網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

claims to have taken 10 guns, 6,000 muskets, and "several hundred " prisoners-an expression which the number of our wounded who fell into his hands must have fully justified. He probably took few others, and no officer of distinction.

distance being maintained on either | grew and Col. C. Davis, of S. C., side. Mahone's brigade was brought and Col. Long, taken prisoners. He up to the aid of Pryor, and Howard's to that of French; and finally Meagher's Irish regiments went to the front, and a desultory conflict was maintained for some two or three hours, during which Gen. Howard lost his arm and had two of his staff wounded. The Rebels at length desisted, and retreated unpursued. Their reports assert that they made no attack, but only repelled one.

The Rebels remained through the day in quiet possession of Couch's and Casey's camps, sending off muskets, tents, and camp equipage to Richmond; following themselves after nightfall. Johnston says that Smith did not renew his attack on our right, because of his discovery of strong intrenchments in that quarter, which he had not seen the night before. It is certain that he was not disturbed by any demonstration on our part, and retired wholly unmolested. Ten days later, we had not recovered the ground held by Casey's advance on the morning of May 31.

Johnston reports the loss in Smith's division at 1,233, and in Longstreet's" at "about" 3,000; total, 4,233; saying nothing of any loss sustained by Huger. Among his killed were Gen. Robert Hatton, of Tenn.; Cols. Lomax, 3d Ala., Jones, 12th Ala., Giles, 5th S. C., and Lightfoot, 22d N. C.; while, beside himself, Gens. Rhodes and Garland, with Cols. Goodwin, 9th Va., and Wade Hampton, S. C., were wounded. He also lost Gen. Petti

12 Gen. McClellan says that Hill estimates his loss at 2,500, and adds this number to the above total, making in all 6,733: but it is evident that Johnston includes Hill's loss in that of Longstreet, who was in command of both divisions.

Gen. McClellan reports our total loss at 5,739," whereof 890 were killed, 3,627 wounded, and 1,222 missing some of these probably dead, and others left on the field wounded, to fall into the hands of the enemy. Among our killed were Col. G. D. Bailey, Maj. Van Valkenburg, and Adjt. Ramsey, of the 1st N. Y. artillery; Cols. J. L. Riker, 62d, and James M. Brown, 100th N. Y., Rippey, 61st, and Miller, 81st Pa. Among our wounded were Gens. Naglee, Pa., Devens, Mass., O. O. Howard, Maine, and Wessells; Col. E. E. Cross, 5th N. II., and many other valuable officers.

Considering that the bulk of the loss on either side fell on regiments which together brought less than 15,000 men into the field, the admitted loss is quite heavy. Keyes's corps numbered about 12.000 men present; of whom 4,000 were dead or wounded before 5 P. M. of the 31st. Perhaps as many had fled to the rear; yet Gen. McClellan's dispatch to the War Department, written so late as noon of the second day, in saying that "Casey's division gave way unaccountably and discreditably," is indiscriminate and unjust. A green division of less than 7,000

13 But in a confidential dispatch of June 4th, to the War Department, he says: "The losses in the battles of the 31st and 1st will amount to 7,000." Though this may have been an estimate merely, it was very near the truth.

MORE DELAYS AND EXCUSES.

149

men could not fairly be expected to | Call's division of McDowell's corps arrest and repel a determined ad- should follow as speedily as might vance of the entire Rebel army, be. Gen. McClellan responded:" whereof two choice divisions, numbering 15,000 men, were hurled directly upon them. That some of our men behaved badly is true; but the responsibility of their failure rests on the Generals by whom they were badly handled. They were sent up by brigades to confront Rebel divisions, and thus beaten in detail; and, when at last the time came for fight- | er. ing with the advantage of numbers on our side, the directing, impelling will was absent.

"I am glad to learn that you are pressing forward reenforcements so vigorously. I shall be in perfect readiness to move for

ward and take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here, and the ground will admit the passage of artillery. I have addriving off the Rebel pickets, and securing vanced my pickets about a mile to-day; a very advantageous position.”

He soon afterward" telegraphed: "I am completely checked by the weathThe roads and fields are literally impassable for artillery-almost so for infantry. The Chickahominy is in a dreadful state. We have another rain-storm on our hands. I shall attack as soon as the will be a delay, the extent of which no weather and ground will permit; but there

Gen. Hooker, next morning," by Heintzelman's order, made a recon- one can foresee, for the season is altonoissance in force, advancing to with-gether abnormal. In view of these cirtion the propriety of detaching largely from cumstances, I present for your consideraHalleck's army, to strengthen this; for it would seem that Halleck has now no large

on

in four miles of Richmond, unresisted save by pickets. Gen. McClellan, learning this movement, ordered Hooker to be recalled to and take position at Fair Oaks. The General commanding wrote this day to the Secretary of War:

"The enemy attacked in force and with great spirit yesterday morning; but are everywhere most signally repulsed with great loss. Our troops charged frequently on both days, and uniformly broke the enemy. The result is, that our left is within four miles of Richmond. I only wait for the river to fall to cross with the rest of the force and make a general attack. Should I find them holding firm in a very strong position, I may wait for what troops I can bring up from Fortress Monroe. But the morale of my troops is now such that venture much. I do not fear for odds against me. The victory is complete; and all credit is due to the gallantry of our offi

cers and men."

can

[blocks in formation]

organized force in front of him, while we
have. If this cannot be done, or even in
connection with it, allow me to suggest the
movement of a heavy column from Dalton

upon Atlanta. If but the one can be done,
it would better conform to military princi-
ples to strengthen this army. And, even
although the reenforcements might not ar-
rive in season to take part in the attack
upon Richmond, the moral effect would be
sistance in ulterior movements.
great, and they would furnish valuable as
I wish to
be distinctly understood that, whenever the
weather permits, I will attack with what-
ever force I may have, although a larger
force would enable me to gain much more
decided results. I would be glad to have
McCall's infantry sent forward by water at
once, without waiting for his artillery and
cavalry."

Secretary Stanton promptly responded:

17

[blocks in formation]

vice, he contemplated sending a column to operate with Mitchel against Chattanooga, and thence upon East Tennessee. Buell reports Kentucky and Tennessee to be in a critical condition, demanding immediate at tention. Halleck says the main body of Beauregard's forces is with him at Okolo

na.

McCall's force was reported yesterday as having embarked, and on its way to join you. It is intended to send the residue of McDowell's force also to join you as speedily as possible.

"Fremont had a hard fight, day before yesterday, with Jackson's force at Union Church, eight miles from Harrisonburg. He claims the victory, but was badly handled. It is clear that a pretty strong force is operating with Jackson, for the purpose of detaining the forces here from you. I am urging, as fast as possible, the new levies.

"Be assured, General, that there never has been a moment when my desire has been otherwise than to aid you with my whole heart, mind, and strength, since the hour we first met; and, whatever others may say for their own purposes, you have never had, and never can have, any one more truly your friend, or more anxious to support you, or more joyful than I shall be

at the success which I have no doubt will soon be achieved by your arins."

18

Gen. McCall's division arrived by water during the two following days; on the last of which, Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, with 1,500 Rebel cavalry and 4 guns, attacked and dispersed two squadrons of the 5th U. S. cavalry, Capt. Royall, near Hanover Old Church; thence proceeding to make a rapid circuit of our grand army, via Tunstall's Station, seizing and burning two schooners laden with forage, and 14 wagons; capturing and taking off 165 prisoners, 260 mules and horses; halting three hours to rest at Talleysville, in the rear of our army; resuming his march at midnight; crossing the Chickahominy near Long Bridge, by hastily improvised bridges, next forenoon; and reaching Richmond unassailed next morning. This was the first of the notable cavalry raids of the war,

tempting to many imitations, some of them brilliant in design and execution; some of them damaging to the adverse party; others disastrous to their executors; but, on the whole, involving a squandering of horseflesh and an amount of useless devastation which rendered them decidedly unprofitable, and hardly reconcilable with the legitimate ends of warfare.

Gen. McClellan, at midnight on the 14th, telegraphed to the War Department as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"CAMP LINCOLN, June 14, 1862. "All quiet in every direction. The stamWeather now very favorable. I hope two days pede of last night has passed away. more will make the ground practicable. I shall advance as soon as the bridges are completed and the ground fit for artillery to move. At the same time, I would be glad to have whatever troops can be sent I can use several new regiments to

to me.

advantage.

"It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops are com

8

pletely under my control. I received telegram from him requesting that McCall's division might be placed so as to join him

immediately on his arrival.

"That request does not breathe the proper spirit. Whatever troops come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not feel that, in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed, Gen. McDowell should wish the general in

terests to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his command.

"If I cannot fully control all his troops, I fight the battle with what I have, and let want none of them, but would prefer to others be responsible for the results.

"The department lines should not be allowed to interfere with me; but Gen. McD., and all other troops sent to me, should be placed completely at my disposal, to do with them as I think best. In no other way can they be of assistance to me. I therefore request that I may have entire and full control. The stake at issue is too great to allow personal considerations to be entertained; you know that I have

[blocks in formation]

18 June 12-13.

STONEWALL JACKSON JOINS LEE.

151

creasing in numbers, and determined to thousand men have left Richmond to rëenfight desperately." force Jackson, it illustrates their strength and confidence. After to-morrow, we shall

On the 20th, he telegraphed to the fight the Rebel army as soon as Providence

President:

[blocks in formation]

At this time, his returns to the Adjutant-General's office give the following as the strength of his army on the Peninsula: Present for duty, 115,102; special duty, sick, and in arrest, 12,225; absent, 29,511-total, 156,838.

Stonewall Jackson, having done us all the mischief he could in the Valley, arrested McDowell's overland march to join McClellan, and sent 40,000 or 50,000 of our men on all manner of wild-goose chases, was now on his way in full force to Richmond; hence, misleading reports of his movements were artfully circu

lated

among our commanders. Gen. McClellan telegraphed" to the War Department that he had information from deserters that troops had left Richmond to reenforce Jackson, and that they were probably not less than 10,000 men. To this the President responded, that he had similar information from Gen. King at Fredericksburg; and added: "If this is true, it is as good as a rëenforcement to you.' McClellan on that day telegraphed

to the President:

[ocr errors]
[blocks in formation]

will permit. We shall await only a favorable condition of the earth and sky, and the completion of some necessary preliminaries."

To-morrow and to-morrow passed, and still our army did not advance; until, on the 24th, a young man of suspicious character was brought in by Gen. McClellan's scouts from the direction of Hanover Court House, fessed himself a deserter from Jackwho, after some prevarication, conson's command, which he had left near Gordonsville on the 21st, moving along the Virginia Central Railroad to Frederickshall, with intent. to turn our right and attack our rear on the 28th. To McClellan's dispatch announcing this capture, and asking information of Jackson's position and movements, Secretary Stanton replied " as follows:

20

"We have no definite information as to the numbers or position of Jackson's force. Gen. King yesterday reported a deserter's statement, that Jackson's force was, nine days ago, 40,000 men. Some reports place 10,000 Rebels under Jackson at Gordonsville; others that his force is at Port Republic, Harrisonburg, and Luray. Fremont

yesterday reported rumors that Western Virginia was threatened; and Gen. Kelly, that Ewell was advancing to New Creek, where Fremont has his dépôts. The last

telegram from Fremont contradicts this rumor. The last telegram from Banks says the enemy's pickets are strong in advance at Luray. The people decline to give any information of his whereabouts. Within the last two days, the evidence is strong that, for some purpose, the enemy is circulating rumors of Jackson's advance in various directions, with a view to conceal

the real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is at Manassas, nor Banks and Fremont, who are at Middletown, appear to have any accurate knowledge on the subject.

"A letter transmitted to the department yesterday, purporting to be dated Gordonsville, on the 14th inst., stated that the actual attack was designed for Washington

20 June 25.

and Baltimore, as soon as you attacked Richmond; but that the report was to be circulated that Jackson had gone to Richmond, in order to mislead. This letter looked very much like a blind, and induces me to suspect that Jackson's real movement now is toward Richmond. It came from Alexandria, and is certainly designed, like the numerous rumors put afloat, to mislead. I think, therefore, that, while the warning of the deserter to you may also be a blind, that it could not safely be disregarded. I will transmit to you any further information on this subject that may be received here."

That day, having his bridges completed, Gen. McClellan ordered an advance of his picket-line on the left, preparatory to a general forward movement; and, during the day, Heintzelman's corps, with part of Keyes's and Sumner's, were pushed forward," he reports, through a swampy wood, though smartly resisted, with a loss on our side of 51 killed, 401 wounded, and 64 missing: total, 516. Returning from overlooking this affair, Gen. McClellan telegraphed to the War Department as follows:

"Several contrabands, just in, give information confirming the supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court House, and that Beauregard arrived, with strong reenforcements, in Richmond yesterday. I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The Rebel force is stated at 200,000, including Jackson

and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds, if these reports be true. But this army will do all in the power of men to hold their position and repulse any attack. I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed

to represent repeatedly the necessity of reenforcements; that this was the decisive

"But Brig.-Gen. A. R. Wright, of Huger's division, who opposed this movement, reports that he had 3,000 men in all, resisting not less than 8,000 or 10,000 on our side; and adds:

"The object of the enemy was to drive us back from our picket-line, occupy it himself, and thereby enable him to advance his works several hundred yards nearer Our lines. In this, he completely failed; and, although

point, and that all the available means of the Government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a General can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command; and, if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. But, if the result of the action, which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs. Since I commenced this, I have received additional intelligence, confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard's arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and now go to the other side of the Chickahominy to arrange for the defense on that side. I feel that

there is no use in again asking for reen

forcements."

lows:The President responded as fol

"WASHINGTON, June 26, 1862. "Your three dispatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending with the statemaking your point, are very gratifying. ment that you completely succeeded in The later one, suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by 200,000 men, and talking of to whom the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have; while you continue-ungene rously I think-to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted-I shall omit-no opportunity to send you reenforcements whenever I can."

Gen. Robert E. Lee, having succeeded to the chief command of the

Rebel army, had, in counsel with the master spirits of the Rebellion, at length resolved on striking a decisive blow. To this end, rëenforcements had been quietly called in from all available quarters, swelling the Rebel Army of Virginia, including JackGen. McClellan at night telegraphed, over his own signature, to the War office in Washington, that he had accomplished his object, had driven me back for more than a mile, had silenced my batteries, and occupied our camps, there is not one word of truth in the whole statement. When the fight ceased at dark, I occupied the very line my pickets had been driven from in the morning; and which I continued to hold until the total rout of the Federal army on the 29th."

« 上一頁繼續 »