Gen. McClellan, during and after the close of the eventful 27th, telegraphed to the War Department as follows: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "June 27-10 A. M. The night passed quietly. During it, we brought all wagons, heavy guns, &c., to this side, and at daybreak drew in McCall's division about three miles. This change of position was beautifully executed, under a sharp fire, with but little loss. The troops on the other side are now well in hand, and the whole army so concentrated that it can take advantage of the first mistake made by the enemy. White House yet undisturbed. Success of yesterday complete." 66 66 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, 66 June 27-12 M. My change of position on the other side just in time. Heavy attack now being made by Jackson and two divisions. Expect attack also on this side." "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "SAVAGE'S STATION, "June 28, 1862-12:20 A. M. "I now know the whole history of the day. On this side of the river-the right bank-we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank, our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish; but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers soon after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men; those battalions which fought most bravely, and suffered most, are still in the best order. My regulars were superb, and I count upon what are left to turn another battle in company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. Had I 20,000 or even 10,000 fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could take Richmond; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and personnel of the army. If we have lost the day, we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the Ariny of the Potomac. I have lost this battle because my force was too small. I again repeat, that I am not responsible for this; and I say it with the earnestness of a General who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to re separate report of their losses in this action. Gen. C. M. Wilcox, 4th brigade, Longstreet's division, states his losses at 584, out of a total of 1,850. Among the Rebel killed were Cols. J. | trieve our fortunes; but to do this the Government must view the matter in the same earnest light that I do. You must send me very large reenforcements, and send them at once. I shall draw back to this side of the Chickalominy, and think I can withdraw all our material. Please understand that in this battle we have lost nothing but men, and those the best we have. In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak. I merely reiterated a truth which to-day has been too plainly proved. If, at this instant, I could dispose of 10,000 fresh men, I could gain the victory to-morrow. I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the responsible for the result. I feel too earnGovernment must not, and can not, hold me estly to-night-I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the Governinent has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now, the game is lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you, or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army. "To Hon. E. M. STANTON, G. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj.-Gen. "Secretary of War." To these reproachful missives, the President thus responded: "WASHINGTON, June 28, 1862. "Save your army at all events. Will send rëenforcements as fast as we can. Of course, they can not reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed rëenforcements; I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have been upon us before the troops sent could have got to you. Less than a week ago, you notified us that reenforcements were leaving Richmond to come in front of us. It is the nature of the case; and neither you nor the Government that is to blame. J. Woodward, 10th Ala.; S. T. Hale, 11th Ala.; John Marshall, 4th Texas; among the severely wounded, Cols. Rainey, 1st Texas, and Robinson, 5th Texas. MCCLELLAN DECIDES TO RETREAT. 159 "Please tell at once the present condition | position, but resting at Tunstall's Staor aspect of things." Gen. McClellan's army had now been concentrated by the enemy in a very strong position, between the Chickahominy on one side, and our General's elaborate and powerful works facing Richmond on the other. It was still more than 100,000 strong; while, save in his imagination, there were not nearly so many armed Rebels within a circuit of 50 miles. Properly handled, it was abundantly able and willing to meet and beat Lee's entire forces in fair battle; or it might have taken Richmond and the Rebel works below it," on the James; thus reopening its communications and receiving fresh supplies by that river, most efficiently patroled by our gunboats. One thing it could not do without invoking disaster, and that was to remain cooped up in its intrenchments; since Porter's defeat and retreat across the Chickahominy had severed its communication with its base of supplies at West Point; Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, with the Rebel cavalry, supported by Ewell's infantry, striking and destroying the York River Railroad and severing the telegraph line at Dispatch Station next morning," and pushing thence down the road toward White House, meeting no serious op "Gen. Magruder, in his official report of his participation in the memorable Seven Days' struggle, says: "From the time at which the enemy withdrew his forces to this side of the Chickahominy and destroyed the bridges, to the moment of his evacuation—that is, from Friday night until Sunday morning-I considered the situation of our army as extremely critical and perilous. The larger portion of it was on the opposite side of the Chickahominy; the bridges had been all destroyed; but one was rebuilt, the New Bridge, which was commanded fully by the enemy's guns from Golding's; and there were but 25,000 tion for the night, which our force' holding White House devoted to the destruction of the vast aggregate of munitions and provisions there stored. Nine large loaded barges, 5 locomotives, with great numbers of tents, wagons, cars, &c., were involved in this general destruction; while our cavalry, under Stoneman and Emory, fled down the Peninsula, leaving large quantities of forage and provisions to fall into the hands of the enemy. Stuart arrived next morning," and found nothing prepared to dispute possession with him but a gunboat, which very soon crowded on all steam and hurried off in quest of safety. McClellan decided not to fight, but to fly. Assembling his corps commanders on the evening after Porter's defeat, he told them that he had determined on a flank movement through White Oak Swamp to the James; Gen. Keyes, with his corps, being directed to move at once across the Swamp in the advance, so as to seize and hold the debouches of the roads on the James river side of the Swamp, thus covering the passage of the other troops and trains. Our commander, during the night, removed his headquarters to Savage's Station, thence to superintend the movement of the corps and trains. men between his army of 100,000 and Richmond. "Had McClellan massed his whole force in column, and advanced it against any point of our line of battle, as was done at Austerlitz, un der similar circumstances, by the greatest Captain of any age, though the head of his column would have suffered greatly, its momentum would have insured him success, and the occupation of our works about Richmond; and consequently the city might have been his re ward. His failure to do so is the best evidence that our wise commander fully understood the character of his opponent." 30 June 23. 31 June 29. The immense amounts of provisions, | Station, which was held by Slocum's division. This position they were to hold until dark," so as to cover the withdrawal of the trains, and then fall back on the roads leading through the Swamp. munitions, and supplies of all kinds that could not be removed, were consigned to destruction; while 2,500 wounded, who were unable to walk, and for whom no ambulances could be afforded, were left in hospital, with surgeons and attendants, to fall into the hands of the enemy. Lee was evidently puzzled with regard to McClellan's intentions, not believing that he could abandon his position and the siege without a battle. He sent Ewell's infantry, as well as some cavalry, down the left bank of the Chickahominy, to watch the roads leading down the Peninsula; but, receiving no advices from Huger and Magruder, stil! between our army and Richmond, of any movement of our trains or forces toward the James, did not divine that movement till late in the afternoon." No serious attack or forward movement was made by the enemy during that day; though in the morning, perceiving that Gen. Franklin's corps were being withdrawn from their front at Golding's farm, opposite Woodbury's Bridge, the Rebels opened on them from Garrett's and Gaines's Hill, and soon advanced two Georgia regiments to assault our works; but they were easily repulsed by the 23d New York and 49th Pennsylvania, with a section of Mott's battery. McCall's weakened division was ordered to follow Porter across the Swamp during the ensuing night," while Sumner's and Heintzelman's corps and Smith's division were directed to take up a line of advance stretching eastward from Keyes's old intrenchments, and covering Savage's Our line of movement-that is, of retreat-being now fully comprehended by the enemy, Lee ordered Longstreet and A. P. Hill to recross the Chickahominy at New Bridge and pursue and attack our rear; Jackson moving down on their left, but between them and the Chickahominy; while Magruder and Huger, advancing from before Richmond on the Williamsburg and Charles City roads respectively, were to strike us in flank. Magruder, on the Williamsburg road, came in sight of our rear, near Savage's Station, about noon; but, finding the business serious, halted and sent to Iluger for reenforcements. Meantime, an attack in light force had been made, at 9 A. M.," on Gen. Sumner's front; but it was easily repulsed; and Gen. Slocum, pursuant to order, had fallen back from Savage's Station, and was crossing White Oak Swamp. At 4 P. M., Magruder attacked in full force; and, though Gen. Heintzelman, under a misapprehension of orders, had posted his corps so far in the rear as to leave a gap of threefourths of a mile between Sumner and Franklin, Magruder's attack was gallantly repelled by Gen. Burns's brigade, supported by those of Brooks and Ilancock, reenforced by two lines of reserves, and finally by the 69th New York; Hazzard's, Pettit's, Osborn's, and Bramhall's batteries playing a most effective BATTLE OF WHITE OAK SWAMP. 161 part in this struggle. By 9 P. M., the | ade, by which all his efforts to cross enemy had recoiled, without having during the day and evening were gained the least advantage; and our repelled and baffled. A heavy fire soldiers fell back, by order, upon of artillery, directed by Capt. Ayres, White Oak Swamp: Gen. French's was maintained throughout that day brigade, forming our rear-guard, be- and evening; Capt. Hazzard's bating in motion by midnight; crossing tery being badly cut up and its comand destroying White Oak Swamp mander mortally wounded; but, Bridge at 5 A. M. next morning." though the enemy replied with equal spirit, and inflicted as well as suffered much loss, our position was too strong to be carried by assault; and every attempt of the Rebels to cross the marsh and creek-the bridge having been destroyed—was worsted. During the night, our troops retired by order, leaving 350 sick and wounded, and some disabled guns, to fall an easy prey to the enemy, as he advanced unopposed next morning. Jackson, who had been delayed by the necessity of rebuilding the Grapevine Bridge over the Chickahominy, reached Savage's Station early this morning, and was ordered, with Longstreet and A. P. Hill, to follow immediately on the track of our army, while Huger, supported by Magruder, pushed down right. on our McClellan, with perhaps a third of our army, had already emerged from the Swamp, upon the high, open ground near MALVERN HILL; while Gen. Holmes, who had just brought part of a Rebel division across from the south side of James river to Richmond, moved down upon the river road, reenforced by Gen. Wise, with part of his brigade. Coming in sight of our advance near Malvern, he was about to open with his artillery, when he found that we were far too strong for him, and recoiled, awaiting the advance of Magruder to his aid. But the main conflict of the day occurred at the crossing of the creek some two miles farther up, or to the right of Jackson, where Lee in person, with Jefferson Davis, accompanied Longstreet's advance, at the head of his own and A. P. Hill's divisions; encountering no resistance until noon, when their advance descried our rear-guard, strongly posted upon the road leading from New Market to Long Bridge, and having a small branch of the White Oak Swamp creek in their front. Seeing that we were in force, Longstreet waited till Jackson was to have deflected to- 3 P. M. for the coming up of Iluger, ward the Chickahominy, so as to gain who was some 3 or 4 miles distant, our right flank and rear; but his ad- on his right, or Jackson, who was vance was checked by the destruc- still nearer, on his left; but,, as tion of the bridge in his front; and neither arrived, he at length ordered on reaching, at noon, White Oak | his batteries to open and his infantry Swamp Bridge, he was confronted to charge, under cover of a shower of by Gen. Franklin, with Smith's division of his own corps, and Richard shells. McCall, with his Pennsylvania son's, of Sumner's, and Naglee's brig- Reserves, which hard fighting had reduced from 10,000 to 6,000 strong, | flanks of the baffled column, hurling was immediately in their front, and his men for a time held their ground gallantly; but days of fighting, succeeded by nights of marching-always, alas! in the wrong direction had told upon the spirits as well as the numbers of these green troops, so suddenly transformed into veterans; while the flushed and confident enemy who assailed them were twice if not thrice their number. An attempt to crush their left by the Rebels was met by a charge of the 5th, 8th, 9th, and 10th regiments, led by Col. Simmons, of the 5th, which hurled the enemy back to the woods in their rear, leaving about 200 prisoners in our hands, who were triumphantly marched off the field. But here Simmons fell, mortally wounded; while hundreds of his soldiers strewed the field; and the charging column, broken as it entered the woods, was unable to reform under the murderous fire of the enemy's infantry and artillery, and fell back in disorder to the woods behind its original position, which they held until night put an end to the contest. A succession of desperate struggles ensued: the Rebels rushing forward in charge after charge to capture our guns, which poured volleys of grape and canister, at short range, into their close masses, sweeping them down by hundreds and forcing them to recoil in dismay; when our supporting regiments would pour a leaden hail of musketry upon the it back in confusion to the sheltering forest. Thus, for two hours, the desperate conflict raged; until Kerns's battery, having fired its last charge, was, by McCall's order, withdrawn from the field, and Col. Roberts's infantry, having just repulsed a Rebel charge, was charged again on its left flank and driven from the field by a fresh force, which, rushing furiously on Cooper's battery, drove off the gunners and captured the guns. A counter-charge was instantly made by the 9th, with parts of other regiments; and, after a desperate but brief struggle, the battery was recovered, and the standard of the 10th Alabama taken. The Reserves still held the field, and not one of their guns had been lost, when, between sunset and dark, Meagher's Irish brigade, of Hooker's division, came up on our left, and, charging desperately across the open field, drove the Rebels back again into the woods. McCall's right, under Gen. Meade, had been likewise engaged with overwhelming numbers, by whom a final charge was made, just at dark, for the possession of Randall's battery; which was carried at the point of the bayonet, though at a fearful cost. Gens. McCall and Meade instantly rallied their infantry for its recapture, and a hand-to-hand struggle of unsurpassed ferocity ensued, wherein the Reserves were overpowered and driven back, though the Rebels had. suffered " too severely to pursue ade on my right had been repulsed, and that my command were exposed to a destructive fire on the flank as well as in front. Nevertheless, they stood their ground, and sustained the unequal combat until reenforced by the brigade of Gen. Gregg. We did not return to our original position until the enemy had abandoned the field and surrendered his artillery into our possession. |