the fort; sending in two different summonses, which were declined; then soliciting and obtaining a personal interview with Campbell; at which the latter "allowed himself to be convinced" that it was useless to hold out, and ingloriously gave up, just 30 minutes prior to the arrival of the 18th Michigan and 102d Ohio to rëenforce him; compelling them also to succumb, after a sharp contest. Forrest now raided north to Pulaski, destroying the railroad and capturing a fortified post by the way; skirmishing heavily all day' at Pulaski; but Gen. Rousseau was here, and had hastily collected such a force that an assault would have been madness; so Forrest drew off eastward and struck the Chattanooga railroad near Tullahoma and Decherd, doing it some damage; but Rousseau had moved rapidly around by rail through Nashville, and again confronted him at Tullahoma; while Gen. Steedman, leading 5,000 men, crossed the Tennessee from northern Georgia, and advanced upon him from the south-west; Morgan's division of the 14th corps moving simultaneously from Atlanta to cooperate in enveloping and crushing him. 1,500 infantry, was steaming up the Tennessee to join in the hunt; and Lt.-Com'r Forrest, with several gunboats, was patroling that river in Alabama, on the lookout for his reappearance hurrying southward. Buford tried to carry Athens, Ala.; which was firmly held by Lt.Col. Slade, 73d Indiana, who repulsed him handsomely; when he drew off westward and escaped' over the Tennessee at Brown's ferry. Forrest had now enemies enough encircling him to have eaten all his horses; but, destroying five miles of the railroad, and paroling his prisoners, he sped south-west through Mount Pleasant and Lawrenceburg, and got safely across the Tennessee at Bainbridge; having inflicted much injury, kept busy many times his number of men, worn out a good many of our shoes, taken at least 1,000 prisoners, and escaped with very little loss. Hood, who had meantime been operating, and continued for a fortnight longer to operate, on Sherman's line of communications nearly up to Chattanooga, and had thence moved westward, as we have seen, into northern Alabama, next demonstrated' in considerable force against Decatur-being the point at which the railroads cross the Tennessee which tend eastward to Chattanooga, westward to Memphis, and northward to Nashville. He found here Gen. Gordon Granger, with a considerable force, which he pressed for several days; establishing a line of rifle-pits within 500 yards of the defenses; intrenching strongly, and threatening an assault; but using no guns, and being roughly handled in Sept. 29. "Oct. 5. Oct. 2-3. 'Oct. 3. Oct. 26. All in vain. Forrest turned on his track, and pushed south-east to Fayetteville; there dividing his forces and sending Buford, with 4,000 men, to summon Huntsville, and then Athens, Ala.; while he, with 3,000, swept north-west to Columbia; threatening that place, but not assaulting it; for by this time Rousseau, with 4,000 mounted men, was coming after him from Nashville; while Gen. C. C. Washburne, with 3,000 cavalry and 'Gen. Thomas's official report. 'Sept. 27. FORREST ASSAILS JOHNSONVILLE, TENN. 679 a sortie,' wherein a part of the garri- | below-was about to follow his vanson gained the rear of the rifle-pits guard across the Tennessee--Gen. on his left; clearing them and taking Thomas directed a concentration of 120 prisoners. On that day, one of the 4th and 23d corps on Pulaski, the batteries on his right was carried with intent to impede rather than and spiked by Col. Morgan's 14th seriously dispute the Rebel advance U. S. colored, with some loss; and on Nashville. Hood's infantry, ache drew off westward next evening. cording to our best advices, now exceeded 40,000; his cavalry were 12,000, well equipped, in high spirits, under their boldest and most skillful leader; so that, including artillery, the entire Rebel force, well concentrated, was not far from 55,000 men. Many of these were Tennesseans and Kentuckians, long exiled, who had come home to stay, alive or dead. To oppose these, Thomas had in hand the 4th corps, Gen. Stanley, 12,000; the 23d, Gen. Schofield, 10,000; and 8,000 cavalry, under Hatcher, Croxton, and Capron—in all 30,000 men. He may have had as many more, scattered over the wide region under his command; but, to concentrate these, he must abandon such posts as Chattanooga, Stevenson, Huntsville, Decatur, Athens, &c., and in effect relinquish more to the enemy than they could hope to win by a victory. He knew that time was on his side-that, if he fell back to Nashville, showing a firm front that would compel Hood to keep his army together, our strength would be constantly augmenting, while the enemy must be steadily weakened. There was a more brilliant alternative, but he chose to be safe. The pressure on Decatur was a feint to cover his crossing farther west; which was soon effected near Florence, in spite of resistance by Gen. Croxton's brigade of cavalry, there picketing the river. Meantime, Forrest, moving eastward from Corinth, Miss., through Paris, Tenn., with 17 regiments of cavalry and 9 guns, had struck the Tennessee at Johnsonville, an important dépôt connected by railroad with Nashville, and a chief reliance of that city for supplies; defended by Col. C. R. Thompson, 12th U. S. colored, with 1,000 men, aided by Lt. E. M. King with three gunboats; and several days' "sharp fighting ensued; the enemy ultimately drawing off, upon the approach by rail of Gen. Schofield with his 23d corps from Nashville; but not till-our mariners having been worsted in a fight with Forrest's cavalry-our commanders had fired their gunboats and transports, lest they should fall into the enemy's hands; and the flames had extended to the stores on the levee and the commissary's and quartermaster's dépôts, involving a loss of $1,500,000 worth of provisions, &c., just when they could worst be spared. Gen. Thomas reports this destruction needless and unjustifiable. It being no longer doubtful that Hood-who had been rëenforced by part of Dick Taylor's army from 9 Oct. 28. While Sherman remained near Kingston, Ga., menacing his flank and rear, Hood seemed to linger on the Tennessee; possibly deeming the odds against him too great; perhaps not yet fully provided and equipped 10 Oct. 28-Nov. 5. for his great venture. At length, a dispatch from Sherman" apprised Thomas that the former had cut loose from his base and started southward from Atlanta on his Great March; and no sooner had the tidings reached Hood, still at Florence, Ala., where he had a pontoon bridge, with part of his force on either side of the river, than the crossing of his remaining corps commenced;" while his van, already over, moved through Waynesboro' and Lawrenceburg on Nashville." Hood's army was organized in three corps, under Maj.-Gen. B. F. Cheatham, Lt.-Gens. A. P. Stewart and S. D. Lee, beside his strong cavalry corps under Forrest. Each corps was composed of three divisions: Maj.-Gens. Cleburne, Loring, Bate, E. Johnson, and Buford, being the best known of their commanders. Thomas had but five divisions of infantry at the front; but he had collected several more before the struggle was brought to a final issue. Gen. Schofield, at Pulaski, now fell back, by order, on Columbia; where his corps was concentrated," as was most of Stanley's; while Gen. Granger withdrew the garrisons from Athens (Ala.), Decatur, and Huntsville, retiring on Stevenson. The force left at Johnsonville now evacuated that post, withdrawing to Clarksville. Stanley to follow his trains to Spring Hill; where he arrived just in time to save them from Forrest's cavalry, which was close upon them, but which he drove off; being assailed, soon afterward, by a much stronger force, including infantry, with which he fought till dark; barely holding the road whereby Schofield must make good his retreat. Schofield, with Ruger's division, had been kept awake all day by the enemy's efforts to cross Duck river at Columbia; repulsing, with heavy loss to them, their repeated attempts to do so. When night fell, he resumed his movement; brushing aside the Rebel cavalry who infested the road, and finding at Spring Hill the enemy bivouacking within half a mile of his line of retreat. He did not choose to have any difficulty with them just then; but pushed on with his entire command; and, after fighting all day and marching 25 miles during the following night, he got into position at FRANKLIN early on the 30th. His cavalry moving on the Lewisburg pike, several miles eastward, had encountered no enemy. Time being absolutely required to save our trains, which choked the road for many miles, Schofield halted on the southern verge of the village, threw up a slight breastwork, and proposed to stop, while his train should be got over the Harpeth and fairly on its way to Nashville. When the enemy appeared before Columbia, declining to assault, but evincing a purpose to cross Duck Franklin is situated in a bend of river above or below, Gen. Schofield the Harpeth, which here rudely dewithdrew" across that stream; and scribes the north and east sides of a on learning that the Rebels had cross-square, which was completed by our ed six miles above, directed Gen. lines of defense. These were held "Dated Cartersville, Ga., Nov. 12. 12 Nov. 17. advance a week or ten days longer, I would have been ready to meet him at some point south "Thomas says: "Had the enemy delayed his of Duck river." 14 Nov. 24. "Nov. 27-8. 19 D 4THA.C HOOD ATTACKS SCHOFIELD AT FRANKLIN. MAJ.GEN. 238 A.C. 4.30 PM. SCHOFIELD UNION) Div. 23 A.C. HARPETH RIVER 3 Div. 4THA.C FORT GRANGER by two divisions of his own and all three of the 4th (Stanley's) corps-the whole reported at 17,000, and certainly not much exceeding that number. As the ground rises from the stream, the position was of little worth, save as its flanks were protected by the river." Hood's army, arriving later, was not ready for the onset till 4 P. M.; when, at the word of command, the charging lines swept on. Hood had delayed the attack till all his forces could be brought up; intending to crush in our front at the first onset by the sheer weight of his assault. Stewart's corps was on his right, next the Harpeth; Cheatham's 681 on his left, reaching westward to the angle of our defenses; Lee in reserve behind them; though Johnson's division of Lee's corps was thrown to the left during the engagement; the cavalry was on both flanks; Forrest, with most of it, on the right. "Break those lines," shouted Hood to his men, "and there is nothing more to withstand you this side of the Ohio river!" Many Tennesseeans were now for the first time in weary months within sight of their homes; one General (Carter) fell mortally wounded within a few rods of his own house. Gen. Schofield watched the progress of the battle from Fort Granger, across the Harpeth. 16 Gen. Hood, in a personal reminiscence of this conflict, fairly said: "The works of the enemy were so hastily constructed that, while he had a slight abatis in front of a part of his line, there was none on his extreme right." Yet, slight as they were, these defenses were of incalculable value. A veteran who fought Of these, two Though Schofield's command numbered nearly if not quite 20,000 men, a good part of it was already across the river, guarding the trains and our left flank, while two divisions held the lines guarding our right; so that all the force directly confronting the Rebel advance hardly numbered 10,000. brigades of the 2d (Wagner's) division of the 4th (Stanley's) corps were thrown out in our front, holding some slight works a few hundred yards in advance of our general line; the key of which was Carter's hill, a gentle eminence, across which ran the Columbia pike through Franklin to Nashville. Behind that hill stood the 1st (Opdycke's) brigade of Wood's 2d division in reserve. The Rebel charge was so imbehind them said, "Such a line at the Chickamauga would have given us a victory." "T is sad that, after all we have spent on West Point, we should have had to learn this simple lesson at a cost of 200,000 lives and Two Billions of money. The Turks had mastered it when they last defended Silistria against the Russians, years ago. petuous, as well as so heavy, that it was scarcely checked by the advanced works held too long by the two brigades aforesaid, but swept over them like a torrent, hurling back our men in tumultuous rout, taking many prisoners, and driving the residue right through the center of our main line, which not merely opened to receive them, but kept widening after they had rushed past. In an instant, the wings next that pike of the 2d and 3d divisions of the 23d (Cox's) corps recoiled before the enemy's charge; the hill was lost, 8 of our guns taken, and the Rebel flag planted in triumph on our breastworks, as the exulting victors, having passed over them, hastily formed on the inside, intending to follow up their triumph. Caissons as well as men streamed wildly to the bridges, sup posing the day utterly lost and nothing left to do but save from the wreck as much as possible. "First brigade! forward to the works!" rang out the steady voice of Opdycke, as the rabble rout swept by; he riding rapidly forward as the bayonets of his men came down to a charge, flashing back the rays of the setting sun. Swiftly, steadily, grandly, that brigade rushed upon the foe; a brief but bloody struggle ensued; and at its close no Rebel remained upon or inside of the works but the dead and wounded, with 300 prison. ers. and here they remained till the last shot was fired that night. Our defenses had been regained as much by surprise as by valor-the enemy not expecting a countercharge they must now be held by valor alone. Exasperated rather than disconcerted, Hood threw heavy masses against the lost breastworks, hoping to retake them before they could be adequately manned; while Opdycke, first exhausting all the shots in his revolver, employed it as a club to drive up stragglers to the help of his heroic brigade; and, when he had broken the pistol, he dismounted and borrowed a musket, which he found even more efficient in the work of persuasion; driving skulkers out of the reserve fort in which they had sought and found comparative safety." Of course, his efforts and those of his men were nobly supported by others—there being ample scope and work for all. The battle raged fiercely till 10 p. M.; the enemy shifting gradually to our right and attacking on the flank; where they were more especially confronted and repelled by Stanley's 1st division, Gen. Nathan Kimball. But our lines were never again broken: assault after assault being repulsed with great loss to the assailants and smaller to the defenders; until the enemy desisted; and then, a little after midnight-our trains being by this time well on their way 10-our men quietly drew out of their defenses, and followed; until, about noon, our weary, sleepless heroes were safe within the defenses of Nashville. was done entirely on his own judgment), the promptness and readiness with which he brought his command into action at the critical and decisive moment, and the signal personal gallantry he displayed in a counter assault on the enemy, when he had broken our lines, disaster instead of victory would have fallen on us at Franklin.” Our guns were recovered; Rebel battle-flags taken; our line was restored, and Opdycke's headquarters established here on the pike; 17 An official recommendation to promotion, indorsed by Gen. Thomas, thus testifies: "At the battle of Franklin, Opdycke [formerly Col. 125th Ohio] displayed the very highest qualities as a commander. It is not saying too much to declare that, but for the skillful dispositions made by Gen. Opdycke (all of which |