itself was the object, it could be obtained without so dangerous an experiment, by a movement on each side of it to the open bank of the nullah, the possession of which would involve that of the tope as a matter of course without loss or risk. This is the clear meaning of this remarkable note. Now let us follow the event-General Harris (on some view or information which is not stated) persisted in his original intention, and ordered the direct attack on the tope; that attack failed, as Colonel Wellesley seems to have expected; and next morning the very plan suggested in his letter of the day before was adopted-according to which, Colonel Wellesley turned the tope by a movement on both its flanks, the enemy retreated, and the position was taken as he had predicted as a matter of course,' and without the loss of a man! Thus, in this little affair-the first of the details of which we have any recordthe only one in the whole course of his long service which ever gave rise to any doubt-we have incontrovertible evidence of his sagacity in foreseeing failure from one course and success from another; and, however vexed Colonel Wellesley might have been by his repulse on the night of the 5th, he must have had the consolation -however inadequate of having foreseen it, and of having suggested as well as executed, the manoeuvre which so easily accomplished the desired object on the morning of the 6th.

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After a siege of near a month, the breach in the works of Seringapatam was practicable; and General Baird, with his usual spirit, solicited the command of the assault, and carried the town with heroic gallantry. Colonel Wellesley commanded the reserve in the advanced trenches, and entered the place so early as to be one of the few present when the body of Tippoo was discovered at the sally-port gate, still so warm that Colonel Wellesley and myself (says Major Allan) were doubtful whether he was not alive.' (Hook's Life of Baird,' vol. i. p. 219.) The confusion and excesses inevitable when any place, but particularly a great town, is taken by storm, naturally ensued, although General Baird used the most active exertions to mitigate and repress them. And here occurs another topic of complaint, made by General Baird of General Harris's undue partiality towards Colonel Wellesley, on which our regard for historical truth, and our respect for the memory of General Harris, induce us to make some observations. We extract from Mr. Hook's 'Life' the account which he gives of this transaction:

General Baird was proceeding (on the morning after the storm) to make further arrangements for the tranquillization and regulation of the town, when Colonel Wellesley arrived at the palace, bringing with him an order from General Harris to General Baird, directing him to deliver over to him (Colonel Wellesley) the command of Seringapatam;

Seringapatam; the city which he had conquered the day before, and - the conquest of which was to him, of all living men, most gloriousand, to use the memorable words of the hero himself, (found in the copy of a letter in his possession,) " Before the sweat was dry on my brow, I was superseded by an inferior officer." Deeply did General Baird feel this unexpected blow-but his regret, though mingled with surprise, we may even add with indignation, partook of no personal feeling of hostility against Colonel Wellesley, whose actual merits, as we have already observed, he always greatly appreciated, and whose future exaltation he always confidently anticipated.'-Life of Baird, vol. i. p. 226.

This is elegantly and, if the premises be correct, justly expressed. We can easily imagine General Baird's mortification, and appreciate his generosity in exculpating Colonel Wellesley from any personal share in the injustice. But Colonel Gurwood remarks

That the authentic documents, relating to the appointment of 'Colonel Wellesley, must exculpate General Harris from unduly favouring Colonel Wellesley to the prejudice of Sir David Baird, a charge which Mr. Hook has permitted himself to cast upon that honourable and distinguished officer.'-p. 25.

We do not think (as Colonel Gurwood seems here, and elsewhere in still stronger language, to hint) that any blame attaches to Mr. Hook for the statement he has made, which is clearly justified by copies of several of General Baird's letters which he quotes. On the contrary, Mr. Hook's statement is, as we have observed, written with moderation and in a spirit of justice and conciliation; but the documents do undoubtedly prove that General Baird himself must have laboured under a misapprehension of the facts of the case: Colonel Gurwood asserts that

the originals of these letters, as well as of the former complaint relative to Colonel Wellesley's appointment to the command of the Nizam's army, remain in the possession of General Harris's family; and it appears that some passages have been omitted in Mr. Hook's publication of them, which in a great measure contain in themselves a refutation · of the partiality and injustice of which General Baird complained.’—— p. 39.

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We will venture to assert that Mr. Hook did not make any such omissions, and that he could have no desire to bring up any thing unfavourable to Sir David Baird,' and least of all with the purpose of attacking the honour of those who are living, and the memory of those who are dead.' (Gurwood, p. 39.) The whole scope and temper of Mr. Hook's work negatives any such intentions; and we regret that Colonel Gurwood should have expressed himself in such terms as we have just quoted. There can be no doubt, as we have already stated and shall presently prove, that

there

there are some serious mistakes, in point of fact, in Mr. Hook's account; but it is equally clear to us that they are not his mistakes, and still less his mis-statements. He, it is evident, tells the story as he had it from General Baird's letters; and the mistakes are referable-not to any intentional misrepresentation on any body's part-but to the inevitable discrepancies which must arise in the accounts given of any transaction by any two men, whatever be their general accuracy, who have seen it from different points of view, and through the medium of opposite interests. When, after the battle of Aumale, in which Henry IV. of France was wounded, he inquired, from the officers collected round his bed, what had passed subsequent to his having left the field, and found that no two agreed in their narratives, he exclaimed, And yet thus it is that history will be written!' And this general difficulty must be seriously increased when one of the statements is made from hearsay, or from the imperfect notes of one side, and when there is no opportunity of verbal explanation, and no means audiendi alteram partem. After these few observations, which we think it but justice to all parties to have made, we shall proceed to notice the detailed evidence. Colonel Gurwood says,

'Major-General Baird having desired to be relieved (in Seringapatam), Colonel Wellesley, being next on the roster, was ordered, on the same night, to command within the fort.'-p. 35.

Colonel Gurwood does not state his authority for the assertion that General Baird desired to be relieved, which is the main point of the controversy: we therefore conclude that he assumes the fact from General Baird's own account of the matter in one of his expostulatory letters to General Harris; this letter, indeed, seems to us to explain the mal entendu―the misapprehension on the part of the high-minded, but hasty Baird-which led to the subsequent discussions. In this letter, General Baird, after stating his mortification at being superseded in the command by a junior officer, proceeds :-

In camp, it is rumoured to have been at my own request that another officer was appointed to the command of Seringapatam. You, sir, must know that this was not the case. Some mis

take may have arisen from my having, through Major Beatson, expressed a desire that the whole storming party might be relieved; and I wished to be relieved, for a short time, that I might myself have had the honour of reporting our success, and informing you in person of every particular relative to the storm.'-Life of Baird, v. i. p. 237.

He adds that he sent a second message at daylight next morning, to say, that as it had not been convenient (to relieve him the night before), and as he was much recovered from the fatigues of the previous day, he wished not to be relieved till he

had

had examined the state of the works, and ascertained the number of cannon captured.'-Ib.

From this, his own statement, it is clear, that General Baird had requested to be relieved on the evening of the 4th, and that, next morning, he repeated his wish to be relieved as soon as he should have examined the state of the works and counted the cannon-the occupation but of a few hours.

It appears also, that, on the receipt of the first message late in the evening of the 4th, General Harris-who could not hesitate to comply with General Baird's request, but who at the same time saw the indispensable and urgent necessity of having an officer of high authority in the place-ordered Colonel Wellesley, who commanded in the advanced trenches, and was first on the roster for duty, to proceed into the town to relieve General Baird.

Baird, perhaps forgetting the exact extent of his message by Major Beatson, or believing that his second message should have suspended the effect of the first, unluckily received Colonel Wellesley's appearance as an offensive permanent supercession. We shall see presently, that in this point too he wholly misunderstood General Harris's intentions; but, under this unfortunate and erroneous impression, he returned, in very bad humour, to the camp, and wrote General Harris such a letter of complaint as produced a severe-under all the circumstances of the case, perhaps we may say a too severe-reply. The question now grew to be one of general discipline; the breach between the two generals became irreparable, and Baird's return to resume the command in Seringapatam impossible. Then, and not before, Colonel Wellesley (who hitherto was acting merely in temporary command) was regularly appointed to the command of the garrison. This explanation, which is the only one which can reconcile the statements on both sides, is corroborated-we may almost say proved-by a series of notes written by Colonel Wellesley to General Harris during the first two days, and which are worth extracting, not only because they tend to clear up the unlucky misunderstanding between two such men as Generals Harris and Baird and their surviving friends, but because they exhibit early proofs of the good sense and decision of the Duke of Wellington, in a (to him at that time) new and difficult position :

"Colonel Wellesley to General Harris.

• Ten A.M., 5th May.

'My dear Sir,-We are in such confusion here, that I recommend it to you not to come in till to-morrow, or, at soonest, late this evening. Before I came here, General Baird had given the treasure in charge to the prize-agents.

• Seringapatam,

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Seringapatam, (afternoon) 5th May. My dear Sir,-Things are better than they were, but they are still very bad. . . . . There are, at this moment, sepoys and soldiers belonging to every regiment in your camp and General Stewart's, in the town. It surely would be advisable to order the rolls to be called constantly, and to forbid any people to leave the camp.

For a few days, likewise, it would be very advisable that the officers of the army should suspend the gratification of their curiosity, and that none but those on duty should come into the town. It only increases the confusion and terror of the inhabitants. Till both subside in some degree, we cannot expect that they will return to their habitations. I hope the relief is coming. A. W. "Seringapatam, 6th May.

My dear Sir, Plunder is stopped, the fires are all extinguished, and the inhabitants are returning to their houses fast. I am now employed in burying the dead, which I hope will be completed this day, particularly if you send me all the pioneers.

It is absolutely necessary that you should immediately appoint a permanent garrison, and a commanding officer, to the place; till that is done, the people will have no confidence in us, and every thing must be in confusion. That which I arrange this day, my successor may alter to-morrow, and his the next day; and nothing will ever be settled. A garrison which would be likely to remain here, would soon make themselves comfortable, although it might be found convenient hereafter to change some of the corps first sent in; but these daily reliefs create much confusion and distrust in the inhabitants; and the camp is at such a distance, that it is impossible for the officers, or soldiers, or sepoys, to get down their dinners.

I shall be obliged to you if you will order an extra dram and biscuit for the 12th, 33d, and 73d regiments, who got nothing to eat yesterday, and were wet last night.

In hopes you may attend to my recommendation to send a garrison in to-morrow, I will look out for a proper place to accommodate one or two battalions of Europeans, and three or four of sepoys.

'I am, &c.

A. W.'

Thus it is evident that Colonel Wellesley did not supersede General Baird as governor of the city he had so gallantly conquered,' but was only ordered in for the moment to supply his place, and to re-establish order, with an expectation of being relieved, perhaps next day: and so little does he seem to have desired that most disagreeable and thankless duty, that he urges the removal of his own regiment from the place, and the sending in of a regular garrison and a permanent governor; and it was not until after it had, from the unfortunate discussion then going on in the camp, become impossible that General Baird should return -and after Colonel Wellesley had, by his activity, firmness,

and