There is something to be said for this argument, and there are other reasons why Danforth's suggestion is worth thinking about.

For example, a greater turnover in Washington might renew the nation's interest in the electoral process. According to the polls, the country is in great doubt as to whether government can accomplish anything worthwhileor, indeed, anything at all. Most people who are eligible to vote don't.

For another, the Danforth proposal would put an end to the system of power by longevity.

Sen. Russell Long (D-La), for instance, has served in the Senate since 1948. At 60 and with at least two terms to go, he is likely to exercise more influence on the lives of his countrymen than any President they may elect. As chairman of the Senate's Finance Committee, Long pretty much decides how much we'll be taxed, how much we'll pay for gasoline, how much we'll get in Social Security payments when we retire and how much we'll get in Medicare when we're sick.

Yet Long is responsible to no one except the voters of Louisiana, whose votes he controls through one of the most powerful political machines in the country. Danforth's amendment would rule out the possibility of any senator's or representative's wielding this kind of power, at least for a considerable length of time.

It is true that time is a great teacher and that experience provides wisdom. But there are four men in the Senate presently who have been there 30 years or more. You'd think that, if they had provided the country with much wisdom, we might know them well. Yet I venture that seven out of 10 readers of this column cannot name them.

I like the remark of Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo), who supports Danforth: "There's no question that, if this amendment were adopted, men of extraordinary talent would not be here. But there's equally no question that men of extraordinary talent are ready to take their places."

3

[From the Family Weekly, 1978]

PRO AND CON-SHOULD CONGRESSMEN'S TERMS BE LIMITED TO 12 YEARS?

PRO-REP. DAN GLICKMAN (D.-KAN.)

For too many years we have had Congressional fiefdoms in Washington. History provides many examples of members of the House and Senate who have, through the privileges granted by seniority, created for themselves farreaching powers. The problem of isolation exists on Capitol Hill. Members who have been in Washington too long tend to believe that it is the center of the universe; they lose contact with the people to whom they should be responding. A member who stays too long can and does begin to accept things as they are, to feel secure in the status quo. The advantages of incumbency make re-election, particularly in so-called "safe districts," an easy task for that member.

CON-REP. W. R. POAGE (D.-TEXAS)

The basic reason for limiting the term of executives-the President or governors-is that they are able to build up political machines based upon their appointive powers. Members of Congress have no such opportunity. While there may not be many members of Congress who will serve as long as I have (42 years), or as long as Sam Rayburn (49 years) or Carl Vincent (50 years), the people should have the opportunity to avail themselves of the service of any individual they want to serve them just as long as they want his service and he is able to serve. When the people decide they do not want a Congressman. they can and will replace him no matter how long his service has been.

[From the Miami, Florida News, Mar. 3, 1978]

NO PUSH FOR REFORM

Although that wise plan to limit the terms of congressmen to 12 years may be about as popular on Capitol Hill as Tongsun Park, it at least is going to get a two-day hearing this month before the Senate Constitution Subcommittee

chaired by Sen. Birch Bayh (D-Ind.). That gives reformers a few crumbs of satisfaction despite the scant hope that careerist-congressmen seriously would tamper with their comfortable baliwicks.

With Sen. Bayh showing little enthusiasm for the proposed constitutional amendment that would prevent politicians from parlaying incumbencies into lifetime jobs, the hearings aren't likely to spark any hard drive for reform. Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), who has been hanging around the Senate for a quarter of a century, is the only veteran offering support to the chief sponsors, Sens. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.) and John Danforth (R-Mex.).

This country could cure a lot of ills by limiting congressional terms. It could put an end to political dynasties of families from "safe" districts. It could dilute the strength of the too-powerful committee chairmen. It could shatter the seniority system that rewards age instead of talent. It could bring more fresh blood and ideas into the legislative process and help remove government from the control of the WASPish lawyer clique.

To get this promising reform, the people will have to want it-the majority of congressmen probably never will.

[From the Birmingham, Alabama News, Mar. 15, 1978]

BAYH NOT IMPRESSED BY TENURE-LIMIT MOVE

Washington (AP).-Sen. Birch Bayh, D-Ind., serving his third term in the Senate, doesn't think much of proposals to limit the tenure of members of Congress, sponsored largely by freshman senators.

In a statement opening hearings by the constitution subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Bayh said he had "serious reservations on the merits of these proposals." He questioned whether the proposed constitutional amendments would weaken the legislative branch and whether the federal government would work as well "if it relied on less experienced legislators."

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 18, 1978]

CONGRESSIONAL LONGEVITY

One of those perennial attempts to reform Congress by limiting the terms of its members was trotted out again this week before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee. Under consideration are two constitutional amendments that would limit the service of future senators and representatives to 12 or 15 years. Proposals like these have been floating around at least since 1951, when the Constitution was changed to restrict presidents to two full terms. We hope they continue merely to float and don't light.

It needs to be conceded that proponents of amendments like these, introduced by Sens. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.) and John C. Danforth (R-Mo.), are focusing on a real problem: the stagnation that prolonged terms in high office can produce. The seniority system, even though it is not so strong now as it once was, places enormous power in the hands of longtime members of Congress solely because they have been there so long. That, coupled with the political advantages that incumbency generates, makes it increasingly difficult for new blood to fight its way to Washington. Even when a veteran member has dropped out of touch philosophically with his constituents, he is often able to stay in office because party officials prefer power to issues.

Sen. DeConcini also argues that this distribution of power operates to deny equal representation to voters in states and districts where hot political competition makes it difficult for any person to stay long in Congress; the representatives of those areas are never able to stand on an equal footing with those from districts that send back the same legislator election after election.

Those are valid and appealing arguments. They make the proposed limits on congressional terms seem attractive. But the senators have traced the problems to the wrong source and are thus prescribing the wrong cure. The evilsand they are that of which they speak grow not out of unlimited service but out of the way in which Congress itself has chosen to treat that service. The cure, then, is not to keep particular people out of Congress, but rather to limit

the power and prerogatives that Congress grants to those members who win reelection repeatedly. For example, restricting the length of time a member could be a committee chairman or, even, serve on a committee might not change the situation as much as would the proposed amendment, but it would certainly reduce the advantages of long service.

To attack this problem the other way, as the proposed constitutional amendments do, is to place an additional restriction on the right of voters to choose whomever they want to represent them in Washington. That right of choice is so fundamental that it should not be tampered with. Voters should be allowed to elect and reelect to Congress whom they please.

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 18, 1978]

WHY WE SHOULD LIMIT CONGRESSIONAL TERMS

(By Milton S. Eisenhower1)

The Post's March 18 editorial "Congressional Longevity" cited some of the reasons given for advocating limited terms for representatives and senators. The editorial remarked that nothing would be gained by such limitation.

But it did not mention what I deem to be the most important reason for limiting representatives to three four-year terms and senators to two six-year terms. The electoral process operates in such a way that we tend to have permanent members of Congress, and to achieve that result the members must support not what is best for the United States but what will most please their constituents at a particular time.

Early in our history the problems facing the nation, while acute, were sufficiently simple that what citizens favored and what best served the national interest were essentially synonymous. Further, the desire of the professional politicians to achieve electoral immortality had not yet developed. Hence, in the early part of the 19th century a Congressional election saw nearly half of the members of the House of Representatives enter as freshmen.

Now the situation is vastly different. The problems the nation faces-energy, inflation, unemployment, imbalances in international trade and payments, the Middle East and African problems, crime-are complex. Citizens often lack basic facts essential to enlightened judgment. Members of the Senate and House have their staffs do publicly financed research, and committees hold prolonged hearings, often for months, on a single problem. A senator or representative therefore develops knowledge superior to that of most of his constituents. The task of statesmanship is for a congressman to vote for what is right (that is, what is best for the nation) and seek to inform constituents, convincing them, we hope, that his vote was the correct one.

Unfortunately, with no limitation on terms of office, there is always the temptation to please constituents rather than to promote the national welfare. One need only think of two problems-inflation and the devastating effect of the coal strike to realize that members of the Senate and the House lack the courage to vote for what is needed, for in doing so they would offend powerful interest groups that have strong influence in political elections. Incumbents have found that the way to achieve electoral immortality is to behave as pressure groups wish.

The cost of a congressional election is now nearly 75 times as great as it was 90 years ago; in that costly process the advantages are with incumbents. They have the franking priivlege. Every member is likely to have one or two employees on the public payroll who work almost exclusively in preparing for the next election. And of course the greater newsworthiness of incumbents helps them. The consequence is that today the historic turnover in the House of Representatives in each election has been reduced to less than 15 percent.

Limited terms for representatives and senators would eliminate the evils of the seniority system. It is true, as the Post said, that Congress could change the seniority system without having a constitutional amendment on limited terms. But the problem has been evident for a long time, and little corrective action has been taken. I see no reason to believe that the House and Senate will radically change the rules.

1 The writer is a retired university president.

The major reason for limited terms for elected representatives applies also to the president. The chief executive should be limited to a single six-year term. He should have no incentive other than that of serving all the people, yet who is there today who cannot recall far-reaching and costly programs proposed and vigorously supported by presidents because they had wide temporary ap peal yet proved in time to be wasteful and ineffective? Nearly every president in modern times has favored policies and programs that would contribute to his reelection. If there were evils in permitting the president to run for a third term-as the Congress and states decided--those same evils apply to election to a second term. Why, in our current economic disarray, have elected officials, including the president and governors, failed to uphold the law in the crippling coal strike? Why did they permit union miners to threaten and intimidate non-union miners so effectively that most non-union mines had to close? Why, when the Taft-Hartley Act was imposed, did not federal and state chief executives see to it that the law was observed?

The reason is obvious. The president and many governors are eligible for re-election. Pressure groups must not be offended-the political imperative. That example, which involves an incumbent president and a few incumbent governors, could be duplicated with respect to policies and programs initiated by their predecessors.

A single six-year term for the president is gaining widespread support, and many states now limit governors to single terms. I think I may live to see the appropriate constitutional amendment adopted to limit the president to one six-year term. It may take longer to persuade the Congress to reform itself.

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 30, 1977]

POLITICS OF ENDURANCE

(By George F. Will)

T. S. Eliot warned against "dreaming of systems so perfect that no one needs to be good." But the oldest American political tradition is the search for institutional arrangements that minimize reliance on public spiritedness. An idea in that tradition-an idea that would make a kind of greatness impossible-is enjoying new currency.

The Foundation for the Study of Presidential and Congressional Terms has been formed to consider, among other questions, whether there should be limits to the number of terms members of Congress can serve. It is an old question in American politics.

Critics argued during ratification debates that the Constitution would produce an alien and irresponsible governing class-a "government of strangers"because it did not provide for compulsory rotation of elective offices. Today interest in compulsory rotation has again become acute, again because of fear of a "professional political class."

Morris Fiorina, a professor at the California Institute of Technology, notes that during the 19th century, 40 to 50 per cent of congressional seats changed hands in each election. Not until the turn of the century did the average continuous service of congressmen reach even five years. But since World War II, nearly 90 per cent of incumbents seeking reelection have been successful. The number of "marginal" districts (where the winner receives 50 to 55 per cent of the votes) has declined. For example, in 1972 fewer than 25 per cent of incumbents received less than 60 per cent of the votes, and 90 per cent of all winners received more than 55 per cent.

According to Fiorina, the growth of the federal role in American life, and the attendant growth of bureaucracy, has enabled congressmen from formerly "marginal" districts to base their appeal on noncontroversial activities. These include delivering benefits from the "social pork barrel" and doing "casework”— nonpartisan constituent services, such as helping voters cope with regulatory agencies. Today, Fiorina says, congressmen are perceived less as legislators than as ombudsmen for dealing with Washington.

John Danforth (R-Mo.), a freshman senator and a director of the foundation, proposes a constitutional amendment to limit senators to two terms and congressmen to six. Today 32 of 100 senators (32 per cent) and 133 of 435 representatives (30.5 per cent) have been in office more than 12 years.

Such an amendment is a recipe for further reducing the power of the legislature relative to the "permanent government," the executive bureaucracy. It would prune deadwood, but also would prevent great legislative careers on the scale of Henry Clay's, Sam Rayburn's and Robert Taft's the sort of careers that give continuity, cohesion and energy to the legislature. Besides, a “fresh face" is by another name a "rookie," with a lot to learn in a town where there is a lot to know.

Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.), another freshman senator and a director of the foundation, favors compulsory rotation of offices in order to produce "citizenlegislators" who "come to government briefly, bringing their varied experiences to bear on current problems. . . ." But it is sentimental to think that the "varied experiences" of the average citizen can be usefully "brought to bear" on the most important complexities (strategic arms, welfare reform, capital formation) of public policy.

Reformers also should consider that compulsory rotation of offices might mean "citizen legislators" who are, increasingly, older and wealthier amateurs. That might not be bad, but it should be considered. If no one can hope to make a career of politics, people will be more apt to enter politics later, after establishing a "real" career, and after establishing it so well that he or she can take a sabbatical.

"Serving as a member of Congress should not be viewed as a profession," says Danforth, "and it should never become a career." Americans cling to the idea that government in a modern state can be an amateur's avocation. But in government, as in other serious enterprises, knowledge is cumulative. Government is as much a profession as law or teaching; it its a learned activity and an increasingly complicated one.

Politics in our time has been ennobled by the long careers of such senators as John Stennis, Hubert Humphrey and Henry Jackson. Granted, long service is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition of legislative greatness. Granted, greatness is rare, even among those who have long careers. But it should not be made impossible.

THE CASE FOR THE CITIZEN LEGISLATOR

(By Dennis DeConcini1)

With his usual flair and wit, George Will recently attacked a constitutional amendment introduced by Sen. John Danforth (R-Mo.) and me. The amendment, which would limit the number of terms representatives and senators could serve, was characterized by Will as the work of "rookies" who have “a lot to learn in a town where there is a lot to know."

Ostensibly, Will's comments addressed themselves to the practicalities of Washington politics. His point is that it takes a long time to find the secret hideaways in the Capitol and to learn to pull the levers of power. And in the absence of that knowledge (government "is a learned activity"), the bureauracy will overwhelm the legislature.

As a practical argument, Will's position is not compelling. The 22nd Amendment prevents an individual from holding the office of President for more than 10 years. I am sure Will would concede that the responsibilities of a President are equal to those of a senator or representative-he might even be tempted to argue they are greated. After all, we demand of our Presidents that within a matter of months they put together an administration, develop a national policy, deal with international crises, serve as party leader and assume all the responsibilities of head of state. If the consequences of limiting the terms of senators and representatives are dire, as Will suggests, surely we should insist that the 22nd Amendment be repealed; perhaps we should insist that Presidents serve three, four or even five terms.

The legislature is the bar of the people. It should be an elite group of professional decision-makers, removed by time, distance and experiences from the people it serves and represents. To Will, the notion of a “citizen legislator" may be corny and naive; to me, the growing reality of the "professional legislator" is frightening. It is yet another step away from the democratic ideal and another step toward rigid, unrepresentative institutions.

1 The writer is a Democratic senator from Arizona.