matters of civil rights, and breaches thereof are civil wrongs; and as only the property and civil rights in the Province are dealt with by the Act; and as "property and civil rights in the Province" are in the enumeration of the "exclusive powers of Provincial Legislatures; " I am of opinion that the Legislature of Ontario, in dealing with these matters in the Act in question, did not exceed their legislative powers. In Paul v. Virginia (8 Wall. U. S., S. C., 168), Held :

That a State Statute compelling a foreign Insurance Company to take out a license and make a deposit of bonds with the State Treasurer according to the amount of its capital, preliminary to transacting business in the State, is not in conflict with the clause of the Constitution of the United States which declares that Congress shall have power to "regulate commerce" with foreign nations and among the several States.

That Corporations are not citizens within the meaning of the clause which declares that "the citizen of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States," and that corporations created in one State have not even an absolute right of recognition in other States, but depend for the enforcement of their contracts upon the assent of those States.

Mr. Justice Field, in delivering the Judgment of the Court, said:

The Corporation being the mere creation of local law, can have no legal existence beyond the limits of the Sovereignty where created. As said by this Court in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, "It must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty." The recognition of its existence even by other States, and the enforcement of its contracts made therein, depend purely upon the comity of those States. Having no absolute right of recognition in other States, but depending for such recognition and enforcement of its contracts upon their assent, it follows, as a matter of course, that such assent may be granted upon such terms and conditions as those States may think proper to impose.

They may exclude the foreign corporation entirely, they may restrict its business to particular localities, or they may exact such security for the performance of its contracts with their citizens as in their judgment will best promote the public interest. The whole matter rests in their discretion.

In Ducat v. Chicago (10 Wall. U. S., S. C., 415), Held:

That a license granted by a State to a foreign Insurance Company,

on condition of the Company paying a tax of two per cent. on its premiums or gross receipts, was not in conflict with the Constitution of the United States.

Mr. Justice Nelson, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: "The power of the State to discriminate between her own domestic corporations and those of other States desirous of transacting business within her jurisdiction is clearly established; as to the nature or degree of discrimination, it belongs to the State to determine, subject only to such limitations on her sovereignty as may be found in the fundamental law of the Union." (Following the decision in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. U. S., S. C., 168.)

In Railroad Company v. Maryland (21 Wall. 456), Held:

That a stipulation in the charter of a Railroad Company, that the Company shall pay to the State a portion of its earnings, is not repugnant to the United States Constitution, it being, a contract by the Company, and different in principle from the imposition of a tax on the movement or transportation of goods or persons from one State to another.

In Howe Machine Co. v. Walker (35 U. C., Q. B., 39), Held:

That a foreign corporation has a right to make contracts and carry on business in the Province of Ontario.

(Richards, C. J., in delivering the Judgment of the Court, gave an elaborate review of the English and United States authorities.)

In Allison v. Robinson (3 Pugs. 103), the Supreme Court of New Brunswick held :

That a business transaction of a foreign Insurance Company was illegal and void, on the ground that it violated the Provincial Act (19 Vic. c. 45), which prohibits any foreign Insurance Company from doing business in the Province without first filing a certificate giving certain information, required by the Statute, as to their business affairs.

Chaudière Gold Mining Company & Desbarats et al. (17 L. C. J. 275),

Held:

That by the laws of the Province of Quebec all corporations are disqualified from acquiring Real Property without first obtaining the Royal or Legislative permission.

In Beard v. Steele (34 U. C., Q. B., 55), Held:

That the Ontario Statute, 33 Vict. c. 19, amending the law relating to bills of lading, and declaring the rights and liabilities of parties

under those instruments of traffic, was not an invasion of the jurisdiction of the Federal Parliament, which alone has the power to regulate trade and commerce.

In Attorney General v. The Niagara Falls Bridge Co. (20 Gr. Ch. 35), Held:

That the Provincial Attorney General, and not the Attorney General of the Dominion, is the proper party to file an information, when the complaint is not of an injury to property vested in the Crown, but relates to a violation of the rights of the public of Ontario, even if those rights are created by an Act of the Dominion Parliament.

That in the case of a public nuisance caused by an illegal obstruction of a railway, the Provincial Attorney General is the proper officer to prosecute in a Court of law.

In Kirtland v. Hotchkiss (100 U. S., S. C. 491), Held:

That the U. S. Constitution does not prohibit a State from taxing a resident citizen for debts held by him against a non-resident, evidenced by his bonds, payment whereof is secured by deeds of trust or mortgages upon real estate in another State.

The debt, although a species of intangible property, if not for all other purposes, may for the purposes of taxation be regarded as situated at the domicile of the creditor.

In Taylor v. Porter et al. (4 Hill 140), Held:

That the Legislature of the State of New York has no power to take private property for private uses. It has no power to take the property of A. and give it to B. either with or without making compensation.

The People v. Supervisors of Westchester (4 Barb. 64), Held:

That vested rights in property acquired by virtue of an Act of the Legislature of the State of New York, cannot be divested or destroyed by such Legislature, by a repeal or modification of the Act.

In The Lottawanna (21 Wall. 558), Held:

That the Congress of the United States, under the power to regulate commerce, has authority to establish a lien on vessels of the United States uniform throughout the whole country, in favor of persons furnishing supplies to vessels, but that the States, until Congress acts, may continue to legislate on the subject, though the contract to furnish the supplies, is a maritime contract, which can only be enforced by proceedings in rem in the District Courts of the United States.

In Church and Middlemiss (21 L. C. J. 319), S. C., Montreal, it was beld:

That the members of the Executive Council are not personally liable in warranty, to a purchaser, for having advised the execution of a deed. of sale by the Crown of certain real property which the Crown had no right to transfer. In theory of law, the judgment and decision upon every matter of State, is that of the Sovereign, though every minister is directly responsible to Parliament for his conduct in office, and for the advice he tenders to his Sovereign.

In Normand and La Compagnie de Navigation du St. Laurent, Held by the Q. B. on 7th March, 1879, reversing decision of the Superior Court, 4 Q. L. R., noted ante p. 143:

That the Provincial Governments have the right to grant letters patent for the use of riparian lots, provided that the use of such lots does not interfere with the navigation of the river, which is controlled by the Dominion authorities exclusively.

The text of the judgment is as follows:

Considering that among the powers conferred on the Governments of the several Provinces, by sect. 92 of B. N. A. Act, 1867, is that of administering and selling the public lands belonging to the Province, and that this right includes that of selling and disposing of the riparian lots of land which form part of the territorial domain of the Provinces ;

And Considering that the Government of the Province of Quebec has not exceeded its powers in granting to the appellant (Normand) the letters patent of the 1st September, 1873, and that there is error in the judgment rendered by the Superior Court at Three Rivers on the 16th February, 1878, which annulled and set aside the said letters. patent;

But Considering that the said letters patent conferred no right of a nature to diminish the advantages of using the River St. Maurice for the ends of navigation, the control of which navigation belongs to the Dominion Government exclusively;

And Considering that the appellant has no right to claim an indemnity from the Company respondent for the wintering of their vessels in that part of the River St. Maurice comprised in said letters patent;

Considering, moreover, that the said letters patent could not be set aside on the issue raised; that the appellant has not proved having suffered damages from the acts of the respondents, and that there is

no error in that part of the judgment appealed from, the Court, reforming the said judgment, quashes and annuls that part of the said judgment which sets aside the said letters patent, and confirms the judgment as to the remainder.

In Pound v. Turck (95 U. S., S. C., 793), where it was held that in the absence of Federal legislation bearing on the case, a Statute of a State which authorizes the erection of a dam across a navigable river, which is wholly within her limits, is not unconstitutional, Mr. Justice Miller, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said:

The principle established by the decisions to which we have referred, is, that in regard to the powers conferred by the Commerce clause of the Constitution, there are some, which from their essential nature are exclusive in Congress, and which the States can exercise under no circumstances, while there are others, which from their nature may be exercised by the States until Congress shall see proper to cover the same ground by such legislation as that body may deem appropriate to the subject.

14. The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization. of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and of Criminal Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts.

In Langlois v. Valin (3 Can. S. C., p. 1), it was held by the Supreme Court of Canada:

That the exclusive power of legislation given to Provincial Legislatures by sub-sec. 14 of sec. 92 B. N. A. Act over procedure in civil matters, means procedure in civil matters within the powers of the Provincial Legislatures, and does not extend to the regulation of the procedure in controverted elections or bankruptcy, which belongs to the Federal Parliament.

In Re Niagara Election case (29 U. C., Q. B., 279), Gwynne, J., in delivering judgment, said:

"These words (procedure in Civil matters in those Courts) plainly apply, as it appears to me, to the procedure in those civil matters over which the preceding paragraph (the 13th) gave to the Provincial Legislature exclusive control, namely, property and civil rights in the Province,' and do not affect the procedure in the case before us, which, being a matter over which the Provincial Legislature has no jurisdiction, it could not assume to prescribe a procedure relating thereto."