NO VIMU

The Campaign on the Peninsula

April-June, 1862

FTER the disastrous battle of Bull Run, the Presi

dent and the people looked for some one to bring order out of the military chaos at Washington and construct an army that could be used effectively against the enemies of the Republic. General George B. McClellan, a graduate of West Point, who had served in the war with Mexico, had been sent to study the military operations in the Crimea, had been successful in several small battles in West Virginia, and who stood high in the opinion of General Scott, was naturally the man to be chosen for the task. On July 27th he was placed in command of the Army of the Potomac, and on November Ist, when General Scott retired, he was made General-in-Chief, commanding all the armies. He planned to have all act in concert, so far as possible, and issued instructions to General Buell of the Department of the Ohio, to General Halleck of the Department of Missouri, to General Thomas W. Sherman at Port Royal, and to General Butler at New Orleans.

For himself he assumed the immediate command of the troops in and about Washington-not many more than fifty thousand at that time-and proceeded to organize and train an efficient army. The first thing to do was to provide for the safety of the capital; the

next, to plan a campaign against the enemy. The army was increased rapidly by the arrival of new regiments, which were formed into brigades, encamped in the suburbs, drilled and disciplined. At the same time a general staff was appointed, and the organization was complete. The means appeared to be ample, the preparations perfect, and confident expectations were entertained of a successful and probably decisive movement against the Confederate capital and its defenders in the spring of 1862.

The autumn and winter had been spent in careful preparation, yet in February General McClellan reported to the President that he was not ready. He wished to leave a large force to defend Washington, place a strong corps of observation along the Potomac, and then move against Richmond with one hundred and fifty thousand men, believing that the Confederate force there numbered as many, though in truth it was not more than half as large. Mr. Lincoln, with all his wonderful patience, grew weary of the delay. In a consultation with Generals McDowell and Franklin and some members of the Cabinet, he declared that if something was not done soon the bottom would be out of the whole affair; and if General McClellan did not want to use the army, he would like to borrow it, provided he could see how it could be made to do something.

Several routes for the march were possible—one by way of Fredericksburg; one down the Potomac, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and thence across country about forty miles to Richmond; and still another from Fort Monroe up the peninsula between the James and York rivers, with base of supplies at West Point on the York. For a long time General

McClellan refused to disclose his plan, even to the President-if he really had any plan; but at last, in a letter, he set forth his ideas. He proposed to move his army down the Potomac on transports, land at or near Fort Monroe, and march up the peninsula to attack Richmond on the north and east sides. Mr. Lincoln did not approve this plan, principally because it would consume much time in preparation; but when he found that the highest officers of the army favoured it, he gave it his sanction-considering that any general would probably fail if sent to execute a plan that he disliked-and then addressed himself to the task of hastening the movement. Yet he himself retarded the opening of the campaign by delaying the order for collecting the means of transportation.

While this was in preparation General Johnston evacuated Manassas and Centreville and placed his army before Richmond.

Four hundred vessels were required for moving McClellan's army and its impedimenta. He had one hundred and twenty-one thousand men, with fourteen thousand animals and forty-four batteries, besides ambulances, pontoons, baggage-wagons, and telegraph apparatus. Just before the embarkation the army was divided into four corps, the command of which was given to Generals Irvin McDowell, Edwin V. Sumner, Samuel P. Heintzelman, and Erasmus D. Keyes.

Another element that entered into the general problem of the war at this time was the appointment, in January, of Edwin M. Stanton to succeed Simon Cameron as Secretary of War. Mr. Stanton, then fortyseven years of age, was a lawyer by profession, a man of great intellect, unfailing nerve, exhaustless energy, and devoted patriotism. He had some traits that made