The Works of John Locke, 第 2 卷T. Tegg, 1823 |
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常見字詞
2d Answer abstract ideas actions æther agree animal annexed aqua regia article of faith belong bishop of Worcester body capable cause cerned clear and distinct clear idea cohesion collection of simple colour complex idea conceive concerning confused connexion consciousness consider consists corporeal substances dead denominate discourse distinct idea distinguish doubt exist farther ferent frame give gold hath horse ideas of sub ideas of substances imperfect intuitive knowledge knowledge language lordship says material substance men's mind mixed modes motion names of substances nature nominal essence obscure observe parrot particles of matter particular perceive personal identity plain plex idea produce raised real essence reason rection relation resurrection Secondly sensation sense sensible qualities signification simple ideas Socrates solid sorts of substances soul speak species stances subsist substratum supposed things thought tion true truth understand vitally united whereby wherein whereof whilst words
熱門章節
第 78 頁 - Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die. And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain ; it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain. But God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him ; and to every seed his own body.
第 299 頁 - For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts ; even one thing befalleth them : as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath ; so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast : for all is vanity. All go unto one place ; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again.
第 351 頁 - It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real, only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.
第 74 頁 - For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad.
第 55 頁 - I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places...
第 158 頁 - Conceptions; and to make them stand as marks for the Ideas within his own Mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the Thoughts of Men's Minds be conveyed from one to another.
第 159 頁 - It may also lead us a little towards the original of all our notions and knowledge, if we remark how great a dependence our words have on common sensible ideas; and how those which are made use of to stand for actions and notions quite removed from sense, have their rise from thence, and from obvious sensible ideas are transferred to more abstruse significations, and made to stand for ideas that come not under the cognizance of our senses...
第 1 頁 - The mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the simple ideas, conveyed in by the senses as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice also that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together...
第 323 頁 - Who also hath made us able ministers of the new testament ; not of the letter, but of the spirit: for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.
第 49 頁 - FROM what has been said, it is easy to discover what is so much inquired after, the principium individuationis ; and that, it is plain, is existence itself, which determines a being of any sort to a particular time and place incommunicable to two beings of the same kind.