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reasoning is void of all positive and substantial weight on the side of truth, either in science, or morals, or religion. If fanciful analogies are put in the place of real analogies, if analogies that are slight and superficial are dealt with as analogies that are essential and characteristic, if analogies that are poetical and rhetorical merely are made to serve the office of those that are proper and logical, if analogous instances are falsely chosen, or used in support of conclusions which they actually defeat, the grossest absurdities will no doubt be fallen into, and the most extravagant mistakes committed. But that is no reason why analogy may not be wisely and soberly used so as to afford results. that not only neutralise objections and expose inconsistencies, but help the inquirer on in his path with an instrument that really guides and proves, as well as suggests and prompts. And even although it yields only presumption and probability, even although its arguments fall short of full proof, yet what it does yield may in any given case be valid and sufficient. That validity and that sufficiency are matters of degree. And it would be contrary to reason and to experience to affirm that the analogous cases, and the analogical reasoning from which they arise, can never be so numerous or so strong as to lift them up to that point at which they will be fairly entitled to rank as positive evidences, as direct contributions to our knowledge, as rational grounds for our faith.

The real question on this point is, Is there any inherent inferiority, any essential flaw in a process of analogical reasoning and proof? Granting the existence of analogies, granting the perception of them by the human mind, granting that the principle on which reasoning upon them proceeds, is, that things less known may be fairly judged of by some similitude observed in things better known, that likeness seen in one direction affords a presumption that likeness may be seen in another, that "similar causes, of whatever kind, will, in similar circumstances, at all times produce similar effects,"-granting this, the question is, Is such reasoning in itself vicious? Is it of necessity unsound and inconclusive? And so long as that question cannot be answered in the affirmative, so long must it be impossible to maintain the doctrine that analogy fails on the positive side. For, while it may be the essence of an argument from analogy to be probable only and not demonstrative, while its probability may, in any single instance, be so feeble as to leave the mind in conjecture and doubt, it may mount up to a clear indication, and thence to a reason for conviction strong as moral certainty. The analogous instances reasoned on may be so adjacent in time, in place, and in

circumstances, the points in which the analogy holds may be so material and permanent, the field over which the induction exhibits the analogy may be so ample, and every step in the course of arguing from the analogy may be so correct and sure, as to put forth a very high degree of substantive proof. A happy illustration of this has been given by Beattie: "When the ancient philosopher who was shipwrecked in a strange country, discovered certain geometrical figures drawn upon the sand by the sea-shore, he was very naturally led to believe, with a degree of assurance not inferior to moral certainty, that the country was inhabited by men, some of whom were men of study and science, like himself. Had these figures been less regular, and liker the appearance of chance-work, the presumption from analogy of the country being inhabited would have been weaker; and had they been of such a nature as left it altogether dubious whether they were the work of accident or design, the evidence would have been too ambiguous to serve as a foundation for any opinion." This is evidently the view held by Sir Isaac Newton when he gave analogy such a high place as the second among his laws of philosophizing. It is the view which the writings of Mr Mill, Dr Whewell, Mr Powell, and others, in recent times are doing so much to advance. Mr Powell goes so far as to say that "the inductive process derives its whole force from the discovery and acceptance of sound and well-framed analogies; or, the soul of induction is analogy; and it is higher, more efficacious, and more enduring, as the analogies are more strictly accordant with the real harmonies of nature." But, for a formal, systematic, complete marshalling of the arguments on which this higher view of analogy turns, and for a most clear and successful vindication of the right to a freer and more extensive use of analogy according to this view, our English literature must now hold itself indebted to Dr Buchanan in the elaborate and learned treatise before us.

Our space forbids us venturing to introduce our readers to those portions of Dr Buchanan's work which he has specially devoted to the sources of analogy, and to its application to some of the religious questions at present most earnestly discussed. Where all the chapters on these points are admirable, we may be allowed simply to refer to that on Analogy applied to Religious Liberalism, as presenting in tone, and sentiment, and reasoning, one of the most powerful antidotes our day has furnished to that spirit, which is perhaps doing more than anything else to lead men away from the Truth, and to withdraw them from the foundations of Faith. Through all the pages which these chapters fill,

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Dr Buchanan's readers will find how eminently he combines intellectual vigour with literary gracefulness, profoundness of thought with felicity and perspicuity of expression, vigorous grasp of principles with easy handling of details, and a most scholar-like appreciation of philosophy, and a strict adherence to truly philosophical methods, with a deep religiousness of feeling, and a most stedfast upholding of the faith once delivered to the saints.

In laying aside this rich deposit of Christian wisdom and truth, it may be permitted us, in this journal, to close with the beautiful and touching dedication which Dr Buchanan has prefixed to it. The well-known lines were repeated, if we remember aright, in the presence of Dr Buchanan and others, by his honoured and beloved colleague Dr Cunningham, shortly before his death.

TO THE MEMORY

OF

WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM, D.D.

"A few short years of evil past,

We reach the happy shore,

Where death-divided friends at last
Shall meet, to part no more."

ART. VI.-Count Montalembert on Religious Toleration.

L'Eglise Libre dans L'Etat Libre. Discours prononcés au Congres Catholique de Malines par Le Comte DE MONTALEMBERT, L'un des quarante de l'Académie Française. Paris. 1863.

COUNT MONTALEMBERT's orations, delivered in August last at the Roman Catholic Congress held at Mechlin, have now been published in a separate form under the title of L'Eglise Libre dans L'Etat Libre. They are highly interesting, both from the eloquence of their style and the nobleness of their sentiments, and also, because they contain so strong an advocacy of the principles of religious toleration, by one who

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ranks among the eminent statesmen and brilliant orators of our time, and who is besides, the acknowledged head of the liberal Roman Catholics in France and in Europe. It is indeed no less strange than gratifying to find a Romanist coming forward as the advocate of religious toleration, as well as of liberty of the press, liberty of teaching, liberty of association, and all the other liberties which the infallible Church has uniformly opposed and condemned, and even yet continues to anathematize. More than thirty years ago, the attempt of Count Montalembert himself to reconcile, in the columns of L'Avenir, the support of these liberties with the claims of the Church, was emphatically condemned by Pope Gregory the 16th; and the views of Gregory are still maintained to their fullest extent by Pius the 9th. As long, therefore, as the head of the Church continues to censure and disavow the opinions maintained by Count Montalembert and his friends on the subject of religious toleration, freedom of the press, and other kindred liberties, the isolated, unauthorised, expression of their opinion is of but little consequence. It has no authority. It is hors de l'Eglise, unsanctioned by the Church, and therefore comparatively valueless. For it must be remembered that the cardinal principal of Romanism is authority, which is to that system what the principal of free inquiry is to Protestantism. Romanism without the principal of authority is an absurdity; and when we find the authority of the Church diametrically opposed to the sentiments expressed by some of her members upon questions of great public interest and importance, we have but little hope that the Church will yield, and considerable fear that her authority will ultimately succeed, if not in convincing her erring members, at least in stifling the public manifestations of their opinions. Some may be inclined to maintain that the Church of Rome has grown wiser by the teaching of experience, and that she is no longer opposed to the concession of religious toleration to those who differ from her. There cannot, however, be a greater error. Rome remains as intolerant as ever; though, fortunately, she is less powerful. Yet, wherever she possesses the power to be intolerant, she never fails to exercise it. And this it is easy to prove by a reference to some of the latest of the papal allocutions; but we shall first cast a rapid glance at some circumstances in the past history of the Papacy.

At an early period, the Romish theocracy arrogated to itself supreme power on earth both in spiritual and temporal affairs, and everywhere prescribed a law unchangeable as the will of God; and for a time, owing to the very exaggera

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tion of its unity, it became the safeguard of civilisation in the midst of the anarchy and violence of the barbarian conquerors of Europe. But a terrible evil attached to this theocratic system. It tended to petrify society in a fixed form, and to render it immoveable, instead of facilitating those successive changes of form which are the inseparable conditions of progress. In making the civil and political authority the passive instrument of the church and the executioner of her sentences, it gave to religion the character of a despotism, and degraded the dignity of the civil power. There was nowhere to be seen, under this system, the unity of the gospel-that unity which is the result of the moral agreement of souls drawn together by faith and lovebut instead, an intolerant and crushing uniformity which stifled every free aspiration of the human spirit, and under which, civil, political, and social liberty could never have arisen. It was a system which might suit for a time the necessities of a nascent civilisation, that required to be held in leading strings, and to be governed by a rule of iron, on account of the disorderly elements by which it was surrounded, and from the midst of which it sprung. But as a definite system for Europe, it was preposterous and absurd, and essentially opposed to the genius of Christianity; as its inevitable tendency was to annihilate personal responsibility, and to retain individuals and nations in a state of perpetual minority and of servile dependence. The great Reformation of the sixteenth century was the indignant protest of humanity against this false and unnatural system. A large part of Europe threw off the yoke of the papacy, and although it still continued to retain its hold in many places, yet it for ever ceased to have the right to affirm that its predominance was founded on the free assent of the reason of nations, since it thenceforward placed itself in open antagonism to the principle of liberty of thought, and declared a systematic and implacable war against the spirit of free inquiry-a principle as indispensable to the progress and greatness of civilised nations, as pure air and water for the preservation of life and health. That war still continues, as we shall now proceed to prove by a reference to some of the encyclical letters and other documents, which have been issued by various popes during the last thirty years.

In 1832, Gregory the 16th fulminated an encyclical letter, emphatically condemning the attempt made by the Abbé Lamennais, Count Montalembert, and others, to reconcile Romanism with the liberal tendencies of the age;* in 1850,

For a detailed account of this refusal of the Papacy to be defended, even by its ablest and most devoted servants, on condition of yielding some counte