STONEMAN'S DISASTROUS RAID TO MACON. 633 loss was 3,722, of whom perhaps 1,000 | army; taking 250 prisoners, killing were prisoners. Gen. Logan counted 800 mules, and bringing away othon the battle-field 2,200 Rebel dead, ers; thence striking, at Lovejoy's, at and estimates that there were 1,000 the time appointed, the Macon railmore not within our lines or who road, and tearing it up; but meeting otherwise escaped observation. We no Stoneman, and getting no news of took 1,000 prisoners, beside the many him. He thence pushed south-west wounded who fell into our hands; to Newnan, on the West Point road; and Gen. Sherman estimates that where he was confronted by infantry Hood's total loss this day can not coming from Mississippi to aid in the have been fewer than 8,000. Among defense of Atlanta, while the Rebel his killed was Maj.-Gen. W. H. T. cavalry were hard on his heels: so Walker, of Georgia. Gen. Garrard, he was forced to fight against odds, with his cavalry, returned from Co- compelled to drop his prisoners, and vington next day; having broken make his way out as he could, with up the railroad, destroyed a train of a loss of 500 men, including Col. cars, with much other property, and Harrison, captured. He reached Mabringing in 200 prisoners, with a to- rietta without further loss. tal loss of two men. Hood was not inclined to force the fighting directly thereafter; and Sherman, while quietly preparing for a new movement by the right, dispatched his now augmented cavalry on a raid against the railroads in Hood's rear. Stoneman, with his own and Garrard's divisions, 5,000 strong, was to move by the left around Atlanta to McDonough; while A. D. McCook, with his own and Rousseau's (now Harrison's) freshly arrived divisions, numbering 4,000, was to move by the right to Fayetteville, thence coming up the road and joining Stoneman at a designated point near Lovejoy's. Such cöoperative movements rarely succeed, and almost never in the hands of second and third-rate leaders. McCook moved down the west bank of the Chattahoochee to Rivertown, crossed on a pontoon, and tore up the West Point railroad near Palmetto station; thence pushing on to Fayetteville, where he captured and burnt 500 wagons belonging to Hood's Stoneman's luck-that is, his management-was far worse. He failed to meet McCook as directed, and divided the force he had; sending Gen. Garrard to Flat Rock to cover his own movement to McDonough. Garrard, after lingering some days, and skirmishing heavily with Wheeler's cavalry, hearing nothing from Stoneman, made his way back, with little loss, to our left. Stoneman started with a magnificent project, to which he had, at the last moment, obtained Sherman's assent. He purposed to sweep down the road to Macon, capture that city, pushing thence by the right to Andersonville, where many thousands of of our captured soldiers were suffering inconceivable privations, liberate and, so far as possible, arm them, and then move with them to our lines in such direction as should seem advisable. The conception was a bold yet not necessarily a bad one; but it needed a Sheridan instead of a Stoneman to execute it. Sherman's assent to it was based on his orders that the two bodies of horse should be concentrated at Lovejoy's, and Wheeler defeated or chased off by their superior force; but, this failing, Wheeler was too strong for either division, and the scheme became chimerical. Stoneman, with his segment of the raiding force, struck out eastward to Covington; thence moving down the east side of the Ocmulgee, breaking up roads and burning bridges, without even attempting to keep his tryst with McCook at Lovejoy's. When at length he appeared before Macon, he had not more than 3,000 men; and, being confronted with spirit by a hastily collected Rebel force under Iverson, he was unable even to cross the river; but, abandoning all idea of reaching Andersonville, turned on his trail, pursued by Iverson. Now he consented to a still further dispersion of his force-the three brigades composing it attempting to escape separately. That led by Col. Adams reached Sherman nearly unharmed; that under Col. Capron was surprised by the way, charged and dispersed: those who escaped generally straggling into camp before Atlanta on foot and disarmed; while that with which Stoneman attempted to maintain some show of resistance was soon surrounded by Iverson, and Stoneman induced, by an imposing pretense of superior force, to surrender at discretion-he having 1,000 men left, and Iverson at hand only some 500. Stoneman, it was reported, cried when he discovered how he had been duped; but his sorrow subserved no good purpose. He had, by incapacity, imbecility, and disobedience of orders, squandered a full third of Sherman's cavalry. 27 July 27. Gen. Howard succeeded," by the President's order, to the command of the Army of the Tennessee; whereupon, Gen. Hooker, considering himself disparaged, was relieved, at his own request, from the command of his corps, which was given to Gen. Slocum. Gen. Palmer was soon relieved from the command of the 14th corps by Gen. Jeff. C. Davis. Gen. D. S. Stanley succeeded Gen. Howard as the head of the 4th corps. The Army of the Tennessee was now shifted" from our extreme left to our extreme right; moving behind the rest of the army from the Decatur road on the east to Proctor's creek on the south-west; initiating a general movement to flank Hood out of Atlanta by cutting the railroads in his rear. The movement was of course detected by Hood; yet it had been substantially completed, and our men were hastily covering their new front with a rude breastwork of logs and rails, when Hood struck out" as heavily from his left as he had done the week before from his right. Evidently expecting to catch Howard in disorder, or at least unprepared, he poured out his masses from the west side of Atlanta, and charged impetuously on our new right, held by Logan's (15th) corps, which had been formed on the crest of a wooded ridge, with open fields sloping from its front, its right refused, and something like a rail breastwork in its front; Howard standing behind it, ready to hurry Blair's and Dodge's corps to its support; and Sherman himself on hand, eager and alert for the encounter. After a brief cannonade, Hood's infantry, under Hardee and Lee, was thrown forward against July 26-7. July 28. SHERMAN FLANKS ATLANTA BY THE RIGHT. 635 having passed our left, was in his rear, had captured 900 beeves, broken the railroad near Calhoun, and was bent on havoc generally, he joyfully ordered Kilpatrick, now commanding our 5,000 remaining cavalry, to move" from Sandtown, in the rear of our right, down to Fairburn, break up the West Point railroad thoroughly; then push across to the Macon road and destroy that; fighting any cavalry that might get in his way, but avoiding a serious conflict with infantry. Howard's right flank, which had been | resolved on a bold stroke for Atlanta; fully prepared for their reception, but, when he heard that Wheeler, and which, as they approached, swept them down by a murderous fire. Again and again were they röformed and pushed up by their officers, only to be again decimated and broken; a few of them pressing up to our rail-pile parapet, only to be there shot down or hauled over as prisoners. When they could no more be driven to this foolish slaughter, their officers, at 3 P. M., gave it up and recoiled; leaving on the ground 642 dead, who were counted by our regular burial-parties; and these were not all. Sherman, whose total loss was but 600, estimates Hood's at 5,000. Hood admits but 1,500." Kilpatrick obeyed; striking the Macon road at Jonesboro', routing a small cavalry force under Ross, and doing some work on the railroad; when a brigade of Rebel infantry and a small force of cavalry appeared from below, and compelled him to resume his travels. Drawing off to the east, he made a circuit, and again struck the railroad near Lovejoy's; but the enemy were already here; so, charging through their cavalry, taking 70 prisoners and a 4-gun battery, which he destroyed, he made for camp by a north-east circuit; reaching Decatur on the 22d. Hood's appetite for attacks in force seems to have been satisfied by this time; since he made no more, though our long-range guns now reached into and shelled Atlanta from several points, kindling fires that involved heavy losses. Meantime, Sherman was steadily extending his right; bringing down Schofield's" army, and then Palmer's corps; until his intrenched line had been pushed nearly to East Point, commanding the railroads whereby Atlanta must be fed. Hood barely watched these operations, and extended his outworks accordingly. Yet a vigorous defensive was so little suited to his impatient, heady disposition that, hav-fident that, though not sufficient to ing squandered half his infantry in rash assaults and charges, he now dispatched Wheeler with his cavalry to our rear, to burn bridges, capture supplies, and break up the railroad whereon Sherman must depend for subsistence. Sherman had already" 20 Logan estimates the Rebel loss at from 6,000 to 7,000. He says he took 1,500 to 2,000 mus Sherman did not hesitate. He made the proper discount on Kilpatrick's estimate of the damage he had done to the railroads; but he was con interrupt transportation for ten days, 31 33 16th and 17th on either flank, he covered his front with the habitual breastwork, and stood in quiet expectation. Hardee drew out his whole force, embracing Lee's corps beside his own, and attacked with great vigor, calculating that Howard might be overwhelmed before he could be rëenforced; but Howard's position was good; his front well covered, and his soldiers as cool as though bullet-proof; and, after two hours of carnage, the enemy recoiled, leaving 400 dead on the ground, and 300 desperately wounded in Jonesboro' when he retreated. Sherman places Hardee's entire loss in this conflict at 2,500; while ours was hardly 500. now Gen. Slocum's, was left to cover, | a formidable foe. Deploying the while the rest of the army should 15th corps in the center, with the move by the right southward; the 4th corps, on our extreme left, marching" to the rear of our right, while Howard, drawing back, should move" to Sandtown, and then to the West Point railroad above Fairburn; Thomas coming into position just above him near Red Oak; while Schofield closed in on Thomas's left, barely clear of the Rebel defenses near East Point. These movements being quietly executed without resistance or loss, our whole army, save the 20th corps, was behind Atlanta, busily and thoroughly destroying the West Point railroad, before Hood knew what Sherman was doing; and the next day it was thrown forward" to the Macon road; Schofield moving cautiously, because of his proximity to Atlanta, and the danger of another of Hood's irruptions, to Roughand-Ready; Thomas to a point designated as Couch's; while Howard, encountering more resistance, halted at dark having crossed Flint river, barely half a mile from Jonesborough. Hood had, because of Kilpatrick's recent raid, and to guard his communications, divided his army; sending half, under Hardee, to Jonesborough; while he remained with the residue in Atlanta: hence his failure to fall on Schofield during our swinging flank movement; hence the formidable resistance encountered by Howard on our right, where none was expected. The light of day" revealed to Iloward-who had been fighting the day before, but constantly gaining ground-the immediate presence of Aug. 25-6. Aug. 26-7. $4 35 Sherman was with Thomas at Couch's, intent on road-breaking, when the sound of guns on the right drew his attention to that quarter, and induced him to impel Thomas and Schofield in that direction, leaving Garrard's cavalry to watch our rear toward Atlanta, while Kilpatrick should hasten down the west bank of the Flint and strike the railroad below Jonesborough. Davis's corps, being on Thomas's right, soon closed on to Howard, relieving Blair's (15th) corps, which was at once drawn out and thrown to Howard's right, so as to connect with Kilpatrick's troopers. All being at length ready, Davis's corps, at 4 P. M., charged the enemy's lines, covering Jonesboro', carrying them at once, capturing Gen. Govan with most of his brigade and two 4-gun batteries. Orders were repeatedly sent to hurry up Stanley and Schofield; but the ground was diffiAug. 31. Aug. 29. 37 HOOD ABANDONS ATLANTA TO SHERMAN. cult and the roads bad, so that they were not up in season to charge that night; and next morning" Hardee was gone, with all that could and would follow him. Before that morning dawned, ominous sounds, first heavy, then lighter, from the north, indicated to Sherman that something momentous was occurring in Atlanta, 20 miles distant. They might have proceeded from an attack on that stronghold by Slocum —which was most unlikely-but the more probable supposition pointed to the truth, that Hood, completely outgeneraled and at his wit's end, was blowing up his magazines, burning his stores, and escaping with the little he could, deprived of railroads, carry off in his flight. But this, if so, could wait; so Sherman ordered a vigorous pursuit in force of Hardee's beaten column. Hardee was found well intrenched, near Lovejoy's, with his flanks covered by Walnut creek and Flint rivera strong position, which was thoroughly reconnoitered, but Sherman was in no hurry to attack it. Soon, flying rumors, then more trust-worthy accounts, imported that Hood had blown up whatever he could in Atlanta and decamped: Stewart's corps retreating on McDonough, while the militia were marched off eastward to Covington. The news was fully confirmed on the 4th by a courier from Slocum, who had entered the city unopposed on the morning after Hood's withdrawal. Sherman thereupon returned" to Atlanta, and, encamping his army on all sides, allowed it that season of rest which, under his able leadership, it had so nobly earned. * Sept. 1. 637 Atlanta had been cheaply won; for, not only was the position one of great importance, but the loss of munitions, guns, locomotives, cars, manufacturing machinery, &c., was very great, and such as the Confederacy could no longer afford. Yet, when Sherman had succeeded, without loss, in placing at least 70,000 veterans between it and the better part of Hood's army, it seems singular that his prisoners were so few. Had he known how Hood's army was divided, he ought, it would seem, to have destroyed or captured at least half of it. General Sherman, having established his headquarters in Atlanta, ordered the removal of its remaining inhabitants-they going South or coming North, as each should prefer. In order to effect this removal with the least possible hardship, a truce for ten days was proposed by Sherman and acceded to by Hood; who took occasion to "protest, in the name of God and humanity," against this "unprecedented measure," which, he asserts, "transcends, in studied and ingenious cruelty, all acts ever brought to my attention in the dark history of war." Let us consider: Every one who could shoulder a musket or drive a team had been conscripted into and marched off with the Rebel army. All the factories, founderies, machine-shops, &c., in which Atlanta had hitherto abounded, and which had done the Confederacy good service, had been destroyed by Hood on leaving, or so dismantled as to be unserviceable. No food of consequence had been left by Hood in Atlanta; while our single railroad |