ADULTERATION OF FOOD ACT-proof that article
sold was represented to be unadulterated: guilty
knowledge-The Adulteration of Food, &c.,
Act, 35 & 36 Vict. c. 74, by s. 2, enacts that
every person who shall sell any article of food
or drink with which to the knowledge of such
person any ingredient or mineral injurious to
the health of persons eating or drinking such
article has been mixed, and every person who
shall sell as unadulterated any article of food
or drink, or any drug which is adulterated, shall
be liable to (certain prescribed penalties). By
section 3, any person who shall sell any article
of food or drink, or any drug, knowing the
same to have been mixed with any other sub-
stance, with intent fraudulently to increase its
weight or bulk, and who shall not declare such
admixture to any purchaser thereof, before
delivering the same, and no other, shall be
deemed to have sold an adulterated article of
food or drink or drug, as the case may be, under
this Act. The appellant went into the shop of
the respondent, a provision and butter dealer,
and asked for a pound of butter at seven pence.
A pound of butter was handed to him, in the
presence of the respondent, which was after-
wards found to be adulterated with different
fats, not necessarily injurious to health :-Held,
first, that there was sufficient evidence under
section 2 of a sale of the butter as unadul-
terated; secondly, that it was not made neces-
sary by section 3 to prove that the respondent
knew the butter had been mixed with some
substance, with intent fraudulently to increase
its bulk. Fitzpatrick v. Kelly, 132

ALEHOUSE license for sale of exciseable liquors: ap-
plication for to special sessions after unsuccessful
application to general sessions]—A house in Mid-
dlesex, kept for years as an inn under 9 Geo. 4.
c. 61, was in February, 1872, left by the licensed
tenant, who gave up possession to T. In March
following, at the annual general licensing meet-
ing, application was made for a license on behalf

of T., but this was refused, and no appeal was
made from the decision. The license expired
on April 5th, when the house was shut up,
and in May T. applied under s. 14 to the special
sessions for a license, who refused it on the
ground that the application had been already
disposed of at the general licensing sessions:-
Held, that after an unsuccessful application at
the annual general licensing meeting, T. could
not afterwards renew his application at the
special sessions. R. v. Taylor, 13

annual value: condition in license for m-
provement of premises :]-At a general annual
licensing meeting, M., the occupier of a houso
licensed as a public-house under 9 Geo. 4. c.
61, applied for a renewal of the license. The
justices renewed the license, but with the
following notice upon it-"This license is
renewed on condition that the licensed premises
shall, before the next general annual licensing
meeting, be improved and made of the annual
value of 30%, in default of which this license will
not be renewed":-Held (MELLOR, J., hæsi-
tante), that the justices had no power to impose
such a condition upon M.; that the provision
in section 46 of the Licensing Act, 1872, as to
improving the premises does not apply to a
house already licensed under 9 Geo. 4. c. 61, and
that the condition was null and void. R. v.
Justices of Exeter, 35

Semble, that part of a license cannot be quashed
upon certiorari without quashing the whole.
Ibid.

repeal of sections in 9 Geo. 4. c. 61, giving
appeal to Quarter Sessions: certificate for sale
of wine, &c., to be consumed off premises: right
of appeal under Wine and Beerhouse Act,
1869] By "The Wine and Beerhouse Act,
1869," 32 & 33 Vict. c. 27, s. 8, all the
provisions of the Act, 9 Geo. 4. c. 61, as to ap-
peal from any act of the justices at the general

annual licensing meeting, shall, so far as may
be, have effect with regard to grants of certi-
ficates under this Act, &c. . . . By the Licens-
ing Act, 1872, 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94. s. 75, and
schedule 2, the provisions of the Act, 9 Geo. 4.
c. 61, as to appeal (ss. 27, 28, 29), are repealed,
"except in so far as these sections relate to the
renewal of licenses or transfer of licenses:"
-Held, that in the absence of any express repeal
of s. 8 of the Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1869,
the appeal given by that section was not taken
away by the repeal of the appeal sections in
the original Act, 9 Geo. 4. c. 61. R. v.
Smith, 46

ALEHOUSE (Continued)-beerhouse having license on
first of May, 1869: discretion to refuse certificate:
Wine and Beerhouse Act, 1869]-By the Wine and
Beerhouse Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 27), s.
19, where, on the first of May, 1869, a license
is in force with respect to any house for the
sale of beer to be consumed on the premises,
it shall not be lawful to refuse an application
for a certificate in respect of such house, except
on one or more of the grounds specified in sec-
tion 8. By the Intoxicating Liquors (Licensing
Suspension Act) Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict. c.
88. s. 3, it was declared that, where a license
had by forfeiture or lapse of time ceased to be
in force, the justices might, in their discretion,
refuse a certificate upon any ground on which
they might refuse a certificate with respect to
any house as to which a license was not in force
on the first of May, 1869. By the Licensing
Act, 1872, 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94. s. 75, the Act of
1871 is repealed, and section 19 of the Act of
1869 is made perpetual :—Held, that, notwith-
standing the repeal of 34 & 35 Vict. c. 88. s. 3,
the justices retained their discretion to refuse a
certificate in the case of a house licensed on
the first of May, 1869, where the license had
lapsed before application was made for renewal.
R. v. Curzon, 155

See Sunday trading.

AMENDMENT-on certiorari in order of justices: bas-
tardy]-The mother of a bastard child, born on
the 27th of May, 1870, applied on the 11th of
August to M., a justice, who issued a summons
against T., the alleged father. Several successive
summonses were issued, and in March, 1871, T.
was served with a summons to appear before the
justices on the 11th of April. The mother and
T. attended, but the mother withdrew the sum-
mons and on the same day applied to B., another
justice, who issued a summons requiring T. to
appear on the 25th of April. On that day an
order was made, which recited the application
to M., adjudged T. to be the father of the child,
and ordered him to pay 2s. 6d. per week, com-
mencing from the 11th of August, 1871, on
which day the mother had applied to M.:-
Held, that section 7 of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45 gave
the Court no power to amend this invalid order,

by alleging the application to B. instead of the
application to M., or by making the payments
to begin from the 11th of April, 1871, instead of
from the 11th of August, 1870. R. v. Tomlin
son, 1

of indictment for larceny: variance : pleading]
-An indictment alleged that the prisoner stole
nineteen shillings and sixpence. The Court
ordered it to be amended at the trial by describ
ing the property stolen to be a sovereign, sub-
ject to the question whether the Court had
power so to do. The jury found the prisoner
guilty of stealing a sovereign :-Held, that the
Court had power to order the amendment to
be made as a variance between the statement
and the proof in the description of a thing
named in the indictment, under 14 & 15 Vict.
c. 100. s. 1. R. v. Gumble, 7

APPEAL to quarter sessions: signature to notice
of appeal:-By 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45. s. 1, in
every case of appeal (except as thereinafter
mentioned) to the General or Quarter Sessions
of the Peace, the notice of appeal "shall be in
writing signed by the person or persons giving
the same, or by his, her or their attorney, on
his, her or their behalf," &c. :-Held, that a
notice of appeal signed, in the name of the ap-
pellant, by a clerk to the appellant's attorney,
by the authority of the appellant, and after-
wards acknowledged by him, was sufficiently
signed. R. v. Justices of Kent, 112

Validity of rule of quarter sessions as to
entry of appeal and deposit of grounds. See
Quarter Sessions.

See Alehouse.

ARSON-"stack of straw:" straw on lory in the
course of conveyance to market]-By 24 & 25
Vict. c. 97. s. 17, whosoever shall unlawfully and
maliciously set fire to any stack of corn. grain,
pulse, tares, hay, straw, haulm, stubble, or of
any cultivated vegetable produce, or of furze,
gorse, heath, &c., or to any stack of wood, shall
be guilty of felony." A quantity of straw,
packed on a lory, in course of transmission to
market, and left for the night in the yard of
an inn, is not a stack of straw within the
meaning of the above section, and the setting
fire thereto wilfully and maliciously is not
felony. R. v. Satchwell, 63

See Evidence.

ASSAULT-indecency to children: mere submission
not consent]-An assault must, in the absence
of fear or fraud to procure consent, be an act
done contrary to the consent of the patient, but
mere submission by the patient, in ignorance of
the moral nature of the act, to an act of in-
decency done by the agent, does not amount

to such consent; therefore where two boys of
eight years of age submitted to indecent acts on
the part of a grown-up man in ignorance of
the nature of the acts to be done and done, the
man was held to be rightly convicted of an
indecent assault. R. v. Lock, 5

AUDITOR-See Poor Law Audit.

BANKRUPTCY-Admissibility of trader's examina-
tion. See Evidence.

BASTARDY-hearing at petty sessions after death
of the mother]-The evidence of the mother of a
bastard child, who is an applicant for an affilia-
tion order against the putative father, is no-
cessary at the hearing of the summons before
justices sitting in petty sessions under 8 & 9
Vict. c. 101. s. 3. Therefore, if the mother
die after making her application for a sum-
mons, and before the hearing of the summons
at petty sessions, the justices have no jurisdic-
tion to make an order thereon. R. v. Arm-
itage, 15

Semble, it may be otherwise on the hearing of an
appeal against an affiliation order under 8 Vict.
c. 10. s. 6, if the mother die after the hearing of
a summons at petty sessions, and if she has
been examined in the presence of the defendant
and might have been cross-examined by him at
the petty sessions. Ibid.

Amendment of invalid order on its removal
by certiorari. See Amendment.

BREAD-sale of otherwise than by weight]-The ap-
pellant was convicted under 6 & 7 Will. 4. c.
37. s. 4 for selling bread without having a cor-
rect beam or scales, &c. The material of which
the bread was made was in all respects the
same as ordinary bread, except that carbonic
acid gas was forced into it. It was crusty all
round, and was known in the trade as French
or fancy bread, but in no way, except the man-
ner of baking in separate loaves, resembled
what was called French or fancy bread at the
time of the passing of the Act:-Held, that
the conviction was right, as the exception in s. 4
as to selling French or fancy bread could not
be construed to apply to bread of such a descrip-
tion.-The Queen v. Wood (38 Law J. Rep.
(N.S.) M.C. 144) observed upon. The Aerated
Bread Company v. Grigg, 117

CAB-STAND-See Railway Station. Town Police
Clauses Act.

CEMETERY. See Poor Rate.

CERTIORARI-time for application for order of
quarter sessions]-The general rule that applica-
tion for a writ of mandamus to the quarter ses-
sions to enter continuances and hear an appeal
must be made not later than the term following
the sessions at which the refusal was made,
NEW SERIES, 42,-MAG, CAS,

does not apply to an application to remove into
this Court an order of sessions for the purpose
of getting it quashed. R. v. Justices cj Lreck.
nockshire, 135

See Amendment.

CONSENT-Mere submission. See Assault.

CONVICTION-Scienter; and for continuing offence.
See Penalty. And see Adulteration of Food Act.
CORONER-Appointment of Deputy. See Perjury.

DEBTORS ACT, 1869-Indictment under. See Evi
dence.

DEED-What is a Deed? See Forgery.

EMBEZZLEMENT-person paid by commission to get
orders: clerk or servant: question for jury]-The
prisoner was employed to solicit orders for the
prosecutors, and was to be paid by a commission
on the sums received through his means. Не
was at liberty to apply for orders whenever he
thought most convenient, but was not to employ
himself for any other persons than the prosecu-
tors. The judge at the trial directed the jury
that the prisoner was a clerk or servant within
the meaning of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 68:-
Held, upon the above facts, that he was not a
clerk or servant within the meaning of 24 &
25 Vict. c. 96. s. 68, and therefore that the
direction was wrong, but that, generally speak-
ing, whether a person under such an employ-
ment and paid by commission is a clerk or ser-
vant is a question of fact for the jury. R. v
Negus, 62

money received neither for, nor in the name
of, nor on account of the master]-Embezzle-
ment of money by a servant under 24 & 25
Vict. c. 96. s. 68 must be in respect of money
delivered to or received, or taken into possession
by the servant for or in the name of or on the
account of his master. And where a servant,
-whose duty it was to take a barge belonging
to his master with cargo from A. to B. and
receive back such return cargo, and from such
persons as his master should direct, and such
only, contrary to the express orders of his
master, which were to return empty from B. to
C., part of the return voyage to A.,-took,
nevertheless, a return cargo from B. to C., and
received the freight from the owner of the
cargo (who know only the prisoner in the tran-
saction) and did not account to his master for
the freight, and denied having carried such
return cargo,-Held, that the money was not
received by him for or in the name of or on
the account of his master, and that he was
not guilty of embezzlement. R. v. Cullum, 64

EVIDENCE-admissibility of examination of trader
in liquidation on trial of indictment under Debtors

Y

Act for obtaining property by false pretences]-
On an indictment of a trader for obtaining pro-
perty on credit, under the false pretence of
dealing in the ordinary way of his trade, within
four months before his liquidation contrary to
the 11th section of the Debtors Act, 1869, an
examination of the trader in liquidation taken
under the 97th section of the Bankruptcy Act,
1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 71), was admitted in
evidence against him. The summons to bring
up the trader for examination was issued before
the certificate of the appointment of the trustee
was given by the registrar. The trader at-
tended, was examined, and the examination was
taken after the giving of the certificate of ap-
pointment:-Held, that whether the summons
was regularly issued or not, the trader by ap-
pearing and submitting to be examined, waived
the irregularity, if any, and the examination was
properly taken and was admissible in evidence
against the prisoner on the trial of the indict-
ment. R. v. Scott followed. R. v. Widdop, 9
EVIDENCE (continued)-deposition of prisoner]-
The respondent was indicted for arson; and at
the trial the deposition of the respondent taken
on oath upon an inquiry into the cause of the
fire, was admitted as evidence in support of the
indictment:-Held, that the evidence was ad-
missible, R. v. Coote, 114; P.C., 45

FORGERY-deed: letters of orders]-By 24 & 25 Vict.
c. 98. s. 20, "whosoever, with intent to defraud,
shall forge or alter, or shall offer, utter, dis-
pose of or put off, knowing the same to be forged
or altered, any deed, or any bond or writing
obligatory, &c., shall be guilty of felony." The
prisoner altered the name of a person ordained
so as to change it to his own, and made other
alterations in Letters of Orders signed, sealed
and issued under his episcopal seal by the
Bishop of Bath and Wells:-Held, that such
document was not a deed within the above sec-
tion of the statute, and therefore the prisoner
could not be convicted of felony under that sec-
tion. R. v. Morton, 58

FRIENDLY SOCIETY-sickness entitling member to
relief: insanity]-By rules of a friendly society
established under 18 & 19 Vict. c. 63. s. 9, a
member, under certain conditions, was entitled to
receive eight shillings a week during any sick-
ness or accident that might befall him, unless
by rioting or drunkenness, &c.:-Held, in the
absence of words shewing a different intention,
that insanity was a sickness which entitled a
member to relief under the above rule. Burton
v. Eyden, 115

HACKNEY CARRIAGE-Right to occupy stand on
railway premises. See Railway Station. And
see Town Police Clauses Act.

HARBOURS, DOCKS AND PIERS CLAUSES ACT-
damage to pier: inevitable accident: liability
of owner of vessel]-By the Harbours, Docks
and Piers Clauses Act, 1847 (10 Viet. c. 27),
s. 74, "the owner of every vessel shall be
answerable to the undertakers for any damage
done by such vessel, or by any person em
ployed about the same, to the harbour, dock, or
pier; and the master, or person having the
charge of such vessel, through whose wilful act
or negligence any such damage is done, shall
also be liable to make good the same, &c.,
provided always that nothing herein contained
shall extend to impose any liability for any such
damage upon the owner of any vessel where
such vessel shall, at the time when such damage
is caused, be in charge of a duly licensed pilot,
whom such owner or master bound by law
to employ, and put his vessel in charge of."
A vessel, by inevitable accident, struck against
a pier and thereby damaged it:-Held, that
the owner of the vessel was answerable for
damages under the section, the proviso making
an exception where the vessel is in charge of a
pilot, but no exception in case of damage done
by inevitable accident. Dennis v. Tovell, 33
HIGHWAY-proceedings for stopping up: vestry
meeting: sufficiency of notice]-Notice of a
vestry meeting was given in the words fol-
lowing "Hamlet of Trevecca.-I, the under
signed, hereby give notice that a meeting
of the ratepayers of the above hamlet will
be held at the vestry room, &c. . . . . for
the purpose of taking into consideration the
proceedings now taken by Mr. John Parry,
against Mr. Rhys Davies, surveyor
of the Talgarth District Highway Board,
respecting Blaenanbach Road, and for other
purposes connected with the highways of the
above hamlet." The meeting so convened
passed a resolution that the road should be stop-
ped up, under the Highways Act, 5 & 6 Will.
4. c. 50. s. 84:-Held, that, having regard to
the fact that proceedings had been taken for
compelling the parish to repair the highway,
the notice sufficiently informed the public that
any steps which might be necessary for defeat-
ing these proceedings, such as stopping up the
highway, would be considered by the vestry,
and that the meeting was therefore duly con-
vened. R. v. Powell, 129

of

INDECENT ASSAULT-consent. See Assault.