It has been stated that land, labour, and capital are the three agents which produce wealth. It is therefore evident that wealth must be distributed between those who are the owners of these agents of production, i.e., between the landlord, the labourer, and the capitalist. If, however, the three agents were supplied by one man, no doubt the produce ought all to belong to him with the exception of what is taken by the Government as taxes. But in a civilised society it is not possible that the same person should own all the land, employ his capital and also labour to produce wealth. The production of wealth, therefore, does not depend upon the exertion of one particular individual, but it is the result of the proper bringing together of land, labour, and capital by different classes of persons. Hence it is quite natural to suppose that these persons should have their several shares in the wealth produced, and may even ask for more than their proper share.

Sometimes the same person owns the capital and the land, but not the labour. The landlord, in his engagement directly with the labourer, supplies the whole part of the stock necessary for cultivation. This system is prevalent in Continental Europe, where the holders are neither serfs nor proprietors. In other cases the labourer does not own the land, but owns the little stock employed on it the landlord not being in the habit of supplying any. This system is nearly universal in India and all countries in the east, and also in Ireland. than in Ireland.

The state of things is, however, better in India Here the owner of land is in the habit of making advances to the cultivators, for which he charges high rate of interest; but the principal landowner, the Government, makes advances without interest, recovering the amount after the harvest when the rent becomes payable. These are the principal classifications in the distribution of agricultural labour. In the case of manufacturing industry, however, there are generally two classes— the capitalists and the labourers. This shows that it is not mere chance or caprice which governs the sharing of wealth, but that there are natural and customary laws which regulate this distribution: : we may, as a general rule, divide the produce of work into four shares, viz., wages, rent, interest, and taxes. It would not be possible to discuss fully the respective functions of these, so I shall only point out the relation which these four parts bear to each other.

Broadly speaking, wages are a compensation made to the labourer for the exertion of his physical powers, or his skill or ingenuity. Naturally this must vary according as we require greater skill with reference to a particular work. To take an ordinary example, the wages of a watch-maker would be greater than that of a carpenter who makes chairs. This at once shows why the price of commodities varies according to the cost of their production, that is, by the

quantities of labour spent in producing them and in bringing them to market. Again, wages vary in proportion to the ease and hardship, the constancy and inconstancy of employment, the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the employments themselves, the easiness or cheapness, or the difficulty and expense of learning the occupation, and lastly, the probability or improbability of success. I will mention here very shortly how there often arise great differences in the rates of wages in different occupations. It no doubt seems very unfair that some labourers should be paid a hundred or even a thousand times as much per day than others for their work. This is due partly to the intellectual attainments and natural endowments which these people have happened to enjoy.

Now "rent" is properly "that portion of the produce of the earth which is paid by the occupier to the landlord for the use of the natural and inherent powers of the soil." The rent of a house or factory would not be all rent in the true sense of the term, for capital must have been spent in erecting the building or factory, and interest must have been paid on the capital, so that we must deduct this interest from what is commonly known as rent before we come at the true rent. The rent of agricultural land is governed by two circumstances: the fertility of the soil and the convenience of situation. When either of these conditions is altogether absent, land can command no rent. Thus, no one will pay rent for land the produce of which will not compensate the capital and labour spent in cultivating it. Lands situate in the immediate vicinity of a large town generally fetch higher rent than those that are situated some twenty or thirty miles off, provided the latter has no other market. The town affords a ready outlet for a great variety of articles for which there is little or no demand in the country. Inasmuch as the cost of conveying articles varies with the distance and difficulty of the roads along which they have to be carried, the less charge on those raised in the vicinity of markets enables their growers to pay a proportionally greater amount of rent.

Now we will see what interest is. Every one knows that money is lent to other people for a certain period, during which he pays to the lender a certain sum as consideration for the loan. This is what is popularly known as interest. This interest will of course be greater or less according as the amount of capital is greater or less; it will also be greater or less according as the capital is employed for a longer or shorter time, so the rate of interest is proportionate to the capital sum and the time during which that is employed. The profits of capital are greatest in those pursuits in which the greatest risk is incurred and where the labour of superintendence is most costly. In uncivilised countries the insecurity of property causes compensation for risk to form a very large proportion of the profits of capital. Mill says: "Those who lend under these wretched governments do so

at the utmost peril of never being paid." So when capital is lent at a very high rate of interest, say 20 or 30 per cent., it will not be true interest, but compensation for the risk of losing the capital altogether. There is an important fact about interest, that it is the same in one business as in another. The rates of profit differ very much, it is true, but this is because the labour of superintendence is different and because there is greater risk in one trade than in another. But the true interest is the same, because capital being lent in the form of money can be lent to one trade just as easily as to another. Thus there is a constant tendency to the equality of interest in all branches of industry.

It is admitted that the legitimate functions of good government are the protection of life and property of its subjects and the maintenance of equal freedom of all. These necessarily entail serious expenditure, and it is only just and proper that the nation for whose benefit the institutions are made should contribute to defray the expense incurred for their maintenance, in proportion to their respective abilities, i.e., in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the State. This money must necessarily be raised by taxation. There are certain rules the due observance of which secures the minimum hardship on the tax-payer and maximum revenue to the government. It would not be possible in this short space to narrate them fully, but the existence of such rules is undoubtedly of great advantage to the community. Duty on manufactured articles is a form of tax which evidently is imposed to encourage local industries. If purchasers are prevented on account of heavy duty from purchasing foreign articles, they will have to buy goods made in the country, and thus keep the men in the trade busy. This theory appeals more to the people in general, to those who take only a superficial view of things, for it is an undeniable fact that the purchase of foreign articles encourages home manufactures in the best possible way, as foreigners would not send us goods if we did not pay for them either in money or by sending other goods in exchange. Now, if goods are sent in exchange, workmen will be needed to replace them, and the more we buy goods of foreign manufacture the greater necessity will there be to produce articles at home to be sent in exchange.

I have succinctly referred to the respective functions which wages, rent, interest and taxes play in the distribution of wealth, and I hope I have been able to give the reader some idea how the wealth of the whole world is regulated by fixed and customary laws, and not by mere caprice.

G. D. SEAL.

THE SELJUKS BEFORE THE

CRUSADES.

WESTERN EUROPE has been familiar with the name of the Turks since the invasion of the Huns, for it is indisputable that they were of the Turkish stock.1

They, however, came in contact with the Moslem world at the time of Motassim, the third son of Khalif Haroon-ar-Rashid. It was Motassim who first enlisted them in his soldiery, but they who entered as slaves were fated ere long to preside over the destiny of the Khalifate of Bagdad.

It was, indeed, with the help of these Turkish archers that the general of Motassim defeated the Byzantine army, commanded by Theophilus and Manuel, at Dasymon.2

The introduction of this Turkish mercenary force was, indeed, one of the many causes which brought about the fall of the Abbasides. It began to play the same part which was played in Italy by Rocimer, Gundobad, and Orestes. It made and unmade four Khalifs sitrocesistively

So extensive, indeed, had become its authority that in 879 Ahmed, the son of Tholon, rendered himself independent in Egypt, and founded a dynasty (879-968) which was at last conquered by the atomites The state of Bagdad was distressing; after a beautiful dawn a sultry noon had set in. During the time of decay and dissolution there were Khalifs incapable of meeting the diffipultion of sovereignty and unworthy of wielding its authority. There was no to, or Zono, or Anastasius to breathe fresh vigour into the decayed constitution and thereby prolong its life.

Hagstad was sinking day by day into political insignificance. In the Bouth contury Khalif Radhi placed in the hands of his minister the administration of finance, the power of waging war and of making poco in tine, motamorphosed him into the veritable Khal, and contented himself with the vain and empty title. This wowly created minister used and abused his power till the long peut up rowoutment of the people of Bagdad found vent in a

Cetbbon, ed Milman, vol, v. p. 172, note (a).

• Pindar, vol ft pc tô7.

* Junquière, l'Alqu. Okkoman, p. 104.

Chand, do Cralexation. Musulmane, pp. 25, 26.

vigorous protest. The help of the Bouides of Persia was sought and obtained, and the Turks, who had become so influential in Bagdad, were driven out; but the title of Emirul-Amra was coveted by the new conqueror. For a century the fate of Bagdad remained in the hands of the Bouides, who in the end yielded to a higher power, though not without a struggle.

The new actors in the world's drama were the Seljuks. In the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries a great portion of Asia was ruled by Turkish dynasties.1 The first heroes of the Seljukian Turks were Togrul Beg, Chakir Beg, and Ibrahim Niyal, the sons of Mikail, the son of Seljuk. They were members of the Turkish tribe of Ghuzz, and traced their descent from Oghuz, the eponymous hero of all Turkish tribes. This band of Turks came into the fold of Islam in the fourth century after the Flight. They dwelt beyond the Oxus,2 and were viewed not without serious apprehension by the neighbouring Mahomedan State. The policy of Mahmud, the Ghaznivide, was distinctly hostile towards them. This course of

action was extremely politic, as events in the sequel will show. He drove the Seljuks to Aderbijan; but his son and successor, Masud, deviated from the wise and cautious policy of his father, and enlarged his army by 1000 Turkish horsemen, taken from these fugitives of Aderbijan. The policy of Mahmud to keep these Seljukian marauders aloof from his dominions was completely reversed, and the unwise Masud paid only the penalty of his indiscretion in the battle of Merv. In this battle, which was fought in the year 1040, the Ghaznivides were completely defeated.

But before this successful attempt of the Seljukians, the Turkish tribes had made many abortive efforts to extend their dominion. Under the leadership of Israil or Pigu Arslan, a portion of the Seljuks crossed the Oxus and spread over the Eastern provinces of Persia. This adventurer was captured and imprisoned by Masud, but his punishment, instead of staving off the impending fall of the Ghaznivides, only precipitated it. His nephews, either exasperated at the imprisonment of their uncle or swayed by motives of plunder, crossed the Oxus and swooped down like a whirlwind on the plains of Persia. After a desperate battle, Persia, once the kingdom of the Sassanides, received as lords the Scythian hordes. This was the famous battle of Merv. Shortly after this Merv was raised to the dignity of a capital, and Togrul saluted as the chief of the Seljuks.3

The victory of Merv inspired confidence in the princes. Togrul Beg, Chakir Beg, and Ibrahim Niyal began their career of conquest; but their success was not without occasional failures. Ibrahim was

1 There is an excellent article on the Seljuks in the Encyclopædia Britannica.

2 Ibn Khallikan, art. on Togrul and Alp Arslan, vol. iii. pp. 224-34.

3 See the curious way in which the Turks used to elect their king.-Migne, Dict. des Croisades, p. 996.