sion, so far as the debates show, upon the subject of slavery. It exhibits the principles by which the speaker as a constitution maker was guided, and especially sets forth the principles upon which he had, as a Southern delegate, insisted. There could not be produced more undeniable evidence-evidence amounting to the clearest proof-that the ratio of three-fifths, as it stood in the report of the committee of the whole, then under the consideration of the Convention, was looked upon as designed to produce an equilibrium between the two sections. This is fortified, and if any doubt remained, would be rendered certain, by the narrative of the introduction of that compromise heretofore given. This is but the contemporaneous exposition of the purpose of the proposed basis, by a single member of the Convention, but, let it be borne in mind, a member speaking for the whole South, and speaking to the whole North. I will proceed to collect all the passages from the succeeding debate, which concern this point, in order to prove that it was universally looked upon in the same light in which it was viewed by Mr. Madison. By this means, the purpose which that body had in view, in establishing that fractional basis, that mode of distributing power between jealous and at length irritated sections, will be established-established, it is believed, to the satisfaction of every sound understanding.

The debate on the eighth resolution, which constituted the second branch of the legislature on the three-fifths ratio, was continued between the larger and the smaller States until the 2nd July, when the Convention divided, by an equal vote, on that question. Maryland voted with the North, because she considered herself in the interest of the small States. But, with that exception, the whole South voted for that resolution. Sectional considerations produced that unity on the part of the South, because, as heretofore observed, to have yielded that department to the control of the small States would have been to place it under Northern control, the Southern policy then being to have the legislature divided equally between the sec

tions, a determining motive with them, as will be disclosed towards the end of the debate. Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, on that occasion, voted with the South; because of the proportional representation which the ninth section embraced. The contest then was between the large and small States, an issue upon which the South, Maryland excepted, invariably voted with Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. The smouldering fires of sectional jealousy had not then burst forth. But, after they had burst forth, so fierce was the heat with which they burned, and so strong the sympathy that linked the Northern States together, that Mr. Gouverneur Morris, of Pennsylvania, threatened to desert to the small States, or rather proclaimed that he would be compelled to vote for “the vicious principle of equality in the second branch," in order to give the North a counterpoise against the South, to whom the three-fifths ratio, in his opinion, would deliver the first branch of the legislature. The advantage which an equal vote in the Senate would secure to the North will explain the following speech of Mr. Charles Pinckney in opposition to it, which was delivered immediately on the announcement of the vote just alluded to:

“Mr. PINCKNEY thought an equality of votes in the second branch inadmissible; at the same time, candor obliged him to admit that the large States would feel a partiality for their own citizens, and give them a preference in appointments; that they might also find some common points in their commercial interests, and promote treaties favorable to them. There is a real distinction between Northern and Southern interests. North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, in their rice and indigo, had a peculiar interest which might be sacrificed. How, then, shall the larger States be prevented from administering the general government as they please, without being themselves unduly subjected to the will of the smaller? By allowing them some, but not a full proportion. He was extremely anxious that something should be done, considering this as the last appeal to a regular experiment. Con

gress have failed in almost every effort for an amendment of the Federal system. Nothing has prevented a dissolution of it but the appointment of this Convention; and he could not express his alarms for the consequence of such an event."

General Pinckney then proposed that a committee, consisting of a member from each State, should be appointed. The proposition to refer covered only the eighth resolution; as yet the seventh resolution had not been assailed. But the bile of anti-slavery rising in the heart of Mr. Strong, a Northern delegate, he proposed that the whole question, embracing both resolutions, should go to committee. Thus the entire ground which had been gained was lost, and the Convention was again at sea.

Whilst the proposition of Gen. Pinckney was pending, Mr. Gouverneur Morris, of Pennsylvania, spoke, and, without submitting any distinct plan, advocated a government in which the Senate and the Executive should be appointed for life, with a House of Commons framed on liberal ideas. The scheme, itself, was but the re-production of that which already had been brought forward by Col. Hamilton, and thoroughly exposed by Mr. Charles Pinckney. It was the reflection, and nothing more than the reflection, of the English Constitution. By its adoption it was probably the hope of its projector that corresponding interests would, after a while, grow up in the country. But the mind of Mr. Morris seemed filled with other ideas. He turned away from sectional interests, and even denied their existence; but with what candor, the reader will hereafter discover. Burke has said, that there is a class of public men whose patriotism is altogether historical. This was eminently true of the political wisdom of Mr. Morris; for he walked with Solon. Unable or unwilling to recognise. the strongly marked differences of the country for which he presumed to suggest a Constitution, his eyes were riveted on the Republics of Antiquity, patterns which stood ready shaped to his hand. He proposed to construct the government with

reference alone to the distinctions of the rich and the poor. Between these two classes the legislature, as we have seen, was to be divided. According to his philosophy, these two elements in society were continually at war, and could not dwell in amity together; that the rich man feared the poor man because he was poor, and the poor man hated the rich man because he was rich; and that there was but one way to avoid oppression on the one hand, or confiscation on the other. If things had been as they were in the antique models which filled the imagination and monopolized the thoughts of Mr. Morris; or even, as according to his opinion, they threatened then to become in Pennsylvania, framed, as society then was, on the substratum of free-soil, his suggestion would have been well founded. As it was, he gave very good reasons for a very bad thing. In respect to the aristocratic house which he proposed to establish, he said: "In the first place, the checking branch must have a personal interest in checking the other branch. One interest must be opposed to another interest. Vices, as they exist, must be opposed to each other." In short, he proposed to arm each of those social elements with a defensive power in the government. This shows how prevalent, among all reading and thinking men, was the opinion of the necessity of that principle in popular government to establish between them an equilibrium. It is a fact worthy of notice, that in all the various schemes broached in the Convention, that principle, under one modification or another, was embraced. They seemed to look upon it, as in truth it was, a back of steel; that, with it, representative government was the greatest blessing of society; but, without it, that it was a bubble that would rise to the surface, glisten for a moment, and be dispersed forever; nor is it surprising that this opinion should have so universally prevailed. It was inculcated by the classical authors, then much read; was taught by Montesquieu, a great authority, and oftener quoted than any other in the Convention; and, above all, was incorporated into the English Constitution, which was thought, at

that time, to be the best government which the world had ever seen. With that superb model before their eyes, they ever acted.

The proposition of General Pinckney was concurred in. Of that committee, known in the annals of the Convention as the Grand Committee, Mr. Gerry, of Massachusetts, was chairman. The day following, being the fourth of July, the Convention rested from their labors. But the committee devoted the holiday to settling the conditions of an adjustment. No angry collisions had as yet taken place, but, from the following observations of Mr. Williamson, from North Carolina, it is to be inferred that the temper of the respective parties boded a fierce contest: "If we do not concede on both sides, our business must soon be at an end. He approved of the commitment, supposing that, as the committee would be a smaller body, a compromise would be pursued with more coolness." The next day, Mr. Gerry made his report, from which it is clearly visible how intimately connected was the question of representation in both branches:

"That the subsequent propositions be recommended to the Convention, on condition that both shall be generally adopted:

"1. That in the first branch of the legislature each of the States now in the Union shall be allowed one member for every forty thousand inhabitants, of the description reported in the seventh resolution of the committee of the whole house; that each State, not containing that number, shall be allowed one member; that all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of the government of the United States, shall originate in the first branch of the legislature, and shall not be altered or amended by the second branch; and that no money shall be drawn from the public treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated in the first branch.

"2. That in the second branch each State shall have an equal vote.”