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respect define or limit the authority of other teachers. Music-teachers, we believe, do not, as a general thing, claim or care to be held responsible for the conduct of their pupils, except during the particular hours that have been set apart for their instruction. The music. teacher's duty is merely to develop the musical faculties, and he has no more power given him by law than is necessary for the accomplishment of that end. The duty of other teachers is not so circumscribed. They are employed for vastly greater purposes. They must teach the science of health with all the learning, but without the pay, of the doctor; they must inculcate the principles of morality with all the impressive sincerity, but without the sectarianism, of the minister; they must be altogether more patient and discreet than parents, and more even-tempered than God Almighty himself for he was "wroth” when he punished the wicked, , whereas, if a teacher punishes in anger, he is guilty of an assault and battery; they must invent schemes to invert human nature, and make every good thing and thought enticing, and every bad thing and thought abominably disgusting, especially to the “desperately wicked,” who have “no good in them;" they must tenderly moderate the zeal of the too ambitious, and inspire the dullest blockhead with a manly thirst for fame and knowledge; and the incorrigibly uncouth and vicious they must endow with the tastes, instincts, and manners of the refined and virtuous. And, in short, they must turn all from the thousand paths that lead to
indolence, ignorance, and folly, and prepare them to find infallibly all the ways of pleasantness and all the paths of peace. These are the high purposes for which teachers are employed; and it would be a shame and a reproach to require so much of them, and at the same time tie their hands by withholding from them the power which is indispensable to their success. The law is not so unreasonable ; for with every well-defined duty the law gives an incontestable right to all the power necessary for the performance of that duty.
SEC. 3. A Remarkable Case-In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence county, Indiana, a teacher was tried, about six years ago, for assault and battery, and found guilty under the following circumstances : The evidence showed that the alleged assault and battery was inflicted by the defendant in the capacity of a school-master, on the prosecutor, a boy of some fifteen or sixteen years of age, as a pupil attending his school, by way of correction, for a violation of the rules of the school by the prosecutor. It also appeared that the correction was administered by the defendant on the prosecutor after the adjournment of the school in the evening, and while the latter was on his way home, for an act committed during that time, and which was seen by the defendant, who thereupon administered the correction by the infliction of sundry stripes with an ordinary-sized rod. There was nothing conducing to show that the correction was other than reasonable and moderate.
The court instructed the jury that, although the defendant, as a teacher, was by law vested with the delegated authority to exercise control over the prosecutor as his pupil during school hours, yet after the adjournment of his school, and after the prosecutor had left and was on his way home, his authority over him had terminated, and his act of administering correction under the circumstances was unauthorized by law, and they must find accordingly; but in fixing the defendant's punishment, they should take into view all the circumstances attending the case, and especially the motives of the defendant in committing the act, and if they should find the circumstances to warrant it, they might fix the fine as low as one cent, and without costs. Under these instructions the jury were constrained to find the defendant “guilty;" but they fixed the fine at a one cent, and without costs,” as had been suggested by the court. (State of Indiana v. Ariel Flinn, in Bedford Independent.) Here, then, we find both court and jury evidently feeling themselves hampered by what they suppose to be the law, but virtually justifying the act of the teacher, which no doubt was right and proper. This case has often been cited as a strong one against the teacher's right to punish for misbehavior on the way to and from school, but we can not so regard it. We think it an excellent illustration rather of what courts and juries will do to shield the prudent and conscientious teacher from harm. The only indiscreet thing the teacher in this case seems to
have done was to inflict the punishment out of school. We think it would have been more prudent to wait until the next day, and inflict the punishment in the school. It is always better to take time for reflection before an act, the propriety of which is likely to be at all questioned. Besides, the teacher's jurisdiction in the school-room would be less likely to be disputed, and, if it were, he could find more and better authorities to support him. In fact, the authority of the teacher to punish for the offense may in some measure depend upon whether the scholar continues under the jurisdiction of the master. For, if the scholar, after leaving the school in the evening, committed an offense as in this case, but never again returned to the school, we think that the teacher's right to inflict punishment under such circumstances would be more than doubtful. Consequently, we would advise the punishment to be deferred in all cases until it can be inflicted in the school-room.
SEC. 4. In RHODE ISLAND the teacher should endeavor to exercise an inspection over the conduct of his scholars at all times. But the power to punish for offenses committed out of school is considered doubtful. In a case where a boy had committed a theft out of school the teacher called him to account for it, and punished him for refusing to answer. The court ruled that the teacher had no right to punish him for refusing to confess a crime for which he might be punished at law. In connection with this decision it must be borne in mind that
the law does not require criminals to confess their guilt. Consequently any punishment for such a refusal, whether the crime is committed in school or out of school, would probably meet with no favor in the courts. The law permits criminals to confess their crimes, but it will not force them to do so. The decision in this case, then, does not place the Rhode Island court against the policy of punishing for misconduct out of school. (See Pub. School Acts of R. I. 1857, with Rem. p. 53.) The following upon this subject is from an excellent French treatise upon education, by J. Willm, Inspector of the Academy at Strasbourg, p. 176: “The last question which presents itself is, how far teachers should pay attention to the conduct of the pupils out of school, and especially at the time when they resort to it or return home. The road leading to school is truly a part of it, if we may so speak, as well as the play-ground. Consequently any disorders committed by the pupils on it ought to be suppressed by the teacher. He ought especially to watch over them at their play, for the sake of discipline, as well as for that of education in general. Their games are, as has been said, of serious importance to him. The conduct of the pupils, when under the paternal roof, and everywhere but in the school or the road leading to it, escapes all the means of discipline; but the teacher ought not to be indifferent to that conduct, especially in the country; he should carefully inquire concerning it, for the sake of moral education. For the same reason, he will have to watch over his own conduct out of school, and