WASHINGTON CITY TO BE COVERED. averaged about 220,000 men," was at no time large enough, according to his computation, to justify a determined offensive, since he persisted in computing the Rebel army confronting him at no less than "150,000 strong, well drilled and equipped, ably commanded and strongly in trenched."" Now, the movement first contemplated, by way of the Rappahannock and Urbana-still more, that ultimately decided on by way of Fortress Monroe and the Peninsula-involved a division of this army, and the reservation of a considerable part of it for the protection of Washington, as also the securing of Maryland and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from desolating raids down the Shenandoah Valley. President Lincoln had reluctantly given his assent to this circumlittoral advance, on these expressed conditions: 46 "EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, "March 8, 1862. "PRESIDENT'S GENERAL WAR ORDER, No. 3: Ordered, That no change of the base of operations of the Army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as, in the opinion of the General-in-Chief and the commanders of army corps, shall leave said city entirely secure. 129 "Ordered, That the army and navy cooperate in an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay, ABRAHAM LINCOLN. "L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.” Gen. McClellan's chief of spies had by this time reduced the force of the Rebels in Northern Virginia" to 115,500 men, with 300 field and 26 to 30 siege-guns-quite a formidable army, if its leader should conclude, after Gen. McClellan's embarking the bulk of his forces for Fortress Monroe, to make a rush upon Washington from behind the Rappahannock. Five days later, Secretary Stanton wrote, as we have already seen, to Gen. McClellan, that the President made no objection to his plan of operations, provided he would "1st. Leave such force at Manassas June tion as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication. 2d. Leave Washington entirely secure. "3d. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac-choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there; or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route." Just before starting for the Penin-sula, Gen. McClellan received, "with "That no more than two army corps surprise," the following note, involv(about 50,000 troops) of said Army of the Potomac shall be moved en route for a new ing a subtraction, he estimates, of base of operations until the navigation of 10,000 troops from the force which the Potomac, from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay, shall be freed from the he expected to have transferred to enemy's batteries, and other obstructions, the Peninsula : or until the President shall hereafter give express permission. "That any movement as aforesaid, en route for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the General-in-Chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th of March instant; and the General-in-Chief shall be responsible that it so moves as early as that day. "EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, "March 31, 1862. "Major-General MCCLELLAN: "MY DEAR SIR: This morning I felt con strained to order Blenker's division to Fremont; and I write this to assure you that I did so with great pain, understanding that you would wish it otherwise. If you could know the full pressure of the case, I am confident that you would justify it, even 4 Letter to the Secretary of War. 47 Report to McClellan, March 8. Stonewall Jackson's advance to and fight at Winchester, indicating further pugnacity in that quarter, were soon found to interfere with Gen. McClellan's order" to Gen. Banks to move his division down to Manassas, leaving only two regiments of cavalry to "occupy Winchester, and thoroughly scour the country south of the railway and up the Shenandoah Valley." Gen. McClellan, on embarking, calculated that he left behind, including Blenker's division, ordered to Fremont, and not including McDowell's corps, which he intended should follow him, no less than 75,000 men. But, as Blenker's division was known to be ordered to Fremont, in West Virginia, they are improperly included. Even excluding these, he computes the whole number available for the defense of Washington, including 35,467 under Banks in the Valley of the Shenandoah, at 67,428 men, with 85 pieces of light artillery. Yet he had barely departed when Gens. Hitchcock and L. Thomas, who had been instructed to investigate the matter, reported," "that the requirement of the President, that this city [Washington] shall be left entirely secure, has not been fully complied with." Gen. Wadsworth, Military Governor of Washington, and as brave a man as ever lived, submitted to the War Department a statement that the entire force left under his command for the defense of Washington amounted to 20,477, of whom 19,022 were present for duty; nearly all of them new and 19 April 2. 48 March 16. 49 imperfectly disciplined, several of the regiments in a very disorganized condition; 2 heavy artillery and 1 infantry regiment, which had been drilled for some months for artillery service, had been withdrawn from the forts on the south side of the Potomac; while he was at this time under orders from McClellan to detail 3 regiments to join divisions on their way to the Peninsula, and another for service at Budd's Ferry; while a further order directed him to send 4,000 men to Manassas and Warrenton to relieve Gen. Sumner, so as to enable him to embark for Yorktown. Upon the report of Gens. Hitchcock and Thomas, the President gave orders" that either McDowell's or Sumner's corps should remain in front of Washington until otherwise directed. Gen. McClellan, from his camp in front of Yorktown, remonstrated;"1 saying: "I am now of the opinion that I shall have to fight all the available force of the Rebels not far from here. Do not force me to do so with diminished numbers; but, whatever your decision may be, I will leave nothing undone to obtain success. If you cannot leave me the whole of the 1st corps, I urgently ask that I may not lose Franklin and his division." Two days later, he telegraphed to the War Department that: "It seems clear that I shall have the whole force of the enemy on my handsprobably not less than 100,000 men, and possibly more. In consequence of the loss of Blenker's division and the 1st corps, my force is possibly less than that of the eneiny, while they have all the advantage of position." In a dispatch of even date to the President, he says: "Your telegram of yesterday received. In reply, I have the honor to state that my $1 April 5. 60 April 3. THE PRESIDENT URGES MCCLELLAN TO ACT. 131 statement taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and en route to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all en route to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for? entire force for duty amounts to only about | just obtained from the Secretary of War a (85,000) eighty-five thousand men. Gen. Wool's command, as you will observe from the accompanying order, has been taken out of my control, although he has most cheerfully cooperated with me. The only use that can be made of his command is to protect my communications in rear of this point. At this time, only 53,000 men have joined me; but they are coming up as rapidly as my means of transportation will permit. Please refer to my dispatch to the Secretary of War to-night, for the details of our present situation." The President responded by this letter: "WASHINGTON, April 9, 1862. "Maj.-Gen. McClellan: "As to Gen. Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was away. "I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you, is with you by this time; and, if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay, the enemy will relatively gain upon you; that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reenforcements than you can by rëenforcements alone. And once more let me tell yon, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the Bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy, and the same or equal intrenchments, at either place. The country will not fail to note-is now notingthat the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated. "I beg to assure you that I have never written you, or spoken to you, in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can. But you must act. "MY DEAR SIR: Your dispatches, complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much. Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here; and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it—certainly, not without reluctance. After you left, I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field-battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junetion; and part of this, even, was to go to Gen. Hooker's old position. Gen. Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted, and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented (or would present, when McDowell and Sumner should be gone) a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the Commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell. "I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manas-bly could not be; since an official resas Junction; but, when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was constrained to substitute something for it myself; and allow me to ask: Do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade. Yours, very truly, A. LINCOLN." The President's question as to the grave discrepancy between the 85,000 men, admitted to be with or on their way to him by Gen. M., and the 108,000 asserted by Secretary Stanton, was never answered, and proba turn of the number of his army April 30th, while it was still before Yorktown, makes its aggregate 130,378, whereof 112,392 were present and fit for duty; Franklin's division of 12,448 men having in the mean time been sent to him. But, on another point, military men are not likely to agree with the President. Gen. Wool's command may "There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had very probably have been doing just what an equal number of McClellan's troops must have done "if that command was away;" but it is by no means the same thing to a commander in the field to have 10,000 men holding an important post in his rear, but wholly independent of his authority, and having them subject implicitly to his orders. Gen. McClellan was therefore manifestly right in not regarding Gen. Wool's 10,000 as equivalent to a rëenforcement of his army by that number; and the order which detached this division from his command has not been justified. True, he had more men than he needed, had he possessed the ability and the nerve to use them." But a General, in such a position as his then was, should either be fully trusted or superseded. Stonewall Jackson, after his defeat" by Shields at Kernstown, had retreated up the Valley, pursued by Gen. Banks, to the vicinity of Harrisonburg. Jackson, after holding some } When he had fairly set down before Yorktown, he telegraphed to Washington as follows: "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "April 10. "Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War: "The reconnoissance to-day proves that it is necessary to invest and attack Gloucester Point. Give me Franklin's and McCall's divisions, under command of Franklin, and I will at once undertake it. If circumstances of which I am not aware make it impossible for you to send me two divisions to carry out this final plan of campaign, I will run the risk, and hold myself responsible for the result, if you will give me Franklin's division. If you still confide in my judgment, I entreat that you will grant this request. The fate of our cause depends upon it. Although willing, under the pressure of necessity, to carry this through with Franklin alone, I wish it to be distinctly understood that I think two divisions necessary. Franklin and his division are indispensable to me. Gen. Barnard concurs in this view. I have determined on the point of attack, and am at this moment engaged in fixing the position of the batteries. "G. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj.-General." The prompt response was as follows: days a strong position near Mount Jackson, crossed" the South Fork of the Shenandoah and took position in Elk Run Valley; but he was soon startled by tidings that Gen. Milroy, with the advance of Gen. Schenck's division of Fremont's West Virginia force, was threatening Staunton from the direction of Monterey. As a junction of Fremont's and Banks's commands would have involved the fall of Staunton, and the complete possession of the Valley by our troops, Jackson resolved to prevent it by striking a swift and hard blow at Fremont's advance. Leaving Ewell, whose division had recently joined him from Gordonsville, to observe and check Banks, Jackson moved rapidly to Staunton, being rëenforced by the division of Gen. Edward Johnson, which he dispatched" in advance of his own, against Milroy; who, being decidedly overmatched, retreated westwardly across Shenandoah Mountain, concentrating his command at MCDOWELL, and sending 66 "WAR DEPARTMENT, April 11, 1862. 'Maj.-Gen. G. B. MCCLELLAN, Commanding Army of Potomac, Fortress Monroe, Virginia: "By direction of the President, Franklin's division has been ordered to march back to Alex andria and immediately embark for Fort Monroe. "L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General." Which McClellan thus acknowledged: "HEADQUARTERS POTOMAC, } "Near Yorktown, April 12-12 M. "Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War: "Your dispatch received. I thank you most sincerely for the reenforcements sent to me. Franklin will attack on the other side. moment I hear from him, I will state point of rendezvous. I am confident as to results now. "G. B. MOCLELLAN, Maj.-General." The |