ARTICLE XVII.

Of Predestination and Election.

Predestination to life is the everlasting purpose of Gad, whereby (before the foundations of the World were laid) he hath constantly decreed by his Counsel, secret to us, to deliver from curse and damnation, those whom he hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, and to bring them by Christ unto everlasting Salvation as vessels made to honour. Wherefore thep which be endued with so excellent a benefit of God, be called according to God's purpose, by his Spirit working in due season. Thep through grace obep the calling, they be justified freely, thep be made Sons of God by Adoption, thep be made like the Image of his only begotten Son Jesus Christ: Thep walk religiously in good works, and at length by God's mercy they attain to everlasting felicity.

As the godly consideration of Predestination and our Election in Christ is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons, and such as feel in themselves the working of the Spirit of Christ, mortifying the works of the flesh, and their earthly members, and drawing up their mind to high and heavenly things, as well because it doth greatly establish and confirm their Faith of eternal Salvation to be enjoyed through Christ, as because it doth fervently kindle their love towards God: So for curious and carnal persons, lacking the Spirit of Christ, to have continually before their Epes the sentence of God's Predestination, is a most dangerous downfall, whereby the Devil doth thrust them either into desperation, or into wretchlesness of most unclean living, no less perilous than desperation.

Furthermore, We must receive God's promises in such wise, as thep be generally set forth to us in holp Scripture: And in our doings, that Will of God is to be followed, which we have expressly declared unto us in the Word of God.

ART.
XVII.

ΤΗ

THERE

HERE are many things in several of the other Articles which depend upon this; and therefore I will explain it more fully: for as this has given occasion to one of the longest, the subtilest, and indeed the most intricate of all the questions in divinity; so it will be necessary to open and examine it as fully as the importance and difficulties of it do require. In treating of it, I shall,

First, State the question, together with the consequences that arise out of it.

Secondly, Give an account of the differences that have arisen upon it.

Thirdly, I shall set out the strength of the opinions of the contending parties, with all possible impartiality and

exactness.

Fourthly, I shall shew how far they agree, and how far they differ; and shall shew what reason there is for bearing with one another's opinions in these matters; and in the

Fifth and last place, I shall consider how far we of this Church are determined by this Article, and how far we are at liberty to follow any of those different opinions.

The whole controversy may be reduced to this single point as its head and source: Upon what views did God form his purposes and decrees concerning mankind? Whether he did it merely upon a design of advancing his own glory, and for manifesting his own attributes, in order to which he settled the great and universal scheme of his whole creation and providence? Or whether he considered all the free motions of those rational agents that he did intend to create, and according to what he foresaw they would choose and do, in all the various circumstances in which he might put them, formed his decrees? Here the controversy begins; and when this is settled, the three main questions that arise out of it will be soon determined.

The first is, Whether both God and Christ intended that Christ should only die for that particular number whom God intended to save? Or whether it was intended that he should die for all, so that every man that would, might have the benefit of his death, and that no man was excluded from it, but because he willingly rejected it?

The second is, Whether those assistances, that God gives to men to enable them to obey him, are of their own nature so efficacious and irresistible, that they never fail of producing the effect for which they are given? Or, whether they are only sufficient to enable a man to obey God; so that their efficacy comes from the freedom of the

will, that either may cooperate with them, or may not, as it pleases?

The third is, Whether such persons do, and must certainly persevere, to whom such grace is given? Or, whether they may not fall away both entirely and finally from that state?

There are also other questions concerning the true notion of liberty, concerning the feebleness of our powers in this lapsed state, with several lesser ones; all which do necessarily take their determination from the decision. of the first and main question; about which there are four opinions.

The first is of those commonly called Supralapsarians, who think that God does only consider his own glory in all that he does: and that whatever is done, arises as from its first cause, from the decree of God: that in this decree God, considering only the manifestation of his own glory, intended to make the world, to put a race of men in it, to constitute them under Adam as their fountain and head: that he decreed Adam's sin, the lapse of his posterity, and Christ's death, together with the salvation or damnation of such men as should be most for his own glory: that to those who were to be saved he decreed to give such efficacious assistances, as should certainly put them in the way of salvation; and to those whom he rejected he decreed to give such assistances and means only as should render them inexcusable: that all men do continue in a state of grace, or of sin, and shall be saved or damned, according to that first decree so that God views himself only, and in that view he designs all things singly for his own glory, and for the manifesting of his own attributes.

The second opinion is of those called the Sublapsarians, who say, that Adam having sinned freely, and his sin being imputed to all his posterity, God did consider mankind, thus lost, with an eye of pity; and having designed to rescue a great number out of this lost state, he decreed to send his Son to die for them, to accept of his death on their account, and to give them such assistances as should be effectual both to convert them to him, and to make them persevere to the end: but for the rest, he framed no positive act about them, only he left them in that lapsed state, without intending that they should have the benefit of Christ's death, or of efficacious and persevering assistances.

The third opinion is of those who are called Remonstrants, Arminians, or Universalists, who think that God intended to create all men free, and to deal with them according to the use that they should make of their liberty:

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ART.

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that therefore he, foreseeing how every one would use it, did upon that decree all things that concerned them in this life, together with their salvation and damnation in the next that Christ died for all men; that sufficient assistances are given to every man, but that all men may choose whether they will use them, and persevere in them, or not.

The fourth opinion is of the Socinians, who deny the ́certain prescience of future contingencies; and therefore they think the decrees of God from all eternity were only general; that such as believe and obey the Gospel shall be saved, and that such as live and die in sin shall be damned: but that there were no special decrees made concerning particular persons, these being only made in time, according to the state in which they are: they do also think that man is by nature so free and so entire, that he needs no inward grace; so they deny a special predestination from all eternity, and do also deny inward assistances.

This is a controversy that arises out of natural religion : for if it is believed that God governs the world, and that the wills of men are free; then it is natural to inquire which of these is subject to the other, or how they can be both maintained? whether God determines the will ? or if his Providence follows the motions of the will? Therefore all those that believed a Providence have been aware of this difficulty. The Stoics put all things under a fate; even the Gods themselves: if this fate was a necessary series of things, a chain of matter and motion that was fixed and unalterable, then it was plain and downright atheism. The Epicureans set all things at liberty, and either thought that there was no God, or at least that there was no Providence. The Philosophers knew not how to avoid this difficulty, by which we see Tully and others were so differently moved, that it is plain they deJoseph. spaired of getting out of it. The Jews had the same lib. xviii. c. question among them; for they could not believe their 2.de Bell. Law, without acknowledging a Providence and yet the Jud. lib. ii. Sadducees among them asserted liberty in so entire a man

Ant. Jud.

c. 7.

ner, that they set it free from all restraints: on the other hand, the Essens put all things under an absolute fate: and the Pharisees took a middle way; they asserted the freedom of the will, but thought that all things were governed by a Providence. There are also subtle disputes concerning this matter among the Mahometans, one sect asserting liberty, and another fate, which generally prevails among them.

In the first ages of Christianity, the Gnostics fancied

XVII.

c. 6.

cal. c. 21.

that the souls of men were of different ranks, and that ART.
they sprang from different principles, or Gods, who made
them. Some were carnal, that were devoted to perdition; Iren. adv.
others were spiritual, and were certainly to be saved; Her. lib. i.
others were animal of a middle order, capable either of c
Epiph.
happiness or misery. It seems that the Marcionites and Her. 31.
Manichees thought that some souls were made by the Clem. Al.
bad God, as others were made by the good. In opposi- Pæd. lib. i.
tion to all these, Origen asserted, that all souls were by Orig. Peri-
nature equally capable of being either good or bad; and archon.
that the difference among men arose merely from the free-1. iii. Philo-
dom of the will, and the various use of that freedom: that Explan.
God left men to this liberty, and rewarded and punished 12. Ep. ad
them according to the use of it; yet he asserted a Provi- Rom.
dence: but as he brought in the Platonical doctrine of
preexistence into the government of the world; and as he
explained God's loving Jacob, and his hating of Esau, be-
fore they were born, and had done either good or evil, by
this of a regard to what they had done formerly; so he
asserted the fall of man in Adam, and his being recovered
by grace; but he still maintained an unrestrained liberty
in the will. His doctrine, though much hated in Egypt,
was generally followed over all the East, particularly in
Palestine and at Antioch. St. Gregory Nazianzen and St.
Basil drew a system of divinity out of his works, in which
that which relates to the liberty of the will is very fully
set forth that book was much studied in the East.
Chrysostom, Isidore of Damiete, and Theodoret, with all Orig. Phi-
their followers, taught it so copiously, that it became the locas.
received doctrine of the Eastern Church. Jerome was so
much in love with Origen, that he translated some parts
of him, and set Ruffin on translating the rest. But as he
had a sharp quarrel with the bishops of Palestine, so that
perhaps disposed him to change his thoughts of Origen:
for ever after that, he set himself much to disgrace his
doctrine; and he was very severe on Ruffin for translating
him though Ruffin confesses, that, in translating his Ruffin.
works, he took great liberties in altering several passages Peror. in
that he disliked. One of Origen's disciples was Pelagius, Orig. in
a Scottish monk, in great esteem at Rome, both for his Ep. ad
learning, and the great strictness of his life. He carried Rom.
Chrys. Ep.
these doctrines farther than the Greek Church had done; 4
so that he was reckoned to have fallen into great errors Olymp.
both by Chrysostom and Isidore, (as it is represented by Isid. Pelus.
Jansenius, though that is denied by others, who think Lib. 1. Ep.
they meant another of the same name.) He denied that
we had suffered any harm by the fall of Adam, or that

Vers. Com.

514.