and by a distance too great to enable the two parts to support each other, shot either be attacked by the masses of the enemy while the other is held in check.

I should perhaps have dwelt more decidedly on the fact that the force left ne Sangster's must be allowed to remain somewhere on that side of the Occoquan un the decisive battle is over, so as to cover our retreat in the event of disaster, unless should be decided to select and intrench a new base somewhere near Dumfries, a ps ceeding involving much time.

After the passage of the Occoquan by the main army, this covering force could drawn into a more central and less exposed position-say Brimstone Hill or nea the Occoquan. In this latitude the weather will for a considerable period be ve uncertain, and a movement commenced in force on roads in tolerably firm cond ti will be liable, almost certain, to be much delayed by rains and snow. It will the fore be next to impossible to surprise the enemy or take him at a disadvantage rapid maneuvers. Our slow progress will enable him to divine our purposes and ta his measures accordingly. The probability is, from the best information we posse that the enemy has improved the roads leading to his lines of defense, while we have to work as we advance.

Bearing in mind what has been said, and the present unprecedented and impas ble condition of the roads, it will be evident that no precise period can be fixed up for the movement on this line, nor can its duration be closely calculated; it see certain that many weeks may elapse before it is possible to commence the mar Assuming the success of this operation, and the defeat of the enemy as certain, t question at once arises as to the importance of the results gained. I think these sults would be confined to the possession of the field of battle, the evacuation of t line of the Upper Potomac by the enemy, and the moral effect of the victory-imports results, it is true, but not decisive of the war, nor securing the destruction of the enem main army; for he could fall back upon other positions and fight us again and aga should the condition of his troops permit. If he is in no condition to fight us ag out of the range of the intrenchments at Richmond, we would find it a very diffic and tedious matter to follow him up there, for he would destroy his railroad brid, and otherwise impede our progress through a region where the roads are as ba they well can be, and we would probably find ourselves forced at last to change whole theater of war, or to seek a shorter land route to Richmond, with a smai available force, and at an expenditure of much more time than were we to adopt short line at once. We would also have forced the enemy to concentrate his for and perfect his defensive measures at the very points where it is desirable to str. him when least prepared.

II. The second base of operations available for the Army of the Potomac is that the Lower Chesapeake Bay, which affords the shortest possible land route to R mond, and strikes directly at the heart of the enemy's power in the east.

The roads in that region are passable at all seasons of the year. The country no alluded to is much more favorable for offensive operations than that in front of W ington (which is very unfavorable), much more level, more cleared land, the woo less dense, the soil more sandy, and the spring some two or three weeks earlier. movement in force on that line obliges the enemy to abandon his intrenched posit: at Manassas, in order to hasten to cover Richmond and Norfolk. He must do tì: for should he permit us to occupy Richmond; his destruction can be averted only entirely defeating us in battle, in which he must be the assailant. This movem if successful, gives us the capital, the communications, the supplies of the re Norfolk would fall, all the waters of the Chesapeake would be ours, all Virgi would be in our power, and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee and North Car lina. The alternative presented to the enemy would be to beat us in a position lected by ourselves, disperse, or pass beneath the Caudine Forks.

Should we be beaten in battle, we have a perfectly secure retreat down the Peri sula upon Fort Monroe, with our flanks perfectly covered by the fleet. During t whole movement our left flank is covered by the water. Our right is secure, for t reason that the enemy is too distant to reach us in time. He can only oppose us front. We bring our fleet into full play.

After a successful battle our position would be: Burnside forming our left, Norfo held securely; our center connecting Burnside with Buell, both by Raleigh 11 Lynchburg; Buell in Eastern Tennessee and North Alabama; Halleck at Nashvi and Memphis. The next movement would be to connect with Sherman on the l by reducing Wilmington and Charleston; to advance our center into South Caroli and Georgia; to push Buell either towards Montgomery or to unite with the ma army in Georgia; to throw Halleck southward to meet the naval expedition from N Orleans. We should then be in a condition to reduce at our leisure all the Southe sea ports; to occupy all the avenues of communication; to nse the great outlet of: Mississippi; to re-establish our Government and arms in Arkansas, Louisiana, a Texas; to force the slaves to labor for our subsistence instead of that of the rebe to bid defiance to all foreign interference. Such is the object I have ever had view; this is the general plan which I hope to accomplish.

For many long months I have labored to prepare the Army of the Potomac to play part in the programme. From the day when I was placed in command of all our azies I have exerted myself to place all the other armies in such a condition that (ev, too, could perform their allotted duties.

Should it be determined to operate from the Lower Chesapeake, the point of landar which promises the most brilliant result is Urbana, on the Lower Rappahannock. as point is easily reached by vessels of heavy draught; it is neither occupied nor obed by the enemy; it is but one march from West Point, the key of that region, and thence but two marches to Richmond. A rapid movement from Urbana would rcbably cut off Magruder in the Peninsula, and enable us to occupy Richmond before could be strongly re-enforced. Should we fail in that, we could, with the co-operaof the Navy, cross the James and throw ourselves in the rear of Richmond, forcing the enemy to come out and attack us, for his position would be untenable ch as on the southern bank of the river. Should circumstances render it not adsable to land at Urbana, we can use Mob Jack Bay; or, the worst coming to the wed, we can take Fort Monroe as a base, and operate with complete security, bough with less celerity and brilliancy of results, up the Peninsula. To reach whatever point may be selected as a base a large amount of cheap water Pasportation must be collected, consisting mainly of canal-boats, barges, wood boats, awners, &c., towed by small steamers, all of a very different character from those ured for all previous expeditions. This can certainly be accomplished within rty days from the time the order is given. I propose, as the best possible plan that in my judgment, be adopted, to select Urbana as a landing place for the first tachments; to transport by water four divisions of infantry with their batteries, e regular infantry, a few wagons, one bridge train, and a few squadrons of cavalry, taking the vicinity of Hooker's position the place of embarkation for as many as ible; to move the regular cavalry and reserve artillery, the remaining bridge Lains and wagons, to a point somewhere near Cape Lookout; then ferry them over enver by means of North River ferry-boats, march them over to the Rappahannock wering the movement by an infantry force near Heathsville), and to cross the pahannock in a similar way. The expense and difficulty of the movement will be very much diminished (a saving of transportation of about 10,000 horses), the result none the less certain.

The concentration of the cavalry, &c., on the lower counties of Maryland can be erted without exciting suspicion, and the movement made without delay from that

This movement, if adopted, will not at all expose the city of Washington to danger. The total force to be thrown upon the new line would be, according to circumstances, om 110,000 to 140,000. I hope to use the latter number by bringing fresh troops into Washington, and still leaving it quite safe. I fully realize that in all projects offered will probably be the most valuable consideration. It is my decided opinion that, that point of view, the second plan should be adopted. It is possible, nay, highly rable, that the weather and state of the roads may be such as to delay the direct move* from Washington, with its unsatisfactory results and great risks, far beyond the required to complete the second plan. In the first case we can fix no definite time a advance. The roads have gone from bad to worse. Nothing like their present uition was ever known here before; they are impassable at present. We are enre at the mercy of the weather. It is by no means certain that we can beat them Manassas. On the other line I regard success as certain by all the chances of war. demoralize the enemy by forcing him to abandon his prepared position for one ich we have chosen, in which all is in our favor, and where success must produce

sense results.

My judgment as a general is clearly in favor of this project. Nothing is certain in , but all the chances are in favor of this movement. So much am I in favor of Leathern line of operations, that I would prefer the move from Fortress Monroe a base as a certain though less brilliant movement than that from Urbana to an tack upon Manassas.

I know that his excellency the President, you, and I all agree in our wishes, and at these wishes are to bring this war to a close as promptly as the means in our sion will permit. I believe that the mass of the people have entire confidence I am sure of it. Let us then look only to the great result to be accomplished al disregard everything else.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

GÉO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

This letter must have produced some effect upon the mind of the President, since the execution of his order was not required, although I was not revoked as formally as it had been issued. Many verbal

conferences ensued, in which, among other things, it was determine to collect as many canal-boats as possible, with a view to employ the largely in the transportation of the army to the Lower Chesapeak The idea was at one time entertained by the President to use them i forming a bridge across the Potomac near Liverpool Point, in order throw the army over at that point; but this was subsequently aba doned. It was also found by experience that it would require muc time to prepare the canal-boats for use in transportation to the exter that had been anticipated.

Finally, on the 27th of February, 1862, the Secretary of War, by th authority of the President, instructed Mr. John Tucker, Assistant Secr tary of War, to procure at once the necessary steamers and sailing cra to transport the Army of the Potomac to its new field of operations. The following extract from the report of Mr. Tucker, dated April will show the nature and progress of this well-executed service:

I was called to Washington by telegraph on 17th January last by Assistant Sect tary of War Thomas A. Scott. I was informed that Major-General McClellan wish to see me. From him I learned that he desired to know if transportation on smoo water could be obtained to move at one time, for a short distance, about 50,000 troop 10,000 horses, 1,000 wagons, 13 batteries, and the usual equipment of such an ar He frankly stated to me that he had always supposed such a movement entirely in ible until two experienced quartermasters had recently reported it impracticable their judgment. A few days afterwards I reported to General McClellan that I w entirely confident the transports could be commanded, and stated the mode by whi his object could be accomplished. A week or two afterwards I had the honor of interview with the President and General McClellan, when the subject was furth discussed, and especially as to the time required.

I expressed the opinion that as the moveinent of the horses and wagons would ha to be made chiefly by schooners and barges; that as each schooner would require be properly fitted for the protection of the horses and furnished with a supply water and forage, and each transport for the troops provided with water, I did r deem it prudent to assume that such an expedition could start within thirty da from the time the order was given.

The President and General McClellan both urgently stated the vast importance an earlier movement. I replied that if favorable winds prevailed, and there was gre dispatch in loading, the time might be materially diminished.

On the 14th of February you (Secretary of War) advertised for transports of vario descriptions, inviting bids. On the 27th February I was informed that the propos movement by water was decided upon. That evening the Quartermaster-Gene was informed of the decision. Directions were given to secure the transportat and any assistance was tendered. He promptly detailed to this duty two most e cient assistants in his department. Col. Rufus Ingalls was stationed at Annapo where it was then proposed to embark the troops, and Capt. Henry C. Hodges is directed to meet me in Philadelphia, to attend to chartering the vessels. With the arrangements I left Washington on the 28th February.

*

I beg to hand herewith a statement, prepared by Captain Hodges, of the vess chartered, which exhibits the prices paid and parties from whom they were taken : 113 steamers, at an average price per day. 188 schooners, at an average price per day. 88 barges, at an average price per day..

....

$215

24

14

In thirty-seven days from the time I received the order in Washington (and most it was accomplished in thirty days) these vessels transported from Perryville, A andria, and Washington to Fort Monroe (the place of departure having been chang which caused delay) 121,500 men, 14,592 animals, 1,150 wagons, 44 batteries, 74 am lances, besides pontoon bridges, telegraph materials, and the enormous quantity equipage, &c., required for an army of such magnitude. The only loss of whic have heard is eight mules and nine barges, which latter went ashore in a gale wil a few miles of Fort Monroe, the cargoes being saved. With this trifling exception the slightest accident has occurred, to my knowledge.

I respectfully but confidently submit that, for economy and celerity of moveme this expedition is without a parallel on record.

*

JOHN TUCKER, Assistant Secretary of War

In the mean time the destruction of the batteries on the Lower Potoae, by erossing our troops opposite them, was considered, and prepaations were even made for throwing Hooker's division across the river, carry them by assault. Finally, however, after an adverse report en Brig. Gen. J. G. Barnard, chief engineer, given below, who made reconnaissance of the positions, and in view of the fact that it was all out of the power of the Navy Department to furnish suitable vesrls to co-operate with land troops, this plan was abandoned as impracable. A close examination of the enemy's works and their approaches, ade after they were evacuated, showed that the decision was a wise The only means, therefore, of accomplishing the capture of these rks, so much desired by the President, was by a movement by land, om the left of our lines, on the right bank of the Potomac-a moveLt obviously unwise.

The attention of the Navy Department, as early as August 12, 1861, ad been called to the necessity of maintaining a strong force of effient war vessels on the Potomac :

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE POTOMAC,
Washington, August 12, 1861.

R: I have to-day received additional information which convinces me that it is re than probable that the enemy will, within a very short time, attempt to throw *«pectable force from the mouth of Aquia Creek into Maryland. This attempt will bly be preceded by the erection of batteries at Mathias and White House Points. aa movement on the part of the enemy, in connection with others probably de, would place Washington in great jeopardy. I most earnestly urge that the gest possible naval force be at once concentrated near the mouth of Aquia Creek, That the most vigilant watch be maintained day and night, so as to render such age of the river absolutely impossible.

ommend that the Minnesota and any other vessels available from Hampton is be at once ordered up there, and that a great quantity of coal be sent to that ty, sufficient for several weeks' supply. At least one strong war vessel should art at Alexandria, and I again urge the concentration of a strong naval force on tomac without delay.

Naval Department will render it absolutely impossible for the enemy to cross river below Washington, the security of the capital will be greatly increased. i annot too earnestly urge an immediate compliance with these requests. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

H.1. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the United States Navy.

It was on the 27th of September, 1861, that General Barnard, chief neer, in company with Captain Wyman, of the Potomac flotilla, been instructed to make a reconnaissance of the enemy's batteries far as Mathias Point. In his report of his observations he says: Batteries at High Point and Cockpit Point, and thence down to Chopawamsic, be prevented. We may, indeed, prevent their construction on certain points, 1 bng here somewhere the enemy can establish, in spite of us, as many batteries chooses. What is the remedy? Favorable circumstances, not to be anticipated rade the basis of any calculations, might justify and render successful the attack a particular battery. To suppose that we can capture all, and by mere attacks of ad prevent the navigation being molested, is very much the same as to suppose the hostile army in our own front can prevent us building and maintaining field > to protect Arlington and Alexandria by capturing them, one and all, as fast as are built.

In another communication upon the subject of crossing troops for the rpose of destroying the batteries on the Virginia side of the Potomac heral Barnard says:

The operation involves the forcing of a very strong line of defense of the enemy All that we would have to do if we were really opening a campaign against them

It is true we hope to force this line by turning it, by landing on Freestone Pois With reason to believe that this may be successful, it cannot be denied that it invol a risk of failure. Should we, then, considering all the consequences which may involved, enter into the operation merely to capture the Potomac batteries? I thi not. Will not the Ericsson, assisted by one other gunboat capable of keeping alog side these batteries, so far control their fire as to keep the navigation sufficiently fi as long as we require it? Captain Wyman says yes.

It was the opinion of competent naval officers, and I concur wi them, that had an adequate force of strong and well-armed vesse been acting on the Potomac from the beginning of August, it wou have been next to impossible for the rebels to have constructed or mai tained batteries upon the banks of the river. The enemy never occupi Mathias Point nor any other point on the river which was out of su porting distance from their main army.

The

When the enemy commenced the construction of these batteries £ Army of the Potomac was not in a condition to prevent it. destruction by our army would have afforded but a temporary reli unless we had been strong enough to hold the entire line of the Pot mac. This could be done either by driving the enemy from Manass and Aquia Creek by main force or by maneuvering to compel them evacuate their positions. The latter course was finally pursued, a with success.

About the 20th of February, 1862, additional measures were tak to secure the reopening of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. The p liminary operations of General Lander for this object are elsewhe described.

I had often observed to the President and to members of the Cabin that the reconstruction of this railway could not be undertaken un we were in a condition to fight a battle to secure it. I regarded t possession of Winchester and Strasburg as necessary to cover the ra way in the rear, and it was not until the month of February that I fi prepared to accomplish this very desirable but not vital purpose.

The whole of Banks' division and two brigades of Sedgwick's div ion were thrown across the river at Harper's Ferry, leaving one briga of Sedgwick's division to observe and guard the Potomac from Gre Falls to the mouth of the Monocacy. A sufficient number of troops all arms were held in readiness in the vicinity of Washington, either march via Leesburg or to move by rail to Harper's Ferry, should th become necessary in carrying out the objects in view.

The subjoined notes from a communication subsequently address to the War Department will sufficiently explain the conduct of the operations:

NOTES.

When I started for Harper's Ferry I plainly stated to the President and Secreta of War that the chief object of the operation would be to open the Baltimore a Ohio Railroad by crossing the river in force at Harper's Ferry; that I had collect the material for making a permanent bridge by means of canal-boats; that from t nature of the river it was doubtful whether such a bridge could be constructed; th if it could not, I would at least occupy the ground in front of Harper's Ferry, in ord to cover the rebuilding of the railroad bridge, and finally, when the communicatio were perfectly secure, move on Winchester.

When I arrived at the place I found the batteau bridge nearly completed; the hol ing ground proved better than had been anticipated; the weather was favorable, the being no wind. I at once crossed over the two brigades which had arrived, and t steps to hurry up the other two, belonging respectively to Banks' and Sedgwic divisions. The difficulty of crossing supplies had not then become apparent. night I telegraphed for a regiment of regular cavalry and four batteries of hea artillery to come up the next day (Thursday), besides directing Keyes' division infantry to be moved up on Friday.

TL