the gentleman from Delaware, the power we exercise in electing a President is not conferred H. of R.] Election of President. [FEB. 3, 1825. That he felt it his duty to make a few remarks in reply to those he had just heard-not so much with the view of affording either interest or instruction to the House, as with the view of publicly avowing those principles, which he deemed sound, and by which he had determined that his conduct on the approaching occasion should be regulated. then, was it, that doomed to political infamy and proscription, Aaron Burr and his associates? Looking at the strict constitutional power of this House, that pretender was as fairly entitled to be chosen by it, as Mr. Jefferson. He had a equal number of electoral votes, making no discrimination. Whence, then, the popular odium incurred by those who voted for Barr? Simply, sir, from the attempt to carry into practical effect the The question, said Mr. M. immediately under consiprinciple that this House has a right to elect a President deration, is intrinsically of but slight and trivial import, without regard to the popular will. This was the sin, but it derives much consequence from other and more sir. "The very head and front of their offending, had important questions that have been drawn into discusthis extent no more A combination of politicians, sion. What, asked Mr. M. is the nature of the question some fifty or sixty in number, who had been accustomed before the House? It is one exclusively of police. But, to wield the political power of the country, seeing the from the manner in which it had been treated, he should sceptre about to pass from their hands, screwed up their have inferred, but for the gentleman's disclaimer, that courage to the sticking point, and boldly set at defiance his object was not so much to discuss this question, as to the will of the nation, by attempting to clect a man Pre-issue a sort of manifesto to the people of the United sident, who was known not to be the choice of the peo- States, to justify those who yield to a strong current, ple. Under the influence-the maddening influence, and to damn those who resist it. It is a question not of of party feelings, they attempted, as a party, what none open galleries or closed galleries. Gentlemen had, of them would have attempted, and perhaps few of therefore, been engaged in combatting shadows; and them approved, as individuals. They were actuated much of what had been said, had been addressed to a by a principle, similar to that which stimulates and sus- motion which no one had made. tains a mob in the commission of depredations, which every individual composing it, when left to himself, would shudder to contemplate. They confirmed the wavering, and quieted the apprehensions of the timid, by crying out, "The party will sustain us; the party will sustain us." Sir, it was a fatal delusion. It was the last act of their political life; it put a final end to the ascendency of the Federal party. I agree with the gentleman from Delaware, that the policy pursued by the Federal party, with the exception of two or three measures, which nobody now attempts to justify, was a wise policy. They organized the Executive Government, and a system of national defence. They erected many monuments of their wisdom. But, in this closing scene of their power, what did they do? An act which alienated the confidence of the country, struck down the fabric of their power, and, by the re-action produced, swept away all the memorials of their glory, of which the gentleman from Delaware has spoken. Measures were confounded with men, and both involved in one common prostration. And hence the feeble and debilitating policy pursued by the Republican party, during the first years of its ascendency. Without pretending to question, therefore, the general wisdom of the Congress of 1801, I must protest against yielding to their precedent on the subject before us. The question, as he understood it, was simply this:Whether the galleries should be thrown open, subject to be closed at the motion of the Speaker, or, whether they should be thrown open, subject to be closed at the request of the delegation from any one state. For his own part, he should have thought that the latter arrangement would have been conceded as a matter of courtesy, to those gentlemen who stand singly and unsustained by colleagues, as representatives from the weaker states. For himself, he had not the remotest idea that those galleries, let them be occupied by whom they might, were about to overawe the House, or exert any improper influence upon it whatever. His reliance was placed upon the deep moral feeling that pervades this nation. On this he relied to sustain gentlemen in the discharge of their duty; and on this he relied more than on all the bayonets and cannon that military despotism ever wielded. This is a mere question of order. The admission of strangers was an act of courtesy, granted, as such acts are always understood to be, upon an implied obligation of good behaviour. It was not to be presumed beforehand, that those who were admitted, would violate the laws of decorum: but, if they did, there could be no doubt that the Speaker was competent to exclude them: and as little doubt that he would do it at the suggestion of the delegation from any one state, that a free exercise of their rights required their exclusion. He would again repeat, that he felt no fears from any attempt to overawe the House; and still less had he fears of the intriguers who had been spoken of, whether posted in the galleries, or operating in this hall. His position was peculiar; it was that of an armed neutrality, he had but little to hope, and nothing to fear. There are some other topics which I intended to touch, but which I will waive, as I have too long trespassed upon the attention of the committee already. There is a single remark, however, which I must be permitted to make, before I sit down. We are called upon to close the galleries; and upon what grounds? Have we any evidence that they will be disturbed? Have we any reason to believe that they will be more disor- He knew that he stood upon a narrow isthmus, lashed derly then, than they are now? Our tongues will be upon either side by the most angry surges, from which silent on the approaching occasion, and it would be a re- neither numbers nor denunciations should be able to flection upon the people of the United States to sup-drive him. Calling to his aid the little lights of his unpose they could be spectators of such a scene, and not be hushed into silent attention by the moral grandeur of so simple and sublime a spectacle. Sir, who are they that will fill the galleries? They will be an epitome of the people of the United States, respectable and intelligent gentlemen from a distance, who, for aught I know, may be as capable of deciding this great question, with a view to the tranquillity of the Union, (I say it without intending to derogate from the dignity of the House,) as our honorable selves. Mr. MANGUM, of North Caralina, then rose, and said, that he felt great repugnance to obtrude his remarks upon the notice of the House at any time-a repugnance which, upon this occasion, was certainly not diminished by the state of indisposition in which he found himself. derstanding, and with a heart bent upon the best interests of his country, he should firmly and fearlessly endeavor to perform his duty. He should not, however, have troubled the House at this time with a single remark, but for the principles he had heard advanced; and against which he felt it his duty to enter his solemn protest. He had always listened to the gentleman from South Carolina with great pleasure, and he must confess that he had heard him on this occasion with the more pleasure, because he thought he had perceived that his talent, his ingenuity, and his fertility of resource, had proved insufficient to sustain him under the weight of the cause he advocated. Whom, asked Mr. M. are we bound to obey, in giving our votes on the approaching occasion? We, I mean, who are in the minority? If I understand the gentleman, we are bound to obey the will of those whose candidate shall have the highest number of votes. I would be glad to know whether we are bound to do this by a moral obligation, or only by reason of the philosophy of the Constitution, to which the gentleman alluded. If by a moral obligation, that obligation addresses itself to every honest mind with the force of a perfect obligation; it must be obeyed, and why then has the Constitution been so silly as to allow us a choice between three candidates, when we are morally, and of course perfectly bound to elect the candidate who has the largest number of votes in the electoral colleges? [Here Mr. M. yielded the floor to Mr. McDUFFIE, who wished to explain. He had not said that gentlemen were bound to elect the candidate who had the highest number of votes; on the contrary, he had said distinctly, that a plurality of votes did not make an election.] Mr. M. resumed. He was then to understand the gentleman, that we are not constitutionally, but only morally bound; or, in other words, that we have no right to disregard the will of the people, as expressed in a plurality of votes by the electoral colleges. But, if so, was not the argument the same?--the conclusion the same? Was not that obligation as binding, as an obligation emanating immediately from the Constitution!Must not every honest man regard it in that light? And must not every man who was not base enough to barter away his birth right for a mess of pottage-to sell himself for loaves and fishes-feel its binding power? If the obligation was a moral one, it was a perfect one, and, as such, commanded perfect obedience. He must, therefore, most emphatically repeat, that it was extreme folly if not worse, in the framers of the Constitution, to give' to this House the power of selection between three candidates, when, at the same time, the hands of members are tied up from the exercise of that power by the strongest obligations. The Constitution, then, holds out to us bread, and gives us a stone. But this never was the design of the framers of the Constitution. And the very fact that they have given us the power to choose, is enough to prove that the principle, as stated, does not furnish the rule by which we are to be governed. [H. of R. and three candidates for the Presidency. Suppose eight states should vote for each candidate; if we are bound to vote as our respective states do, no election can be made. And what will be the result? It is obvious.By adhering to the principle, of which the gentleman speaks, you postpone three candidates, upon whom the people of the United States had fixed their eyes, as fit persons for the Chief Magistracy, and each of whom had received the votes of one-third of the people of the United States for that office. You set aside all these, and let the Vice President into that office; a man who had not received a single vote in the United States for the Presidency. What will the people's men say to this doctrine and yet it is principle, sacred principle, according to the views of some gentlemen. But, says the gentleman, we are first to try to elect the people's man, and if we cannot effect that object, then, and then only, take up some other candidate. We must yield to the necessity of the case. Mark me, it is moral principle, says the gentleman, by which we are bound. A principle is surely a very bad one, which will not wear longer than one day, and which must be abandoned as soon as it is put into practice. But we must yield to the necessity of the case! I had thought that that which yields to any necessity whatever was not moral principle, for moral obligation admits of no compromise. It is said that, if on trial we cannot succeed in electing a Presi dent, to prevent the Vice President's coming into that office, we must give way. But here are eight states in favor of each candidate-who is to give way first? If I give way first, may not my constituents reproach me with an abandonment of principle? If the gentleman gives way first, does he not abandon principle? Sir, such a principle as must be abandoned on one day's trial, is not a principle which I will ever recognize. If, then, sir, we are under no moral obligation to vote for the candidate who has the highest number of votes, nor to obey the votes of our respective states; what, I again ask, is to be the rule which must govern us? Sir, it appears to me that the whole fallacy, which pervades the arguments of the gentlemen whose views I am opposing, consists in this-they are comparing the votes of the people, taken per capita, with the votes of twenty-four distinct and independent sovereigns. They are comparing things which have no points of resemblance, nor have they any assignable relation to each other.The states, as sovereigns, are all equal. The people, who make up those sovereignties, numerically considered, are totally unequal, and, in that respect, bear towards each other various and diversified proportions. Are we then to be bound by the votes of our respective districts? (This is the doctrine of the people's men, and all are people's men now-a-days, from the much reprobated caucus men, down to the humblest political professors.) Here, I trust, I may be permitted to say, that I shall, for once in my life, at least, in the honest discharge of my duties, fall in with the doctrines of the people's men— I expect to represent the plurality of my district. If, then, we are not bound by the gentleman's moral obligation, to elect that candidate who happens to have a plurality of votes in the electoral colleges, what is the rule by which we are to be governed? Is it by the vote of our respective states? That cannot be the rule: for the Constitution has not prescribed any uniform mode for the election of electors, but has left that power in the Legislatures of the States. And it may happen in those States in which they elect electors by districts, that there may be a tie; that the votes for two contending candidates may be equal. How will gentlemen extricate themselves from this dilemma-the dilemma of a tie? Will they resort to their principle? It will fail them-it is not principle-it is, in my humble judgment, absurdity. The gentleman from South Carolina has But are we bound by the votes of our districts? I asked the gentleman from Delaware, with a sort of tri- mean, in point of principle? Did the framers of the umph, to answer the case which he put, to wit: that if Constitution design that we should be so bound? If 130 votes should be given for one candidate, falling one they did, wherefore does not the Constitution prescribe vote short of the number required for an election, whe- an uniform mode of electing representatives by districts? ther that gentleman would dare to resist such a majority? And yet the power of prescribing the mode, is left with I would answer, that great respect is due to the opinions the legislatures of the respective states. Some states of the people. That it would be great impolicy, in or elect their representatives by general ticket, as does dinary cases, to resist so full an expression of the public Georgia, for example. How will gentlemen ascertain will. But reasons might exist, which would render it the votes of their districts, under the general ticket systhe imperious duty of the representative, as an honest tem? How will gentlemen extricate themselves from man, to resist it. There is no principle concerned, as, I this dilemma? Will they do it by resorting to the state. trust, I have shown. It is mere matter of expediency.ment, that the state, in that case, is each member's dis But let me suppose a case, predicated upon the alleged principle, that we are bound to give our votes in accordance with the votes of our respective states, and ask the gentleman to answer it. There are twenty-four states trict? If so, then each member is bound to represent the vote of his state. This brings the question back to the ground on which I have already considered it; and the doctrine is subject to all the objections to which I have already adverted. It is true, that the gentleman from South Carolina cannot be mistaken as to the vote of the people: for in that state they elect members by districts. Should he recognize the principle of perfect obedience to the voice of his district, then should also every other member. If this is principle, what would be the consequence of adherence to it, in the most of casesindeed, in the actual posture of affairs at present? It is plain-no President could be made, and the Vice President would come in. If it is principle, we are bound to adhere, but if we may give way, and are not bound to adhere, then it should no longer be dignified with the name of principle, but it is a mere question of expediency. Again, if we are not bound by the votes of our districts, (as is clearly the case, in some of the states, for the simple reason, that they have no districts,) hut are bound by the votes of our respective states, then this dilemma might arise-A member might be obliged to vote for a candidate, who was opposed by every man in his district. Here he gives up the wishes of all his constituents, the only people upon earth to whom he is politically responsible, and for what? To fall in with the vote of the state-and by adhering to that vote, no President is elected and the Vice President comes in, after all these fearless and patriotic sacrifices. Again: If our states were all of equal size, that is, equal in point of population, and the people fail to make an election in the electoral colleges, it is clear that no election could ever be made by the House of Representatives, should the members recognize as correct, and adhere to the principle, that they are bound to vote in accordance with the votes of their respective states. In the present unequal size of the states, under any ordinary circumstances of combination, the operation of that principle would defeat an election nine times out of ten; and in no solitary case can an election be made in the House of Representatives by adhering to the principle, except by enforcing the odious doctrine, that the minority shall prevail over the majority-that is, by making thirteen or more of the smaller states, that had voted for one candidate in the electoral colleges, without effect, come into the House and do the same, with com plete effect. What they were unable to do, by reason of inequality of population, they are made to effect by the equality of their sovereignity. Sir, if these are people's principles, I, for one, beg to be delivered from them. It is said that, in matters of legislation, it is a vexed question, whether the representative is not bound to obey the will of his constituents, and that many great and wise men have held the affirmative. Sir, I would not give a button for the doctrine, either the one way or the other, so far as regards its practical utility. As to the mere theory, I concede it to gentlemen-they may delight themselves with whatever theories they please, whether ingeniously or inartificially constructed. But, though the question, as to legislation, may be vexed, gentlemen tell us, that, in the business of electing a President by the House of Representatives, there can be no doubt the case is a plain one. Sir, I argue directly the reverse. In the business of legislation, the people, in primary assemblies, cannot act-it is constitutionally, it is physically impossible. There is, therefore, a propriety, in a representative government like ours, that the legislative body should respond to the voice of the people; that, as a reflector, it should give back the true image of the people's wishes. But, in the election of a chief magistrate, the people can act in primary as semblies. Those assemblies present the proper and the best mode in which the election can be made. But the people, having attempted an election in this mode, and having failed of success, the constitution brings the election to this House: this House is the umpire, the judge on whom devolves the settlement of that momentous question, which the people have been unable to settle themselves, for want of greater unanimity. [FEB. 3. 1825. Sir, I hope I have now succeeded in showing e fal lacy of the gentleman's pardon me-the people's doctrines, of instruction. What, then, is our duty, in the present crisis, and on the approabhing occasion? Is it to fall into the ranks of the candidate, who may happen to be the strongest? (A very comfortable doctrine, indeed, particularly, to those who happen to be in the minority; our understandings and conscience approving, we should like to be wafted with you gentlemen, on the strong currents.)—Is it to obey the voice of our states? or, is it to obey the voice of our districts? It is, in my judment, neither more nor less than this-To do what is right, according to the best dictates of our own understandings, and leave the consequences to God, and to our country. It has been asked, how can we hold up our heads when we return home, if we have gone against the will of our constituents? Sir, we can hold our heads as erect as an angel. The man who has honestly done, what he understood, after deep and anxious reflection, to be his duty, may meet the eyes of his constituents, aye, the eyes of the world, and neither blench nor quail, though none should smile upon him. It has, also, been said, (and the remark, though it can have none here, may be calculated to have an effect abroad,) that, whenever a man has done deeds of renown, the people delight to honor him, and will, with great certainty, elevate him to the highest offices. Sir, this is a mere truism; every body here, knows that this is true. It is what the people will always do; it is what they have done, in a thousand instances; but, sir, it is exactly what, in the present case, they have not done. Else, why does the election come to this House? Sir, a majority of the people have distinctly told you, that not even the most favored candidate is the man of their wishes. Neither is elected, though all may have been honored. It is we who must elect. We have also been told, that, upon grounds of expediency, the sceptre ought not to be placed in the hands of any man who has not a majority of the votes of his countrymen; and that, if we do place it in the hands of. such a one, we only place it there to lop off his arm. Sir, this but ill agrees with what is a fundamental principle in the system of the people's men. What, sir! are the intelligent and enlightened people of these states, who are so much flattered in one breath, to be represented in the next as ferocious as tigers! Are they to rise in their wrath, and hurl the full weight of their indignant vengeance at an individual who has done no harm? Who has done no one act to excite their displeasure? Suppose three candidates should come before us with an unequal number of votes, I admit we should very properly feel inclined to elect him "cæteris paribus," who had the largest number, (for I would not willingly deprive gentlemen of the smallest comfort.) But, suppose the candidate who had the smallest number should, in the result, be chosen President, is it maintained that the people of the United States would rise in vengeance against that man? Surely, sir, whatever phials of wrath might be exhausted on the heads of their guilty representatives, the people would pour out none upon the innocent head of a man who had done no one offensive deed, and whose only crime had been to be constitutionally presented for choice, and constitutionally chosen. We have heard, further, and much to my astonishment, that the doctrine of the gentleman from Delaware would not flourish in old England-nay, that it is too strong even for the military despotism of Napoleon. I scorn to flatter any man, and am sure that, on this occasion, I shall be exempt from the imputation of such design, when I say I was an attentive listener to the gentleman from Delaware, and did think, and still think, that sounder doctrines, or doctrines delivered with more pellucid clearness, never fell from the lips of any man, than from those of that distinguished member; and I did consider the FEB. 4, 1825.] Suppression of Piracy. [Senate. demonstration by which they were maintained, preclud- up to the authority of the Island where captured, or to I have not heard why his doctrines would not flourish in old England; the gentleman from South Carolina did not condescend to favor us with any thing more on that point than mere assertion. As to what was said in regard to the iron reign of Napoleon, and the declarations that he made, it is indeed true, that that despotic ruler professed to be governed by the will of the people, (Bonaparte, it seems, too, was also a "people's man.") But, sir, while he professed this, he was supported by 250,000 bayonets; and, in such circumstances, what was the "people's will "" It was the will of their tyrant. Here Mr. M., not having concluded his remarks, gave way for a motion for the committee to rise. IN SENATE-FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1825. The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill "for the suppression of piracy in the West Indies" The motion of Mr. SMITH to amend the 4th section, (which Mr. MACON had proposed to strike out,) being the question pending This motion was decided without debate, by yeas and YEAS.-Messrs. Bell, Branch, Brown, Chandler, On motion of Mr. MILLS, some minor amendments On motion of Mr. BARBOUR, (who wished to accommodate those who objected to the clause as it stood) the limitation of salvage for recaptures, was stricken out, and the amount to be allowed, left to the discretion of the Courts. The bill was then reported to the Senate as amended, and the amendments made in committee of the whole concurred in. an intention to offer, viz: Mr. LLOYD, of Mass, moved the adoption of the fol. Mr. TALBOT hoped the Senate would not go on de-lowing section, which he had some days ago intimated bating for days, motions to amend parts of the bill which were then, after all the time spent on their details, struck out; he therefore suggested to Mr. SMITH the propriety of withdrawing his motion to amend, that the question might be taken on the principle itself contained in the fourth and remaining sections of the bill. Mr. SMITH yielded to this suggestion, to save time, and withdrew his motion. And be it further enacted, That for every pirate, who shall be captured by the officers, or crews, or any part of them, of vessels belonging to the United States, and brought into the United States; and who shall be convicted of the crime of piracy, by any competent tribunal, the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he hereby is, authorized and required to pay, or cause to be paid, to the owners, officers, and crews, of the vessels capturing such pirates, or to their agents, the sum of one hundred dollars for each and every pirate captured, and condemned as aforesaid; to be divided among the parties receiving the same, in like manner as is provided in the fifth section of this act, for the distribution of the pro Mr. TALBOT then moved to strike out the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th sections of the bill, (all relating to armed merchant vessels,) which authorize the recapture of vessels from the pirates, taken on the coast of Cuba, &c. allow salvage therefor of one-eighth to onehalf, apportion among the crews and owners of merchant vessels, the property of captured piratical vessels, re-perty captured from pirates; and that the sum of ten quiring bond of armed merchant vessels, for lawful conduct-authorizing the President of the United States to establish instructions for them, providing for a fund out of the vessels captured from pirates, from which pensions are to be allowed to sailors disabled in action with pi. rates, and to their families if killed, &c. &c. On the motion to strike out these sections, a wide debate took place, in which Messrs. TALBOT, BARBOUR, SMITH, HOLMES, of Maine, and MILLS, engaged. The question being taken on striking out the sections, it was decided in the negative by yeas and nays, as follows: thousand dollars, from any money in the Treasury, not After some debate on this amendment, between The question was put on the section offered by Mr. Mr. VAN BUREN then renewed the motion he had unsuccessfully made in committee of the whole, to reYEAS-Messrs. Barton, Bell, Bouligny, Branch, commit the bill to a select committee, with instructions Brown, Chandler, Clayton, Cobb, D'Wolf, Dickerson, "to report amendments thereto, giving power to the Findlay Gaillard, Lowrie, Macon, Noble, Ruggles, Tal- President, on its being satisfactorily proved to him that bot, Taylor, Tazewell, Thomas, and Van Dyke-21. any of the pirates, mentioned in the said act, find refuge NAYS-Messrs. Barbour, Benton, Eaton, Edwards, in any of the cities or ports of the said Island of Cuba, Hayne, Jackson, Johnson, of Ky., Johnston, of Lou., or other Islands mentioned in the said bill, and that the Kelly, King, of N. Y., Knight, Lloyd, of Md., Lloyd, of local governments of the said Islands, on being requestMass., M'Ilvaine, M'Lean, Mills, Palmer, Parrott, Sey-ed so to do, neglect, or refuse, to aid in the apprehenmour, Smith, Van Buren, and Williams-22. Mr. LOWRIE then moved to strike out the second section of the bill, which is as follows: Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That the commanders and crews of the armed vessels of the United States shall be, and they are hereby, authorized, under such instructions as may be given them by the President of the United States, in the fresh pursuit of pirates on the Island of Cuba, or any other of the Islands of Spain in the West Indies, to land whenever it may be necessary to secure the capture of the said pirates, and there to subdue, vanquish, and capture them, to deliver them sion, prosecution, and conviction, of such pirates, to Mr. VAN BUREN supported his motion with some |