SEC. 2. A music-master in trouble.-This was an action for an assault, in which the defendant, as musicmaster of the Chichester Cathedral, pleaded a justification of the trespass, as committed by him, in correcting the plaintiff, who was a chorister of the cathedral, and had absented himself from his duty. The cause was tried at the Assizes at Sussex, when a verdict was found for the plaintiff for the sum of £5, it being held that the justification was not sustainable. It appeared that the plaintiff had applied to the master for leave to go and sing at a certain club, but permission was refused. Notwithstanding this refusal the plaintiff went to the club, and on the next day the defendant, as music-master of the cathedral, and consequently having jurisdiction over the choristers, corrected the plaintiff, and committed the assault complained of. At the trial evidence was offered of the practice at other cathedrals, but was rejected. Evidence was also proposed to be brought forward in order to show that the chorister's practicing at the clubs disqualified him for singing in the cathedral. The judge at the trial thought the evidence too general, and rejected it. The defendant now moved, on the ground of misdirection, to set aside. the verdict, and have a new trial. Mr. Justice Bayley observed, thereupon, that "the boy was under an obligation to attend in the church at certain periods, in order to receive instruction, but that the master had no occasion for his services at the time when his absence was complained of." And Chief-Justice

Abbott said, that, "supposing the boy had bathed and caught cold, that would be injurious to his singing, but would not justify the measures adopted by the defendant." A new trial was therefore refused. (Newman v. Bennett, 2. Chitt. 195.) This decision, it will be observed, does not go so far as to say that the music-master could under no circumstances punish his pupils for misconduct out of school hours; but it would seem that the alleged cause of the punishment was the absence of the pupil from duty; and one of the judges merely decides that "at that time the master had no occasion for the services" of the pupil, and consequently the defense failed. And the chief-justice merely added to this, that, even if the boy did injure his voice singing at the clubs, he did not thereby commit such an offense as would justify the master in correcting him corporally. The court, therefore, seem to have been unwilling to declare that the master could under no circumstances punish his pupil for misconduct out of the hours set apart for instruction, but confined themselves rather to this particular instance, and, without declaring any general principle, decided that the offense was not sufficient to justify the act of the teacher. It must be borne in mind, also, that this is a decision in reference to the authority of a music-teacher only, and that the jurisdiction of other teachers is altogether more extended. Consequently, even if the court had decided that the jurisdiction of music-masters could not in any instance extend to acts done outside of the school, such a decision would in no

respect define or limit the authority of other teachers. Music-teachers, we believe, do not, as a general thing, claim or care to be held responsible for the conduct of their pupils, except during the particular hours that have been set apart for their instruction. The music. teacher's duty is merely to develop the musical faculties, and he has no more power given him by law than is necessary for the accomplishment of that end. The duty of other teachers is not so circumscribed. They are employed for vastly greater purposes. They must teach the science of health with all the learning, but without the pay, of the doctor; they must inculcate the principles of morality with all the impressive sincerity, but without the sectarianism, of the minister; they must be altogether more patient and discreet than parents, and more even-tempered than God Almighty himself— for he was "wroth" when he punished the wicked, whereas, if a teacher punishes in anger, he is guilty of an assault and battery; they must invent schemes to invert human nature, and make every good thing and thought enticing, and every bad thing and thought abominably disgusting, especially to the "desperately wicked," who have "no good in them;" they must tenderly moderate the zeal of the too ambitious, and inspire the dullest blockhead with a manly thirst for fame and knowledge; and the incorrigibly uncouth and vicious they must endow with the tastes, instincts, and manners of the refined and virtuous. And, in short, they must turn all from the thousand paths that lead to

indolence, ignorance, and folly, and prepare them to find infallibly all the ways of pleasantness and all the paths of peace. These are the high purposes for which teachers are employed; and it would be a shame and a reproach to require so much of them, and at the same time tie their hands by withholding from them the power which is indispensable to their success. The law is not so unreasonable; for with every well-defined duty the law gives an incontestable right to all the power necessary for the performance of that duty.

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SEC. 3. A Remarkable Case.-In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence county, Indiana, a teacher was tried, about six years ago, for assault and battery, and found guilty under the following circumstances: The evidence showed that the alleged assault and battery was inflicted by the defendant in the capacity of a school-master, on the prosecutor, a boy of some fifteen or sixteen years of age, as a pupil attending his school, by way of correction, for a violation of the rules of the school by the prosecutor. also appeared that the correction was administered by the defendant on the prosecutor after the adjournment of the school in the evening, and while the latter was on his way home, for an act committed during that time, and which was seen by the defendant, who thereupon administered the correction by the infliction of sundry stripes with an ordinary-sized rod. There was nothing conducing to show that the correction was other than reasonable and moderate.

The court instructed the jury that, although the defendant, as a teacher, was by law vested with the delegated authority to exercise control over the prosecutor as his pupil during school hours, yet after the adjournment of his school, and after the prosecutor had left and was on his way home, his authority over him had terminated, and his act of administering correction under the circumstances was unauthorized by law, and they must find accordingly; but in fixing the defendant's punishment, they should take into view all the circumstances attending the case, and especially the motives of the defendant in committing the act, and if they should find the circumstances to warrant it, they might fix the fine as low as one cent, and without costs. Under these instructions the jury were constrained to find the defendant "guilty;" but they fixed. the fine at " one cent, and without costs," as had been suggested by the court. (State of Indiana v. Ariel Flinn, in Bedford Independent.) Here, then, we find both court and jury evidently feeling themselves hampered by what they suppose to be the law, but virtually justifying the act of the teacher, which no doubt was right and proper. This case has often been cited as a strong one against the teacher's right to punish for misbehavior on the way to and from school, but we can not so regard it. We think it an excellent illustration rather of what courts and juries will do to shield the prudent and conscientious teacher from harm. The only indiscreet thing the teacher in this case seems to