punishment, therefore, which may seriously endanger life, limbs, or health, or shall disfigure the child, or cause any other permanent injury, may be pronounced in itself immoderate, as not only being unnecessary for, but inconsistent with, the purpose for which correction is authorized. But any correction, however severe, which produces temporary pain only, and no permanent ill, can not be so pronounced, since it may have been necessary for the reformation of the child, and does not injuriously affect its future welfare. We hold, therefore, that it may be laid down as general rule, that teachers exceed the limits of their authority when they cause lasting mischief, but act within the limits of it when they inflict temporary pain. When the correction administered is not in itself immoderate, and therefore beyond the authority of the teacher, its legality or illegality must depend entirely, we think, on the quo animo with which it was administered. Within the sphere of his authority, the master is the judge when correction is required, and of the degree of correction necessary; and like all others intrusted with a discretion, he can not be made penally responsible for error of judgment, but only for wickedness of purpose. The best and the wisest of mortals are weak and erring creatures, and in the exercise of functions in which their judgment is to be the guide can not be rightfully required to engage for more than honesty of purpose and diligence of exertion. His judgment must be presumed correct, because he is the judge, and also because of the difficulty of proving the offense or accumulation

of offenses that called for correction; of showing the peculiar temperament, disposition, and habits of the individual corrected; and of exhibiting the various milder means that may have been ineffectually used before correction was resorted to. But the master may be punished when he does not transcend the powers granted, if he grossly abuses them. If he use his authority as a cover for malice, and under pretense of administering correction gratify his own bad passions, the mask of the judge shall be taken off, and he shall stand amenable to justice, as an individual not invested with judicial power. We believe that these are the rules applicable to the decision of the case before us. If they be, there was error in the instruction given to the jury, that if the child was whipped by the defendant so as to occasion the marks described by the prosecutor, the defendant had exceeded her authority, and was guilty as charged. The marks were all temporary, and in a short time all disappeared. No permanent injury was done to the child. The only appearances that could warrant the belief or suspicion that the correction threatened permanent injury were the bruises on the neck and the arms; and these, to say the least, were too equivocal to justify the court in assuming that they did threaten such mischief. We think that the instruction on this point should have been, that unless the jury could clearly infer from the evidence that the correction inflicted had produced, or was in its nature calculated to produce, lasting injury to the child, it did not

exceed the limits of the power which had been granted to the defendant. We think, also, that the jury should have been further instructed, that however severe the pain inflicted, and however, in their judgment, it might seem disproportionate to the alleged negligence or offense of so young and tender a child, yet if it did not produce or threaten lasting mischief, it was their duty to acquit the defendant; unless the facts testified induced a conviction in their minds that the defendant did not act honestly in the performance of duty, according to her sense of right, but under the pretext of duty was gratifying malice. We think that rules less liberal toward teachers can not be laid down without breaking in upon the authority necessary for preserving discipline and commanding respect, and that, although these rules leave it in their power to commit acts of indiscreet severity with legal impunity, these indiscretions will probably find their check and correction in parental affection and in public opinion; and if they should not, that they must be tolerated as a part of those imperfections and inconveniences which no human laws can wholly remove or redress. (The State v. Pendergrass, 2 Dever. and Bat. R. 365.) that "the welfare of the child is the main purpose for which punishment is permitted to be inflicted," may be correct, but the welfare of the school can be hardly less important.

The opinion of this court,

SEC. 5. The law is silent on the subject of corporal punishment in schools. It neither grants nor withholds

authority to inflict it. The whole subject is left to the judgment and discretion of the local school authorities, and to the sanction of general usage and custom. That the teacher must be clothed with authority to use the rod in certain cases is self-evident. It grows out of the very nature of the case, and of his relations to his pupils. The prudent exercise of such authority is acquiesced in by the opinions and practice of the whole country, and is almost invariably sustained by the courts, on the ground, not of statutory enactments, but of common custom, common sense, common justice, and the nature and necessity of the case. It is only the flagrant abuse of the admitted right which either society or the law is disposed to frown upon and condemn. (Am. School Laws of Ill. 1865, p. 190, dec. 15.) It is undoubtedly true that, in order to support an indictment for assault and battery, it is necessary to show that it was committed ex intentione, and that, if the criminal intent is wanting, the offense is not made out. But this intent is always inferred from the unlawful act. The unreasonable and excessive use of force on the person of another being proved, the wrongful intent is a necessary and legitimate conclusion in all cases where the act was designedly committed. It then becomes an assault and battery, because purposely inflicted without justification or excuse. Whether, under all the facts, the punishment of the pupil is excessive must be left to the jury to decide. (Commonwealth v. Randall, 4 Gray, 38.)

SEC. 6. To the Supreme Court of Indiana. (See sec.

1.) What is the great end of a system of public schools supported by the state? Can the answer to this fundamental inquiry be more comprehensively epitomized than in this proposition? The chief end is to make good citizens. Not to make precocious scholars; not to make smart boys and girls; not to gratify the vanity of parents and friends; not to impart the secret of acquiring wealth; not to confer the means of achieving the ends of personal ambition; not to enable the youth to shine in society; not to qualify directly for professional success; not one or all of these, but simply, in the widest and truest sense, to make good citizens. The state, as such, has nothing to do with the foregoing enumerated objects; it leaves them all to other agents and other influences. If parents seek brilliant scholarship, morbid precociousness, social preeminence, affluence, or professional distinction for their children, the state has nothing to say; but inasmuch as none of these things are essential to a true and noble citizenship, the state will not enact laws, frame systems, levy taxes, build school-houses, and employ teachers to enable those parents to carry out their designs. That such selfish and subordinate ends are often sought through, and to some extent promoted by, the public schools is true, but it is not the object of public schools to foster such ends. The aim of the commonwealth is higher and broader. It has to do with the child only in its civil relations, as a member of the great body politic; not, primarily, in its home relations, as a member of the family. And yet, in an important sense,