EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, May 14, 1868. MY DEAR SIR:-When I wrote on the 7th I had an impression that possibly, by an early movement, you could get some advantage, from the supposed facts that the enemy's communications were disturbed, and that he was somewhat deranged in position. That idea has now passed away, the enemy having re-established his communications, regained his positions, and actually received re-enforcements. It does not now appear to me probable that you can gain any thing by an early renewal of the attempt to cross the Rappahannock. I therefore shall not complain if you do no more for a time than to keep the enemy at bay, and out of other mischief, by menaces and occasional cavalry raids, if practicable, and to put your own army in good condition again. Still, if, in your own clear judgment, you can renew the attack successfully, I do not mean to restrain you. Bearing upon this last point I must tell you I have some painful intimations that some of your corps and division commanders are not giving you their entire confidence. This would be ruinous if true, and you should, therefore, first of all, ascertain the real facts beyond all possibility of doubt. Yours truly, A. LINCOLN. Both armies remained inactive till the 5. f June, when General Hooker wrote to the President that appearances indicated an advance by General Lee. The President answered him as follows: June 5, 1863 MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER:- Yours of to-day was received an hour ago. So much of professional military skill is requisite to answer it, that I have turned the task over to General Halleck. He promises to perform it with his utmost care. I have but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you, and that is, in case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I would by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, it would fight in intrenchments and have you at advantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting an advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled up on the river like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear without a fair chance to gore one way or to kick the other. If Lee would come to my side of the river I would keep on the same side and fight him, or act on the defensive, according as might be my estimate of his strength relatively to my own. But these are mere suggestions, which I desire to be controlled by the judgment of yourself and General Halleck, A. LINCOLN. By the 10th of June Lee's forward movement was well developed. The President's views as to the proper course to be pursued by our army remained as before, and he sent the following letter expressing them : WASHINGTON, D. C., June 10, 1868. MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER:-Your long dispatch of to-day is just received. If left to me, I would not go south of the Rappahannock upor Lee's moving north of it. If you had Richmond invested to-day you would not be able to take it in twenty days; meanwhile your communications, and with them your army, would be ruined. I think Lee's army, and not Richmond, is your true objective point. If he comes towards the Upper Potomac, follow on his flank, and on the inside track, shortening your lines while he lengthens his. Fight him, too, when opportunity offers. If he stay where he is, fret him and fret him. A. LINCOLN. Lee's advance was to the northwest, through the Valley of the Shenandoah. His advance was heard of far down that valley while yet his rear was near Fredericksburg, and on the 14th the President wrote to General Hooker as follows:: WASHINGTON, D. C., June 14, 1863. MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER: So for as we can make out here, the enemy have Milroy surrounded at Winchester, and Tyler at Martinsburg. If they could hold out a few days, could you help them? If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg and the tail of it on the plankroad between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be rery slim somewhere; could you not break him? A. LINCOLN. HON. JOHN MINOR BOTTS. The following brief letter, written during the first Presidential canvass, shows what were Mr. Lincoln's views in regard to the action of the Southern States in the event of his election: SPRINGFIELD, ILL, August 15, 1860. MY DEAR SIR:-Yours of the 9th, enclosing the letter of Hon. John Minor Botts, was duly received. The latter is herewith returned according to your request. It contains one of the many assurances I receive from the South, that in no probable event will there be any very formidable effort to break up the Union. The people of the South have too much of good sense and good temper to attempt the ruin of the Government rather than see it administered as it was administered by the men who made it. At least, so I hope and believe. I thank you both for your own letter and a sight of that of Mr. Botts. JOHN B. FRY, Esq. TO GOVERNOR MAGOFFIN. In August, 1861, Governor Magoffin, of Kentucky, urged the removal by the President of the Union troops which had been raised and were encamped within that State. To this request he received the following reply: WASHINGTON, D. C., August 24, 1861 To His Excellency B. MAGOFFIN, Governor of the State of Kentucky SIR: Your letter of the 19th instant, in which you "urge the removal from the limits of Kentucky of the military force now organized and in camp within that State, is received. I may not possess full and precisely accurate knowledge upon this subject, but I believe it is true that there is a military force in camp within Kentucky, acting by authority of the United States, which force is not very large, and is not now being augmented. I also believe that some arms have been furnished to this force by the United States. I also believe that this force consists exclusively of Kentuckians, having their camp in the immediate vicinity of their own homes, and not assailing or menacing any of the good people of Kentucky. In all I have done in the premises, I have acted upon the urgent solici tation of many Kentuckians, and in accordance with what I believed, and still believe, to be the wish of a majority of all the Union-loving people of Kentucky. While I have conversed on the subject with many eminent men o Kentucky, including a large majority of her members of Congress, I do not remember that any one of them, or any other person, except your Excellency and the bearers of your Excellency's letter, has urged me to remove the military force from Kentucky or to disband it. One other very worthy citizen of Kentucky did solicit me to have the augmenting of the force suspended for a time. Taking all the means within my reach to form a judgment, I do not believe it is the popular wish of Kentucky that the force shall be removed beyond her limits, and, with this impression, I must respectfully decline to remove it. I most cordially sympathize with your Excellency in the wish to preserve the peace of my own native State, Kentucky, but it is with regret I search for, and cannot find, in your not very short letter, any declaration or intimation that you entertain any desire for the preservation of the Federal Union. ABRAHAM LINCOLN. TO COUNT GASPARIN. The following letter addressed by President Lincoln to the Count de Gasparin, one of the warmest friends of the United States in Europe, who had written to the President concerning the state of the country, will be read with interest : EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, August 4, 1862, TO COUNT A. DE GASPARIN: DEAR SIR:-Your very acceptable letter dated Orbe, Canton de Vaud, Switzerland, 18th of July, 1862, is received. The moral effect was the worst of the affair before Richmond, and that has run its course downward. We are now at a stand, and shall soon be rising again, as we hope. I believe it is true that, in men and material, the enemy suffered more than we in that series of conflicts, while it is certain he is less able to bear it. With us every soldier is a man of character, and must be treated with more consideration than is customary in Europe. Hence our great army, for slighter causes than could have prevailed there, has dwindled rapidly, bringing the necessity for a new call earlier than was anticipated. We shall easily obtain the new levy, however. Be not alarmed if you shall learn that we shall have resorted to a draft for part of this. It seems strange even to me, but it is true, that the Government is now pressed to this course by a popular demand. Thousands who wish not to personally enter the service, are nevertheless anxious to pay and send substitutes, provided they can have assurance that unwilling persons, similarly situated, will be compelled to do likewise. Besides this, volunteers mostly choose to enter newly forming regiments, while drafted men can be sent to fill up the old ones, wherein man for man they are quite doubly as valuable. You ask, "why is it that the North with her great armies so often is found with inferiority of numbers face to face with the armies of the South?" While I painfully know the fact, a military man, which I am not, would better answer the question. The fact I know has not been overlooked, and I suppose the cause of its continuance lies mainly in the other fact that the enemy holds the interior and we the exterior lines; and that we operate where the people convey information to the enemy, while he operates where they convey none to us. I have received the volume and letter which you did me the honor of addressing to me, and for which please accept my sincere thanks. You are much admired in America for the ability of your writings, and much loved for your generosity to us and your devotion to liberal principles generally. You are quite right as to the importance to us for its bearing upon Europe, that we should achieve military successes, and the same is true for us at home as well as abroad. Yet it seems unreasonable that a series of successes, extending through half a year, and clearing more than a hundred thousand square miles of country, should help us so little, while a single half defeat should hurt us so much. But let us be patient. I am very happy to know that my course has not conflicted with your judgment of propriety and policy. I can only say that I have acted upon my best convictions, without selfishness or malice, and that by the help of God I shall continue to do so. Please be assured of my highest respect and esteem. B. A. LINCOLN. THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MCCLELLAN. THE transfer of General McClellan's army from the Potomac, where it lay in front of the rebels at Manassas, was a movement of so much importance, and has given rise to so much controversy, that we append, for its further elucidation, a memorandum made by Major-General McDowell of the private discussions which preceded it. A copy of this memorandum was given by General McDowell, in the spring of 1864, to Mr. Raymond, and by him, some months afterwards, submitted to the President. The manuscript was returned by the latter, with the following indorsement:— I well remember the meetings herein narrated. See nothing for me to object to in the narrative as being made by General McDowell, except the phrase attributed to me "of the Jacobinism of Congress, " which phrase I do not remember using literally or in substance, and which I wish not to be published in any event. October 7, 1864. The following is the A. LINCOLN. MEMORANDUM OF GENERAL MCDOWELL. January 10, 1862.—At dinner at Arlington, Virginia. Received a note from the Assistant Secretary of War, saying the President wished to see me that evening at eight o'clock, if I could safely leave my post. Soon after, I received a note from Quartermaster-General Meigs, marked "Pri vate and confidential," saying the President wished to see me. Note herewith. Repaired to the President's house at eight o'clock P. M. Found the President alone. Was taken into the small room in the northeast corner. Soon after, we were joined by Brigadier-General Franklin, the Secretary of State, Governor Seward, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Assistant Secretary of War. The President was greatly disturbed at the state of affairs. Spoke of the exhausted condition of the Treasury; of the loss of public credit; of the Jacobinism in Congress; of the delicate condition of our foreign relations; of the bad news he had received from the West, particularly as contained in a letter from General Halleck on the state of affairs in Missouri; of the want of co-operation between General Halleck and General Buell; but, more than all, the sickness of General McClellan. The President said he was in great distress, and, as he had been to General McClellan's house, and the General did not ask to see him, and as he must talk to somebody, he had sent for General Franklin and myself, to obtain our opinion as to the possibility of soon commencing active operations with the Army of the Potomac. To use his own expression, if something was not soon done, the bottom would be out of the whole affair; and, if General McClellan did not want to use the army, he would like to "borrow it," provided he could see how it could be made to do something. The Secretary of State stated the substance of some information he considered reliable, as to the strength of the forces on the other side, which he had obtained from an Englishman from Fortress Monroe, Richmond, Manassas, and Centreville, which was to the effect that the enemy had twenty thousand men under Huger at Norfolk, thirty thousand at Centreville, and, in all, in our front an effective force, capable of being brought up at short notice, of about one hundred and three thousand men-men not suffering, but well shod, clothed, and fed. In answer to the question from the President, what could soon be done with the army, I replied that the question as to the when must be preceded by the one as to the how and the where. That, substantially, I would organize the army into four army corps, placing the five divisions on the Washington side on the right bank. Place three of these corps to the front, the right at Vienna or its vicinity, the left beyond Fairfax Station, the centre beyond Fairfax Court-House, and connect the latter place with the Orange and Alexandria Railroad by a railroad now partially thrown up. This would enable us to supply these corps without the use of horses, except to distribute what was brought up by rail, and to act upon the enemy without reference to the bad state of country roads. The railroads all lead to the enemy's position. By acting upon them in force, besieging his strongholds, if necessary, or getting between them, if possible, or making the attempt to do so, and pressing his left, I thought we should, in the first place, cause him to bring up all his forces, and mass them on the flank mostly pressed-the left-and, possibly, I thought probably, we should again get them out of their works, and bring on a general engagement on favorable terms to us, at all events keeping him fully occupied and harassed. The fourth corps, in connection with a force of heavy guns afloat, would operate on his right flank, beyond tho Occoquan, get behind the batteries on the Potomac, take Aquia, which, being supported by the Third Corps over the Occoquan, it could safely attempt, and then move on the railroad from Manassas to the Rappahannock. Having a large cavalry force to destroy bridges, I thought by the use of one hundred and thirty thousand men thus employed, and the |