toward Richmond, and there Franklin was to intercept him. But there was an important element in the problem which neither General Burnside nor any man in his army knew or suspected. Near the foot of Marye's Hill, where the Confederate army awaited attack, there was an old sunken road skirting the base of the hill, with a stone wall on its outer side. There could not be a more perfect intrenchment; and the road was so filled with Confederate soldiers that every man at the wall had three or four behind him to load muskets and hand them to him as rapidly as he could fire them.

Sumner's attack against this impregnable hill was made with the divisions of Hancock and French. They were deployed in columns and passed through the town under the fire of the Confederate batteries. And when they rushed across the open ground between the town and the hill, still subject to fire from the batteries, they met a continuous sheet of flame and lead from the sunken road. No troops that ever charged could stand it; and when nearly half of French's men were struck down, the others fell back. Hancock's men, five thousand strong, charged as boldly, and some of them got within twenty yards of the wall; but within fifteen minutes two thousand of them were down, and the remainder fell back. The costly and useless attempt was made by three other divisions, and then all remained in a position where they could not be reached by the musketry, but were still within range of the artillery.

Burnside now became frantic, appeared to lose his head, and ordered Hooker to attack. With three divisions Hooker made a reconnoissance and then returned and advised Burnside to give up the useless attempt. But the General insisted, and Hooker's four thousand, with fixed bayonets, rushed forward to

the sacrifice. They soon returned, like the others, leaving seventeen hundred of their number on the field.

Meanwhile, on the left, where Franklin commanded, and where there was a possibility of reaching the enemy, Meade's division was chosen to lead the attack. They moved forward, preceded by a heavy line of skirmishers, while their batteries, firing over their heads, shelled the Confederate position. They crossed the railroad under a heavy fire, passed into a gap between two divisions of the Confederate line, doubled back the flanks of both, and took many prisoners and a few battle-flags. Then they marched up the heights and met the enemy's second line. This was too strong for them and by firing on their flanks drove them back. Gibbon and Doubleday had followed with their divisions; and when all were returning somewhat broken and confused, Birney's division went forward and stopped pursuit by the enemy.

Burnside intended to make another attempt at the heights the next day, leading in person the Ninth Corps (his old command). But General Sumner persuaded him to give up the plan. In the night of the 15th, in a heavy storm, the army withdrew to the north side of the river.

The entire National loss in this battle was 12,353; but some of the missing afterward rejoined their commands. Hancock's division lost 156 officers, and one of his regiments lost two thirds of its number. The Confederate loss was 5309. The gain-so far as there was any gain in the sorrowful campaign—lay in the demonstration of the perfect discipline and unfailing courage of the Army of the Potomac, with the inference that it could hardly fail to accomplish its mission when it should have a competent commander.

GE

The Battle of Chancellorsville

May 1-3, 1863

ENERAL JOSEPH HOOKER, who had commanded one of the grand divisions of the Army of the Potomac, succeeded General Burnside as commander of that army, January 25, 1863. He was a graduate of West Point, had seen service in Mexico and in Florida, as well as in the Civil War, was notable for the energy he had displayed in subordinate stations, and was called by the soldiers "fighting Joe Hooker." On giving him this high promotion, President Lincoln wrote him a remarkable letter. He said:

mac.

I have placed you at the head of the Army of the PotoOf course I have done this upon what appear to me sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable if not indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during General Burnside's command of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honourable brother