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Stonewall Jackson's advance to and fight at Winchester, indicating further pugnacity in that quarter, were soon found to interfere with Gen. McClellan's order to Gen. Banks to move his division down to Manassas, leaving only two regiments of cavalry to "occupy Winchester, and thoroughly scour the country south of the railway and up the Shenandoah Valley."

Gen. McClellan, on embarking, calculated that he left behind, including Blenker's division, ordered to Fremont, and not including McDowell's corps, which he intended should follow him, no less than 75,000 men. But, as Blenker's division was known to be ordered to Fremont, in West Virginia, they are improperly included. Even excluding these, he computes the whole number available for the defense of Washington, including 35,467 under Banks in the Valley of the Shenandoah, at 67,428 men, with 85 pieces of light artillery. Yet he had barely departed when Gens. Hitchcock and L. Thomas, who had been instructed to investigate the matter, reported, "that the requirement of the President, that this city [Washington] shall be left entirely secure, has not been fully complied with." Gen. Wadsworth, Military Governor of Washington, and as brave a man as ever lived, submitted to the War Department a statement that the entire force left under his command for the defense of Washington amounted to 20,477, of whom 19,022 were present for duty; nearly all of them new and April 2

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imperfectly disciplined, several of the regiments in a very disorganized condition; 2 heavy artillery and 1 infantry regiment, which had been drilled for some months for artillery service, had been withdrawn from the forts on the south side of the Potomac; while he was at this time under orders from McClellan to detail 3 regiments to join divisions on their way to the Peninsula, and another for service at Budd's Ferry; while a further order directed him to send 4,000 men to Manassas and Warrenton to relieve Gen. Sumner, so as to enable him to embark for Yorktown. Upon the report of Gens. Hitchcock and Thomas, the President gave orders" that either McDowell's or Sumner's corps should remain in front of Washington until otherwise directed.

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Gen. McClellan, from his camp in front of Yorktown, remonstrated; saying:

"I am now of the opinion that I shall have to fight all the available force of the Rebels not far from here. Do not force me to do so with diminished numbers; but, whatever your decision may be, I will leave nothing undone to obtain success. If you cannot leave me the whole of the 1st corps, I urgently ask that I may not lose Franklin and his division."

Two days later, he telegraphed to the War Department that:

"It seems clear that I shall have the whole force of the enemy on my handsprobably not less than 100,000 men, and possibly more. In consequence of the loss of Blenker's division and the 1st corps, my force is possibly less than that of the eneiny, while they have all the advantage of position."

In a dispatch of even date to the President, he says:

"Your_telegram of yesterday received. In reply, I have the honor to state that my

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THE PRESIDENT URGES MCCLELLAN TO ACT.

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entire force for duty amounts to only about | just obtained from the Secretary of War a (85,000) eighty-five thousand men. Gen. statement taken, as he said, from your own Wool's command, as you will observe from returns, making 108,000 then with you and the accompanying order, has been taken en route to you. You now say you will out of my control, although he has most have but 85,000 when all en route to you cheerfully cooperated with me. The only shall have reached you. How can the disuse that can be made of his command is to crepancy of 23,000 be accounted for? protect my communications in rear of this point. At this time, only 53,000 men have joined me; but they are coming up as rapidly as my means of transportation will permit. Please refer to my dispatch to the Secretary of War to-night, for the details of our present situation."

The President responded by this letter:

"WASHINGTON, April 9, 1862.

"Maj.-Gen. MOCLELLAN :

"MY DEAR SIR: Your dispatches, complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much. Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here; and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it-certainly, not without reluctance. After you left, I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field-battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction; and part of this, even, was to go to Gen. Hooker's old position. Gen. Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted, and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented (or would present, when McDowell and Sumner should be gone) a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

"I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but, when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substi

tuted for it, of course I was constrained to substitute something for it myself; and allow ine to ask: Do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.

"There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had

"As to Gen. Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was away.

"I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you, is with you by this time; and, if so, I think it is the precise time

for you to strike a blow. By delay, the enemy will relatively gain upon you; that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reenforcements than you can by reenforcements alone. And once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the Bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy, and the same or equal intrenchments, at either place. The country will not fail to note--is now notingthat the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

"I beg to assure you that I have never written you, or spoken to you, in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can. But you must act.

"Yours, very truly, A. LINCOLN." The President's question as to the grave discrepancy between the 85,000 men, admitted to be with or on their way to him by Gen. M., and the 108,000 asserted by Secretary Stanton, was never answered, and probably could not be; since an official return of the number of his army April 30th, while it was still before Yorktown, makes its aggregate 130,378, whereof 112,392 were present and fit for duty; Franklin's division of 12,448 men having in the mean time been sent to him.

But, on another point, military men are not likely to agree with the President. Gen. Wool's command may very probably have been doing just

what an equal number of McClellan's troops must have done "if that command was away;" but it is by no means the same thing to a commander in the field to have 10,000 men holding an important post in his rear, but wholly independent of his authority, and having them subject implicitly to his orders. Gen. McClellan was therefore manifestly right in not regarding Gen. Wool's 10,000 as equivalent to a rëenforcement of his army by that number; and the order which detached this division from his command has not been justified. True, he had more men than he needed, had he possessed the ability and the nerve to use them." But a General, in such a position as his then was, should either be fully trusted or superseded.

Stonewall Jackson, after his defeat" by Shields at Kernstown, had retreated up the Valley, pursued by Gen. Banks, to the vicinity of Harrisonburg. Jackson, after holding some

62 When he had fairly set down before Yorktown, he telegraphed to Washington as follows: “HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, April 10.

"Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War: "The reconnoissance to-day proves that it is necessary to invest and attack Gloucester Point. Give me Franklin's and McCall's divisions, under command of Franklin, and I will at once undertake it. If circumstances of which I am not aware make it impossible for you to send me two divisions to carry out this final plan of campaign, I will run the risk, and hold myself responsible for the result, if you will give me Franklin's division. If you still confide in my judgment, I entreat that you will grant this request. The fate of our cause depends upon it. Although willing, under the pressure of necessity, to carry this through with Franklin alone, I wish it to be distinctly understood that I think two divisions necessary. Franklin and his division are indispensable to me. Gen. Barnard concurs in this view. I have determined on the

point of attack, and am at this moment engaged in fixing the position of the batteries.

"G. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj.-General." The prompt response was as follows:

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days a strong position near Mount Jackson, crossed the South Fork of the Shenandoah and took position in Elk Run Valley; but he was soon startled by tidings that Gen. Milroy, with the advance of Gen. Schenck's division of Fremont's West Virginia force, was threatening Staunton from the direction of Monterey. As a junction of Fremont's and Banks's commands would have involved the fall of Staunton, and the complete possession of the Valley by our troops, Jackson resolved to prevent it by striking a swift and hard blow at Fremont's advance. Leaving Ewell, whose division had recently joined him from Gordonsville, to observe and check Banks, Jackson moved rapidly to Staunton, being rëenforced by the division of Gen. Edward Johnson, which he dispatched" in advance of his own, against Milroy; who, being decidedly overmatched, retreated westwardly across Shenandoah Mountain, concentrating his command at MCDOWELL, and sending

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THE FIGHT AT MCDOWELL.

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to Schenck for assistance. Schenck 3 missing. Our total loss in this well was at Franklin, 34 miles north, contested action was 256, including which distance he traversed, with his 145 slightly wounded. Gen. Jackbrigade, in 23 hours, joining Milroy son's report admits a loss on his part at 10 A. M. of the 8th; but he of 461-71 killed, including 3 Cobrought only three regiments, reduced lonels and 2 Majors, and 390 woundby details to less than 2,000 men; ed, among whom was Gen. Johnson. while Milroy's force was but very Our troops retreated to Franklin little stronger. Jackson's column during the night, carrying of their was considerably the larger, though wounded, but burning a part of their it is stated that but six regiments were stores. actually engaged in the fight.

Jackson pursued next day toward Franklin, but did not see fit to attack. Returning to McDowell," he recrossed the Shenandoah Mountain to Lebanon White Sulphur Springs; where he gave his troops a brief rest, and then resumed" his march to Harrisonburg, having ascertained that Banks had fallen back to Strasburg. Being joined near Newmarket by Ewell's division, he moved via Luray upon Front Royal, keeping his advance carefully masked by Ashby's cavalry, so that he swooped down" almost unannounced on our small force holding that position, under Col. John R. Kenly, who nevertheless made a spirited resistance, but was soon driven out with loss by the enemy's overwhelming numbers. Kenly, after abandoning the town, attempted to make a stand on a ridge scarcely a mile in its rear; but, his force being hardly a tenth of that assailing him, he was soon compelled to retreat across the river, after

The Rebels advanced to and posted themselves on the top of a ridge in the Bull Pasture Mountain, where it is traversed by the Staunton turn pike, a mile or two west of McDowell. Schenck saw that Milroy's position was untenable, being commanded by hights in several directions; but he could not safely abandon it in broad daylight, and so decided to remain. Some desultory skirmishing and cannonading followed; until, at 3 P. M., upon information that the Rebels were trying to plant a battery on the mountain, where it would command our whole encampment, Schenck directed Milroy, with the 3d Virginia, 25th, 32d, and 82d Ohio, numbering a little over 2,000 men, to advance and feel of the enemy. Led by Col. N. C. McLean, of the 75th Ohio, they charged up the mountain with great gallantry, defying the fire of a superior force, whose heads only were visible, and were engaged at close range for an hour.destroying his camp and stores. He and a half, during which an attempt was made to turn the Rebel right, but repulsed. The fight did not wholly cease till 8 P. M., when our withdrawn by order, bringing in their dead and wounded,

men

tried to burn the bridge over the North Fork of the Shenandoah, but the Rebels were upon him and extinguished the flames. A few miles farther on, he was overtaken by the Rebel cavalry under Ashby and

taking 4 prisoners and reporting but Flournoy, and a fight ensued, in

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his train captured, and his command nearly destroyed. Fully 700 prisoners, a section of rifled 10-pounders, and a large amount of stores, were among the trophies of this Rebel triumph. Our men fought nobly; but they were 900 against 8,000.

which Col. K. was severely wounded, town-a report soon confirmed by a disorderly rush of fugitives and wagons to the rear. The column was thereupon rëorganized, with the train in the rear; and, on reaching Middletown, Col. D. Donnelly, commanding the vanguard, encountered a small force of Rebels, who were easily repulsed and driven back on the road to Front Royal. Col. Brodhead, 1st Michigan cavalry, now took the advance, and soon reported the road clear to Winchester. Before all our army had passed, the Rebels advanced on the Front Royal road in such force as to occupy Middletown, compelling our rear-guard to fall back to Strasburg, making a circuit thence to the north, whereby the 1st Vermont, Col. Tompkins, was enabled to rejoin Banks at Winchester in season for the fight of next morning; while the 5th New York,. Col. De Forrest, made its way through the mountains to the Potomac, bringing in a train of 32 wagons and many stragglers. There was some fighting with our rear-guard at Strasburg, and again at Newtown, eight miles from Winchester; but our men retreated with moderate loss, and our infantry and artillery were again concentrated at Winchester by midnight. Here they were allowed a rest of two or three hours, broken at brief intervals by the rattle of mus

Gen Banks remained quiet and unsuspecting at Strasburg, with no enemy in his front, and no sign of danger, until the evening of the 23d, when he was astounded by tidings of Kenly's disaster, and assurances that the Rebels, 15,000 to 20,000 strong, were pressing forward to Winchester, directly in his rear. Shields's division having been sent, by order from Washington, to the Rappahannock, he had hardly 5,000 men at hand, with perhaps 2,000 or 3,000 more scattered through the Valley in his rear. Jackson's force must have exceeded 20,000 men." Banks had, on the first tidings of trouble at Front Royal, dispatched a small force to the aid of Kenly; but this was now recalled, and our trains sent forward on the road to Winchester, escorted by Gen. Hatch, with our cavalry, and 6 pieces of artillery. At 9 A. M. our column was in motion, and had hardly proceeded three miles when it was apprised that the train had been attacked, and that the Rebels held the road at Middle

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B9 Lt.-Gen. Jackson, in his official report, says: "My command at this time embraced Ashby's cavalry; the 1st brigade, under Gen. Winder; the 2d brigade, Col. Campbell commanding; 3d brigade, Col. Fulkerson commanding; the troops recently under command of Brig.-Gen. Edward Johnson; and the division of Gen. Ewell, comprising the brigades of Gens. Elzey, Taylor, Trimble, and the Maryland Line, consisting of the 1st Maryland regiment and Brockenbrough's battery, under Brig.-Gen. Geo. H. Stewart, and the 2d and 6th Virginia cavalry, under Col. Flournoy."

On our side, Brig.-Gen. Gordon, in his official report, says:

"From the testimony of our signal officers, and from a fair estimate of the number in Rebel lines drawn up on the hights, from fugitives aud deserters, the number of regiments in the Rebel army opposite Winchester was 28, being Ewell's division, Jackson's and Johnson's forces; the whole being commanded by Gen. Jackson. These regiments were full, and could not have numbered less than 22,000 men, with a corresponding proportion of artillery."

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