and of a higher order than intellect; but, on this hypothesis, how can will act at one time in this and at another in the opposite direction? How happens it, that in one the will looks only for selfish gratifications, and in another for general happiness? Can will take a determinate direction without any cause? Is it different in itself, or is it influenced by other causes-may it, for instance, be excited by the feelings? In this case, however, it would become dependent and exposed to aberrations.

The Christian law commands the will to resist inferior temptations, and to follow the inspirations of the Spirit. Pious persons, also, in their addresses to the Great Guiding Power, pray that their will may be directed towards certain actions, and turned away from others. This proves that they consider will as susceptible of being influenced, and by no means as independent, and acting without any cause. Such an independent will would, indeed, be a principle, and could have only one, never opposite tendencies.

Thus, in the world, will has been separated from mere desires, or from the affective faculties; and intelligence been considered a condition necessary to its manifestations. Yet intelligence does not constitute will; for a person with an excellent intellect may take very little interest in the welfare of other beings. He may acknowledge the better, and still incline and even yield to his inclination to pursue the worse. Two conditions then, the feelings and intellect, are necessary to will; in other terms, will consists in the application of reason to the affective and perceptive faculties.

The greater number of persons take their individual inclinations and pleasures for will, forgetting that these give motives blindly and involuntarily. We may, indeed, say, that the exhibition of true will is very rare; it is too generally in opposition to our inclinations. This state has been noticed by several moralists. The spirit,' it is said, 'is willing, but the flesh is weak.'* 'For that which I do,' says the Apostle Paul, I allow not for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I.'t

Here it is sufficient to know that will can neither be confounded with the individual inclinations nor with intellect; and that it is no special faculty, but the application of reason, or the reflective powers, to our desires and notions. I shall afterwards show that in its true signification it is the basis of liberty.

XI. Affections.

There is a great confusion of ideas in the works which treat of the affections. The name affection is sometimes given to fundamental powers, as to physical love, to self-love, to the love of approbation, and to hope. Affections are also confounded with passions. Moreover, affections are occasionally put for the pathognomical signs, which indicate different states of satisfaction or discontent of the fundamental powers; for instance, smiling, laughing, sighing, yawning, shedding tears, &c.

I employ the word in none of the preceding significations, but solely according to its etymology, to indicate the different states of being affected of the fundamental powers. The sense of feeling, for instance, may convey tickling, itching, burning, or lancinating pain; its various modes of sensation are affections. In the same way the internal faculties may be differently affected.

The affections of the fundamental faculties may be divided into qualitive and quantitive. The former may again be subdivided into five sorts: 1st, general, which exist in each fundamental power; 2d, common, which inhere in several faculties; 3d, special, which belong to individual powers; 4th, simple or compound; finally, 5th, which are common to man and animals, and which are proper and peculiar to man.

The quantitive affections may be subdivided into two sorts: 1st, the fundamental powers and their qualitive affections may be active in very different degrees, from indolence to passion; and 2d, they may act with more or less quickness and duration.

Among the qualitive and quantitive, and among the simple and compound affections, we may also distinguish those which appear

in the state of health from those which occur in disease. Let us now quote examples of each kind.

A general quantitive mode of action or affection is desire: each faculty being active, desires; hence, there are as many sorts of desire as fundamental faculties. The sensations of pleasure and pain are two sorts of general qualitive affections; they are effects, and happen, the former if any faculty be satisfied, the latter if its desire be not complied with. There are consequently as many kinds of pleasure and of pain as individual faculties.

The mode of being affected, called sentiment, is common to several affective faculties. That known under the name of memory, belongs to the intellectual faculties. Fury is common to combativeness and destructiveness. Simple affections take place in individual faculties. Anger, in my opinion, is a special affection of combativeness or destructiveness; fear, of circumspection; compassion, of benevolence; and repentance or remorse, of conscientiousness. Compound affections, on the contrary, depend on the combined activity of several faculties; jealousy, for instance, whose essence is egotism, is modified according to the peculiar faculties which desire, as physical love, friendship, love of approbation. Envy is another compound affection: it is jealousy without benevolence; it increases by the want of the superior feelings. An envious person covets for himself alone; he would possess all enjoyments, to the entire exclusion of others; while a jealous man desires to enjoy and is especially careful not to lose possession of the pleasure he enjoys.

The affections common to man and animals, and those proper to man, depend on the respective faculties. Anger, fear, jealousy, envy, appear in man and animals, as the faculties to which these affections belong inhere in both; while adoration, repentance, admiration, and shame, pertain, like the faculties from which they arise, to man alone.

Let us now remark that the fundamental powers and their qualitive affections may be more or less active or strong. The different degrees of activity are called velleity, desire, ardent desire,

passion; of the agreeable affections, pleasure, joy, and ecstasy; and of the disagreeable affections, pain, grief, and misery.

The nervous irritability, which is styled sentimentality in friendship, irascibility in courage, sensibility in benevolence, indicates only a higher degree of excitability or activity of the fundamental powers, and irregularity of application.

The affections may, further, be sudden and transitory, or slow and durable. Finally, the difference of the affections in the healthy and diseased state is easily understood. The complete absence of a faculty may be called imbecility, if it never existed, and fatuity, if it have been destroyed by disease. Fury, melancholy, despair, and irresistibility of any inclination, are diseased affections. But this subject is treated of at greater length in my work on Insanity, and I shall not dwell longer on it here.

Physicians, as well as moralists, must study the doctrine of the affections, on account of their influence on the vital functions and on man's actions in society. The same may be said in regard to the following article on

XII. Passions.

This word passion is commonly confounded with affection. What I have stated upon the affections, however, being known, the signification which I attach to the term passion will be easily understood; I use it to indicate only the highest degree of activity of any faculty. Passions, therefore, are not fundamental powers, but quantitive modes of action, and effects; there are, consequently, as many sorts of passions as of faculties.

Physicians, idealogists, and moralists, incessantly complain of the influence of the passions, since they ruin health and often occasion insanity, disorder judgment, cloud reason, and are causes of many errors and criminal actions.

Passions being the highest degree of activity of every faculty, we easily conceive why great results, whether good or bad, follow from them; why they advance the arts and sciences, and why they

may be excessively dangerous. This depends on the nature of the faculties which act with the utmost degree of energy. The lower feelings, however, let me remark, are commonly the most active; and in speaking of passions, we are apt to think of them. Still, the superior sentiments and the reflecting powers also act with passion in some, that is, they act with the greatest possible energy. Two feelings, selfishness and the love of glory, have been considered by Helvetius as the greatest, or principal passions, and the cause of all our actions. There is no doubt that these two feelings are very active in the majority of individuals, and excite and employ the other faculties to procure their satisfaction. But certain it is, also, that they cannot produce talents. There are ambitious people eager for distinction, who labor hard, and who notwithstanding all, never excel in any one particular.

As there reigns a natural harmony among the fundamental powers, those faculties which are too energetic, or which act with passion, must obviously disturb this balance or order. A youth in love, and a fanatic in religion, sacrifice the rest to their passion, and do harm. Yet in complaining of the passions, we do not stigmatize the fundamental powers themselves, but only their too great energy. This remark applies to the religious and moral feelings, as well as to the most brutal propensities. Selfishness, though it undermines morality, is still necessary to self-preservation. The love of approbation, though the main cause of political slavery, has a useful destination in private life. And religion, though the source of incalculable misery, procures the greatest consolation to humanity.

I shall make one observation more upon passions: the factitious passions, spoken of in books, do not exist. The primitive powers, on which they depend, are innate; their applications alone may be called factitious. Love of approbation is inherent in human nature; its satisfaction by external marks, titles, &c. is artificial.

I conclude with repeating that the various conceptions of philosophers, of idealogists as well as of moralists exist in nature,