PLEASANTON FOR PURSUIT MEADE HESITATES. 389 having the advantage of position. | infantry force was behind them, ready Doubtless, our loss was much the to strike heavily and attempt to turn greater on the first day, a little more the Rebel right. than the enemy's on the second, and far the less on the third. Probably, 18,000 killed and wounded, with 10,000 unwounded prisoners, would pretty fairly measure the Confederate losses during their Pennsylvania campaign. The battle being over, Pleasanton, who was in chief command of the cavalry, urged Meade to order a general advance; being satisfied by appearances that not only was the Rebel army demoralized and beginning to retreat, but nearly out of ammunition. But, as it was not certain that the enemy was going, Meade chose to be assured on that point, by a cavalry reconnoissance to the Rebel rear. Pleasanton accord During the 2d and 3d, the cavalry of either army, hovering around its flanks, ready to make a dash at the trains or camps of its adversary if opportunity should serve, had had several slight collisions, but no seri-ingly dispatched some cavalry on this ous contest. On the 3d, an attempt errand, who rode all night; Gregg, of Hood, by a movement on the Em- who, moving by our right, had been mitsburg road, to turn our left-out 22 miles on the Chambersburg which Gen. Meade regarded as our weak point was defeated by Merritt's cavalry brigade, then coming up from Emmitsburg with intent to strike the rear and flank of the Rebel right, and by Farnsworth's brigade, which was guarding our own flank in that quarter. Gregg's division watched our right flank, confronted by Stuart. No important advantage was gained on either side; but a considerable infantry force under Hood seems to have been neutralized, during the grand assault, by the sturdy efforts of Merritt and Farnsworth, which were held to indicate that a strong road, returning first, at 8 A. M.," and reporting that road strewn with wounded and stragglers, ambulances and caissons, showing that not only was the enemy in full retreat, but that he was completely demoralized. Gregg had easily taken quite a number of prisoners. Other commanders of cavalry, returning later from similar reconnoissances on other roads, found them likewise covered, and captured many stragglers and wagons. Still, as Meade did not advance in force on their direct line of retreat,' and as the movement of the artillery and trains of a great army requires 42 42 Gen. D. B. Birney, who succeeded Gen. Sickles in the command of the 3d corps, says: "I was ordered to send out a reconnoissance at daylight [on the 4th] to ascertain the position of the enemy. I did so early Sunday morning, and reported that the enemy were in full retreat. I also sent back for permission to open upon the enemy with my rifled batteries as they were crossing a point very near me, upon the turnpike going toward Hagerstown; and the staff officer brought me permission to do so. I had commenced the movement to attack, when another staff officer arrived from Gen. Meade with a written order from him to make no attack; time, the Rebel pickets along their front were not withdrawn till 2 A. M. of next day." Meantime, an advance division of Couch's militia, about 5,000 strong, under Gen. W. F. ['Baldy'] Smith, had come up in our rear; reporting to Gen. Meade on the 4th. 44 Next morning, there could no longer be even an affectation of doubt that the enemy were in full retreat; and Sedgwick's (6th) corps was ordered to follow on the track of the fugitives. The spirit in which this pursuit was prosecuted is thus portrayed by Gen. A. P. Howe, commanding a division of that corps, who thus narrates" its progress and results: ટી. "On the 4th of July, it seemed evident enough that the enemy were retreating. How far they were gone, we could not see from the front. We could see but a comparatively small force from the position where I was. On Sunday, the 5th and 6th corps moved in pursuit. As we moved, a small rear-guard of the enemy retreated. We followed them, with this small rearguard of the enemy before us, up to Fairfield, in a gorge of the mountains. There we again waited for them to go on. There seemed to be no disposition to push this rear-guard when we got up to Fairfield. A lieutenant from the enemy came into our lines and gave himself up. He was Northern Union man, in service in one of the Georgia regiments; and, without being asked, he unhesitatingly told me, when I met him as he was being brought in, that he belonged to the artillery of the rearguard of the enemy, and that they had but two rounds of ammunition with the rearguard. But we waited there without receiving any orders to attack. It was a place where, as I informed Gen. Sedgwick, we could easily attack the enemy with advantage. But no movement was made by us until the enemy went away. Then, one brigade of my division, with some cavalry, was sent to follow on after them, while the remainder of the 6th corps moved to the which was done. My skirmishers advanced and took possession of their hospitals, with a large number of their wounded. I had sent some twenty orderlies with a staff officer, who led the reconnoissance; and I reported these facts con left. We moved on through Boonsboro', is July 5. LEE'S RETREAT TO THE POTOMAC. was still with me, and I said to him, ' If you go away from there, I will have to hold it.", That's all right,' said he; 'I will go away.' He did so, and I moved right up. It was a pretty good position, where you could cover your troops. Soon after relieving Buford, we saw some Rebel infantry advancing. I do not know whether they brought them from Hagerstown, or from some other place. They made three dashes, not in heavy force, upon our line to drive us back. The troops that happened to be there on our line were what we considered in the Army of the Potomac unusually good ones. They quietly repulsed the Rebels twice; and, the third time they came up, they sent them flying 391 been started by Butterfield, chief of staff, on the Boonsboro' road, were halted; while others, farther in admoved on. Soon, word came vance, from Sedgwick that it was unwise to push the enemy farther on the route he was following; whereupon, the whole army was impelled down the Middletown road; Sedgwick being ordered to move the most of his command from Fairfield Pass by Emmitsburg to join the main body. "Yet there was no permission to move Arrived at Middletown, the army on and follow up the enemy. We remained was halted a day to rest and refit, there some time, until we had orders to and then moved through South move on and take a position a mile or more nearer Hagerstown. As we moved up, we Mountain by Boonsboro' to Hagerssaw that the Rebels had some light field-town and the Potomac; where Lee works-hurriedly thrown up, apparentlyto cover themselves while they recrossed into Funkstown. the river. I think we remained there three days; and the third night, I think, after we got up into that position, it was said the Rebels rêcrossed the river." had of course arrived before it, taken a strong position, and was prepared to maintain it. Lee says, in his official report: "Little progress was made that night, barrassed our movements. owing to a severe storm, which greatly emThe rear of the column did not leave its position near Gettysburg until after daylight on the 5th. "The march was continued during that day without interruption by the enemy, except an unimportant demonstration upon our rear in the afternoon, when near Fairfield, "The army remained at Gettysburg durThe 4th and 5th were devoted by ing the 4th, and at night began to retire by Gen. Meade to caring for the wound-the road to Fairfield, carrying with it about 4,000 prisoners. Nearly 2,000 had previed and burying the dead; part of ously been paroled; but the enemy's numerour cavalry pursuing on the Cash-ous wounded, that had fallen into our hands after the first and second day's engagements, town road, as Sedgwick did on that were left behind." by Fairfield. On the 5th, Meade was satisfied that Lee had retreated; but he believed that he was falling back into the Cumberland Valleynot making for the shelter of the Potomac. He decided to move the great body of his forces by the left flank through Boonsboro' Pass, and so place himself between the enemy and his resources. But Sedgwick soon reported" that the main body of the enemy was in position in and around Fairfield Pass, and that it might be necessary to fight another battle in those mountains. Hereupon, the 5th corps and some other troops were sent to rëenforce Sedgwick, and the 1st and 3d, which had 46 which was easily checked. Part of our train moved by the road through Fairfield, and the rest by the way of Cashtown, guarded by Gen. Imboden. In passing through the mountains, in advance of the column, the great length of the trains exposed them to attack by the enemy's cavalry, which cap tured a number of wagons and ambulances; but they succeeded in reaching Williamsport without serious loss. They were attacked at that place on the 6th by the enemy's cavalry, which was gallantly repulsed by Gen. Imboden. The atand driven off by Gen. Stuart, and pursued tacking force was subsequently encountered for several miles in the direction of BoonsJuly 6. 4 boro'. The army, after an arduous march, rendered more difficult by the rains, reached Hagerstown on the afternoon of the 6th and morning of the 7th July." He had had a marvelous escape. When his shattered columns commenced their retreat from Gettysburg, few of his officers can have imagined that they would ever reach Virginia with their artillery and most of their trains. There was not a probability that they could rëcross the Potomac with more than the wreck of an army. But heavy rains fell, as usual after great battles; and these are apt to impede pursuers more than pursued, though they need not. Then, every sort of miscalculation combined with lack of energy to impede the progress of our army; so that Lee had had four days wherein to strengthen his position at Williamsport before Meade was there" to assail him. But neither Lee's army nor his troubles were yet over. The heavy rains following the battle had swelled the Potomac to an upfordable state; while Gen. French, who, with 7,000 · veterans, had been left idle at Frederick during the great events in Pennsylvania, had, without orders, sent a cavalry force to Falling Waters and Williamsport, which captured the weak guard left by Lee to hold his bridge, which they forthwith destroyed. Lee's hold on the Maryland bank was therefore compulsory, while he collected material and repaired or renewed his bridge. Ere this was accomplished," Meade's army was before him, strengthened by French's division, and by part of Couch's militia, which had reported at Gettysburg and joined the army at Boonsboro'. The 12th having been spent in getting our troops into position, Gen. Meade called a council of his corps commanders, to consider the expediency of attacking next morning. The council sat long and debated earnestly. Gens. Howard, Pleasanton, and Wadsworth (in place of Reynolds, killed) urged and voted to attack; but Gens. Sedgwick, Slocum, Sykes, French, and Hays (in place of Hancock, wounded at Gettysburg) opposed it. Gen. Meade, having heard all, stated that his judgment favored an attack-that he came there to fight, and could see no good reason for not fighting. Still, he could not take the responsibility of ordering an assault against the advice of a majority of his corps commanders-four of them ranking officers of the army next to himself. His decision would seem to have been a mistake; but he had been in command little more than a fortnight, and the responsibility of overruling a majority and the seniors among his counselors was a grave one. At all events, he did not take it: so our army stood idle throughout the following day; and in the night Lee withdrew across the Potomac, leaving (he says) but two stalled guns, a few disabled wagons, and some weary stragglers, to fall into the hands of his pursuers. This, however, is not exactly true. Kilpatrick, commanding our cavalry on the left, learning at 3 A. M. that the enemy's pickets in his front were retiring, started after them, and, at 7 A. M., came up, about two miles from their bridge at Falling Waters, with their rear-guard, under Gen. Pettigrew, who had taken up a strong position and contested thereon his ad18 July 13. 48 MEADE IN VIRGINIA-FIGHT IN MANASSAS GAP. 393 vance. A gallant saber-charge by the 6th Michigan, Maj. Webber, into and over their earthworks, was repulsed with loss-Maj. Webber being among the killed; but, after a fight of over two hours, the enemy was driven to the river, with a loss of 125 killed and 1,500 prisoners, which includes 50 of their wounded. Gen. Pettigrew was here mortally wounded. Our total loss was 105. Our cavalry advance, Col. J. I. Gregg, crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry that day," and moved out, next morning, from Bolivar Heights on the Winchester turnpike to Hall's Mills, thence taking the road to Shepherdstown; where it was soon involved in a spirited fight with Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry, and driven back a short distance to a strong position, where it held its ground, repulsing several determined charges, until the Rebels were willing to give it up. The day's loss was about 100 on either side; Cols. Drake (1st Virginia) and Gregg were among the Rebel killed; Capt. Fisher, 16th Pa., being the highest officer lost on our side. The ground was so rough and wooded that nearly all the fighting was done on foot. Gen. Meade crossed the Potomac at Berlin on the 18th; moving by Lovettsville," Union," Upperville," and Salem," to Warrenton;" thus retaking the line of the Rappahannock which our army had left hardly two months before. This movement being in advance of Lee, who halted for some days near Bunker Hill, and made a feint of rëcrossing the Potomac, Meade was enabled to seize all the passes through the Blue Ridge north of the Rappahannock, barring the enemy's egress from the Shenandoah Valley save by a tedious flank march. 65 Meade, misled by his scouts, had expected to fight a battle in Manassas Gap-or rather, on the west side of it-where our cavalry, under Buford, found the Rebels in force; when the 3d (French's) corps was sent in haste from Ashby's Gap to Buford's support, and its 1st division, Gen. Hobart Ward, pushed through' the Gap, and the Excelsior (New York) brigade, Gen. F. B. Spinola, made three heroic charges up so many steep and difficult ridges, dislodging and driving the enemy with mutual loss-General Spinola being twice wounded. Col. Farnum and Major McLean, 1st Excelsior, were also wounded, and Capt. Ben. Price" killed. Next morning, our soldiers pushed forward to Front Royal, but encountered no enemy. Unknown to us, the Excelsiors had been fighting a brigade of Ewell's men, who were holding the Gap while Rhodes's division, forming the rear-guard of Lee's army, marched past up the valley, and had, of course, followed on its footsteps during the night. No enemy remained to fight; but two days were lost by Meade getting into especially of the National Homestead bill. He volunteered at the very outset of the war, and gave his best efforts and his life for Freedom and Equal Rights to all mankind. Though distinguished by gallantry, capacity, intelligence, and zeal, he entered the service a captain, and died a captain. |