with his brigade, was assigned to duty on the extreme right, where Geary's men were nearly exhausted with hours of climbing and fighting. This wing was assailed, about dark, but to no purpose-Carlin easily repelling the enemy; who, before morning, abandoned the mountain altogether, leaving 20,000 rations and the camp equipage of three brigades, as they silently dropped into the Chattanooga valley. Sherman had begun to cross the Tennessee early this morning." His pontoons had been prepared in the little creek on the north side, called the North Chickamauga; whence they, before daylight, were pushed out into the river, bearing 30 men each, and floated silently past the Rebel pickets, along the south bank, to the destined point just below the mouth of the South or real Chickamauga, where they struck the hostile shore, capturing a picket of 20 before their coming was suspected. The steamboat Dunbar, with a tow-barge, having been employed during the night in ferrying across horses procured from Sherman, wherewith to move Thomas's artillery, was sent up to hasten the crossing here; and, by daylight, 8,000 of Sherman's men were over the river and so established in rifle-trenches as to be prepared for an assault by twice their number. By noon, Sherman had bridges across both the Tennessee and the South Chickamauga, and was pushing over the rest of his command; and, at 3 P. M., he had, by sharp fighting, carried the north end of Mission ridge nearly to the railroad tunnel; and here he so fortified himself during the night as to be ready for any 99 Nov. 24. emergency. Meantime, Col. Long, with his brigade of Thomas's cavalry, had crossed the Tennessee and the Chickamauga on our left, and raided on the enemy's lines of communication; burning Tyner's Station, and, pushing out to Cleveland, capturing 200 prisoners, with 100 wagons, and destroying considerable Rebel stores, with small loss on our side. Thomas this day improved and strengthened his advanced positions ; pushing Howard's corps up the Tennessee till it joined hands with Sherman, just as the latter had brought his rear division across the river. Thus, by continuous though moderate advances, our army, at small cost, had wrested from the enemy several important advantages of position, and was now stretched in unbroken line from the north end of Lookout mountain to the north end of Mission ridge, with the enemy compressed between them. Next morning, 100 Hooker moved down from Lookout mountain, and across Chattanooga valley, which his hold of Lookout mountain had compelled the enemy to abandon, burning the bridge over the creek; which arrested our advance here for three hours. So soon as our new bridge could be crossed, Osterhaus pushed on to Rossville; driving the enemy out of the gap in Mission ridge by flanking them, and capturing guns, munitions, wagons, &c. By this time, the bridge was finished, and Hooker's force all over: so Hooker undertook, as ordered, to clear Mission ridge, on his left, of the enemy: Osterhaus moving eastward of the ridge, Geary on the west of it, and Cruft directly upon it, the batteries 100 Nov. 25. HOOKER STILL ADVANCING-SHERMAN CHECKED. 441 with Geary, and all moving together | had anticipated. The ridge was not toward Bragg and Chattanooga. In continuous, but a succession of emithe progress of the movement, the nences: that which he had carried narrowness of the crest compelled a division of Cruft's command into two lines. The enemy's front was protected by breastworks, thrown up by our men while holding here in front of Bragg's triumphant army during the night and day following the fight of Chickamauga, and they seemed disposed to hold on; but that was not to be. As their skirmishers advanced to check our movement, the 9th and the 36th Indiana sprang forward, forming line under their fire, and, instantly charging, drove them back; while the residue of our column formed line: Gross's brigade, with the 51st Ohio and 35th Indiana, in advance; the residue of Whitaker's brigade, closely supporting; Geary and Osterhaus advancing abreast of them; and all, at a charging pace, swept on, pushing back all opposition; every attempt of the enemy to make a stand being defeated by a withering flank-fire from Geary and Osterhaus, who gathered up as prisoners all who sought escape by flight down the ridge. Osterhaus alone took 2,000 of them. Those who fled along the ridge were intercepted by Johnson's division of Thomas's corps, who were now advancing from the direction of Chattanooga. At sunset, Hooker halted for the night, there being no more enemies in his front; his troops going into bivouac on the rocky steeps they had so nobly won, Gen. Sherman, who had been fortifying his position during the night, received orders to attack at daylight this morning, and did so; finding the ground far more difficult than he being commanded by that in his front, across quite a valley; its crest covered with forest, and bristling with breastworks and abatis. But, difficult as was the task, these works must be carried; and by sunrise Sherman had completed his dispositions and given the order to advance. Gen. Corse, with a regiment from Lightburn's brigade, was directed to advance along the ridge; Gen. Morgan L. Smith to move along its east base, connecting with Corse; Col. Loomis, in like manner, was to advance along its west base, supported by two reserve brigades under Gen. John E. Smith. And thus our line moved on: the 40th Illinois, supported by the 20th and 46th Ohio, pushing directly down the face of the hill held by Sherman and up that held by the enemy, to within eighty yards of the Rebel intrenchments, where Gen. Corse found a secondary crest, which he gained and held; calling up his reserves, and preparing to assault, when a hand-to-hand contest was maintained for an hour with varying success and heavy loss on our part; but Corse was unable to carry the enemy's works, as were they to drive him from his sheltering hill. But Gen. Morgan L. Smith on side, and Col. Loomis on the other, gained ground on the flanks, though John E. Smith's supporting brigades recoiled before a sudden and heavy artillery fire, giving the impression in Chattanooga that Sherman was losing ground. Yet no ground was really lost by our advance; and an attempt to pursue one the recoiling brigades was promptly checked by a flanking fire from the crest; the enemy taking to the shelter of his crest and his woods. Still, no decided success had been won by Sherman's column up to 3 P. M. Meantime, Gen. Giles A. Smith had been disabled at 4 P. M. of the day before; and Gen. Corse had been severely wounded at 10 A. M. of this day. Gen. Grant had been awaiting advices of Hooker's successful advance on the right, before giving Thomas the signal to advance. Unaware of the long detention of Hooker in bridging Lookout creek, he had expected such advices before noon; and was still impatiently awaiting them, when, seeing that Bragg was weakening his center to support his right, and judging that Hooker must by this time near Rossville, he gave Thomas, at 2 P. M., the order to advance and attack. be at or volley of grape and canister from near 30 Says Gen. Thomas, in his report: tinuous line, the enemy, seized with panic, "Our troops advancing steadily in a conabandoned the works at the foot of the hill and retreated precipitately to, the crest; whither they were closely followed by our troops, who, apparently inspired by the imAt once, Baird's, Wood's, Sheri- pulse of victory, carried the hill simultanedan's, and Johnson's divisions went ously at six different points, and so closely upon the heels of the enemy, that many of forward, with double lines of skirmish- them were taken prisoners in the trenches. ers in front, followed, at easy support- tion, before they could be removed or deWe captured all their cannon and ammuniing distance, by the entire force, right stroyed. After halting a few moments to into the enemy's rifle-pits at the base reorganize the troops, who had become somewhat scattered in the assault of the hill, of the ridge; driving out the occu- Gen. Sherman pushed forward in pursuit, pants, and hardly stopping to reform and drove those in his front, who escaped their lines before they charged right Wood and Baird, being obstinately resisted capture, across Chickamauga creek. Gens. up the steep and difficult ascent- by rëenforcements from the enemy's exslowly, of course, but steadily and in treme right, continued fighting until darkness set in; slowly but steadily driving the order; following so close to the reenemy before them. In moving upon Rosstreating foe as to embarrass, doubt-ville, Gen. Hooker encountered Stewart's less, his gunners firing from the crest of the ridge. Says Gen. Grant, in his official report: "These troops moved forward, drove the enemy from the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge like bees from a hive, stopped but a moment until the whole were in line, and commenced the ascent of the mountain from right to left almost simultaneously, following closely the retreating enemy without further orders. They encountered a fearful division and other troops; finding his left flank threatened, Stewart attempted to escape by retreating toward Greysville; but some of his force, finding their retreat threatened in that quarter, retired in disorder toward their right along the crest of the ridge; where they were met by another portion of Gen. Hooker's command, and were driven by these troops in the face of Johnson's division of Palmer's corps, by whom they were nearly all made prisoners." As yet, we have looked at this re "SIR-On Monday, the 23d, the enemy advanced in heavy force, and drove in our picket line in front of Missionary ridge, but made no further effort. "On Tuesday morning early, they threw over the river a heavy force, opposite the north end of the ridge, and just below the mouth of the Chickamauga; at the same time displaying a heavy force in our immediate front. After visiting the right, and making dispositions there for the new development in that direction, I returned toward the left, to find a heavy cannonading going on from the enemy's batteries on our forces occupying the slope of Lookout mountain, between the crest and the river. A very heavy force soon advanced to the assault, and was met by one brigade only, Walthall's, which made a desperate resist ance, but was finally compelled to yield ground. Why this command was not sustained is yet unexplained. The commander on that part of the field, Maj.-Gen. Stevenson, had six brigades at his disposal. Upon his urgent appeal, another brigade was dispatched in the afternoon to his supportthough it appeared his own forces had not been brought into action—and I proceeded to the scene. Arriving just before sunset, I found that we had lost all the advantages of the position. Orders were immediately given for the ground to be disputed until we could withdraw our forces across Chattanooga creek, and the movement was commenced. This having been successfully accomplished, our whole forces were concentrated on the ridge, and extended to the right to meet the movement in that direction. "On Wednesday, the 25th, I again visited the extreme right, now under Lt.Gen. Hardee, and threatened by a heavy force, whilst strong columns could be seen marching in that direction. A very heavy force in line of battle confronted our left and center. "On my return to this point, about 11 A. M., the enemy's forces were being moved | 66 443 in heavy masses from Lookout, and beyond, to our front, whilst those in front extended to our right. They formed their lines with great deliberation, just beyond the range of our guns, and in plain view of our position. the strength of our position that no doubt Though greatly outnumbered, such was was entertained of our ability to hold it, and every disposition was made for that purpose. During this time, they had made several attempts on our extreme right, and had been handsomely repulsed, with very heavy loss, by Maj.-Gen. Cleburne's command, under the immediate direction of Lt.-Gen. Hardee. By the road across the ridge at Rossville, far to our left, a route was open to our rear. Maj.-Gen. Breckinridge, commanding on the left, had occupied this with two regiments and a battery. It being reported to me that a force of the enemy had moved in that direction, the General was ordered to have it reconnoitered, and to make every disposition necessary to secure his flank; which he proceeded to do. "About half-past 3 P. M., the immense force in the front of our left and center advanced in three lines, preceded by heavy skirmishers. Our batteries opened with fine effect, and much confusion was produced, before they reached musket range. In a short time, the roar of musketry became very heavy, and it was soon apparent that the enemy had been repulsed in my immediate front. "Whilst riding along the crest, congratulating the troops, intelligence reached me that our line was broken on my right, and the enemy had crowned the ridge. Assistance was promptly dispatched to that point under Brig.-Gen. Bate, who had so successfully maintained the ground in my front; and I proceeded to the rear of the broken line to rally our retiring troops, and return them to the crest to drive the enemy back. Gen. Bate found the disaster so great that his small force could not repair it. About this time, I learned that our extreme left had also given way, and that my position was almost surrounded. Bate was immediately directed to form a second line in the rear, where, by the efforts of my staff, a nucleus of stragglers had been formed, upon which to rally. "Lt.-Gen. Hardee, leaving Maj.-Gen. Cleburne in command on the extreme right, moved toward the left, when he heard the heavy firing in that direction. He reached the right of Anderson's division just in time to find it had nearly all fallen back, commencing on its left, where the enemy had first crowned the ridge. By a prompt and judicious movement, he threw a portion of Cheatham's division directly across the ridge, facing the enemy, who was now moving a strong force immediately on his left flank. By a decided stand here, the enemy was entirely checked, and that portion of our force to the right remained intact. All to the left, however, except a portion of Bate's division, was entirely routed, and in rapid flight; nearly all the artillery having been shamefully abandoned by its infantry support. Every effort which could be made by myself and staff, and by many other mounted officers, availed but little. A panic, which I had never before witnessed, seemed to have seized upon officers and men, and each seemed to be struggling for his personal safety, regardless of his duty or his character. In this distressing and alarming state of affairs, Gen. Bate was ordered to hold his position, covering the road for the retreat of Breckinridge's command; and orders were immediately sent to Gens. Hardee and Breckinridge to retire their forces upon the dépôt at Chickamauga. Fortunately, it was now near nightfall, and the country and roads in our rear were fully known to us, but equally unknown to the enemy. The routed left made its way back in great disorder, effectually covered, however, by Bate's small command, which had a sharp conflict with the enemy's advance, driving it back. After night, all being quiet, Bate retired in good order, the enemy attempting no pursuit. Lt.-Gen. Hardee's command, under his judicious management, retired in good order and unmolested. "As soon as all the troops had crossed, the bridges over the Chickamauga were destroyed, to impede the enemy, though the stream was fordable in several places. "No satisfactory excuse can possibly be given for the shameful conduct of our troops on the left, in allowing their line to be penetrated. The position was one which ought to have been held by a line of skirmishers against any assaulting column; and, wherever resistance was made, the enemy fled in disorder, after suffering heavy loss. Those who reached the ridge, did so in a condition of exhaustion from the great physical exertion in climbing, which rendered them powerless; and the slightest effort would have destroyed them. "Having secured much of our artillery, they soon availed themselves of our panic, and, turning our guns upon us, enfiladed our lines, both right and left, rendering them entirely untenable. Had all parts of the line been maintained with equal gallantry and persistence, no enemy could ever have dislodged us; and but one possible reason presents itself to my mind in explanation of this bad conduct in veteran troops, who had never before failed in any duty assigned them, however difficult and hazardous. They had for two days confronted the enemy, marshaling his immense forces in plain view, and exhibiting to their sight such a superiority in numbers, as may have intimidated weak minds and untried soldiers. But our veterans had so often en-¡ countered similar hosts, when the strength of position was against us, and with perfect success, that not a doubt crossed my mind. As yet, I am not fully informed as to the commands which first fled and brought this great disaster and disgrace upon our arms. Investigation will bring out the truth, however; and full justice shall be done to the good and the bad. "After arriving at Chickamauga, and informing myself of the full condition of affairs, it was decided to put the army in motion for a point farther removed from a powerful and victorious army, that we might have some little time to replenish and recuperate for another struggle. The enerny made pursuit as far as Ringgold; but was so handsomely checked by Maj.-Gen. Cleburne and Brig.-Gen. Gist, in cominand of their respective divisions, that he gave us but little annoyance. "Our losses are not yet ascertained; but in killed and wounded it is known to have been very small. In prisoners and stragglers, I fear it is much larger. "The chief of artillery reports the loss of forty (40) pieces. "I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, BRAXTON BRAGG, "General Commanding." He is not usually accounted a good workman who disparages his tools; and the soldiers thus discredited by Bragg were mainly those who fought so bravely, skillfully, tenaciously, successfully, at the Chickamauga, barely two months before. They were probably reduced by the casualties of that bloody contest, by Longstreet's withdrawal, and otherwise, to 40,000; while Grant must have had here not less than 70,000, nearly all of whom were brought into action. This disparity of numbers, together with the fact that the movements on our side appear to have been judiciously planned, skillfully combined, and vigorously made, explain the result more naturally than does Bragg's as |
