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their immediate neighbor, and of which the conservation and perpetuity of slaveholding was the most cherished idea. Some of those Chiefs have since insisted that they were deceived by the Confederate emissaries, and especially by Gen. Albert Pike, chief Commissioner for Indian Affairs of the Confederacy, who had led them to confound that concern with the Union. What is certain is, that, directly after tidings reached them of the battles of Bull Tun and Wilson’s creek—the latter reported to them from that side as a complete discomfiture of the North, which view the undoubted death of Lyon and abandonment of Springfield tendedstrongly to corroborate—the Chiefs of most of the tribes very generally entered into a close offensive and defensive alliance with the Confederacy; even so cautious and politic a diplomatist as John Ross throwing his weight into that scale. It is said that, after the death of Lyon, Ben McCulloch’s brigade of Texans was marched back to the Indian border, and that the Creeks and Cherokees were impressively required to decide quickly between the North and the South; else, betwixt Texas on the one side and Arkansas on the other, a force of 20,000 Confederates would speedily ravage and lay waste their country. They decided accordingly. Yet a very large minority of both Creeks and Cherokees rallied around the Chief Opothleyolo, made head against the current, and stood firm for the Union. Assembling near the Creek Agency, they tore down the Rebel flag there flying and replanted the Stars and Stripes; and a letter" from Col. McIntosh to the True Dem
ocrat" called loudly for röenforcements to the Rebel array in the Indian Territory, and expressed apprehension that the Northern party might prove the stronger. A battle between the antagonistic Indian forces took place Dec. 9th, 1861, on Bushy creek, near the Verdigris river, 180 miles west of Fort Smith, the Confederates being led by Col. Cooper, the Unionists by Opothleyolo. The result was not decisive, but the advantage appears to have been with the Rebel party, the Unionists being constrained soon after to make their way northward to Kansas, where they received the supplies they so much needed, and where a treaty of close alliance was negotiated" between Opothleyolo and his followers on one side, and Col. Dole, U. S. Commissioner of Indian Affairs, on the other.
The Rebels were thus left in undisputed possession of the Indian Territory, from which they collected the four or five thousand warriors who appeared at Pea Ridge; but, though the ground was mainly broken and wooded, affording every facility for irregular warfare, they do not seem to have proved of much account, save in the consumption of rations and massacre of the Union wounded, of whom at least a score fell victims to their barbarities. Their war-whoop was overborne by the roar of our heavy guns; they were displeased with the frequent falling on their heads of great branches and tops of the trees behind which they had sought shelter; and, in fact, the whole conduct of the battle on our part was, to their apprehension, disgusting. The amount of effort and of profanity expended
* Oct. 17, 1861.
* Little Rock, Arkansas.
* At Leavenworth, Feb. 1, 1862.
by their White officers in trying to keep them in line at the front, probably overbalanced the total value of their services; so that, if they chose to depart for their homes soon after the close of the battle, it is not probable that any strenuous efforts were made to detain them.”
Gen. Curtis, after resting and refitting his army, finding no enemy in its vicinity, again put his column in motion, proceeding S. S. E. through north-western Arkansas to Batesville,” on White river, near which point he had expected to meet gunboats with supplies from below. He found the river, however, at an unusually low stage for the season— barely four feet; while the gunboats required six or seven; beside which, the Mound City, which attempted the ascent, had been resisted and blown up in a fight with the Rebel battery at St. Charles some days before. Being compelled, therefore, to depend for all his supplies on wagontrains from Rolla, Mo., now several hundred miles distant, he did not feel strong enough to advance on Little Rock, the capital of Arkansas, nearly 100 miles S. S. W. from his present position. Having halted seven weeks, wholly unmolested, at Batesville, he again set forth,” crossing the Big Black by a pontoon-bridge, and pursuing a southerly course through a
generally swampy, wooded, and thinly settled country, where none but negroes made any professions of Unionism, and, being joined at Jacksonport” by Gen. C. C. Washburne, with the 3d Wisconsin cavalry, which had come through from Springfield alone and unassailed, proceeded to Augusta, where he took leave” of the White, and, assuming a generally S. W. direction, took his way across the cypress swamps and canebrakes of the Cache, where his advance (the 33d Illinois, Col. Hovey), which had been struggling over roads heavily obstructed by fallen trees, was attacked” by some 1,500 Rebel cavalry, mainly Texans, led by Gen. Albert Rust, who held him in check for an hour, until he was joined by the 1st Indiana cavalry, Lt.-Col. Wood, with two howitzers, when an impetuous charge was made by the Indianians, whereby the enemy were routed and put to flight. The bodies of 110 dead Rebels were buried by our soldiers; whose loss was but 8 killed and 45 wounded, including Maj. Glendennin, who led the charge, receiving a shot in the breast, which proved mortal. The Rebels were satisfied with this experiment, and gave no further trouble. Gen. Curtis again struck” White river at Clarendon, just below the mouth of the Cache, only to learn, with intense chagrin, that Col. Fitch,
* Pollard says:
“The Indian regiments, under Gen. Pike, had not come up in time to take any important part in the battle. Some of the red men behaved well, and a portion of them assisted in taking a battery; but they were difficult to manage in the deafening roar of artillery, to which they were unaccustomed, and were naturally amazed at the sight of guns that ran on wheels. They knew what to do with the rifle; they were accustomed to the sounds of battle as loud as their own war-whoop; and the amazement of these
simple children of the forest may be imagined at the sight of such roaring, deafening, crashing monsters as 12-pounders running around on wheels. Gen. Van Dorn, in his official report of the battle, does not mention that any assistance was derived from the Indians—an ally that had, perhaps, cost us much more trouble, expense, and annoyance than their services in modern warfare could, under any circumstances, be worth.” *Arriving there May 6. *June 25. “July 4.
* July 7. * July 9. * July 11.
with the expected gunboats and transports, had gone down the river barely 24 hours previous. Being short of provisions, in a thoroughly inhospitable country, he had no choice but to make his way to the most accessible point on the Mississippi. This was Helena, 65 miles S. E., which was made” by Gen. Washburne, with 2,500 cavalry and 5 howitzers, in a march of 24 hours, the infantry coming through during the two following days, bringing about half a regiment of white Arkansas volunteers, with a large number of negroes, who, having been employed to block the roads in our front by felling trees across them, were entitled to liberty and protection under the regnant military policy. A single train of 40 wagons, laden with supplies, being wholly unguarded, was captured by Rebel guerrillas in Missouri, within 30 miles of Rolla, its starting-point.
Gen. John M. Schofield had at an early day” been placed by Gen. Halleck in command of all the Missouri militia—a force then visible only to the eye of faith. By the middle of April following, he had an array of 13,800 men in the field, mainly cavalry; to which was intrusted the defense of the State, while our other troops were drawn away to Arkansas and the Tennessee. Gen. Curtis's movements eastward toward the Mississippi opened the State to incursions from the Rebels, still in force in western Arkansas; while considerble numbers of Price's men were clandestinely sent home to enlist recruits and organize guerrilla bands for activity during the summer. Scho* Nov. 27, 1861.
* Aug 6, 1862.
field persisted in enrolling and organizing militia until he had 50,900 men on his lists, of whom about 30,000 were armed. Upon full consideration, he decided to enroll only loyal men, since passive were often converted into active Rebels by a requirement to serve in the Union forces. He had 20,000 men ready for service, when, late in July, 1862, the tidings of McClellan's disastrous failure before Richmond combined with other influences to fill the interior of the State with formidable bands of Rebel partisans. Of these, Col. Porter's, two or three thousand strong, was attacked” at Kirksville, Adair County, by Col. John McNeil, with 1,000 cavalry and a battery of 6 guns, and, after a desperate fight of four hours, utterly defeated, with a loss of 180 killed and 500 wounded. Several wagonloads of arms were among the spoils of victory, and Porter's force was by this defeat practically destroyed. McNeil's loss was reported at 28 killed and 60 wounded. Four days thereafter, Col. Poindexter's band of about 1,200 Rebels was attacked, while crossing the Chariton river, by Col. Odin Guitar, 9th militia cavalry, 600 men, with 2 guns, and thoroughly routed; many of the Rebels being driven into the river and drowned. “Many horses and arms, and all their spare ammunition and other supplies, were captured.”” Poindexter, with what remained of his force, fled northward to join Porter; but was intercepted and driven back by another Union force under Gen. Ben. Loan, and again struck by Guitar; who, in a running fight of nearly 48 hours, * Gen. Schofield's official report.
killed, captured, or dispersed his entire command. Poindexter, after wandering alone through the woods for several days, was made a prisoner; and Porter, driven back upon McNeil by the same movement of Gen. Loan, was compelled to disperse his band to save it from destruction. This was the last appearance of the Rebels in formidable force northward of the Missouri river; though small bands of guerrillas continued to plunder and murder there, as elsewhere, for more than a year. Independence, on the western border of the State, was about this time attacked” by a Rebel band of 500 to 800, under Col. Hughes; and its garrison, 312 men of the 7th Missouri cavalry, was surrendered by Lt.-Col. Buel, after a short resistance. Gen. Coffey, with 1,500 Rebel cavalry from Arkansas, early in August, invaded south-western Missouri, and, avoiding Springfield, moved rapidly northward. Col. Clark Wright, 6th Missouri cavalry, was sent with 1,200 men in pursuit; Gen. Totten being directed by Schofield to strike the band which had just captured Independence, before it could be joined by Coffey; while Gen. Blunt, commanding in Arkansas, was requested to send a force from Fort Scott, to cóoperate in cutting off Coffey's retreat; and Col. Fitz-Henry Warren, 1st Iowa cavalry, was dispatched from Clinton with 1,500 men to effect a junction with Maj. Foster; who, with the 7th militia cavalry, 800 strong, had been pushed out from Lexington by Totten, in quest of Hughes. These combinations upon our side failed most signally. Coffey and Hughes united their forces and fought
Maj. Foster at Lone Jack, Jackson county, wounded and defeated him, with the loss of his two guns, and compelled him to fall back to Lexington, upon which place Coffey was advancing with an army now augmented to 4,500 men; when, finding that Gen. Blunt was in strong force, threatening his line of retreat, while Loan's and Wright's and other commands were concentrating upon him from every direction, he relinquished the hope of capturing Lexington and relieving the Rebels north of the river, and turned to fly. Eluding Gen. Blunt in the night, he was hotly pursued to the Arkansas line, but escaped without serious disaster. Gen. Schofield was soon after” superseded in the command of the department, by Gen. Curtis, but immediately placed at the head of the forces confronting the enemy in the south-west, where the Rebels, now led by Gen. T. C. Hindman,” were threatening a fresh invasion. Setting forward from Springfield” to Sarcoxie to reconnoiter the enemy's position, Gen. Salomon's advance had been overwhelmed at Newtonia by a large body of Rebel cavalry. Salomon had thereupon moved forward to their support, and renewed the battle at noon; fighting until sunset without serious loss, ultimately retiring in good order from the field. He estimated his strength at 4,500, and the enemy’s in his front at 7,000. Gen. Schofield, being röenforced by Gen. Blunt from Arkansas, found himself at the head of 10,000 men; while the Rebels at Newtonia were estimated at 13,000 to 20,000. He resolved to advance that night and attack at daylight next morning; Gen. Blunt approaching Newtonia from the north and west, and Gen. Totten from the east. He found, on coming up, that the enemy had sent their baggage to the rear, and were preparing to retreat. Immediately charging with cavalry and artillery, the Rebels fled without resistance, and were chased 30 miles into Arkansas. It appeared that, though in great numbers, they were badly armed, many of them not at all; having been sorely disappointed by the capture of a vessel laden with arms for their use on the Mississippi some time previously. Schofield pressed on" to the old battle-ground of Pea Ridge, only to find the enemy's forces divided: a part, under Cooper, having moved westward toward Maysville, with intent to operate on our communications with Fort Scott, while the main body had retreated south-westerly toward Huntsville, leaving two or three thousand cavalry in our front to screen these movements. Gen. Blunt was thereupon sent after Cooper; and, after a hard night's march, found him in camp near Maysville, and at once attacked, capturing his 4 guns and completely routing his command. The Rebels fled in disorder across the Arkansas to Fort Gibson. Their loss in material would have been greater had they had more to lose. Gen. Schofield, with the residue of his army, made a forced march over White River Mountains, to a point 8 miles west of Huntsville, where Rains had encamped the day before. His advance was next morning pushed forward into Huntsville, whence a few Rebel cavalry fled at his approach. He here learned that Rains was retreating across the mountains
* Aug. 11. * Sept. 24.
* Late M. C. from Arkansas.
* Oct. 1.
to Ozark, resolved not to fight until rèenforcements should arrive, and that further pursuit would be useless; so he retraced his steps, via Bentonville, to Cross Hollows and Osage Springs, sending Gen. Herron, with the 1st Iowa and 7th militia cavalry, about 1,000 in all, to attack in the rear some 3,000 or 4,000 Rebel cavalry who were encamped on White river, Smiles from Fayetteville; while Gen. Totten, advancing via Fayetteville, was to assail them in front. Gen. Herron reached their camp at early dawn," and immediately attacked with such vigor that the Rebels, though in superior numbers, fled rapidly into the mountains, with the loss of their camp equipage. Gen. Totten did not arrive till after they had vanished. Gen. Schofield found no further enemies within striking distance, until compelled by sickness to resign his command,” leaving Missouri substantially pacified. But Gen. Hindman, commanding the Confederate forces in Arkansas, was not disposed to rest satisfied with such a conclusion of the campaign. Having collected, by concentration and conscription, a force estimated by our officers in his front at 25,000 to 30,000 men—while he officially reports that, for want of stores, etc., he was able to take on this expedition but 9,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and his artillery—he crossed the Arkansas river at or near Van Buren, and advanced upon our scattered and numerically far inferior division, which was watching him from the neighborhood of the last conflict. It was now December; but the weather was clear and dry, and the days bright and warm, though the nights Were
* Oct. 17. * Oct. 28. *7 Nov. 20.