statute "to show," as he says, that "the whole scheme of the statute is based upon those 'minute distinctions' condemned in the Mondou and Ellis Cases (223 U. S. 1, 56 L. ed. 327, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 44, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 169; 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255), and, secondly, to demonstrate, if we can, that, as we urged in the state court, so much of the act is unconstitutional that all must fall." The state court did not yield to the contention nor its asserted consequences. Nor can we yield to it. Its foundation is based on the distinction made between buildings in cities and buildings in villages (§ 6); the distinction between houses exclusively for private residences and other constructions as to the strength of the supports for joists (§§ 2 and 3); the distinction between the protection required for men working upon swinging and stationary scaffolds used in the construction, alteration, repairing, removing, cleaning, or painting of buildings, and that given to advertising agents. (Sections 1 and 5.) Sections 2 and 3 must fall, it is contended, because of the exception of private residences; section 6, because of its limitations to cities; sections 1 and 5, be688]cause they discriminate between the indicated classes. It is enough to say of these contentions-(1) of the asserted dis 2. The common-law fellow-servant rule must be assumed to have existed in Porto Rico, in view of the provisions of Porto Rico Rev. Stats. & Codes 1902, p. 150, adopting the English employers' liability act, that the master shall be liable in certain specific cases for injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow servant, and that the act shall not apply to injuries caused to domestic servants or farm laborers by fellow employees. [For other cases, see Evidence, II. b, in Di- " [For other cases, see Trial, VI. c, 21, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 283.] crimination in §§ 1 and 5, plaintiff in error Submitted May 2, 1913. Decided May 26, cannot complain, and, so far as it is made a eriticism of the statute, we are not concerned with it; (2) of the distinction made by the other sections, they are within the power of classification which the legislature possesses. Judgment affirmed. ROY BROOKS, Plff. in Err., V. CENTRAL SAINTE JEANNE. (See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 688–695.) Master and servant - fellow servants -volunteer. 1. A person consenting to aid in hauling a boiler to a sugar mill, whether a volunteer or not, must be regarded as a fellow servant with the driver of the mill owner's 1913. IN ERROR to the District Court of the a judgment entered on a verdict directed in favor of the defendant in an action for personal injuries. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. N. B. K. Pettingill and George H. Lamar submitted the cause for plaintiff in error: Plaintiff's rights were the same as if he had had no business connection of any kind with defendant company, but had been a stranger, riding as a passenger by invita tion issued under due authority. Union P. R. Co. v. Fort, 17 Wall. 553, 21 L. ed. 739; Northern P. R. Co. v. Hambly, 154 U. S. 349, 357, 38 L. ed. 1009, 1012, 14 automobile during a trip taken for the pur- Sup. Ct. Rep. 983; Fletcher v. Baltimore & pose of doing the work, so as to preclude P. R. Co. 168 U. S. 135, 138, 42 L. ed. 411, any recovery against such owner for in-412, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35. NOTE. As to fellow servants and their or country-see notes to Brown v. Wright, negligence, generally-see notes to Hough 21 L.R.A. 471; and Cherry v. Sprague, 67 v. Texas & P. R. Co. 25 L. ed. U. S. 612; L.R.A. 40. Coyne v. Union P. R. Co. 33 L. ed. U. S. 651; Quebec S. S. Co. v. Merchant, 33 L. ed. U. 8. 656; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Baugh, 37 L. ed. U. S. 773; and Central R. Co. v. Keegan, 40 L. ed. U. S. 418. On presumption as to law of other state On liability of master for injury to volunteer-see notes to Evarts v. St. Paul M. & M. R. Co. 22 L.R.A. 663; Grissom v. Atlanta & B. Air Line R. Co. 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 561; and Hunter v. Corrigan, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 187. A gratuitous passenger may recover from retention of Monsieur Lewis as a driver of the owner for negligence of driver. the steam-driven truck, in the light of Little v. Hackett, 116 U. S. 366, 371, the dangers of such employment as revealed by the record in this case. 29 L. ed. 652, 654, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 391; New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. v. Steinbrenner, 47 N. J. L. 171, 54 Am. Rep. 126, 12 Am. Neg. Cas. 258; Crampton v. Ivie Bros. 126 N. C. 894, 36 S. E. 351; Frerker v. Nicholson, 41 Colo. 12, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1122, 92 Pac. 224, 14 Ann. Cas. 730; Clark v. Wright, 25 C. C. A. 190, 49 U. S. App. 260, 79 Fed. 747, 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 100; Wilson v. Puget Sound Electric R. Co. 52 Wash. 522, 132 Am. St. Rep. 1044, 101 Pac. 50; Chadbourne v. Springfield Street R. Co. 199 Mass. 576, 85 N. E. 737; Johnson v. Coey, 237 Ill. 88, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 81, 86 N. E. 678; Gresh v. Wanamaker, 221 Pa. 28, 69 Atl. 1123; Routledge v. Rambler Automobile Co. Tex. Civ. App. 95 S. W. 749. The ordinary rule for negligence cases is applicable. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518, 33 L. ed. 440, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 175. The principles of the American law are applicable unless such principles are varied by local statutes. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, 37 L. ed. 97, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261. Porto Rico statutes announce principles in substantial harmony with the American law. Northern P. R. Co. v. Herbert, 116 U. 8. 647, 648, 29 L. ed. 758, 759, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 590; Wabash R. Co. v. McDaniels, 107 U. S. 454, 27 L. ed. 605, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 932; Northern P. R. Co. v. Mares, 123 U. S. 710, 31 L. ed. 296, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 321; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Henthorne, 19 C. C. A. 623, 43 U. S. App. 113, 73 Fed. 638; Fletcher v. Baltimore & P. R. Co. 168 U. S. 135, 42 L. ed. 411, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35. Even the fellow-servant doctrine would not relieve against such negligence as we have in this case. Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Cummings, 106 U. S. 700, 702, 27 L. ed. 266, 267, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493; Deserant v. Cerillos Coal R. Co. 178 U. S. 420, 421, 44 L. ed. 1133, 1134, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 967, 20 Mor. Min. Rep. 573; Hayes v. Frederick Stearns & Co. 130 Mich. 293, 89 N. W. 947; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Thomas, 90 Va. 205, 44 Am. St. Rep. 906, 17 S. E. 884. The relation of fellow servant was not established. As an employee of the Murphy Company, Redinger v. Crespo, 18 P. R. R. 106; 12 the facts in respect to his aiding in the Manresa's Com. 608-609, 611-612; October towing of the boiler are entirely consistent 21, 1882; Juris. Civ. vol. 50, p. 207; June (1) with the principles applicable to serv 27, 1894; Juris. Civ. vol. 75, p. 848; De-ice in cases of emergency, and (2) to serv cember 12, 1894; Juris. Civ. vol. 76, p. 483; October 12, 1897; Juris. Civ. vol. 82, p. 417; Rodríguez v. Fernández Hermanos, 13 P. R. R. 349; Vargas v. Monroigé Hijos, 15 P. R. R. 27. Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense, of which the burden of proof is on the defendant. Looney v. Metropolitan R. Co. 200 U. S. 488, 50 L. ed. 569, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 303, 19 Am. Neg. Rep. 627. A passenger invited to ride in a vehicle has a right to presume that the driver furnished is competent and of sufficient experience. ices rendered by persons assisting servants of another for the purpose of expediting their business, or both. In either instance the defendant would be liable for the neg ligence of its agents. Thomp. Neg. §§ 4984, 4986; McKinney, Fellow Servants, § 19, p. 49. Although the plaintiff might have avoided the accident by the exercise of ordinary care, he may, nevertheless, recover if it be shown that the defendant might have avoided the accident by the exercise of proper care. Vargas v. A. Monroig é Hijos, 15 P. R. R. 26. Carr v. Easton, 142 Pa. 139, 21 Atl. 822; State v. Boston & M. R. Co. 80 Me. 445, The plaintiff filed his complaint, charg15 Atl. 36, 11 Am. Neg. Cas. 642. ing negligence against the defendant, estabAt any rate, there was no such evidentlished his grounds of liability, and, having lack of due care as authorized the taking of the case from the jury. Chadbourne v. Springfield Street R. Co. 199 Mass. 574, 85 N. E. 737; Clarke v. Connecticut Co. 83 Conn. 219, 76 Atl. 523. The defendant corporation, as such, was guilty of negligence in the employment or done this, he need not go further in those jurisdictions where the burden of proof is on the defendant to show contributory neg ligence. Thomp. Neg. § 401; Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Landrigan, 191 U. S 461, 48 L. ed. 262, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 137; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Gentry, 163 U. S. 353, 41 L. ed. | 224 U. S. 85, 56 L. ed. 679, 32 Sup. OL 186, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1104. Rep. 402. At best, the evidence bearing upon the subject of contributory negligence cannot be taken from the jury unless the proof supplied thereby is clear and conclusive. Thomp. Neg. §§ 369, 401. Messrs. Benjamin S. Minor, Hugh B. Rowland, and Colley W. Bell submitted the cause for defendant in error: The evidence presented at the trial was insufficient to place any liability upon the defendant for the injuries sustained by Brooks. Merrick v. Giddings (Morris v. Giddings) 115 U. S. 300, 305, 29 L. ed. 403, 405, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65; Patton v. Texas & P. R. Co. 179 U. S. 658, 660, 45 L. ed. 361, 363, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 275; Supreme Lodge K. P. v. Beck, 181 U. S. 49, 52, 45 L. ed. 741, 745, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 532. The fellow-servant rule, as known to the common law of England and the United States, is and apparently always has been in force in Porto Rico, as will be seen from the statute law hercinabove set forth, and from a reading of the decisions of the Porto Rico courts. Diaz v. Fajardo Development Co. 2 Porto Rico Fed. Rep. 152; Colon v. Ponce & G. R. Co. 3 Porto Rico Fed. Rep. 367; Natal v. Bartolomey, 14 P. R. R. 474. The plaintiff was a fellow servant of the driver. Northern P. R. Co. v. Charless, 162 U. S. 359, 363, 364, 40 L. ed. 999, 1001, 1002, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 848; Northern P. R. Co. v. Peterson, 162 U. S. 346, 357, 40 L. ed. 994, 998, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 843; Martin v. Atch ison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 166 U. S. 399, 403, 41 L. ed. 1051, 1052, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 603, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 747; Randall v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 109 U. S. 478, 27 L. ed. 1003, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 322; Quebec S. S. Co. v. Merchant, 133 U. S. 375, 33 L. ed. 656, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 397; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 37 L. ed. 772, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 914; Northern P. R. Co. v. Hambly, 154 U. S. 349, 38 L. ed. 1009, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 983; Oakes v. Mase, 165 U. S. 363, 41 L. ed. 746, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 345, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 544; Northern P. R. Co. v. Poirier, 167 U. S. 48, 42 L. ed. 72, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 741, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 751; New England R. Co. v. Conroy, 175 U. S. 323, 44 L. ed. 181, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 85, 7 Am. Neg. Rep. 182; Northern P. R. Co. v. Dixon, 194 U. S. 338, 48 L. ed. 1006, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 683, 16 Am. Neg. Rep. 645; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Bourman, 212 U. S. 536, 53 L. ed. 641, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 319; Bautler v. Grand Trunk Junction R. Co. The plaintiff had ample time and oppor tunity to observe, had he chosen to do so, the driver of the truck, and to judge for himself as to his competency, carefulness, and capability. Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. R. Co. 220 U. S. 590, 596, 55 L. ed. 596, 600, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 561. A servant who is transferred from one part of the work to another assumes the risks incident to the new employment. Reed v. Stockmeyer, 20 C. C. A. 381, 34 U. S. App. 727, 74 Fed. 190; O'Connor v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 70 C. C. A. 87, 137 Fed. 504. Assuming that the plaintiff was a fellow servant of the driver of the truck, the defendant cannot be held responsible for the accident in question unless plaintiff shows that the defendant was negligent in some particular. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, and there is nothing in the record which even intimates that the defendant was in any way negligent, either in the hiring of the driver or in retaining him in its employ. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Barrett, 166 U. S. 617, 619, 41 L. ed. 1136, 1139, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 707, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 745; Patton v. Texas & P. R. Co. 179 U. S. 658, 663, 664, 45 L. ed. 361, 364, 365, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 275; Claudio v. Cortinez, 9 P. R. R. 97. The test whether a person is guilty of contributory negligence is not whether he exposed himself to danger after actually seeing that danger, but whether he had an opportunity of observation from which a reasonable man could judge whether or not danger existed. Reed v. Stockmeyer, 20 C. C. A. 381, 34 U. S. App. 727, 74 Fed. 189; Northern P. R. Co. v. Freeman, 174 U. S. 379, 383, 43 L. ed. 1014, 1016, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 763; Claudio v. Cortinez, 9 P. R. R. 97; Patton v. Texas & P. R. Co. 179 U. S. 658, 659, 660, 45 L. ed. 361, 362, 363, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 275. Mr Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court: This is an action for personal injuries suffered in Porto Rico. The declaration alleges that the plaintiff, at the defendant's request, made a trip on an automobile of the latter "for the purpose of aiding other employees of the defendant in moving a certain boiler which was the property of the defendant," and that, in returning from the trip, the automobile was so negligently operated by the defendant, its agents and employees, that it was driven into a ditch and the plaintiff was badly hurt. There was a trial by jury, in which, at the end of the plaintiff's evidence, the judge di- low servant with the driver of the ma rected a verdict for the defendant and the chine. Martin v. Atchison, T. & 8. F. R. plaintiff excepted. The evidence showed Co. supra; *Northern P. R. Co. v.[694 that the machine was driven by a servant of Dixon, 194 U. S. 338, 48 L. ed. 1006, 24 Sup. the defendant, so that it appeared in proof Ct. Rep. 683; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Bourman, that the plaintiff was suing for an injury 212 U. S. 536, 541, 53 L. ed. 641, 644, 29 caused by a fellow servant, as is to be in- Sup. Ct. Rep. 319; Beutler v. Grand Trunk ferred from the face of the declaration it- Junction R. Co. 224 U. S. 85, 56 L. ed. 679, self. 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 402. If the law of Porto Rico does not differ in this respect from the common law, the direction to the jury was right. Notwithstanding the admission that the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant, imported by the words "for the purpose of aiding other employees," it is argued that 693] *the plaintiff was not a fellow servant, and therefore, although the contention hardly is open, the substance of the testimony may be stated. The plaintiff's general employers had sold a sugar mill to the Cen tral, delivered in New Orleans. At the request of the Central they had sent over the plaintiff to put up a chimney, a battery of six boilers, and a bagasse track. While at the work he seems to have been paid by the defendant and was under the direction of its chief engineer. The chimney had been nearly finished and the next work was to set up the boilers, but they had not arrived. The man in charge of the transportation directed the plaintiff to go and help to get a boiler, which, after asking the chief engineer for leave, he did. When they got to the boiler there were not enough machines to haul it, so that they had to return to the Central. On the way the driver seems to have been more or less drunk, and negligently, it must be assumed, upset the machine. Whether the plaintiff was in the general employ of the defendant, as he seems to have been, or not, the service that he consented to render was the defendant's work. In rendering that, at least, he came under its orders and became its servant. Assuming in his favor that he was a volunteer, that fact did not enlarge his rights. Degg v. Midland R. Co. 1 Hurlst. & N. 773, 26 L. J. Exch. N. S. 171, 3 Jur. N. S. 395, 5 Week. Rep. 364; Potter v. Faulkner, 1 Best & S. 800, 31 L. J. Q. B. N. 8. 30, 8 Jur. N. S. 259, 5 L. T. N. S. 455, 10 Week. Rep. 93; Barstow v. Old Colony R. Co. 143 Mass. 535, 536, 10 N. E. 255; Wischam v. Rickards, 136 Pa. 109, 10 L.R.A. 97, 20 Atl. 532. Other cases will be found in 2 Labatt, Mast. & S. § 631. He was the defendant's servant not only while actually at work on the boiler, but during the trip taken for the purpose of doing the work. Northern P. R. Co. v. Peterson, 162 U. S. 346, 358, 40 L. ed. 994, 998, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 843; Martin v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 166 U. S. 399, 403, 41 L. ed. 1051, 1052, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 603; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Bourman, 212 U. S. 536, 538, 539, 53 L. ed. 641, 643, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 319. And he was fel Whether the common-law rule prevails is not made clear by any authority cited. But by the act of March 1, 1902 (Rev. Stat. & Codes, 1902, p. 150), the English employers' liability act was copied more or less exactly, as it has been in some of the states. That statute presupposes the common-law rule as to fellow servants (Ryalls v. Mechanics' Mills, 150 Mass. 190, 191, 5 L.R.A. 667, 22 N. E. 766), and the Porto Rican copy would be hard to account for except upon the same presupposition. If a master were liable for injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow servant there would be no need of enacting that he should be liable for such injuries in specific cases, as the statute does, and no sense in the provision of § 10, that the act shall not apply to injuries caused to domestic servants, or farm laborers, by fellow employees. Therefore, while we might hesitate if we were deducing the rule from the considerations on which it originally was placed (Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. R. Co. 205 U. S. 1, 11, 12, 51 L. ed. 681, 685, 686, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 407), as indeed one might hesitate about the more general liability to which it is an exception, we must assume that it exists, even laying on one side the suggestion that the statute offers the only remedy for cases within it. We should add that this suit is not brought under the act. It was argued, evidently as an afterthought for which no foundation was laid in the pleadings, that the defendant might have been liable on the ground that it employed an incompetent servant. This suggestion is based on a single expression concerning the driver, that it was his custom to drink while driving the machine. This neither stated nor meant, so far as we can judge, that it was the custom of the driver to drink to excess, or so as to unfit *him [695 for his work. The only other reference to the matter was by another of the plaintiff's witnesses, that the driver was "not in the mood or attitude which he usually had when we worked together in the shops," importing usual sobriety. It would have been permitting a mere guess to allow the jury to find for the plaintiff on this ground. Judgment affirmed. STANLEY FRANCIS, Petitioner, V. 986; Tumlin v. Bryan, 21 LR.A.(N.S.) 960, 91 C. C. A. 200, 165 Fed. 166; Re Stein, J. HECTOR MONEAL, Trustee in Bank- 62 C. C. A. 272, 127 Fed. 547; Re Mercur, ruptcy of the Provident Investment 58 C. C. A. 472, 122 Fed. 384; Re Sanderlin, Bureau. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 695–702.) partnership Bankruptcy property of partner. An individual partner who has not been adjudged a bankrupt may be required to turn over his separate estate for administration to the trustee in bankruptcy of the firm, where the partnership and individual estates together are not enough to pay the partnership debts, especially where such partner has not objected that he should have been put into bankruptcy, and where, assuming that the case is within the provisions of the bankrupt act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat. at L. 548, chap. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3424), § 5h, that, "in the event of one or more but not all of the members of a partnership being adjudged bankrupt," the partnership property may be administered by the partners not so adjudged, and does not come into bankruptcy at all except by consent, such partner has never objected to the administration of the firm property by the trustee. [No. 290.] 109 Fed. 857; Re Solomon, 163 Fed. 140; Re Everybody's Grocery & Meat Market, 173 Fed. 492; Re Meyer, 39 C. C. A. 368, 98 Fed. 976; Strause v. Hooper, 105 Fed. 590; Re Farley, 115 Fed. 359; Re Barden, 101 Fed. 553; Re Hale, 107 Fed. 432. Before a partnership can be adjudged a bankrupt for an act of bankruptcy involving insolvency, it is not necessary that the individual partners be insolvent also. Re Bertenshaw, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 886, 85 C. C. A. 61, 157 Fed. 363, 13 Ann. Cas. 986; Re Sanderlin, 109 Fed. 857; Re Everybody's Grocery & Meat Market, 173 Fed. 492. Section 5h is applicable to a case where the partnership has been adjudicated a bankrupt as well as where it has not. Re Bertenshaw, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 886, 85 C. C. A. 61, 157 Fed. 363, 13 Ann. Cas. 986; Re Solomon, 163 Fed. 140. So distinct are the estates of the members of the firm from that of the firm, that when all the members of the firm are adjudged bankrupt individually, and the firm is not so adjudged, the trustee of the individual members is adjudged not to be entitled to administer the firm assets which Argued May 5 and 6, 1913. Decided May are in the hands of the trustee under an ON 26, 1913. N WRIT of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to review a decree which affirmed an order of the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, requiring a partner to turn over his separate estate for administration to the trustee in bankruptcy of the partnership. Affirmed. See same case below, 108 C. C. A. 459, 186 Fed. 481. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Charles L. Frailey argued the cause, and, with Mr. Henry J. Scott, filed a brief for petitioner: A partnership for the purpose of adjudication and administration in bankruptcy under the act of July 1, 1898, is an entity separate and distinct from the members which compose the partnership. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Gaskell, 115 C. C. A. 527, 195 Fed. 865; Mills v. Fisher, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 656, 87 C. C. A. 77, 159 Fed. 897; Re Bertenshaw, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 886, 85 C. C. A. 61, 157 Fed. 363, 13 Ann. Cas. NOTE.-As to effect of adjudication of bankruptcy of partnership to subject the separate estates of the partners to administration in bankruptcy-see note to Dickas 7. Barnes, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 654. assignment made by the firm. Mills v. Fisher, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 656, 87 C. C. A. 77, 159 Fed. 897; Re Mercur, 58 C. C. A. 472, 122 Fed. 384. If, then, to summarize, a partnership is an entity separate and distinct from the members that compose it, and is a "person" which can commit any act of bankruptcy defined in the statute, including one involving insolvency, and can be discharged under § 14a and 14b; if it can be insolvent without its members being insolvent, and if, although adjudicated a bankrupt, together with one or more, but not all, of its unless he consent otherwise, administer the members, an unadjudicated partner shall, follows that the trustee of a partnership partnership business,-then it necessarily adjudicated a bankrupt because of the commission by it of any of the acts of bankruptcy defined in the act of 1898 cannot draw to himself for administration or ad minister in bankruptcy the estate of an unadjudicated partner. A. Re Bertenshaw, supra; Re Stein, 62 C. C. 272, 127 Fed. 547; Strause v. Hooper, 105 Fed. 590. Mr. George Wharton Pepper argued the cause, and, with Mr. Edgar J. Pershing, filed a brief for respondent: The court below was right in thinking |