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looking it, without further loss than 4 or 5 wounded. The residue of Gen. Smith's men, with further materials for the bridges, had simultaneously moved across Moccasin point on our side, to the ferry, unperceived by the enemy; and, before dawn, they had been ferried across, and the difficult heights rising sharply from the Tennessee and from Lookout valley on the south-west were firmly secured. By 10 A. M., a capital pontoon-bridge had been completed at the ferry; and now, if Bragg chose to concentrate on Hooker or on Chattanooga, we had the shorter line of concentration, and were ready. Before night, Hooker's left rested on Smith's force and bridge; while Palmer had pushed across to Whiteside in his rear; and now the wagon route of supply for Chattanooga, no longer infested by Rebel sharpshooters, was reduced to the 28 miles of relatively tolerable road from Bridgeport, or, by using the river from Bridgeport to Kelly's ferry, to barely 8 miles. Grant's fighting had not yet begun; but Chattanooga was safe, and Bragg virtually beaten. Hooker had found no enemy to repel, save pickets and perhaps a few sharp-shooters, until—having passed through a gorge of Raccoon mountain into Lookout valley, some two miles wide, which is commanded and observed throughout by the crests of Raccoon mountain on the one hand and of Lookout mountain on the other, while a low range of five or six hills, 200 to 300 feet high, divides it nearly in the center—he reached Wauhatchie, a petty station on the railroad, some 12 or 15 miles from

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Chattanooga, directly under the guns of the Rebel batteries on Lookout mountain. Of course, every movement on our side was watched by the enemy, who might almost count the men in our ranks as they marched. Through another gorge on Hooker's left, a road led down to Kelly's ferry, three miles distant. Howard's (11th) corps, in our advance, had passed Wauhatchie, and had lost a few men by shells thrown from Lookout mountain, and as many by an irregular musketry fire from the wooded hills in its front, whence the enemy was speedily dislodged by a flanking advance; burning the railroad bridge over Lookout creek as he fled. At 6 P. M.,” our column was halted for the night, but little over a mile from I3rown's ferry, toward which three companies were thrown out; while Geary's weak division of the 12th corps bivouacked at Wauhatchie, three miles back, holding the road from Kelly’s ferry that leads up Lookout valley. Law's division of Longstreet's corps held Lookout mountain, and were deeply interested but quiet spectators of Hooker's arrangements for the night. They were not strong enough to fight his entire force by daylight; but it was calculated that they would suffice” to strike Geary by surprise in that strange, wooded region; routing him before he should be fairly awake, stampeding his men, running off his animals, and burning his trains. Accordingly, about 1 A. M.," they attacked him with Rebel impetuosity and the unearthly yells wherein they stood confessedly unrivaled, driving in his pickets on a run, and following them into his lines; but they found him wide awake, and no wise inclined to panic or running. Charged at once on three sides, he met the enemy with a fire as deadly as theirs, and with ranks steadier and firmer than those of a charging column could be, and was fully holding his own against them, when Carl Schurz's division of Howard's corps came rushing from Hooker to his aid; Tyndale's brigade assaulting and carrying the hill whence they were enfiladed on their left, while a thin brigade of Steinwehr's division, which closely followed, was led by Col. Orlan Smith, 73d Ohio, on a charge up a very steep, difficult hill farther behind; carrying it without a shot, and taking some prisoners. It was now time for the Rebels to be off, and they left—all save 153 who lay dead in Geary's front, and over 100 prisoners. Their reports admit a loss of 361. Darkness prevented any ef. fective pursuit. Hooker's total loss here was 416,” including Gen. Green severely, and Col. Underwood, 33d Mass., desperately wounded. Capt. Geary, son of the General, was killed. There can be no severer test of the quality of soldiers than such a night attack, in a country whereof they know nothing and their assailants know everything; and when the presumption is strong that the latter must have carefully measured their strength, and know what they have to do. Geary's men were inferior in number to their foes; but the ordeal was nobly passed. No regiment

e- Oct. 28.
* Hooker says they were two strong divi-

sions: Pollard says they were but six regi-
ments. *Oct. 29.

quailed; and, though the 73d Ohio suffered most, losing over 100, the charge of the 33d Massachusetts and that of the 136th New York, Col. James Wood, Jr., were equally intrepid and effective. This beginning of its work in the West signally inspirited and prepared Hooker's command for the arduous labors before it. The flight of the Rebels occurred at 4 A. M., before all Howard's corps had arrived; those in the rear were now halted and impelled in an opposite direction; soon clearing Raccoon mountain of the enemy, with all west of Lookout valley. And Bragg, who had weakened himself by sending Longstreet against Burnside, did not feel encouraged to make any more attacks, but remained quiet and watchful in his intrenchments before Chattanooga. His position was one of remarkable strength, along the western and northern declivities of the difficult steeps known as Lookout mountain and Mission ridge, and across the valley at the mouth of Chattanooga creek, here very narrow, and so enfiladed by heavy batteries along its mountain sides as to be impregnable to direct assault. Grant was eager to attack, so as to be able to send aid to Burnside, who was urgently calling for it; but the utterly brokendown condition of most of his horses, rendering them unequal to the task of hauling his cannon, much less mounting his cavalry, constrained him to await the arrival of Sherman, who, with the 15th corps, then on the Big Black, had been telegraphed" by Grant, on his assuming command of this department, to embark a division at once for Memphis, and had started it, under Osterhaus, at 4 P. M. of that day. Repairing next day by order to Vicksburg, he dispatched the rest of his corps up the river; following" himself to Memphis, whence he marched eastward, repairing and using the Charleston railroad for his trains, to Corinth. His forces having been sent forward from Memphis in divisions, he took the cars," and reaching, about noon, Colliersvillestation, found there the 66th Indiana, Col. D. C. Anthony, just undergoing an attack by Chalmers, with 3,000 Rebel cavalry and 8 guns. Having as escort a battalion of the 13th regulars, he helped beat off the assailants, and moved on ; reaching Corinth that night. But the Rebels did not seem reconciled to his movements, and were constantly infesting Osterhaus's division, who held the advance, supported by Morgan L. Smith's, both under the command of Frank Blair, as well as John E. Smith's, which covered the working parties engaged in repairing the railroad; so that the movement had to be made circumspectly and slowly. Stephen D. Lee, with Roddy's and Ferguson's brigades, made up a force of about 5,000 irregular cavalry, who were constantly watching for chances to do mischief; and, though not strong enough to be perilous, they were so lively as to be vexatious. At length, they got directly in the way at Cane creek,” near Tuscumbia, compelling Blair to hurt some of them before they would move. By this time–Hooker having long since arrived on the Tennessee —Grant had become impatient for more decisive operations, and a mes

* Since crossing the Tennessee, 437 : 76 killed, 339 wounded, 22 missing. He estimates

the Rebel loss much higher—some 1,500; but he is clearly in error. * Sept. 22.

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* Sept. 27. * Oct. 11. *1 Oct. 27.

senger reached Sherman with an order to drop all work on the railroad, and push on rapidly to Bridgeport. Moving energetically to Eastport, Sherman found there two gunboats and a decked coal-barge, which Admiral Porter, at his request, had sent up the Tennessee from Cairo, to facilitate his crossing; but two transports and a ferry-boat soon arrived,” by whose aid Sherman was pushing on next day, leaving Blair to protect his rear. Arrived at Rogersville, he found the Elk unbridged and unfordable, and was compelled to move up its right bank to Fayetteville, crossing there on a stone bridge, and marching by Winchester and Decherd to Bridgeport;” whence he forthwith reported in person to Grant at Chattanooga,” being at once made acquainted with the plans of the General commanding, and accompanying him to a survey of the positions of the enemy; returning forthwith to Bridgeport to expedite the movement of his troops. Grant had resolved to put in Sherman's force mainly on his left—or up the Tennessee; so his first point was to make Bragg believe that he should use it on his extreme right. To this end, his divisions were crossed as they arrived at Bridgeport; the foremost (Ewing's) moving by Shell Mound to Trenton, threatening to assail and turn Bragg's extreme right. But the residue of this army, as it came up, moved quietly and screened from Rebel observation to Kelly's ford, récrossing on Smith's pontoons, and marching around Chattanooga to its assigned position on the left of Thomas, where materials had already been noiselessly prepared for throw* Oct. 31. ** Noy. 13. * Nov. 15.

ing a bridge across the river above the town. At the proper time, Hugh S. Ewing's division was drawn back from Trenton and followed the others to our extreme left; but the roads were so bad, and the overtaxed bridges broke so frequently— the river being swelled by heavy rains —that unexpected delays occurred; and Osterhaus's division was left to aid Hooker on the right. Grant, impatient to relieve Burnside, had fixed the 21st for the attack; but it was found impossible for Sherman to get ready by that time; in fact, Ewing was not in position till the 23d, when the movement was begun. Grant's eagerness to attack was stimulated by the misguiding report of a deserter that Bragg was falling” back, when he was only posting his forces to strengthen himself for the coming attack. A most impertinent message" from the Rebel chief, received two days before, had strengthened Grant's suspicion that Bragg was mainly intent on getting safely away from that dangerous neighborhood. Hence, before Sherman was fairly in position, Thomas was ordered” to advance our center, and see what was behind the Rebel picket-line facing Chattanooga. Hooker's purposed attack on Lookout mountain was suspended, and Howard's (11th) corps pushed over to Chattanooga and temporarily added to Thomas's command. The movement was initiated by Granger's (4th) corps; Sheridan's division on the right, Wood's on the 9° Nov. 22.


“Maj.-Gen. U. S GRANT, Commanding U. S.

forces at Chattanooga: “GENERAL: As there may still be some non

left, reaching nearly to Citico creek; Palmer, of the 14th corps, supporting Granger's right with Baird's division, p. refused; Johnson's division under’ arms in our intrenchments, ready to move to any point at a word. Howard's corps was likewise held in readiness to act whenever required. It was 2 P. M. when Granger's men moved out; advancing steadily, squarely, swiftly, upon the Rebel intrenchments, driving before them pickets, reserves, and grand guards, and rushing into the Rebel rifle-pits, on the low hill known as Orchard ridge, where they made some 200 prisoners. This was done so quickly that no force was, and probably none could have been, sent from Bragg's main camp, somewhat farther away from us, to resist it; and Granger, under orders to secure his new position at once by temporary breastworks, and throw out strong pickets, while Howard moved up on his left, was soon too well established to be expelled during the remaining daylight: so he held on, unmolested, through the night. Hooker was now to take the laboring oar, by an assault on the north face and west side of Lookout mountain, attracting the enemy's attention to that quarter while Sherman should lay his pontoons and cross the Tennessee on our left, near the mouth of the Chickamauga. Accordingly, Hooker, at 4 A. M., was under arms and ready to advance; but an unexpected obstacle confronted him. The heavy rain of the 21st and 22d had

combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal. “I am, General, very respectfully, your obe: dient servant, BRAxTON BRAgg, Gen. Com'g.”

*7 Nov. 23.

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not only deranged our pontoon bridges; it had so swelled Lookout creek that it was unfordable: so he dispatched Geary, supported by Cruft, up the creek to Wauhatchie, there to cross and hold the right bank, while the residue of his command should construct temporary bridges directly in their front, lower down. A heavy mist favored this movement, which would otherwise have been perilous; as it was, the enemy were so intent on watching Hooker's bridge-builders that they did not observe Geary, who crossed the creek at 8 A. M.,” capturing a picket of 42 men posted at the bridge, resting here his left, extending his right to the foot of the mountain, on the enemy's side of the valley, facing northward. Gross's brigade now, by Hooker's order, advanced and seized the bridge over the creek just below the railroad crossing, and pushed across there. Now Osterhaus, who had just come up from Brown's ferry, pushed forward Wood's brigade to a point half a mile above Gross, laid a temporary bridge, • and crossed there. Meanwhile, our batteries, established on the most available hills, were so planted as to enfilade the Rebel infantry, as they marched down from their camp on the mountain to man their breastworks and rifle-pits. Part of them had taken post behind a railroad embankment, and kept up a deadly fire with little exposure or loss on their part. Still, Hooker's men— they were 9,681, all told, and no two divisions of them had hitherto fought in the same battle—acted from the first as though they were bound to conquer.

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By 11 A. M., Wood had his bridge finished; Geary was close at hand, skirmishing smartly; and now all our guns opened in concert; while Wood and Gross, springing across the creek, joined Geary's left, and moved down the valley, sweeping all before them ; taking many prisoners in their rifle-pits, and allowing few to escape up the mountain; our men from right to left following at full speed, right under the muzzles of the enemy's guns; climbing over ledges and bowlders, crests and chasms, and driving the Rebels through their camp without allowing them to halt there; hurling them back with little more than a show of fighting; Geary's advance rounding the peak of the mountain about noon, and still pressing on ; though Hooker, who knew that Bragg had réenforced this wing, but not to what extent, had given orders that they be halted and réformed on reaching the summit; but the men would not be halted, but rushed forward, making hundreds of prisoners, and hurling the residue down the precipitous eastern declivity of the mountain.

Darkness, at 2 P. M., arrested our victorious arms; the mountain being now enveloped in a cloud so thick and black as to render farther movement perilous, if not impossible; when Hooker's line was established along the east brink of the precipice, its left near the mouth of Chattanooga creek; where, by 4 P. M., it was so fortified, by whatever means' were at hand, that he sent word to Grant that his position was impregnable.

At 5+, Brig.-Gen. Carlin, of the 14th corps, reported to him, and,

* Nov. 24.

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